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Abstract 
In 1933, an American entrepreneur offered the people of St. Lawrence, a small 
town on the south coast ofNewfoundland, the prospect of escaping rampant 
unemployment and meager public relief by starting a mine to extract the area's vast 
deposits of fluorspar, which is used in the manufacture of steel, aluminum, and various 
chemical products. Coming in the context of the Great Depression and the collapse of the 
fishing industry, the mining industry was eagerly embraced by residents of St. Lawrence 
and surrounding communities. Several mines were subsequently established, by both the 
original American company, the St. Lawrence Corporation ofNewfoundland, and later by 
the Aluminum Company of Canada (Alcan). The fragile prosperity that accompanied the 
industry from the 1930s until closure of the last Alcan mine in 1978, however, exacted a 
heavy price. Many St. Lawrence workers lost their lives to industrial diseases caused by 
dust and radiation in the mines. 
This thesis explores the history of industry, labour, and health and safety at the St. 
Lawrence mines. This study focuses on the struggle by workers and their union for 
recognition of workplace hazards, improved working conditions, and adequate 
compensation for industrial disease victims and their families. The thesis argues that, 
rather than being passive victims of an unavoidable tragedy, workers at St. Lawrence were 
aware of the adverse health impacts of their work from the very early years of mining, and 
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fought constantly over several decades to have their concerns addressed. Furthermore, 
the thesis argues that the disaster which ultimately unfolded at St. Lawrence was primarily 
the result of industry and government authorities ignoring or downplaying legitimate 
concerns and thereby shirking their moral and legal responsibilities. 
-m-
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Though heard less often as the last of the old miners die and the lyrics fade from 
memory, the "Miners' Alphabet" is still sometimes sung at kitchen parties in St. Lawrence, 
a small town on the south coast ofNewfoundland.1 Composed by a group oflocal men 
half a century ago, the song says much about the daily rhythms and hazards of a miner' s 
life, the hierarchies of the workplace, and the humor that sustains workers through trying 
circumstances. Perhaps the most poignant of the song's lyrics, however, are the words, 
"Give a miner good pay and there' s nothing goes wrong." These words speak to the 
tension underlying the relationship between the worker and his employer: the miner 
depends on his wages just as the employer depends on the cooperation of the miner, and 
this relationship hinges on the threat of resistance should the employer renege on his end 
ofthe bargain. Set against the backdrop ofthe history of the St. Lawrence mines, these 
words are also tinged with a dark irony that is palpable whenever they are sung. In St. 
Lawrence, much has gone wrong. 
In 1933, an American entrepreneur offered the people of the community an 
opportunity to escape the poverty and degradation of unemployment and public relief by 
mining and exporting the vast quantities of fluorspar buried in the barren hills around the 
town. 2 The fragile prosperity that accompanied the mining industry during the subsequent 
1 See map, Appendix A. 
2Fluorspar is used in the manufacture of stee~ aluminum and various chemical 
products. 
decades exacted a heavy toll. Scores of men from St. Lawrence and surrounding 
conununities have lost their lives to industrial diseases associated with the mines. In many 
cases they left financially destitute widows and children with little support from the state 
and none from the mining companies. Though there is little left of the mines but a 
network of gravel roads connecting patches of rusty steel, the town still bears reminders of 
its grim past. Atop the Memorial Miners' Museum sits a giant miner' s hat, whose light 
shines into a nearby cemetery, which is replete with the headstones of dead miners, many 
of them in their fifties, forties, and even their thirties. 
In both popular discourse and official accounts, the St. Lawrence tragedy is 
shrouded in controversy and misconception. It is often portrayed as the result of an 
unfortunate convergence of unforeseen forces, and its victims as unwitting and passive. 
This thesis aims to challenge that view by examining the history of mining, labour, and 
occupational health and safety in St. Lawrence from 1933 to 1978. This thesis argues that 
miners at St. Lawrence were aware even in the industry's formative years that conditions 
at the mines were hazardous to their health, and tried repeatedly over several decades to 
have workplace hazards recognized and addressed. The thesis demonstrates that any 
improvements made in working conditions and protective legislation came about not as a 
result of concern on the part of industry and government authorities, but as a response to a 
persistent struggle on the part of workers, their union, and others in the conununity, 
including miners' wives. By analysing the St. Lawrence case as a history of struggle, 
resistance, neglect, and exploitation, the thesis contends that the tragedy which unfolded 
2 
at St. Lawrence was neither unpredictable nor unpreventable. Rather, it was the result of 
industry and government ignoring and downplaying workers' concerns and thereby 
shirking their legal and moral responsibilities. 
1.1 Literature Review 
This thesis builds upon and contributes to several themes within the historiography 
of both Newfoundland and Canada. In the Newfoundland context, it represents the first 
long-term, detailed study of the union movement in the context of the mining industry. 
Despite the fact that mining has long been a feature of the Newfoundland economy and 
miners' unions have been at times the most organized and militant in the province, this 
topic has received little attention apart from some popular or folkloric treatments. 3 As 
such, this thesis contributes to the emerging historiography of the Newfoundland labour 
movement and sheds light upon a little known aspect of that history.4 
30n Bell Island, see Gail Weir, The Miners ofWabana (St. John's: Breakwater, 1989), 
which grew out ofher MA research. On Buchans, see Derek Yetman, Riches of the 
Earth: The Story of Buchans (St. Johns: Tenax, 1986); and Red Indian Lake Development 
Association, Khaki Dodgers: The History of Mining and the People of the Buchans Area 
(Grand Falls: The Association, 1992). While as yet unpublished, Peter Narvaez' s "The 
Protest Songs of a Labor Union on Strike Against an American Corporation in a 
Newfoundland Company Town: A Folkloric Analysis with Special Reference to Oral Folk 
History," PhD thesis, Indiana University, 1986, is also worth noting. 
4Newfoundland labour history emerged as a distinct area of inquiry relatively recently, 
during the 1980s, which is attributable in part to the fact that in 1980, the journal 
Labour!Le Travail moved, with its founding editor, Gregory S. Kealey, to Memorial 
University. This had an important impact upon, among other things, research within the 
graduate program. The first general survey dealing specifically with the Newfoundland 
3 
This thesis therefore represents both a continuation of the ongoing effort to uncover the 
history ofNewfoundland workers and their struggles, and the first long-term study of the 
union movement within the Newfoundland mining industry. 
Because it focuses on occupational hazards and industrial disease, this thesis also 
contributes to our understanding of the history of occupational health and safety policy in 
labour movement was published in 1986. William Gillespie's A Class Act: An fllustrated 
History of the Newfoundland Labour Movement (St. John's: Creative, 1986) is a useful 
summary of the major trends and events in the Newfoundland labour movement since the 
early 19th century. It should be noted that while Gillespie's was the first such published 
account, much of the same historical ground had already been covered by Rolf 
Hattenhauer in an unpublished manuscript, a condensed version of which appeared as "A 
Brief Labour History ofNewfoundland," prepared for the Royal Commission on Labour 
Legislation in Newfoundland and Labrador, 1970. Important subsequent works include 
Briton Cooper Busch, "The Newfoundland Sealers' Strike of 1902," Labour/Le Travail 
14 (Fall1984), 73-101; Ian D.H. McDonald, "To Each his Own": William Coaker and 
the Fishermen's Protective Union in Newfoundland Politics, 1908-1925, J.K.. Hiller, ed. 
(St. John's: ISER, 1987) and Gordon Inglis, More Than Just a Union: The Story of the 
NFFAWU (St. John's: Jesperson Press, 1985). A significant event in the evolution of 
Newfoundland labour history as a sub-discipline was the 1990 publication of a Special 
Issue of Labour/Le Travail devoted to the subject. Articles in that issue included Linda 
Little, "Collective Action in Outport Newfoundland: A Case Study From the 1830's," 
Labour/Le Travai/26 (Fa111990), 7-35; Jessie Chisholm, Organizing on the Waterfront: 
The St. John's Longshoremen's Protective Union, 1890-1914," 37-59; Peter Mcinnis, 
"All Solid Along the Line: The Reid Newfoundland Strike of 1918," 61-84; Dufferin 
Sutherland, ''Newfoundland Loggers Respond to the Great Depression," 83-115; and 
Sean Cadigan, "Battle Harbour in Transition: Merchants, Fishermen and the State in the 
Struggle for Relief in a Labrador Community in the 1930s," 125-50. See also, Dufferin 
Sutherland, ''Newfoundland Loggers Respond to the Great Depression," Labour/Le 
Travai/29 (Spring 1992), 81-116; Sutherland, "A Social History ofPulpwood Logging in 
Newfoundland During the Great Depression," MA thesis, Memorial University of 
Newfoundland, 1988; Sutherland, "'We are only Loggers': Loggers and the Struggle for 
Development in Newfoundland, 1929-1959," PhD thesis, Simon Fraser University, 1995; 
and Ingrid Botting, "'Getting a Grand Falls job': Labour Markets, Migration, and 
Women's Paid Domestic Work in the Pulp and Paper Mill Town of Grand Falls, 
Newfoundland, 1905-1939," PhD thesis, Memorial University ofNewfoundland, 2000. 
4 
Newfoundland and the role workers have played in that history. While there have been a 
number of studies on contemporary occupational health and safety issues in various 
industries, there has been little historical analysis of the issue in the Newfoundland 
context.5 This thesis therefore represents the first long-term analysis of this neglected area 
of Newfoundland history and the first attempt to combine an emphasis on heath and safety 
with that on the labour movement. 
Just as labour within the mining industry has received scant attention in the 
Newfoundland context, it also has not figured prominently in the broader Canadian 
context, despite the fact that the Canadian mining industry has long been the site of 
50ne important exception is Fred Winsor, "The Newfoundland bank fishery: 
government policies and the struggle to improve bank fishing crews' working, health, and 
safety conditions, 1876-1920, "PhD thesis, Memorial University ofNewfoundland, 1996. 
Contemporary studies include Mark Shrimpton and Keith Storey, Work-related Stress in 
the Nelifoundland Offshore Oil industry: Implications for Health and Safety (St. John' s: 
ISER, 1991); Shrimpton and Storey, Workers in Remote Areas: The Petroleum, Mining 
and Forestry Industries (Geneva: Occupational Health and Safety Branch of the 
International Labour Office, 1995); Shrimpton and Storey, eds. Social, Psychological and 
Cultural Aspects of Health and Safety in the Offshore Oil Industry (St. John's: ISER, 
1993); J.D. House, But Who Cares Now?: The Tragedy of the Ocean Ranger (St. John's: 
Breakwater, 1987); Barbara Neis, "Can't get my breath," in Invisible: Issues in Women 's 
Occupational Health (Charlottetown: Gynergy, 1995); and Susan Williams and Barbara 
Neis. Occupational Health in Nelifoundland 's Deepsea Fishing Industry: Stress and 
·Repetitive Strain Injuries Among Plantworkers; Accidents on Board Trawlers, Final 
Report (St. John's: ISER, 1990). The only work to explore the health impacts of mining in 
Newfoundland is Elliot Leyton's Dying Hard: The Ravages of Industrial Carnage 
(Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1975). Based on interviews with former miners and 
widows in St. Lawrence, Dying Hard was, by Leyton' s own account, a work of social 
advocacy rather than of academic analysis and contained little discussion of the way in 
which workers and others had fought for improved working conditions over the years, or 
of the specific role which government and industry played in the St. Lawrence case. 
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frequent and militant labour unrest. 6 There are important exceptions to this general lack 
of attention. A collection of articles dealing with the famous 1949 strike at the asbestos 
mine and mill in Asbestos, Quebec, edited by Pierre Trudeau and first published in 1956, 
was one of the earliest attempts to analyze the many facets of a miners' strike in Canada, 
including its political, economic, religious and public relations aspects. 7 Unionism, labour 
radicalism, and occupational health and safety among coal miners, especially in Nova 
Scotia, have received a lot of attention. 8 The history and activities of international 
6 According to figures provided in Gregory S. Kealey and Douglas Cruikshank, during 
the first half of the 20th century there were more strikes in mining than in any other 
industry sector, per total number of workers, and strikes in the mining industry involved 
more workers and were almost invariably longer in duration than strikes in other sectors: 
"Strikes in Canada, 1891-1950," in Gregory S. Kealey, Workers and Canadian History 
(Montreal and Kingston: MeGill-Queen's University Press, 1995), 402. 
7Pierre Elliott Trudeau, The Asbestos Strike, translated by James Boake (Toronto: 
James Lewis and Samuel, 1974). First published in 1956 as La Greve de 1' amiante. 
8These include: Don McGillivray, "Military Aid to the Civil Power: The Cape Breton 
Experience in the 1920s,~~ Acadiensis, III, 2 (Spring 1974), 45-64; Paul MacEwan, Miners 
and Steelworkers: Labour in Cape Breton (Toronto: Samuel Stevens Hakkert, 1976); 
David Frank, "Class Conflict in the Coal Industry Cape Breton 1922," in Gregory S. 
Kealey and Peter Warrian, eds., Essays in Canadian Working Class History (Toronto: 
Mcelland and Stewart, 1976),161-84; Ian McKay, "The Provincial Workmen' s 
Association," in W.J.C. Cherwinski and G.S. Kealey, eds., Lectures in Canadian Labour 
and Working-Class History (St. John's: CCLH, 1985), 127-34; Ian Mckay, "The Realm of 
Uncertainty: The Experience ofWork in the Cumberland Coal Mines, 1873-1927," 
Acadiensis, XVI, 1 (Autumn 1986), 3-57; Michael Earle, " 'Down with Hitler and Silby 
Barrett' : The Cape Breton Miners' Slowdown Strike of 1941 ," Acadiensis, XVIII, 1 
(Autumn 1988), 3-26; Ron Crawley, "Offto Sydney: Newfoundlanders Emigrate to 
Industrial Cape Breton, 1890-1914," Acadiensis, XVII, 2 (Spring 1988), 27-51 ; Michael 
Earle, "The Coalminers and their 'Red' Union: The Amalgamated Mine Workers ofNova 
Scotia, 1932-1936," Labour/ Le Travail, 22 (Falll988), 99-137; Michael Earle and H. 
Grunberg, "The United Mineworkers and the Coming of the CCF to Cape Breton," 
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organizations in Canada, such as the Western Federation of Miners and the International 
Union ofMine, Mill and Smelter Workers, have also been the subject ofstudy.9 Laurel 
Sefton MacDowell's analysis of the 1941-42 Kirkland Lake miners' s strike is a useful case 
study on the impact ofwar upon the industrial relations regime in Canada.10 Apart from 
these works and brief coverage in surveys or in histories of particular mining industries . 
and communities, the consideration given to labour within the mining industry has been 
minimal considering its long and active history. 
In addition to being the site of frequent labour unrest, the mining industry has long 
been recognized as among the most dangerous in the world, a distinction it has held since 
its ancient origins and which has drawn comment and criticism from many observers down 
Acadiensis XIX, 1 (Autumn 1989) 56-90; David Frank, JB. McLachlan: An 
Autobiography (Toronto: Lorimer, 1999); David Frank "Class Conflict in the Coal 
Industry, Cape Breton, 1922," in Gregory S. Kealey and Peter Warrian, eds., Essays in 
Canadian Working Class History (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1976), 161-84"; and 
David Frank, "Industrial Democracy and Industrial Legality: The UMW A in Nova Scotia, 
1908-1927," inJohnH.M. Laslett, ed., The United Mine Workers of America: A Model of 
Industrial Solidarity? (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996), 438-55. 
9Mike Solski and John Smaller, Mine Mill: The History of the International Union of 
Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers in Canada Since 1895 (Ottawa: Steel Rail, 1984) is a 
popular history but contains much useful information. Hard Lessons: The Mine Mill 
Union and the Canadian Labour Movement, Mercedes Stedman, Peter Suschnigg and 
Dieter K. Buse, eds. (Toronto: Dundum Press, 1995) is a collection of articles on a variety 
of topics and events associated with the Mine-Mill. On labour radicalism in British 
Columbia and Alberta, see, Allen Seager, "Socialists and Workers: The Western Canadian 
Coal Miners, 1900-21," Labour/Le Travail, 16 (Fa111985), 23-59. 
10Laurel Sefton MacDowell, "Remember Kirkland Lake ": The History and Effects of 
the Kirkland Lake Gold Miners' Strike, 1941-42 (Toronto: University ofToronto Press, 
1983). 
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through the ages. 11 The relationship between labour unrest and occupational hazards 
within the mining industry has seldom been explored in detail. 12 One influential study has 
suggested that one of the reasons for this is that occupational health and safety struggles 
are often fought not in the formal arena of contract negotiations and authorized strikes, 
but through more informal channels - in everyday relations between workers and their 
supervisors or fellow workers, and through unofficial and unauthorized job actions such 
as wildcat strikes or other forms ofprotest. 13 The authors ofthis study also argued that 
usee, for example, George Rosen, The History of Mining Diseases: A Medical and 
Social Interpretation (New York: Schuman' s, 1943), which documents mining hazards 
from Neolithic times to the end of the 19th century. Georgius Agricola' s landmark work 
De Re Metallica, :first published in 1556, contains a discussion of the various dangers to 
which miners at that time were exposed and the methods devised to deal with them. See 
the Herbert Clark Hoover translation (New York: Dover, 1950), especially 200-18. 
Bernardino Ramazzini's A Treatise of the Diseases ofTradesmen (London 1746) was also 
an important work in documenting the hazards of the mining industry. Through the 
1980s, the fatality rate in the mining industry was over seven times the average for all 
industries: Labour Canada, Employment Injuries and Occupational illnesses, 1985-87 
(Ministry of Supply and Services,l990), Table 6. 
12For brief references to important developments in the pre-1970s literature, see Harold 
Logan, Trade Unions in Canada: Their Development and Functioning (Toronto: 
MacMillan, 1948), 69, 166. It mentions attempts by the Trades and Labour Congress and 
the Nova Scotia Provincial Workmen' s Association to reform in occupational health and 
safety in Canadian mines during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. See also Charles 
Lipton, The Trade Union Movement of Canada, 1827-1959 (Montreal: Canadian Social 
Publications, 1967), 58-75, 323-5, for references to union demands for health and safety 
improvements in British Columbia's mines in the 1930s and Quebec' s asbestos mines in 
the 1940s. 
13Charles E. Reasons, Lois L. Ross, and Craig Patterson, Assault on the Worker: 
Occupational Health and Safety in Canada {Toronto: Butterworths, 1981), 239-42. To 
illustrate, the authors point out that of 46 disputes over occupational health and safety 
issues in British Columbia froml973 to 79, nearly all were very short in duration and were 
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while health and safety concerns may not be the official, explicit issues at stake in job 
actions, they can often be an underlying cause of labour unrest. The result, they 
concluded, is that a lot of labour unrest which results from occupational health and safety 
issue is not reported as such or is not reported at all, making it a difficult area for historical 
inquiry.l4 
This thesis seeks to overcome some of the common difficulties in researching the 
relationship between labour unrest and health and safety by going beyond the standard 
historical sources, such as official strike reports, and delving into the details of the daily 
relations between workers, management, and government, thereby revealing the effects of 
health and safety concerns on the general labour relations climate and on specific labour 
disputes. 
In addition to the difficulty created by the marginalization of health and safety 
issues within standard labour history sources, there is also the problem of actually 
identifying occupational illnesses. This points to an important distinction between job-
related injuries and illnesses. As one Canadian researcher put it in reference to the 
available data from the 1960s and 1970s, 
staged during the term of a collective agreement. 
14Reasons, Ross, and Patterson, Assault on the Worker, 236-9. Richard Hyman, in his 
sociological analysis of strikes in Great Britain, makes a similar point in a more general 
way, pointing out that in Great Britain, the United States, and France many work 
stoppages have gone unrecorded because they were ''unofficial" in one way or another -
brief: wildcat strikes or strikes unauthorized by the union executive, and staged while a 
collective agreement was in place: Strikes (London: Fontana, 1972), 42-3. 
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Unfortunately, our knowledge about industrial disease, its measurement 
and prevention, is very limited. The statistics on industrial diseases have not 
been assembled in a fashion to permit analysis. Accidents and fatalities can 
be counted; industrial exposure to noise, fumes, heat, cold and chemicals 
may result in illness at a later date, or illness which may not be attributed to 
the work exposure either because of multiple causation or because of 
individual or medical ignorance.15 
Because injuries are more easily identifiable and quantifiable than are illnesses, 
much historical research has tended to focus on the former. Furthermore, workplace 
accidents causing multiple injuries or fatalities tend to be .dramatic in nature and to 
therefore attract more media and public attention. As one historian studying occupational 
hazards in Ontario mines has pointed out, when workers are killed slowly, one at a time, 
as they are by industrial disease, it tends to provoke little public interest or outrage. 16 
Given these factors, it is not surprising that much research on occupational health and 
safety in the Canadian mining industry has focused on workplace accidents as opposed to 
the more surreptitious causes of disablement and death. 17 While workplace injuries and 
15G.B. Reschenthaler, Occupational Health and Safety in Canada: The Economics and 
Three Case Studies (Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1979), 2. See also 
Harry J. Glasbeek and Susan Rowland, "Are Injuring and Killing at Work Crimes?'' 
Osgoode Hall Law Journal, 17 (December 1979), 509; and Terence Ison, The 
Dimensions of Industrial Disease, Research and Current Issues Series, N. 35 (Kingston: 
Industrial Relations Centre, Queen' s University, 1978), 2. 
16Doug Baldwin, "A Study in Social Control: The Life of the Silver Miner in Northern 
Ontario," Labour/Le Travailleur, 2 (1977), 94. 
17Examples of the former include: David Jay Bercuson, "Tragedy at Bellevue: Anatomy 
of a Mine Disaster," Labour/Le Travailleur, 3 (1978), 221-32; Ian McKay, "Springhill 
1958," New Maritimes, 2 (December 1983/January 1984), 4-16; Bryan D. Palmer and 
Robert Lunn, "The Big Sleep: The Malartic Mine Fire of 1947," Labour Le Travail, 39 
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fatalities caused by accidents are discussed in this thesis, the focus is on industrial diseases. 
The thesis therefore adds to our understanding of a topic that has received little attention, 
from a historical perspective, even in the occupational health and safety literature. It also 
explores the relationship between industrial accidents and industrial diseases, showing, for 
example, how the two are portrayed for public relations reasons. 
While factors such as those discussed above may have inhibited research in these 
areas, industrial diseases and workers' occupational health and struggles within the mining 
industry have drawn some attention from historians over the years. The 1970s was a time 
of heightened interest in such issues in Canada, for a number of reasons. Occupational 
hazards associated with such industries as copper, asbestos and uranium mining were 
generating intense public scrutiny and criticism during this time. As one commentator 
noted in the late 1970s, "There has been rarely a week in the past two or three years when 
some major Canadian newspaper did not contain at least one story related to occupational 
health. " 18 From 1969 to 1976, four major studies on occupational health and safety in 
Canada, three of them dealing with the mining industry, were released.19 There was also 
(Spring 1997), 225-40; and Christopher McCormick, ed., The Westray Chronicles: A 
Case Study in Corporate Crime (Fernwood: Halifax, 1992). 
18Robert Paehlke, "Occupational Health Policy in Canada," in William Leiss, ed., 
Ecology versus Politics in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979), 97-98. 
19These three were: the Royal Commission on Radiation, Compensation and Safety at 
the Fluorspar Mines, St. Lawrence, Newfoundland (Newfoundland 1969), the Royal 
Commission on the Health and Safety ofWorkers in the Mines of Ontario (Ontario 1976), 
and the Comite d ' etude sur Ia salubrite dans I ' industrie de l'aminante (Quebec 1976). 
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some concern during the 1970s that despite apparent legislative progress throughout the 
20th century, mining continued to lead all industries in work-related fatalities.20 Increased 
concern about the environmental impacts of industrial contaminants, as well as increased 
education levels among industrial workers, have also been credited with raising awareness 
about occupational hazards around this time.21 
Coinciding with these historical factors was shift taking place in the study of 
Canadian history, characterized by an increased emphasis on the labour movement and the 
working class. The convergence of these trends gave rise to increased attention to the 
history of workers' occupational health and safety struggles dating back to the late 19th 
Similar developments were taking place in other countries. In the United States, major 
changes to occupational health and safety legislation were introduced through the federal 
Mine Safety and Health Act of 1969 and the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 
generating a lot of public and academic debate, while in Great Britain, the Robens 
Committee on Safety and Health at Work released its report in 1972. 
2oaeschenthaler, Occupational Health and Safety in Canada, 2. According to Labour 
Canada figures, the mining industry had an average fatality rate of 121 per 100,000 
workers from 1969 to 1978. Government ofCanada, Department ofLabour, 
Occupational Health and Safety Branch, Fatalities in Canadian Industry, 1969-1978. 
21N. Ashford, Crisis in the Workplace: Occupational Diseases and Injury (Cambridge: 
MIT Press, 1976), 3-4. For a brief discussion of how these developments influenced the 
study of occupational health and safety in Canada, see Reschenthaler, Occupational 
Health and Safety in Canada, 1-3. This increased attention was reflected in the 
publication ofG.W. Gibbs and P. Pintus, Health and Safety in the Canadian Mining 
Industry (Kingston: Queen's University Centre for Resource Studies, 1978), the first 
comprehensive survey of the various health and safety hazards associated with the mining 
industry in Canada, including asbestosis, cancer, and silicosis. 
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and early 20th century. 22 
Since the 1970s, however, occupational health and safety have declined in 
prominence as a theme within the Canadian literature. 23 Some important contributions 
22 A 1974 collection by Irving Abella contained accounts of several labour disputes in 
which occupational hazards were a major consideration, including S.D. Hanson's account 
of a bitter and violent strike at Estevan, Saskatchewan in 1931: "Estevan 1931 ,"in Irving 
Abella, ed., On Strike: Six Key Labour Struggles in Canada, 1919-1949 (Toronto: James 
and Lewis, 1974), 33-78. The Estevan strike and accompanying riot prompted a Royal 
Commission on wages and working conditions there, the report of which can be found in 
the Labour Gazette, XXXII (1932), 262-70. See also Jack Scott, Sweat and Struggle: 
Working Class Struggles in Canada, Volume 1, 1789-1899 (Vancouver: New Star, 
1974), 149-84, which descnbed occupational health and safety struggles among British 
Columbia coal miners during the 1850s, and Stuart Jamieson, Times of Trouble: Labour 
Unrest and Industrial Conflict in Canada, 1900-66 (Ottawa: Task Force on Labour 
Relations, 1968), 163, which described how nearly 1,200 British Columbia coal miners 
staged a month-long strike in 1918 to demand improved ventilation in the mines. The 
inaugural issue of Labour!Le Travail (published in 1976) contained a piece by Stanley 
Scott exploring the role of occupational hazards in labour unrest in the copper mining and 
smelting industry in Cominco, B.C., during the First World War, as well as an account by 
Doug Baldwin of working conditions and workers' struggles in the mines of northern 
Ontario during the early 20th century. Stanley Scott, "A Profusion oflssues: Immigrant 
Labour, the World War, and the Cominco Strike of 1917," Labour/Le Travailleur, 2 
(1977) 54-78; and Doug Baldwin, "A Study in Social Control: The Life of the Silver 
Miner in Northern Ontario." 
23Wallace Clement's Hard Rock Mining: Industrial Relations and Technological 
Changes at !NCO (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1981), while it focused on work 
processes and industrial relations, also examined the effects of technology, workers' 
compensation regimes, the collective bargaining process, and other factors upon 
occupational health and safety issues. Jeremy Mouat's, Roaring Days: Ross/and's Mines 
and the History of British Columbia (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 
1995), touches upon health and safety issues, but does not explore them in any detail. 
Mouat states, for instance, that the miners of Rossland had ''their own reasons" for 
forming a union and affiliating with the Western Federation ofMiners in 1895, including 
"certain expectations regarding working conditions," 69, but does not explore whether or 
how the union acted upon those expectations. 
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have been made, however, by non-historians, such as those in the fields oflaw and 
journalism. 24 Two key works by non-historians that have informed this thesis are Lloyd 
Tataryn's Dying for a Living, and Assault on the Worker, which was coauthored by 
Charles Reasons, Lois Ross, and Craig Patterson. 25 Tataryn, a journalist, took several 
case studies from the Canadian mining industry to support an indictment of how 
governments and corporations have turned a blind eye to the known health impacts of 
industry in Canada. His analysis also included the important roles which such factors as 
media coverage and economic dependence play in this process. Assault on the Worker 
touched upon a wide range of historical and contemporary topics, including employers' 
strategies for divesting themselves of responsibility and the occupational hazards of 
24See, for example, Harry J. Glasbeek and Susan Rowland, "Are Injuring and Killing at 
Work Crimes?'' Osgoode Hall Law Journal, 17 (December 1979), 506-594; Robert Sass, 
"The Underdevelopment of Occupational Health and Safety in Canada," in William Leiss, 
ed., Ecology versus Politics in Canada (Toronto: University ofToronto Press, 1979), 72-
96; and Doug Smith, Consulted to Death: How Canada 's Workplace Health and Safety 
System Fails Workers (Winnipeg: Arbeiter Ring Publishing, 2000), 36-43, 147. A work 
which combined an attention to historical detail with a legal perspective was Eric Tucker's 
Administering Danger in the Workplace: The Law and Politics of Occupational Health 
and Safety Regulation in Ontario (Toronto: University ofToronto Press, 1990). While 
not dealing specifically with mining, Tucker's was the first full-length study devoted to the 
history of occupational health and safety in a Canadian setting. It explored the issue from 
a variety of perspectives, including the impact of industrial hazards, workers' struggles for 
improvements, and the political and economic forces which shaped occupational health 
and safety policy during the period in question. 
25Lloyd Tataryn, Dyingfor a Living: Occupational Health and Safety in Canada 
(Deneau and Greenburg, 1979), Charles E. Reasons, Lois L. Ross, and Craig Patterson, 
Assault on the Worker: Occupational Health and Safety in Canada (Toronto: 
Butterworth's, 1980). 
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various industries, including mining, forestry, and fanning. 
This thesis aims to integrate the thematic concerns of conventional labour history, 
such as union formation and the collective bargaining process, with other perspectives not 
often found in the traditional approach, such as legislative regimes and the role of the 
media. In doing so, it aims not only to shed light on the St Lawrence case itself and on a 
neglected area of the history of both Newfoundland and Canada, but also to offer an 
innovative approach to understanding the history of occupational health and safety and the 
relationship among workers, employers, and the state within that history. 
1.2 Methodology. Scope. Sources and Organization 
While labour relations and health and safety are the central concerns of this thesis, 
such issues as industry developments and govennnent policy are also important 
considerations. These are treated as interrelated elements, influencing and shaping each 
other as the saga unfolds. Fluctuations within the mining industry, for example, are 
analyzed in light of their effect on the labour relations climate and on attitudes toward 
occupational health and safety, just as labour relations and govennnent policy are viewed 
as influencing each other. 
Nor is occupational health and safety the only issue given consideration within the 
labour relations context. Union formation, shifting union priorities, contract issues, 
affiliation versus independence, and other industrial relations concerns are also addressed. 
The thesis also sets labour relations in St. Lawrence within the wider context of major 
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developments in Newfoundland and in Canada. Including these elements helps to outline 
the various phases through which the union and the labour relations regime in St. 
Lawrence passed, and to establish the context for the discussion of specific collective 
bargaining issues. 
Viewing health and safety concerns within a wider labour relations context also 
helps illustrate how health and safety is treated as a labour relations issue. It highlights, 
for example, how the union attempted at various times to make health and safety a central 
concern within the collective bargaining process, and how that issue was marginalized or 
downplayed by employers and policymak:ers. Occupational health and safety is thus 
viewed as part of a broader history of struggle and conflict. This perspective also 
illuminates the way in which labour disputes that were ostensibly about such issues as 
wages or hours were in fact informed and motivated by long-standing grievances over 
working conditions and industrial disease. Viewed in this way, the analysis presented in 
this thesis has wider implications, beyond the specific case of St. Lawrence, for our 
understanding of occupational health and safety as a labour relations issue. 
Though the first StLawrence mine was established in 1933, the historical account 
offered here begins before that, with a surmnary of major developments in industry, 
labour, and occupational health and safety in Newfoundland mining and a brief history of 
the community of St. Lawrence up to the 1930s. This provides the historical context for 
the issues under consideration. Though the impacts of the mining industry, such as the 
health, social, and economic impacts did not cease to be felt with industry closure in 1978, 
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that is a logical cut-off date for the thesis, as the union, which is central to the analysis, 
ceased to function at that point. However, a brief account of major developments in the 
community from 1978 to the present is included. 
While this thesis encompasses a variety of themes, some of these figure more 
prominently and are dealt with in more detail than are others. While it addresses major 
industry developments, especially in light of their effect on labour relations and health and 
safety, the thesis is not a business history. Likewise, while the nature of ore bodies and 
work processes are discussed when relevant to the main issues under consideration, they 
are not analyzed in a detailed, technical fashion. Similarly, the medical and pathological 
dimensions of various occupational illnesses are described in basic terms, but a detailed 
description is outside the scope of the thesis and the expertise of the author. 
While the thesis considers the relationship between mining and other economic 
activities (such as the fishery), fluctuations in population, involvement by the non-mining 
population in industry-related protests, periodic intervention by the clergy, and other 
developments at the community level, the community itself is not central to the thesis. A 
community study of St. Lawrence, one examining these issues in more detail, and 
including such considerations as gender relations, social hierarchies, leisure activities, 
housing, religion, and education would be a valuable contribution to our understanding of 
the interactions among industry, labour, health and safety, and community. Within the 
limitations of this thesis, however, and considering the diverse and complex issues already 
under consideration, it would be impossible to explore these themes in depth. 
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To facilitate the integrated approach outlined above, the thesis makes use of a 
wide variety of sources. A key source is a collection of archival documents, pertaining 
mostly to the miners' union, housed at the St. Lawrence Miners' Museum. While this 
collection does not have an official title, it is referred to in the thesis as the "Archival 
Collection of the St. Lawrence Miners' Museum", and designated by the acronym 
"SLMM" The SLMM documents date from 1939 to 1978 and are arranged 
chronologically in the museum collection. They have been referenced as such in the thesis, 
but in cases where a duplicate of a museum document exists in a more central and 
accessible location, such as at the Provincial Archives ofNewfoundland and Labrador 
(P ANL) in St. John' s, the latter reference is provided. Documents from P ANL, in 
particular the files ofthe Commission of Government (GN38) dating from 1934 to 1949, 
are also used extensively throughout the thesis. Other crucial P ANL sources are a 
collection of Department ofHealth files dating from the 1950s to the 1970s (GN78) 
pertaining to industrial disease, health surveys, and workers' compensation in St. 
Lawrence, and a collection of files relating to a Royal Commission conducted from 1966 
to 1969 (GN6). The Centre for Newfoundland Studies Archive (CNSA), especially the 
papers of late Premier J.R. Smallwood, were an important source of information on 
government policy in the post-confederation era. Documents from the National Archives 
of Canada (NAC), especially those in the Labour Canada collection (RG27), were also 
utilized. The files of the Newfoundland and Labrador Department of Mines and Energy 
(DME) were crucial in providing information on mining operations and mines inspections. 
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An archival collection held at the Maison d' Alcan in Montreal was instrumental in 
providing details on that company's mining operations in St. Lawrence. While there was 
no local newspaper in the St. Lawrence area during much of the period under study, the 
major St. John's newspapers were surveyed for relevant material. Other newspapers were 
consulted for information on specific issues. The author also conducted a number of 
recorded interviews with former miners in St. Lawrence, which were instrumental in 
providing insight into working conditions, labour relations, worker attitudes toward health 
and safety, and other issues. These have been supplemented with other interviews on file 
at the Memorial University Folklore and Language Archive (MUNFLA). 
The thesis is arranged chronologically, which not only helps to organize a mass of 
archival and other material, but also allows for an exploration of what the level of 
knowledge about certain workplace hazards was at given points during the period in 
question, and whether various interests acted appropriately given this knowledge. In other 
words, the chronological approach is best suited to examining how the actions or lack of 
action by various parties contributed to the disaster which ultimately unfolded. 
Chapter Two describes the historical background to the establishment of the first 
St. Lawrence mine in 1933 and explores the history of mining, labour, health and safety, 
and government policy up to 1939. Chapter Three covers the war years, from 1939 to 
1945, describing union formation, attempts to improve working conditions, labour 
relations and industry fluctuation during that period. Chapter Four covers the period from 
1946 to 1956, and thus encompasses the post-war slump in the mining industry, the 
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impacts ofNewfoundland's confederation with Canada in 1949, and increasing awareness 
of the health impacts of the St. Lawrence mines. Chapter Five covers the crucial period 
from 1957 to 1962, when one of the St. Lawrence mining companies entered a decline 
culminating in closure, federal and provincial authorities undertook the first detailed 
investigations of health concerns at the St. Lawrence mines, and workers staged a walkout 
to demand improvements in working conditions. Chapter Six examines developments 
from 1963 to 1969, including the union's decision to affiliate with a Quebec-based 
organization, labour unrest, public relations, and the proceedings and findings of a Royal 
Commission appointed in 1967. Chapter Seven covers the period from 1970 to 1978. It 
deals with reaction to the Royal Commission's report, escalating labour and public unrest 
throughout the 1970s, and industry closure in 1978. The Conclusion recapitulates the 
evidence and arguments presented in the main body of the thesis and presents the 
conclusions reached in light of that evidence, and includes a brief"Epilogue" covering 
major developments up to the present. 
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Chapter 2: Mining, Working Conditions, and Government Policy 
in the 1930s 
Introduction 
The primary aim of this chapter is to describe the establishment of the first St. 
Lawrence mine in 1933 and developments in industry, working conditions, labour 
relations, and government policy up to 1939. To provide the historical background to this 
account, however, the chapter begins with a summary of the major developments in 
industry, labour, and health and safety in Newfoundland mining up to the 1930s. This is 
followed by a description of the political and economic situation in Newfoundland in the 
early 1930s and a briefhistory ofthe community of St. Lawrence in the pre-mining era. 
The remainder of the chapter describes how, alongside industry expansion throughout the 
1930s, workers, lacking alternatives, exploited by their employers, and abandoned by a 
government fixated on fiscal restraint, were forced to toil under primitive and extremely 
hazardous conditions. 
2.1 The Historical Background: Mining. Labour, and Health and Safety up to the 1930s 
The first major mines in Newfoundland were the copper mines established in the 
19th century inN otre Dame Bay, on the island' s northeast coast. 1 The three main sites 
were at Tilt Cove (established in 1864), Little Bay (1874), and Betts Cove (1875). The 
10n earlier developments, see Wendy Martin, Once Upon a Mine: Story of Pre-
Confederation Mines on the Island of Nelifoundland (Montreal: Canadian Institute of 
Mining and Metallurgy, 1983), 1-10. 
Notre Dame Bay copper mines were Newfoundland's first experience with the boom-or-
bust cycles characteristic ofthe mining industry. Mining industries sprang up practically 
overnight, followed by influxes of people seeking employment. 2 So sudden was this 
growth, that the Notre Dame Bay mines were heralded by some as an indication ofthe 
potential of the mining industry to break Newfoundland's dependence on the fishery, and a 
sign of vast, untapped resource wealth of the island.3 
2For example, by 1869, just 5 years after the mine opened there, the population ofTilt 
Cove was 768, or 45 times its 1857 level: Colonial Secretary' s Office, Census of 
Newfoundland and Labrador, 1857 and Census of Newfoundland and Labrador, 1869. A 
visitor to Bert's Cove in 1878 estimated the population to be around 1,800: Reverend M. 
Harvey, Across Newfoundland with the Governor: A Visit to our Mining Region, (St. 
John's, 1879), 75-6. If that is an accurate figure, it represents a very large increase in such 
a short time, since a decade earlier no one was living at the site. Harvey' s estimate must be 
viewed in light of the fact that he was more than a disinterested observer; James Hiller has 
descnbed Harvey's assessments of the island's resources as a "Niagara of propaganda." 
James K. Hiller, ''Newfoundland Confronts Canada, 1867-1949," inE.R Forbes and D.A. 
Muise, eds., The Atlantic Provinces in Confederation (Toronto and Fredericton: 
University ofToronto Press and Acadiensis Press, 1993), 357. 
3For example, according to one commentator at the time, the Tilt Cove mine was proof 
of the industry's potential to provide "an employment which would relieve the fisheries 
from a pressure which at present they cannot support": The Courier, 24 November 1866. 
The debate over land-based industrial diversification versus the fisheries was a prominent 
one at the time, and has become central to the Newfoundland historiography. See David 
Alexander, "Development and Dependence in Newfoundland, 1880-1970," Acadiensis, 
IV, 1 (Autumn 1974), 3-31; Alexander, ''Newfoundland' s Traditional Economy and 
Development to 1934," Acadiensis, V, 2 (Spring 1976), 56-78; Alexander, "Economic 
Growth in the Atlantic Region, 1880 to 1940," Acadiensis, VIII, 1 (Autumn 1978), 47-76; 
Steven Antler, "The Capitalist Underdevelopment ofNineteenth Century Newfoundland," 
in Robert J. Brym and R. James Sacouman, eds., Underdevelopment and Social 
Movements in Atlantic Canada, (Toronto: New Hogtown Press, 1979); Gerald Sider, 
Culture and Class in Anthropology and History: A Newfoundland illustration 
(Cambridge University Press 1986); Ian McDonald, "To Each His Own ": William Coaker 
and the Fishermen 's Protective Union in Newfoundland Politics, 1908-1925, James K. 
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The enthusiasm with which these enterprises were greeted masked some of the 
grim realities of life and work in these places. A visitor to the Bert's Cove mine in 1878, 
for example, described climbing steep ladders and negotiating narrow tunnels by the dim 
light of candles, where "a false step would be instantly fatal." The deepest workings at 
that time were 400 feet below the surface, but descending to just the 150-foot level left 
this visitor exhausted from the heat and longing for fresh air.4 Another observer noted in 
reference to Little Bay in 1891 that, 
A drearier looking place it would be hard to find. The sulphur smoke [from 
the copper smelters] went up in great volumes, and when the wind drove it 
inland, and the heavy atmosphere prevented its rise, those who were 
obliged to pass through it were almost suffocated. It gave the buildings a 
shabby appearance, and, of course, destroyed vegetation.... The men 
formed a dismal procession coming out of the pit, their clothes wet with 
mire, and a candle sticking in their caps. We can never forget one poor 
Hiller, ed. (St. John's: Institute of Social and Economic Research,1987); William Reeves, 
"Alexander's Conundrum Reconsidered: The American Dimension in Newfoundland 
Resource Development, 1898-1910," Nelifoundland Studies 5, 1 (Spring 1989), 1-37; 
Sean Cadigan, Hope and Deception in Conception Bay: Merchant-Settler Relations in 
Newfoundland, 1785-1855 (Toronto: University ofToronto Press, 1995), esp. vii-xii; 
James.K.. Hiller, "The Railway and Local Politics in Newfoundland: 1870-1901 ," in James 
K. Hiller and Peter Neary, eds., Newfoundland in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries 
(Toronto 1980), 123-47; Hiller, "The Origins ofthe Pulp and Paper Industry in 
Newfoundland," Acadiensis 11, 2 (Spring 1982), 52-64; Shannon Ryan, Fish out of 
Water: The Newfoundland Saltfish Trade, 1814-1914 (St. John's: Breakwater, 1986); and 
Ryan, The Ice Hunters: A History of Newfoundland Sealing to 1914 (St. John' s: 
Breakwater, 1994). 
4Harvey, Across Newfoundland with the Governor, 82-4. 
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fellow, the victim of an explosion, carried home blinded and disfigured 
beyond all recognition. 5 
There was at that time no legislation for the protection of workers in 
Newfoundland mines. A bill introduced in 1877, calling for the inspection of 
Newfoundland mines for the safety of workers, does not appear to have gotten past First 
Reading.6 The issue surfaced in the House of Assembly again in 1887, when a committee 
appointed to investigate matters relating to the railway, agriculture, and mines noted with 
respect to mining that, 
In view of the numbers who are likely to be engaged in the prosecution of 
this industry, we shall be glad to give prompt attention to the placing of 
measures on the Statute-Book which will afford to operative miners 
protection from injury to life and limb whilst engaged in their avocations. 7 
Again, however, nothing came ofthe recommendation. 
The optimism which the Notre Dame Bay mines initially generated was quickly 
overtaken by harsh realties. Market forces, mismanagement, and depletion of reserves 
5Brenton Symons, "The Mineral Resources ofNewfoundland," Engineering and 
Mining Journal (August 1910), 361. 
6Journal of the House of Assembly of Newfoundland, 1877, 123. Such regulations 
were in place in some other jurisdictions, such as Great Britain. The first legislation 
governing safety and inspections in British mines was passed in 1842, and was aimed 
specifically at coal mines. The legislation was refined and expanded over the ensuing 
years, and in 1872 an act was passed governing non-coal mines. See P.W.J. Bartrip and 
S.B. Burman, The Wounded Soldiers of Industry: Industrial Compensation Policy, 1833-
1897 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1983), 83-96. Canadian legislation came somewhat later. This 
issue is discussed in more detail later in Chapter Two. 
1Journal of the House of Assembly of Newfoundland, 4 March 1887. 
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soon led to the collapse of these industries an<;l the communities associated with them. 
While several Notre Dame Bay mines would be reopened in the 1950s and 1960s, the 
initial phase of mining ended with the closure of the Tilt Cove mine in 1916. 
Following the Notre Dame Bay copper mines, the next major mining industry 
established in Newfoundland was at Bell Island, a short distance from St. John's. 
Established in 1895, the Bell Island iron ore mines were originally owned by the Nova 
Scotia Steel Company (usually known simply as "Scotia"), which used the iron ore to 
supply its Nova Scotia steel mills. The Bell Island mines went through many changes of 
ownership during their long life (from 1895 to 1966). In 1921, the Dominion Iron and 
Steel Company (DISCO), which owned a portion of the enterprise, merged with Scotia to 
form the British Empire Steel Corporation (BESCO). When BESCO went into 
receivership in 1926, the mines were taken over by the mortgager, National Trust, which 
ran the mines until1930, when the Dominion Steel and Coal Company (DOSCO) took 
over.8 
By 1901, there were about 1,100 workers employed at the Bell Island mines. The 
population had doubled in the decade from 1891 to 1901, and by 193 5 was nearly eight 
8See Gail Weir, The Miners ofWabana: The Story of the Iron Ore Miners of Bell 
Island (St. John's: Breakwater, 1989), Martin, Once Upon a Mine, 52-65; John W. 
Hammond, Wabana: A History of Bell Island from 1893-1940 (New Brunswick: Print'n 
Press, 1982); and David Frank, "The Cape Breton Coal Industry and the Rise and Fall of 
the British Empire Steel Corporation," Acadiensis VII, 1 (Autumn 1977), 3-34. 
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times the 1891level.9 Many Bell Island workers were native to the island or were from 
nearby outports around Conception Bay. These men worked under very dangerous and 
difficult conditions. By 1905, the ore bodies near the surface were exhausted and workers 
began tunneling out under the sea By 1909, they were working a mile out under the 
ocean, more than 400 feet below sea leve4 with only an 85-foot ceiling between them and 
the ocean floor. 10 There was no protective clothing and the mines were notoriously hot 
and wet. Candles or seal-oil lamps provided the only light until carbide lamps were 
introduced in 1911. Until the 1930s, there were no proper eating or toilet facilities. The 
bunkhouses were crowded and dirty, with up to thirty men sleeping on hay mattresses. 
Miners worked ten hours a day, six days a week. 11 Approximately 100 men were killed 
over the life of the Bell Island mines, by rockfalls, explosions, rail car accidents, and other 
accidents. 12 
Bell Island miners did not passively accept these conditions. In 1896, only eight 
months after the first shipment of ore left the island, 180 men struck for an increase of two 
cents on their wage often cents per hour. The men were not unionized at that time and 
9The population went from just over 700 in 1891 to over 6,000 in 1935. 
Newfoundland. Colonial Secretary's Office, Census of Newfoundland and Labrador, 
1891; Census of Newfoundland and Labrador, 1921; Newfoundland. Department of 
Public Health and Welfare, Eleventh Census of Newfoundland and Labrador, 1935; and 
Weir, The Miners ofWabana, 18. 
1~art~ Once Upon a Mine, 55-56. 
11Weir, Miners ofWabana, 65-69. 
12Weir, Miners ofWabana, 94. 
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they returned to work after several days, following the intervention of the local priest. 13 In 
1899, a St. John's journalist reported seeing the words "I am killing myself for 10 cents an 
hour" written on the side of an ore car at the Bell Island loading dock. 14 
In 1900, the Bell Island workers formed their first union, the Wabana Workmen 
and Labourers' Union (WWLU), and shortly after, 1,600 men walked off the job to 
demand a five-cent-per-hour increase. The 1900 strike was bitter and sometimes violent. 
There were clashes between strikers and replacement workers as well as between strikers 
and St. John's police who had been called to the scene. After five weeks, and the arrest of 
several strike leaders, the company agreed to a two and one-half-cent raise.15 
Within the history of the Newfoundland labour movement, the 1900 Bell Island 
miners' strike was significant in a number of respects. While the history of the labour 
movement in Newfoundland can be traced back to sealers' strikes during the 1830s, and 
workers in various sectors organized during the nineteenth century, 16 the formation of the 
13The Evening Herald, 25 August 1896. 
14From a collection compiled by Addison Bown, entitled ''Newspaper History of Bell 
Island," n.d, unpublished document, CNS. 
15For a brief account ofthe formationofthe WWLU and the 1900 strike, see William 
Gillespie, A Class Act: An Illustrated History of the Newfoundland Labour Movement (St. 
John's: Creative Publishers, 1986), 36. 
16Skilled workers associated with the fisheries and other marine occupations (such as 
coopers, shipwrights, seal skinners and sailmakers) formed protective associations and 
engaged in various struggles throughout the nineteenth century, as did St. John's craft and 
clerical workers. For an account of the major developments in labour history during this 
period, see Little, "Collective Action in Outport Newfoundland"; Busch, "The 
Newfoundland Sealers' Strike of 1902"; Ryan, The Ice Hunters, 329-353; and Gillespie, A 
27 
WWLU and the 1900 strike were indicative of a new industrial and labour relations 
climate emerging at that time. For many of the workers involved in the 1900 strike, this 
was their first experience of open confrontation with a large, foreign employer. These 
men were primarily fishermen unaccustomed to this new industrial climate and especially 
to concerted, hostile resistance from their employers and from the state. The formation-of 
the WWLU and the 1900 strike can thus be viewed as an early instance of a broader shift 
in the industrial and labour relations climate taking place at that time. 17 
Though the WWLU was partly successful in the 1900 strike, the union dissolved 
shortly after the agreement was reached. In 1912, however, about 150 Bell Island 
workers walked off the job demanding 16 cents per hour and an 8-hour day. Wages and 
working hours were not the only issue at stake in the 1912 dispute; there were also 
ongoing concerns over health and safety. One of the miners who walked out in 1912 
claimed that the conditions which existed at Bell Island, including dangerous blasting 
practices and insufficient ventilation, would not be tolerated in any mine in Canada or the 
Class Act, 13-24. 
17In 1902, longshoremen in St. John' s formed the Longshoremen' s Protective Union 
(LSPU) to control waterfront labour and to standardize what had until then been 
haphazard and exploitative hiring and work practices; in 1912, pulp and paper workers at 
the Grand Falls mill (opened in 1909) unionized under international organizations; and in 
1917, the Newfoundland Industrial Workers Association (NIWA) was formed by workers 
employed by the powerful Reid Newfoundland Company in the railway, foundry, drydock, 
and other sectors. See Chisholm, "Organizing on the Waterfront"; Gillespie, A Class Act, 
38; and Mcinnis, "All Solid Along the Line." 
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United States, where some Bell Island miners had worked.18 
An Act respecting mine safety and inspections had been passed in 1908, perhaps 
partly in response to the accident rate at the Bell Island mines. The 1908 Act established 
standards in such areas as ventilation, explosives, hoisting, signaling devices, and 
tramways, and required inspections by the Government Engineer in cases of a fatal or 
serious accident.19 According to one striking Bell Island worker in 1912, however, these 
regulations were useless because workers were not aware of them and did not know 
whether they were being followed, and inspections were only conducted when another 
"mangled corpse" was brought out of the mine.20 
While Bell Island workers obviously had many grievances regarding wages and 
working conditions, they did not, through the first few decades of mining, form a stable 
and lasting union. In 1922, for instance, curtailments and layoffs associated with the 
18Daily News, 19 February 1912. It is unclear what the outcome of this strike was; it is 
not followed up in the newspapers or in any published source. 
19 An Act Respecting the Regulation of Mines," No. 6, 1908. 
20 Daily News, 19 February 1912. The 1908 Act also allowed operators to establish 
"Special Rules" subject to government approval. In 1908, DISCO introduced a set of 
such rules, outlining specific responsibilities of managers and of workers occupying certain 
positions within the mine. These rules were updated in 1916. See "Special Rules for the 
Conduct and Guidance of all Persons Employed in the Management and of All Persons 
Employed in or about the Mines of the Dominion Iron and Steel Company Limited at 
Wabana Mines, Bell Island, Newfoundland." Unpublished document, CNS; and "Special 
Rules for the Conduct and Guidance of All Persons Acting in the Management and of All 
Persons Employed in or about the Mines of the Dominion Iron and Steel Company 
Limited, 1916." Unpublished document, CNS. 
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postwar slump, and the hostile labour relations atmosphere which marked the BESCO 
years, prompted workers to form the Wabana Mineworkers' Union (WMWU), an affiliate 
of the powerful International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers.21 While the 
WMWU won some key concessions in such areas as hours of work and method of 
payment, by 1926 it too had dissolved.22 
The next major Newfoundland mining centre to emerge after Bell Island was at 
Buchans, in the island's interior. The Buchans Mining Company (BMC), a joint subsidiary 
of the Anglo-Newfoundland Development (AND) Company and the American Smelting 
and Refining Company (ASARCO), was established in 1927 to extract the area's copper, 
21BESCO management's reaction to labour unrest during the early 1920's was typified 
by manager Roy M. Wolvin's remark that those men who had returned from overseas duty 
had, during the war, "grown to like working in the sunlight and do not take kindly to their 
old tasks, which is ... a great hardship to us." Quoted in David Frank, "Coal Masters and 
Coal Miners: The 1922 Strike and the Roots of Class Conflict in the Cape Breton Coal 
Industry," MA Thesis, Dalhousie University, 1974, 74-75. 
22Peter Neary has suggested that the lack of stability within the Bell Island union 
movement arose in part from cultural factors. According to Neary, Bell Island in early 
years of mining was an amalgam of the "modem" world of wage work and factory 
discipline, and the ''traditional" world whose values were associated with rural life and the 
fishery. For these workers, he suggested, the union represented the modern, industrial 
world -- a world they were as yet unprepared to fully embrace, coming as they did from a 
world whose values and institutions were based on individualism, paternalism, and an 
"essential conservatism." Peter Neary, "'Traditional' and 'Modern' Elements in the Social 
and Economic History of Bell Island and Conception Bay," Canadian Historical 
Association, Historical Papers (1973), 118-34. For a more economically oriented 
interpretation of Bell Island unionism, see Derek Green, "Miners' Unions on Bell Island." 
B. Com. Thesis, Memorial University ofNewfoundland, 1966. 
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lead, and zinc deposits. 23 
Because the AND Company had been granted exclusive control over vast tracts of 
land, including the Buchans mineral deposits, under the 1905 Pu1p and Paper Act,24 the 
BMC was able to regulate nearly every aspect of economic and social life in the 
community ofBuchans. Workers were forbidden to build their own houses or to repair 
the company-owned ones in which they lived. The company constructed a rail line 
between Buchans and Millertown, and travellers cou1d only board the train at Millertown 
with written proof that they were employed at the Buchans mine. Goods were transported 
to town on the company railway, purchased at the company store, and charged against 
wages.25 
Many of the Newfoundlanders who came to work at Buchans had worked at other 
mines, including at Bell Island and Tilt Cove, but few had experienced this degree of 
restriction and controL Nor was this the only problem workers encountered. Newly 
arrived employees slept in storage sheds or tents while they awaited accommodations. 
There was no sewer system, houses went unrepaired, and the mess halls and bunkhouses 
were in deplorable condition. During the first years of operations, several miners were 
killed by falling ground and many complained of the fou1 air in the mill, where there was a 
23Martin, Once Upon a Mine, 74-7. 
24
"An Act to Encourage the Manufacture of Pulp and Paper in the Colony," No.5, 
1905. 
25Yetman, Riches of the Earth, 15-20; and Martin, Once Upon a Mine, 77. 
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high concentration of chemicals. Wages at Buchans, however, were relatively good (31-
36 cents an hour), and Newfoundland in the 1920s was not an easy place to find any type 
of paying work. In fact, men continually showed up at Millertown hoping to obtain a job 
at Buchans. 26 
When Buchans workers occasionally demanded improvements in working and 
living conditions, the company usually responded that since that since the projected life of 
the mine was short, major upgrades would be a waste of time and money. The 
Newfoundland government tended to agree with this position, and pointed out that the 
need for jobs, especially in the context ofthe Great Depression, took precedence over 
such considerations.27 In 1934, however, Buchans workers decided to take concerted 
action to improve working conditions, living standards, and wages by forming the 
Buchans Workers Protective Union (BWPU), with an initial membership of four 
hundred.28 
Up until the establishment ofthe first St. Lawrence mine in 1933, therefore, 
several mining enterprises had emerged at various places in Newfoundland and under 
various circumstances, from the short-lived, unplanned copper mining sites ofNotre Dame 
26Yetman, Riches of the Earth, 15. For a contrasting description oflife in Buchans see, 
Letter from P.W. George, Manager, BMC, to Newfoundland Book Publishers, 2 
September, 1936. Unpublished document, CNS. 
27Martin, Once Upon a Mine, 78-80; and Yetman, Riches of the Earth, 15-25. 
28Gillespie, A Class Act, 63-4. 
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Bay to the rigidly controlled community ofBuchans. Two constants within this diversity 
were the danger to which workers were exposed and the lack of protection afforded them. 
Even when safety regulations were introduced in 1908, they were inadequate and poorly 
enforced. Workers did sometimes attempt to bring about improvements, but met with little 
success. These developments form part of the historical backdrop to the establishment of 
the first St. Lawrence mine. The other major important components of the historical 
context are the general situation in Newfoundland and the circumstances within the 
community of St. Lawrence in the early 1930s. 
2.2 Newfoundland and St. Lawrence in the Early 1930s 
The 1920s and the onset ofthe Great Depression were difficult times for 
Newfoundland, especially for communities such as St. Lawrence whose economies 
depended on the production and export of salt cod. By 1930, various factors, including 
growing international competition and a decline in the world market for Newfoundland's 
salt fish, had led to a situation in which the income from the traditional inshore fishery 
could in many cases no longer support the average Newfoundland family, and a large 
portion of the population was dependent upon public relief A 1933 Royal Commission 
appointed to investigate and make recommendations on the situation reported an 
unmanageable public debt, widespread poverty and disease (especially communicable 
diseases such as tuberculosis), inadequate medical, transportation and communication 
systems, a stifling and sometimes exploitative merchant-credit system, a fishing economy 
33 
in collapse, and a political system marred by corruption 29 
The Amulree Commission reconunended a number of major reforms be 
undertaken, including the suspension of elected government and the appointment of a 
Conunission of Government to run the affairs of the colony until the situation had 
improved to the point where some form of elected government could be reinstated. In 
January 1934 a Conunission of Government -- an unelected body of administrators and 
bureaucrats -- was appointed to fulfil this role. The Commission of Government was 
divided into six departments -- Finance, Justice, Home Affairs and Education, Public 
Utilities, Natural Resources, and Public Health and Welfare-- and a Conunissioner 
appointed to oversee each. Sir John Hope Simpson, a British civil servant with ample 
colonial experience in such places as China and India, was appointed Commissioner of 
Natural Resources, which included mines. The Health and Welfare portfolio, which 
included labour, went to John. C. Puddester, who had served as Minister of that 
department in the outgoing government of Frederick Alderdice. Public Utilities, under 
which Labour was subsumed, went to Thomas Lodge, an Englishmen who had served in 
29Lord Amulree (Chair), Report of the Newfoundland Royal Commission, 1933 
(London: HM Stationery Office, 1933). See also, David Alexander, "Newfoundland's 
Traditional Economy and Development to 1934," Acadiensis, 5, 2 (Spring 1976), 56-78; 
David Alexander, "The Collapse of the Saltfish Trade and Newfoundland's Integration 
into the North American Economy," Canadian Historical Association Papers (1976), 
229-248; Valerie Summers, Regime Change in a Resource Economy (St. John's: 
Breakwater, 1984), 92-97; Peter Neary, Newfoundland in the North Atlantic World, 
1929-1949 (MeGill-Queen's University Press, 1988), 12-43; and Shannon Ryan, Fish out 
of Water: The Newfoundland Saltfish Trade, 1814-1914 (St. John' s: Breakwater, 1986). 
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various capacities with the British civil service since 1905.30 
Among the important administrative measures which the Commission undertook 
early in its tenure were the establishment of the Newfoundland Ranger Force and the 
reorganization of the magistracy, measures designed to compensate for the lack oflocal 
government in rural areas. When the Commission created the Newfoundland Ranger 
Force in 1935, it was intended to be a communication link between outport communities 
and the government in St. John's. The Rangers acted not only as liaisons between the 
people and the government, but also as game wardens, arbitrators, investigators, and in 
some cases as Relieving Officers as well.31 The Commission also in 1935 reorganized the 
magistracy so that District Magistrates took on functions beyond their normal legal duties. 
They reported on and often intervened in local social and economic affairs, and brought 
people's concerns to the attention of the government. 
300n the introduction and structure of the Commission of Government, see Neary, 
Newfoundland in the North Atlantic World, 44-52; Susan Macorquodale, "Public 
Administration in Newfoundland During the Period of the Commission of Government: A 
Question of Political Development," PhD thesis, Queen's University, 1973, 131-21 0; 
S.J.R. Noel, Politics in Newfoundland (University ofToronto Press, 1971), 202-43; and 
James Overton, "Economic Crisis and the End of Democracy: Politics in Newfoundland 
During the Great Depression," Labour/ Le Travai/26 (Fall1990), 85-124. For 
biographical sketches of these three Commissioners, see Dictionary of Newfoundland and 
Labrador Biography, Robert H. Cuff, ed. (St. John' s: Harry CuffPublications, 1990), 
314, 280, and 202. 
31The Rangers served in this capacity until they were effectively replaced by the RCMP 
after confederation. See Marilyn Tuck, "The Newfoundland Ranger Force, 1935-1950," 
MA thesis, Memorial University, 1983; and Harold Horwood, A History of the 
Newfoundland Ranger Force (St. John's: Breakwater, 1980). 
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While the structure and policies of the Commission of Government would have an 
important influence on developments in St. Lawrence, just as important was the history of 
the community itself in the years immediately preceding establishment of the first mine 
there. Like many coastal communities in Newfoundland, St. Lawrence was for centuries 
an important fishing and trading station for various European countries. Basque fishermen 
were operating out of St. Lawrence as early as the sixteenth century, and the French and 
English struggled for control of the site at various times throughout the seventeenth and 
early eighteenth centuries.32 Over the course of the eighteenth century, St. Lawrence 
emerged as one of the major Irish settlements outside the Avalon Peninsula. 33 By 1921, 
St. Lawrence had a population of803, with Catholics and Protestants comprising roughly 
70 and 30 per cent of the population, respectively.34 
The census for 1921, the last one from the pre-mining period, shows an economy 
based primarily on inshore cod fishing and small scale agriculture. Of the 803 people in 
St. Lawrence in 1921, 355 (226 males and 129 females) were engaged in the catching 
and/or curing offish and there were about 200 small boats in use. Of the other 
employment categories reported, there were seven teachers, nine merchants, six in 
32D. W. Prowse, A History of Newfoundland from the English, Colonial and Foreign 
Records (Mika: Belleville, 1972), 48, 185, 246. (Originally published London, 1895). 
33W. Gordon Handcock, "So Ionge as there comes no women ": Origins of English 
Settlement in Newfoundland (St. John' s: Breakwater, 1989), 89. For population :figures, 
see Appendix B. 
34Colonial Secretary' s Office, Census of Newfoundland and Labrador, 1921. 
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government services, one clergyman, and nineteen "otherwise employed." While no one 
reported farming as a primary occupation, more than 1 00 people were reported to be 
engaged in "cultivating the land," and substantial amounts of root crops and dairy 
products were being produced. 35 
St. Lawrence was also at that time a geographically isolated community. The 
town of Burin, approximately 30 kilometres northeast of St. Lawrence, was for the first 
half of the twentieth century the commercial and administrative centre of the southwest 
portion of the Burin Peninsula. It was where the bank, the hospital, and many of the 
major businesses were located. A road linking St. Lawrence to Burin was not completed, 
however, until the early 1950s, so until then travel between the two towns was undertaken 
by boat or by horse and sled. There was a road which ran southwest out of St. Lawrence, 
in the opposite direction to Burin, and looped back around the peninsula to Burin, but by 
this route the trip covered approximately 150 kilometres over some rough roads and 
through some desolate country. Lady Hope Simpson, wife of then Commissioner for 
Natural Resources Sir John Hope Simpson, made the trip in 1935 and remarked that, 
"Yesterday [23 July 1935], we drove about 14 miles over a rough track with the priest 
from St. Lawrence to Lamaline -- such wild moorlands and such hills .... How they exist I 
don't know."36 
35Census of Newfoundland and Labrador, 1921. 
36Peter Neary, ed., White Tie and Decorations: Sir John and Lady Hope Simpson in 
Newfoundland, 1934-1936 (Toronto: University ofToronto Press, 1996), 196. 
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In the St. Lawrence area, the general economic hardship which marked 
NewfoWldland in the late 1920s was exacerbated by a natural disaster. On 18 November 
1929 the southeast coast of the Burin Peninsula was struck by a tidal wave originating 
from an Wldersea earthquake approximately 200 miles to the south. A massive wave and 
high tides devastated communities along the east side of the peninsula, claiming 27lives 
and sweeping away houses, fishing premises, boats and supplies. In St. Lawrence, while 
there was no loss of life, more than 30 boats were lost or destroyed and many buildings 
and their contents were swept out to sea. The damage along the coast was estimated at 
hWldreds of thousands of dollars and the people of St. Lawrence were described as "dazed 
and destitute."37 A government inspector described the scene in St. Lawrence as one of 
"desolation," with all "stores, provisions, coals, on both sides of the harbour gone. The 
people are in a state of dire destitution."38 Another observer remarked that, 
... it was most pitiful because the calamity came upon years of misfortWles, 
and men who had struggled in keeping themselves and their families off the 
dole were left with nothing -- no homes, no implements, no tools -- nothing 
with which to start work again. It seems as though the whole coast had 
suffered in this way -- misfortWle treading upon misfortWle, treading them 
down and down. The atmosphere of depression and hopelessness is 
terrible. 39 
37Daily News, 23 November 1929, 3. 
38
"Report by Inspector J.H. Dee on Disaster ofNight of 18th November, on the Coast 
from Lamaline to St. Lawrence, Inclusive," Wlpublished document, CNS. 
3~eary, White Tie and Decorations, 196-197. 
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In addition to the immediate damage it caused, the tidal wave also reportedly 
adversely affected the fishery for several years after. One resident remarked that, "the 
tidal wave apparently altered the course of the codfish and the bait, because for many 
years afterwards the codfish and bait failed to come to our shores.',..0 In 1936, the area's 
Relieving Officer noted that the fishery "has been practically a failure every year since the 
tidal wave," and the same year District Magistrate reported that, ''the fish seems to have 
left the Burin Peninsula for good .... For seven years around the Burin Peninsula, the 
fishery has been going from bad to worse. ,,..1 Given this combination of circumstances --
high employment, a natural disaster and the collapse of the fishery-- it is not surprising 
that when a New York entrepreneur proposed in the early 1930s to establish an industry 
to mine and export the area's vast deposits of fluorspar, he found willing participants in 
St. Lawrence. 
"Fluorspar" is a popular commercial name for a non-metallic mineral composed of 
calcium and fluoride (its chemical formula is CaF2). It usually occurs as veins within the 
crevices of surrounding rock such as granite or limestone. It has a number of commercial 
uses, depending on the proportion ofCaF2 to other ingredients in the ore. The three basic 
4~ennie Slaney, More Incredible than Fiction: The True Story of the Indomitable 
Men and Women of St. Lawrence from the Time of Settlement to 1965 (Montreal: La 
Confederation des Syndicats Nationeaux, 1975), 2. 
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"Report ofthe Receiving Officer for Lamaline," l2 March 1936, GN 38, S6-1-1, File 
7, PANL; and "Magistrate's Report to the Department ofNatural Resources," 31 July 
1936, GN38, S4-3-3, File 7, PANL. 
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grades are "acid," "ceramic" and "metallurgical." Acid grade fluorspar is at least 97 per 
cent CaF2, and is used in the manufacture of hydrofluoric acid. Hydrofluoric acid is used 
in, among other things, the smelting of aluminium. Ceramic grade fluorspar is 94 to 95 
per cent CaF2, and is used in making various types of glass and ceramics. Metallurgical 
grade fluorspar is at least 85 per cent CaF 2, and is used primarily in making steel. 
Fluorspar is rarely found in a natural state with these concentrations ofCaF2, but usually 
must be refined to bring it up to these specifications. Ore coming out of the ground as 60 
per cent CaF 2 may be brought up to metallurgical grade and then up to acid grade through 
various stages of processing. 
While fluorspar had been mined in different parts of the world since 1870, demand 
increased substantially in the years immediately prior to the First World War and 
continued to increase throughout the 1920s. In the United States, about 85 per cent of all 
fluorspar mined from the 1870s to the 1920s went into steel production and nearly all of 
this came from mines in Illinois and Kentucky. The Aluminum Company of America 
(ALCOA), however, owned a few small mines in Kentucky and Illinois to meet some its 
own fluorspar requirements. In Canada, fluorspar mining was confined to a small mine 
near Madoc, Ontario, operated by Huntingdon Fluorspar Mines. The Madoc mine 
produced a total of just 20,000 tons of fluorspar from 1916 to 1920, and less than 100 
tons a year during the interwar period. 42 (Most fluorspar mines at that time produced 
42Carl M. Fellman, "The Mining ofFluorspar and its Uses," Proceedings of the Lake 
Superior Mining Institute, 25 (1926), 197-211; Canada, Department ofFinance, "Report 
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between 40,000 and 80,000 tons in a single year.) 
While fluorspar deposits were known to exist in the St. Lawrence area since 1870, 
it was not until the 1920s that they attracted attention for their potential commercial 
value.43 In 1929, businessman John H. Taylor of St. John's staked several claims believed 
to cover a large deposit known as the ''Black Duck" vein.44 In 1930, Taylor sold the St. 
Lawrence claims to Walter Seibert, a 27-year-old broker with the Corporation Trust 
Company of New York, for "one dollar and other valuable considerations.'>45 After trying, 
unsuccessfully, to sell the claims, Seibert contacted St. Lawrence merchant Aubrey Farrell 
to arrange the mining and export of a 2,000-ton trial shipment. Under this arrangement, 
Seibert would supply the equipment and Farrell the labour. Farrell would receive his share 
of the profit, ifthere was any, and the men would be paid their 15 cents per hour when the 
fluorspar was mined, shipped, sold and paid for. In March 1933, a boat load of dilapidated 
mining equipment, described by one observer as "second-hand junk, which would be 
of the Tariff Board Relative to the Investigation Ordered by the Minister ofFinance 
Respecting Fluorspar," Ottawa, 10 September 1958, 19-20; and United States Bureau of 
Mines, Minerals Yearbook (Washington, Bureau ofMines,1940), 1333-51. 
43 Alexander Murray and James P. Howley noted the existence of the deposits in 
"Report for 1870," Geological Survey of Newfoundland (London: Edward Stanford, 
1881), 235, but were more interested in the small amounts of lead and silver which also 
existed in one of the deposits. 
44Newfoundland Registry of Deeds, Volume 37, Folio 7 records Taylor's acquisition of 
the claim. 
45Newfoundland Registry ofDeeds, Volume 112, Folio 462. 
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discarded by any up-to-date mining conce~'>46 arrived in St. Lawrence. The people of 
the town unloaded the equipment, hauled it with horses over the barrens to the Black 
Duck site, and built a makeshift mill. The initial work of transporting and setting up the 
equipment was not part ofthe Seibert-Farrell deal; it was undertaken in the hope of paying 
work in the future. With Seibert's used equipment and a few basic hand tools, 30 men · 
began mining the Black Duck vein and hauling the ore by horse and cart to the loading 
wharf in the community. 47 
2.3 Mining, Working Conditions, and Government Policy, 1934-39 
Unexpected flooding and other problems delayed the initial contract well past the 
anticipated three months. The first portion of the 2,000-ton trial shipment left St. 
Lawrence for the Dominion Steel and Coal Corporation' s steel plant in Sydney, Nova 
Scotia, late in 1933, and the second portion in March 1934. Neither Farrell nor the men 
received any payment until June 1934 (more than a year after the initial deal was struck). 
When Farrell refused to enter into any more arrangements with Seibert, Seibert formed the 
46Letter from C. Wilbur Miller ofDupont Chemicals to Lammot Dupont, 11 February 
1937, Files of the Hagley Museum and Library, Wilmington, Delaware. 
47Martin, Once Upon a Mine, 66-7; Ena Farrell Edwards, Notes Toward a History of 
St. Lawrence (St. John's: Breakwater, 1983), 70-71; C.K. Howse and R.P. Fischer, 
"Newfoundland Ships Fluorspar: Production from St. Lawrence Region, Begun in 1932, 
has Increased Steadily," Engineering and Mining Journa/140, 7 (1939); and Slaney, 
More Incredible than Fiction, 2-4. For a map showing the location of veins and mines, 
see Appendix C. 
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St. Lawrence Corporation ofNewfoundland and hired a number of men to continue 
mining the Black Duck and other veins.48 The men were paid 17.5 cents an hour, 
considerably less than workers at other Newfoundland mines were being paid at that time. 
Miners at Bell Island, for example, were earning an average of27 cents an hour in 1931, 
while Buchans miners were earning between 31 and 36 cents an hour in 1929. Workers at 
both Bell Island and Buchans took a pay cut in 1932, but were still earning an average of 
about 25 and 30 cents respectively in 1934.49 
Initially, the St. Lawrence veins were mined by the "open-cut" method, where the 
overburden was removed to expose the vein and the vein then followed vertically and 
horizontally as far as equipment and conditions would allow. The Black Duck vein was 
mined for a length of350 feet and to a depth of70 feet using this method, while a second 
vein, the "Blue Beach," was mined down to 70 feet. The lack of proper equipment, 
exposure to the weather, and constant flooding made for harsh working conditions in 
those first open cut mines. During the winter of1935-36, for instance, the Black Duck 
48See C.K. Howse and R.P. Fischer, ''Newfoundland Ships Fluorspar: Production from 
St. Lawrence Region, Begun in 1932, has Increased Steadily," Engineering and Mining 
Journal, 140, 7 (1939), W.S. Smith, "Fluorspar at St. Lawrence," 1957, Archival 
Collection ofNewfoundland and Labrador Department of Mines and Energy (DME), and 
Ambrose Howse, "Fluorspar Deposits ofthe St. Lawrence Area, Newfoundland: Geology 
and Economic Potential" 1983, DME. 
4~ell Island figures taken from Derek Green, "Miners' Unions on Bell Island," 42; and 
Buchans figures from Derek Yetman, Riches of the Earth, 25. For St. Lawrence wage 
figures, see Appendix D. 
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mine was shut down for extended periods due to flooding and storms. 50 
At the end of 1935, the Corporation employed about 60 in mining, and about 50 
others who found periodic work as ore haulers and stevedores. 51 According to the 
District Magistrate, some men also mined ore at various sites on a contract basis: 
... the low grade ores [are] now produced mostly by contract labour in 
outlying locations ... scattered along the harbour within a radius of several 
miles. The Company pays a fixed price per ton for the ore, supplying 
explosives and other material needed. The contract price depends on the 
quality ofthe ore mined. On December 10 about six contracts were going 
on, this gives employment to at least 17 men. 52 
While fishing was still the primary occupation reported in the Census of 1935, the number 
of fishing boats in use had decreased from 201 in 1921 to 79 in 193 5 and there were fewer 
cod traps in use. 53 It is likely that given the depressed state of the cod fishery, the 
apparent scarcity offish and the introduction of the mining industry, people were reluctant 
to replace boats and equipment which had been lost in the tidal wave. 
By 1936, the Corporation was working three veins, the Black Duck, the "Iron 
Springs" and the "Hare's Ears," and small-scale contract mining was still being carried out 
50
"Reports ofOutport Magistrates, 1935-36," December, 1935, GN38, S4-3-1 , File 14, 
PANL. 
51 According to the 1935 Nominal Census, all these workers were from St. Lawrence, 
with the exception of a few from nearby Little St. Lawrence. 
52
"Reports ofOutport Magistrates, 1935-36," December, 1935, GN38, S4-3-1, File 14. 
PANL. 
53Newfoundland. Department of Public Health and Welfare, Tenth Census of 
Newfoundland and Labrador, 1935 (St. John's: The Department, 1937). 
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at several other locations. A government official who visited the site in 1936 noted that 
the 15,000 tons of ore produced to this point required only sorting and washing to bring 
it up to metallurgical grade. This official noted, however, that the mining methods 
themselves were primitive and dangerous, especially when the trenches had reached a 
substantial depth. 54 
In 1936, when open cut mining was no longer possible, a shaft was sunk to a depth 
of 140 feet beside the open trench at the Black Duck vein. 55 Once underground mining 
began, two basic methods were developed for extracting the ore, "benching" and "open-
stoping." With each method, horizontal tunnels known as "drifts" were established at 
various depths along the shaft. These drifts branched off in both directions from the shaft 
and ran parallel to the vein. Thus, a vein running in a north-south direction might be 
followed by both a ''north drift" and a "south drift" on a particular level. With the 
benching method, at intervals along a drift, workers drilled and blasted the ore to create a 
series of downward steps or terraces until the limit of the vein was reached or until other 
conditions, such as weakening of the mine walls or difficulty extracting broken ore from 
the mined areas, halted progress. With open stoping, which became the most common 
method used in St. Lawrence, workers also drilled and blasted ore at intervals along the 
drift, but instead of''benching down," they proceeded inward and upward. When a 
54C.K. Howse, "The Fluorspar Industry at St. Lawrence," 1936, File 1L/14 (3), DME. 
For annual production figures, see Appendix E. 
55C.K. Howse, "The Fluorspar Industry at St. Lawrence." 
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quantity of ore was blasted from the vein, the space thus created was known as a "stope." 
Instead ofbeing removed (or "pulled") right away, this broken ore was left on the floor of 
the stope so that miners could work from on top of it and proceed inward and upward in 
the stope. If stoping was carried out to a sufficient height from a particular level, the 
stope would eventually break through to the level above, creating a honeycomb pattern of 
horizontal and vertical openings throughout the mine. The broken ore, or ''muck," was 
removed and hoisted in a variety of ways. It could be shovelled by hand out of the stopes 
by "muckers" and loaded into tram cars which were then pushed along tracks through the 
drift. The ore could then be dumped into chutes or "ore passes" at intervals along the drift 
and accumulated at a collection point known as a "loading pocket" from which it was 
hoisted in an ore bucket, or "skip" to the surface. Alternatively, the tram cars themselves 
could be placed on the hoist to be brought to the surface and dumped, and then sent back 
down into the mine for refilling. Electric or diesel-powered tram cars and mucking 
machines were also used, and there were combinations of hand and powered methods. 
While many variations on these methods were employed at the St. Lawrence mines over 
the years, the basic operations and terminology remained generally consistent. 56 
The move to underground mining in 1936, while it provided some protection from 
the elements and decreased work stoppages, brought with it a new set of problems. One 
miner, among the first to work underground at Black Duck, recalled that, 
56For a depiction of a typical St. Lawrence underground mine, see Appendix F. 
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This was the beginning of the dust and smoke problems. Before this, in the 
open cut, dust and smoke were not so much of a problem.... In the 
[underground], drilling was done with a dry hammer. This machine was 
second-hand and had already drilled thousands of feet on some other job. 
The hannner was hung on the shoulder which brought the drill hole directly 
opposite the driller's mouth .... He also, at times, used curtain screen or 
cheesecloth over his mouth, but this clogged with dust in seconds and had 
to be discarded. Every few minutes, he would have to shut off the machine 
to clear his eyes and nostrils of dust.. .. The further the drifts advanced, the 
dust and smoke became worse. Men were continually vomiting. 57 
These "dry drills" had been among the used equipment Seibert had shipped to St. 
Lawrence in 1933, and were so called to distinguish them from more modem types 
available at the time, which supplied a flow of water to the drill bit to suppress dust. In 
the United States and Canada these machines had long been recognized as hazardous to 
health because of the dust they generated, especially in unventilated areas. Dry drills were 
known as ''widow-makers" among early 20th-century silver miners in Northern Ontario, 58 
and as early as 1913 the Ontario government recognized the danger "arising from the 
breathing of the dust caused by the drilling and other operations, and especially from the 
hammer drills where no water is used to allay the dust." The Ontario Mines Act was 
amended in 1914 to address this problem and after that the water-fed drill gradually 
replaced the dry drill in Ontario mines. 59 Wet drills were standard equipment in the 
57Slaney, More Incredible than Fiction, 14-15 
58Doug Baldwin, "A Study in Social Control: The Life of the Silver Miner in Northern 
Ontario," Labour/Le Travailleur, 2 (1977), 92. 
598. Price, "Report on Limitation of the Hours ofLabor of Underground Workmen in 
the Mines of Ontario," Ontario, Sessional Papers, No. 85 (1913), 11 (Quoted in Baldwin, 
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fluorspar mines ofKentucky and Illinois by the 1920s.60 The fact that dry drills had been 
discarded and outlawed in many jurisdictions by the 1930s suggests why Seibert was able 
to purchase a quantity of well-used ones to ship to St. Lawrence. 
St. Lawrence workers had little choice at the time but to tolerate these working 
conditions. Mike O'Leary started work as an ore-sorter in 1936, when he was sixteen 
years old (boys under eighteen received just 10 cents an hour) and worked at both Black 
Duck and Iron Springs during the ensuing years. He related an incident which indicates the 
extent of the control which the company exerted over the workforce in the absence of any 
employment alternatives: 
The way that was done in the Black Duck, you had all jackhammers [dry 
drills]. That was open cut, 300 feet open cut, with just a canvas link:um on 
your head, and when the ore was blasted out of the face, you had to wheel 
that out then in a wheelbarrow out where the bucket come down for to put 
it in.... One time when we were picking the ore, this was down in Iron 
Springs, old Kelleher was over there then, he was the manager then of the 
St. Lawrence Corporation. This morning the boys ... we all left the job and 
come out and wanted more pay, so we went down and went in talking to 
old Kelleher and he was pretty upset and he said, "Well boys, I'll tell ye 
what I'll do for ye ... if ye don't go back to work now any one of ye that 
got your father working in the mine I'll lay off you and I'll lay offyour 
father too. And we had to go back and go to work. ... No choice.61 
"A Study in Social Control," 92.); and Baldwin, "A Study in Social Control," 92-93. 
60Fellman, "The Mining ofFluorspar," 206. See also David Rosner, Deadly Dust: 
Silicosis and the Politics of Occupational Disease in Twentieth-Century America (New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1992)135-54; and "The Water Drill as a Preventive of 
Miners' Phthisis," Iron Age 74 (August 1904). 
61lnterview with Mike O'Leary, Little St. Lawrence, 26 October 1997, conducted by 
and in the possession of the author. A "linkum" is a sou'wester hat. There is little 
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Workers did not, however, passively accept their conditions. In March 1936 the 
District Magistrate reported "general dissatisfaction" in St. Lawrence and outlined three 
main grievances: working conditions, irregularity of wage payment, and the "methods 
employed to obtain cheap labour." According to the magistrate, workers were upset that 
they were :frequently thrown out of work and back on the dole for extended periods when 
the mines flooded, and that in some places they were working in a narrow trench more 
than 100 feet below the surface without proper hoisting or safety equipment of any kind. 62 
There was also the problem of wage payment. Workers received their pay in scrip 
-- slips of paper representing amounts based on hours worked -- which would be taken to 
local stores and traded for goods. The merchants then held these slips until the 
Corporation had deposited sufficient money in the bank (at Burin) to reimburse the 
merchant for goods advanced. Under this system, the workers themselves never actually 
saw any cash, since by the time the money to cover the scrip was deposited in the bank, 
their wages had been taken up in goods. There were often long delays in the bank 
deposits, however, as the Corporation only deposited the cash when a given quantity of 
fluorspar had been mined, shipped and sold. Workers were therefore often in debt to the 
merchants and the merchants often threatened to cut off supply when no cash was 
biographical information available on Kelleher. It is not a local name, and he was likely 
recruited by Seibert from outside Newfoundland. 
62
"Magistrate's Report to the Department ofNatural Resources," 25 March 1936, 
GN38, S2-1-11 , File 1, PANL. . 
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forthcoming to cover their costs. The magistrate appears to have been more concerned 
with the effect this had on the merchants and on the government than on the workers. The 
proble~ in his view, was that the various merchants were eager to get the miners' 
accounts, only to find that they then had to wait long periods to be reimbursed. Also, 
when merchants cut off credit to a worker, the worker was then forced to apply for the 
dole, so that the Department of Public Health and Welfirre was in effect forced to ''finance 
this corporation. '>63 
The magistrate also reported that the Corporation was using the dole system to 
drive down the price of labour and to suppress potential labour unrest. As an example, he 
related an incident in which the company offered a group of their regular employees 60 
cents per ton to haul ore from a mine site to the dock for shipment. When the men 
objected to the price, claiming they could not possibly supply horses and hauling 
equipment and break even at such a wage, the company offered the work to unemployed 
men in receipt of the dole allowance. These men could not refuse the work at that or any 
wage offered, since Public Health and Welfare regulations stipulated that persons on the 
dole must accept paying work or be cut from the relief roll. As the magistrate put it, 
The dole men could not refuse the employment whether it paid [i.e., was 
worthwhile financially] or not as they must earn what they can or be cut off 
the dole .... in the meantime they had to be fed on dole until some of the 
work was done, thus we have the position where the dole men were being 
fed on dole and at the same time working for a Company who defers 
63
"Magistrate's Report to the Department of Natural Resources," 25 March 1936, 
GN38, 82-1-11, File 1, PANL. 
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payment for an unreasonably long period. The dole men were successfully 
used by the Company to break the strike of the regular workmen. 64 
According to the magistrate, the Corporation justified these substandard conditions and 
practices by claiming it did not yet have the capital to make improvements, but would do 
so as soon as possible. The magistrate doubted the management was being completely 
sincere in this, but was unable to access any financial information on the company. 
Meanwhile, he called upon the Department ofNatural Resources to investigate the 
situation further. 
In response, the Department of Natural Resources expressed some vague concern 
over working conditions in St. Lawrence but seemed primarily concerned that the area' s 
mineral resources were not being fully maximized. The government's Geological 
Division, it was noted, had expressed great optimism for the area's economic potential, 
but the fear was that the Corporation's lack of capital was impeding development. To 
help remedy this situation, Hope Simpson suggested that the government secure a loan of 
$150,000 for the Corporation, to be used to upgrade and expand their operations. 
Suggested additions included a concentration mill (for refining fluorspar), two more 
shafts, roads and loading facilities. The proposal came with several key conditions, 
including that the government be granted control over the Corporation's finances, 
64
"Magistrate's Report to the Department ofNatural Resources," 25 March 1936, 
GN38, S2-1-11 , File 1, PANL. 
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technical inspections and the fixing of wage rates. 65 The suggestion does not appear to 
have gone past the proposal stage, but it is a good illustration of the department's 
priorities. The only specific mention of working conditions in response to the magistrate's 
report was the Commissioner's remark that when he had visited one of the mines in 1935, 
it appeared very dangerous, but that he had since been assured that it was "perfectly 
safe.'>66 
The government's response to the St. Lawrence situation at this time must be 
viewed in light of its position with respect to mine regulations and inspections. In other 
jurisdictions, mine regulations had been updated on a much more regular basis than in 
Newfoundland, and inspection services were a regular feature of the health and safety 
regime. In Great Britain, the first legislation pertaining specifically to health and safety in 
mines was passed in 1842. While the 1842 Act did not contain a requirement for regular 
inspections, a series of coal colliery accidents combined with lobbying from various parties 
resulted in the establishment of a mines inspectorate by 1850. In 1872, a new set of 
regulations was created to cover non-coal (or "metalliferous") mines in Great Britain. 
Canadian legislation tended to follow the British pattern, and many Canadian provinces 
65
"Memorandum submitted by Commissioner for Natural Resources for Consideration 
of Commission of Government," 16 April1936, GN 38, S2-1-11, File 1, PANL. 
66
"Memorandum submitted by Commissioner for Natural Resources for Consideration 
of Commission of Government," 16 April1936, GN 38, S2-1-ll , File 1, PANL. Lady 
Hope Simpson' s horrified reaction to the sight of the Black Duck mine when she visited 
there in 1935 is recorded in Neary, White Tie and Decorations, 193. 
52 
had their own legislation and inspection services in place by the 1890s. While the British 
and Canadian systems were far from perfect, and while hazards still abounded in the 
mining industry in both places, by the 1930s adequate mine regulations and regular 
inspections were firmly entrenched principles in these jurisdictions. 67 
The Newfoundland government, however, resisted calls to update the 1908 Act, 
though the Newfoundland mining industry had undergone substantial growth since that act 
was introduced. Shortly after the issue of working conditions in St. Lawrence was 
brought to the attention of the Department ofNatural Resources, the Commissioner 
suggested that while the government's current policy required inspection of working 
conditions only when an accident occurred (in keeping with the 1908 Regulations), this 
seemed to him to be adequate. The Commissioner pointed out that in the preceding year 
(1935), there were "only" five fatal accidents in Newfoundland mines.68 The Geological 
Division had recently pointed out that with 2,500 men employed in mines around the 
67See P.W.J.Bartrip and S.B. Burman, The Wounded Soldiers of Industry: Industrial 
Compensation Policy, 1833-1897 (Oxford: Claredon Press, 1983), 83-96; and Eric 
Tucker, Administering Danger in the Workplace, 223-27. In the United States, the 
Bureau of Mines, which was created in 1910, was technically responsible for promoting 
and ensuring mine safety, but was reluctant to do anything until forced to by an escalating 
death toll between 1910 and 1940. 
68
"Proposal that the operator of the diamond drill should be competent to inspect mines 
and also the matter offinancial provision therefor," 26 May 1936, GN 38, S1-l-12, File 8 
(NR 63-36), P ANL. The memo does not specifY in which mines the men were killed. 
None were killed in St. Lawrence, but Buchans was obviously involved, since the memo 
stated that, "In the case ofBuchans the survivors were compelled to leave the place and 
set up home elsewhere which was an expensive matter for a widow and family." 
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island and with the possibility of future expansion in the industry, a full-time mines 
inspector might be required, but the Commissioner responded that since all these workers 
were employed in just three mines -- Bell Island, Buchans, and St. Lawrence -- there was 
no justification for a full-time inspector. The Commissioner suggested that perhaps the 
job of Mines Inspector could be linked to the operation of the diamond drill, which the 
government had recently acquired for mineral exploration.69 He pointed out, however, 
that this would mean increasing the $100 per month paid to the drill operator, possibly by 
another $100, and he agreed to this system of mines inspection only if the Department of 
Finance would help meet the extra cost. 70 
The Department of Finance, however, replied that under the existing regulations 
the Government Engineer was endowed with the power to inspect mines and therefore no 
additional appointment was necessary. Hope Simpson responded that while it was 
technically and legally correct, the training and duties the Government Engineer were of a 
more general nature and did not qualifY him for such a job. Hope Simpson suggested a 
man for the job, a man who had worked as an engineer at both Bell Island and Buchans 
and came highly recommended by the Geological Division. According to Simpson, he had 
69 A diamond drill is a standard exploratory device, so called because of its diamond-
tipped drill bit which makes it capable of drilling to great depths through nearly any type 
of rock. 
70
"Proposal that the operator of the diamond drill should be competent to inspect mines 
and also the matter of :financial provision therefor," 26 May 1936, GN 38, Box S1-1-12, 
File 8 (NR 63-36), P ANL. 
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agreed to work as both diamond drill operator and mines inspector for $200 a month.71 
On 28 July 1936, shortly after Hope Simpson made that proposal, he was replaced as 
Commissioner ofNatural Resources by Robert Ewbank.72 Ewbank stated that, after 
meeting with Public Utilities Commissioner Thomas Lodge, he was of the opinion that, 
"there was no necessity to make arrangements to employ an Engineer permanently for this 
work and that negotiations to this end might be dropped." He suggested that as a 
temporary solution, "for this year we should request the Ministry of Mines, Ontario, to 
lend us a man to inspect the active mines here at once. We would pay salary, expenses, 
and a bonus to be agreed upon." A more pennanent arrangement might be made, he 
stated, when the Department of Public Utilities had completed the ongoing reorganization 
of its staff, at which time it would take responsibility for mines inspections. This, Ewbank 
predicted, might take "some years" and until that time arrangements could be made to 
bring in trained inspectors from other places, as was now being recommended. 73 
In Augustl936, the Newfoundland government brought in A.E. Cave ofthe 
Ontario Department of Mines to conduct the first ever general inspection of 
Newfoundland mines. Cave visited mines at Bell Island, Buchans and St. Lawrence, 
71
"Proposed appointment of J. St. John, Esq., as Mining Engineer and diamond drill 
operator," 2 June 1936, GN38, Box S1-1-12, File 18 (NR 63a-36), PANL. 
72Ewbank: was a native of England and a career civil servant. Dictionary of 
Newfoundland and Labrador Biography, 101. 
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describing the mining methods at each operation and noting any hazards. He divided the 
St. Lawrence mines into two categories: the smaller mines being worked by small teams 
on contract, which included the Hare's Ears, Blue Beach and Doctor's Pond sites, and the 
two main operations run directly by the Corporation, the Black Duck and the Iron Springs 
mines. Cave described methods at all of these operations as "primitive." The contract men 
drilled the ore with "hand steels," drill bits that were driven with hammers and turned by 
hand, and had nothing in the way of powered equipment. The equipment at Black Duck 
and Iron Springs was marginally better; workers there had the use of air compressors and 
jackhammers, but were still ill-equipped by the standards of the day. The main concern 
Cave expressed about the St. Lawrence mines was the potential for cave-ins and flooding 
in the open cuts. Cave also suggested that all mines be provided with toilet facilities and 
clean drinking water, and he had other suggestions regarding the use of explosives, 
hauling and hoisting devices, safety belts and other matters. He also strongly suggested 
that the Newfoundland government hire a qualified inspector to carry out regular detailed 
inspections, and that it require mining companies to submit mine plans and details of all 
fatalities and injuries, which was routine in jurisdictions across Canada. 74 
While Cave did not go into the matter in detail, according to workers the 
conditions at Iron Springs mine were as bad as those at Black Duck. Workers reportedly 
74A.E. Cave, "Report on Mines Inspection ofNewfoundland," Submitted to 
Newfoundland Commission of Government, Department of Natural Resources, 6 
November 1936, DME. 
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toiled with primitive, used equipment and with nothing in the way of safety clothing or 
basic facilities. In bad weather, they ate in small unheated shacks used to house mining 
equipment or in the nearby woods. There were no bathroom facilities; workers simply 
went to the woods, or stayed in the pit when weather or the depth of the trench made that 
impossible. They obtained drinking water from nearby streams or from the mine walls. 
Workers climbed wood ladders up and down the pits and many of them walked several 
kilometres to and from work. 75 The government took no action in response to the Cave 
report, and workers in St. Lawrence grew increasingly frustrated by their situation In 
June 1937, they walked off the job over a number of grievances. 
The 1937 walkout was motivated in part by the arrival of a second mining 
company in St. Lawrence, which created a point of comparison for Corporation 
employees. Joshua Hookey, a broom manufacturer in St. John's, had been staking claims 
in the St. Lawrence area since 1930, and by 1937 he owned about 25 claims, including 
some which turned out to cover two major fluorspar veins, "Director" and "Tarefare." In 
1937, the St. Lawrence fluorspar deposits captured the interest of Edwin Lavino ofE.J. 
Lavino and Company, a Philadelphia-based firm involved in the production and 
distribution of various mineral and chemical products. On 11 May 193 7, Lavino and 
Hookey incorporated the American-Newfoundland Fluorspar Corporation (ANF), and 
entered into an agreement whereby Lavino acquired a 51 per cent controlling interest in 
75Slaney, More Incredible than Fiction, 16-19. 
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the company in exchange for a $10,000 cash advance to the ANF. In June 1937, ANF 
hired 35 miners, under the direction of mine manager A.J. Wallace, to sink a shaft on the 
Tarefare vein. The shaft was sunk to a depth of85 feet and a crosscut from the shaft 
revealed a very large body of ore. ANF also engaged a number oflocal men to search for 
further deposits. Late in the summer of 1937, prospectors discovered another major ore 
body, the Director vein.76 
On 1 June 1937, Government Geologist Claude Howse arrived in St. Lawrence to 
advise ANF on its mining and exploration plans, but he soon became involved in matters 
related to the Corporation mines. The day of Howse's arrival, Corporation workers 
walked off the job to protest working conditions and the method of wage payment. 
Howse interviewed a number of the parties involved, including several merchants, Kelleher 
(the mine manager), the Catholic Priest (Father Augustus Thome), representatives of the 
miners, and the Ranger/Receiving Officer. 
The merchants pointed out that while the men now received pay cheques, neither 
they nor the merchants were any better off, since often when the men tried to cash them at 
the bank in Burin they were told that there were insufficient funds in the Corporation 
account to cover them. They were therefore forced to continue taking up credit at the 
stores and were constantly in debt. Howse found that only the barest necessities of life 
were purchased on miners' accounts and that the number of men in debt to the merchants 
76Martin, Once Upon a Mine, 70; C.K. Howse and R.P. Fischer, ''Newfoundland Ships 
Fluorspar." 
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had actually increased since many had moved off the dole and into mining. Kelleher, 
meanwhile, insisted that the men had done well by the Corporation, which he claimed at 
times had put the workers' interests ahead of its own. He admitted that the men had not 
been able to cash their cheques in over a month, but claimed this was a minor matter since 
''for purposes of bookkeeping," the pay was always two weeks late anyway. He blamed 
the discontent among the miners on the merchants, claiming that "but for the merchants 
there would be no trouble with the men." Kelleher also stated that ''the men have no 
reason for complaint as the only alternative is the dole and they are better off working for 
the Company than living on dole." The Parish Priest, Father Thome, had reportedly "done 
his best in keeping the men contented and optimistic," and "smoothed over whatever 
trouble and contention there has appeared in the past." The priest conceded that in some 
cases miners and their families were worse off in 193 7 than in 1932, but did not lay the 
blame entirely on Seibert or the Corporation. According to Howse, the priest was of the 
opinion that "if the men worked as hard in the gardens as he [the priest] does in his that 
they would not be so completely at the mercy ofMr. Seibert."77 
According to the group of five miners with whom Howse met, the non-payment of 
wages and the debt situation were the main issues in the June walkout. They explained 
that on 20 April1937 they had presented Seibert with a list of demands, including a wage 
increase to about $2.40 per shift (or 30 cents an hour), an increase of about 33 per cent. 
77
"Report on Investigation of Conditions at St. Lawrence," 8 June 1937, GN38, S-1-
11, File 1 (NR44-37), PANL. 
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The St. Lawrence workers had received no formal response to their April request, but had 
heard a nunour that Seibert was prepared to offer only a 10 per cent increase, which 
would bring the average wage to about 25 cents an hour, or $2.00 per shift. By way of 
comparison, workers at the Bell Island mines were earning an average of$2.55 per shift at 
this time, while some underground workers were earning up to $3.20 a shift if they 
qualified for bonus pay based on the amount of ore hoisted.78 Frustrated by the 
management's refusal to reply to their demands, on 1 June the Corporation men had 
walked off the job. Many of them claimed they had no food in their homes despite having 
a month's work to their credit. Ranger Davis, who was also the Relieving Officer, 
substantiated the claims of the merchants and the miners but pointed out that, regardless 
ofhis personal inclinations, he was forbidden to issue relief to men who were, technically, 
on the company payroll, or who refused work. In other words, if the men were supposed 
to be getting paid but were not, then they were still employed and not entitled to relief, if 
they refused to work under these conditions, they were denied reliefbecause they had 
turned down "paying" work. The merchants claimed that while they would not see the 
people starve, they could no longer carry the accounts without some sort of security 
against default. Howse also inspected conditions in the mine and found them inadequate 
and dangerous. The Black Duck shaft, for example, was flooded up to 35 feet at the base 
and had been for most of the winter. As for inspection of the underground by mine 
78
"Report of a Visit by A.K. Snelgrove to the Wabana mines," 17 September, 1937, 
GN38, S6-1-3, File 42, PANL. 
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management, one foreman, a local man, stated that he had seen Kelleher underground only 
once in two years and that on that occasion Kelleher had been drunk. 79 
When the miners walked off the job on 1 June, the company responded by hiring a 
group of replacement workers, including contract miners and boys, mostly their sons. 
Howse noted that although the men were upset by the hiring of these replacements and by 
the overall situation, they were thus far ''very peaceful." He warned, however, that the 
men were nearing the end of their patience and noted that their attitude about Seibert and 
the Corporation had changed over time: 
Five years ago, when the operations began the men were prepared to 
accept reverses, hoping that conditions would improve. They have tried to 
help Mr. Seibert and have worked willingly with no prospect of immediate 
payment. However, conditions are quite as bad now as they were five 
years ago .... 75-80% of[the miners] are at present in debt. They are 
gradually leaning to the opinion that Seibert is using them as pawns and 
cares absolutely nothing about the welfare of the men. The Management 
has stated that the Company is one step ahead of the Commission of 
Government and now that they are on the property they will do as they 
please.80 
According to Howse, another factor contributing to the workers' sense of 
grievance was the apparent contrast between the Corporation and ANF. The minimum 
wage paid by the ANF Company was $2.50 per day. There was also a strong belief 
among the men that Seibert had received offers from E.J. Lavino and Company to 
79
"Report on Investigation of Conditions at St. Lawrence," 8 June 1937, GN38, S-I-
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purchase and take over the Corporation mines, which added to their frustration. Howse 
claimed to have witnessed women in the community going to church to pray for the new 
company to take over the operation. He stated that he knew that Seibert had received 
"liberal offers" from five companies, including E.J. Lavino and Company, and that the 
Secretary of Department ofNatural Resources had received copies of two of the offers. 
According to Howse, Seibert had refused all offers and "kept a community in the depths 
of poverty not because he could not get capital but because his avarice dictated terms 
which no capitalist could accept," and because his greed prompted him to take advantage 
ofthe economic condition ofthe people "knowing that they could not get dole while he 
offered them work." Noting that the government had thus far taken the position that little 
could be done by government to improve the situation at St Lawrence, Howse warned 
that conditions there had deteriorated to the point where "extraordinary measures are 
warranted." He suggested establishment of a minimum wage of25 cents per hour, a 
requirement for payment in cash twice a month, the dismissal of Kelleher and the 
appointment of a new manager with appropriate qualifications, a statement from the 
government to the Corporation demonstrating the government's awareness of the offers 
from various companies, and a warning to Seibert that should he persist in his approach, 
the government would to levy a property tax so high as to put him out of business 
inunediately and lead to the expropriation of the property.81 
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On 9 June, the day after Howse submitted his report and recommendations, a St. 
Lawrence merchant wrote to his St. John's supplier explaining that his account was in 
arrears because the Corporation had again failed to deposit cash in the bank, and asking 
the St. John's firm to bring the St. Lawrence situation to the attention of the Department 
ofNatural Resources. According to this merchant, several men who were still technically 
on the company payroll had recently applied for dole and been refused, and some had been 
forced to sell livestock and whatever else they could to obtain food. He also pointed out 
that the Corporation was taking advantage of the fact that the men had no choice and 
drew attention to the contrast between the Corporation and ANF: 
... the people are treated like a bunch of coolies, and have to accept it 
owing to the depression and nothing else to earn.... Seibert really put one 
over on the Natural Resources and they don't forget to boast of it .... The 
New Company (ANF) are as yet only prospecting and have about 13 men. 
They are regular guys and doing their work in business form. They pay 25 
cents hr. while Seibert only pays 17 Yz. If the fluorspar is on their claims 
no doubt Mr. Wallace tells me it will be a good boom for St. Lawrence.82 
The St. John's wholesaler forwarded this letter to Ewbank, the Commissioner for 
Natural Resources. In response to this letter and to the Howse report, the Department of 
Natural Resources wrote to Seibert in Nutley, New Jersey, outlining its concerns. The 
correspondence reminded Seibert of two previous letters which the Department had 
received from him regarding the situation at St. Lawrence. One letter, dated 16 October 
1936, had contained a promise from Seibert to increase wages the following May or June, 
82L.J. Saint, St. Lawrence to Stephenson, Royal Stores, St. John' s," 9 June 1937, GN 
38, Sl-11, File 1 (NR44-37), PANL. 
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and to take inunediate measures to begin paying the men in cash and on time. Another 
letter Seibert had sent to the Department on 16 June 1936, promised a wage increase and 
indicated the Corporation's plan to implement some kind of unemployment insurance to 
cover periodic shutdowns. The Department reminded Seibert that as of Howse's 
investigation in early June 1937 none of these measures had been adopted and that, instead 
of improving, conditions had in fact deteriorated since the preceding year. The conclusion 
to this letter from the Department to Seibert is revealing of the Department's position with 
respect to the situation at St. Lawrence. On the matter of wage payment, the letter seems 
primarily concerned with the fact that in many cases miners were not being paid at a rate 
or in a manner sufficient to enable them to live without government assistance. 83 
The government's focus on the issue of public relief in St. Lawrence must be 
viewed against the backdrop of its general approach to this issue. From its inception in 
1934, the Commission of Government had focused on reducing both the number of people 
on public relief and the amounts distributed to recipients. There is little doubt that when 
the Commission took power, the unemployment and public relief situation had reached 
crisis proportions. It was estimated that in the district of Harbour Grace in September 
83Department ofNatural Resources to Mr. W.E. Seibert, St. Lawrence Corporation, 
Nutley, N.J, GN38, S-1-11, File 1, (NR44-37), PANL. The letter is not dated, but the 
reference number (NR 44-3 7) indicates that it was written in 193 7 and its contents clearly 
show that it was written in direct response to the Howse investigation conducted during 
the first week in June. 
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1934, for example, 30 per cent of the population was in receipt of public relief.84 This, it 
must be noted, was before the onset of winter, when the numbers invariably increased. 
Though there was considerable fluctuation from place to place and over the course of 
time, the situation was rarely much better in other parts of the colony, especially outside 
the fishing season. The relief system in Newfoundland up to this point was administered 
by the central government, on a mostly ad hoc basis, and was intended primarily to meet 
the needs of the infirm, the aged, widows, and others who could clearly not look after 
themselves and had no family or other resources to turn to.85 Neither the Newfoundland 
state apparatus nor the treasury was capable of coping with the growing demands on able-
bodied relief in the early 1930s. 
The Commission of Government' s response to this question must be understood in 
part within the context of the situation in Great Britain at the time and the way in which 
the public relief system had evolved there. The British system had emerged out of a series 
84Records of the Dominions Office (DO), 35/499/Pt. 2/1934, CNS. 
85For an account ofthe evolution of public relief in Newfoundland during the 1920s, 
see James Overton, "Self-Help, Charity, and Individual Responsibility: the Political 
Economy of Social Policy in Newfoundland in the 1920s," in Twentieth-Century 
Newfoundland: Explorations, James Hiller and Peter Neary, eds. (St. John' s: 
Breakwater, 1994), 79-122. On other government measures to reduce unemployment and 
public relief: and public reaction to them, see Overton, "Moral Education of the Poor: 
Adult Education and Land Settlement Schemes in Newfoundland in the 1930's," 
Newfoundland Studies 11, 2 (Fall 1995), 25-82; Overton, "Public Relief and Social Unrest 
in Newfoundland in the 1930's: An Evaluation of the Ideas ofPiven and Cloward," 
Canadian Journal of Sociology 13, 1-2 (Winter-Spring 1998), 143-69; and Gordon 
Handcock, "The Commission of Government' s Land Settlement Scheme in 
Newfoundland," in Hiller and Neary, eds., Twentieth-Century Ne»foundland, 123-52. 
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of compromises and adjustments embodied in such measures as the Unemployed 
Workmen Act of1905, the National Insurance Act of1911, and the Out-of-Work 
Donation Scheme of 1918. These and other measures were motivated by several factors, 
including the political pressure brought to bear by the working-class and unemployed vote, 
and the obvious inadequacy of the old system of Poor Law relief through local agencies in 
dealing with mass, long-term unemployment. By the time the National Government was 
formed in 1931, the unemployed in Great Britain had been divided into two basic groups: 
the temporarily unemployed, who were insured for a given period; and the long-term 
unemployed, who were subject to a means test to qualify for state assistance. The latter 
group included many able-bodied unemployed, who were required to meet certain 
conditions, including proof that they had sought employment and not turned down any 
employment offered to them, in order to qualify for state assistance.86 Several important 
principles were embodied in the legislation pertaining to this latter group. One was a 
qualified acceptance of the state's responsibility for maintaining the able-bodied, long-term 
unemployed. Also, the stipulations on qualifYing effectively institutionalized the 
distinction between the ''deserving" and the ''undeserving" poor, and gave state 
administrators the power to draw that distinction based upon an examination of each case. 
The Depression-era approach to public relief also strengthened the principle of "less 
eligibility," which had long been a characteristic of the British system. Under this 
86W.R. Garside, British Unemployment, 1919-1939: A Study in Public Policy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 32-65. 
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approach, public relief policy was designed so that persons in receipt would ideally be kept 
at a living standard below that of the lowest paid worker. Public relief was thus designed 
to be so unattractive as to compel persons to seek and retain almost any kind of 
employment. During the Depression the government of Great Britain adopted measures 
designed to force all "voluntary unemployed back into the labour market, making them 
accept less attractive jobs at lower wages."87 
This also became a prominent feature of the Canadian system during this period. 
In Cana~ as one historian has described it, the goal of the less-eligibility doctrine as it 
was applied during the 1930s was not so much to maintain the able-bodied poor as to 
"preserve the motivation of those who worked, particularly those in the worst jobs society 
bad to offer."88 One crucial difference between Newfoundland and both Canada and Great 
Britain was that in Newfoundland there was no official means for the population to impose 
sanctions on the government and its policies. In Canada, for example, the electorate 
expressed its opinion of the R.B. Bennett government' s unemployment and public relief 
policies by ousting it from office in 1935 and replacing it with the government of 
Mackenzie King. Governed by a body ofunelected officials, and with no elections 
pending at any specific time in the future, Newfoundlanders bad no such recourse. 
87Noel Whiteside, Bad Times: Unemployment in British Social and Political History 
(London 1991), 83. 
88James Struthers, No Fault of their Own: Unemployment and the Canadian Welfare 
State, 1914-1941 (University ofToronto Press 1983), 6-7. 
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In addition to the fact that they were operating within this established approach to 
the issues of unemployment and public relief: the Commission of Government was also 
under considerable pressure from the British government itself From its inception, the 
Commission was required to submit frequent, detailed reports on public relief: and to 
justifY all expenditures. It was also pressured to reduce the numbers on public relief: and 
to explain any increase in those numbers. In October 1934, for example, Hope Simpson 
was forced to explain to the Dominions Office why it had been impossible, despite the 
Commission's best efforts, to completely eliminate able-bodied relief to fishermen during 
that summer past. 89 Many of the demands placed on the Commission of Government were 
created by political pressure within Great Britain, where the government was forced to 
explain expenditures in a distant former colony when the situation at home was so 
desperate. Another memo, also from October 1934, illustrates the various pressures under 
which the Commission was operating: an official of the Dominions Office thanked the 
Commission for providing information on the employment situation in Newfoundland, as it 
would help answer some potentially "awkward" questions in Parliament, but also 
demanded that the Commission provide a more specific outline of its plans for the public 
relief system 90 
8~omas Lodge, Commissioner for Public Utilities, to P .A. Clutterbuck, Dominions 
Office, 19 October 1934, DO 35/499/N1 028/4, CNS. 
90P .A. Clutterbuck, Dominions Office, to Thomas Lodge, Commissioner for Public 
Utilities, 19 October, 1934, D035/499, CNS. 
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In response to this request, the Commission outlined the system as it then 
operated. The 121 Relieving Officers (many of whom were Rangers) who had been 
stationed throughout the country had been ordered to investigate all applications and, if 
approved, grant the applicant a dole order to acquire goods, on the approved scale, from 
the nearest store. The store owner in turn sent the dole orders to St. John's for payment. 
The great advantage of this system, it was pointed out, was that it enabled the Department 
of Public Health and Welfare ''to maintain a thorough check and prevent collusion 
between the Storekeeper and the Relieving Officer.'>91 In keeping with its overriding 
mandate to reduce expenditure in this area, the Department of Public Health and Welfare 
set strict guidelines for the granting and administration of relief. A 1934 memorandum, 
for instance, set out strict guidelines for the type and quantity of foods to be administered 
to recipients, and in 193 5 Relieving Officers were reminded to be very careful in 
distributing clothing to the outports in winter, as the government suspected ample 
opportunities for abuse. Outport officials were ordered to investigate every claim, issue 
relief only when and to whom it was absolutely necessary, and distribute the absolute 
minimum.92 
91P A. Clutterbuck, Dominions Office, to E.B. Speed, Treasury, 17 November 1934, 
D035/499/1 028/4, CNS. 
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With regard to the Burin Peninsula in particular, an August 193 7 report suggested 
that what was required in the town of Burin, where unemployment and poverty were 
particularly bad owing to the failure of the fishery, was "a stricter guy," who would act on 
the government's orders that "every possible man should be gotten off relief whole or part 
time." Likewise, in Marystown the Relieving Officer was ordered to check on "slackers" 
who refuse or abandon work on ''the usual flimsy pretexts of unpleasant or 
unremunerative activities." With respect to St. Lawrence, the report stated that, 
... the two mining companies operating at St. Lawrence are absorbing 
practically all the able-bodied labor available. Rates and conditions of 
payment do not appear to be very satisfactory, but the men are at least self-
supporting. The future of the operation appears somewhat uncertain, as far 
as one of the companies is concerned, though the two may presently 
amalgamate. If the work does cease or if it is curtailed to any material 
extent, much destitution will almost certainly prevail with consequent large 
demands on us for public relief. 93 
Given the extent to which the government relied on the St. Lawrence mines to help 
accomplish its over-riding goal of reducing the numbers on public relief, it is not surprising 
that little action was taken to address issues of working conditions and wages. The 
government seemed content to ignore these issues provided the mines were keeping 
people off the relief rolls. From its perspective, perhaps any serious attempt to address 
problems in the St. Lawrence mines might jeopardize the industry, especially given the 
apparently precarious financial position of the Corporation. That may explain why the 
93Report on the relief situation on the Burin Peninsula and the south coast," August, 
1937, GN38, S6-l-2, File 4, PANL. 
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government took such a half-hearted approach in confronting Seibert about conditions at 
St. Lawrence. While the letter sent to Seibert after the Howse report in 193 7 outlined 
various problems at the mines and reminded him of his failed promises to improve 
conditions there, it concluded by simply stating that, "Government is concerned at the 
continuance of the state of affairs," and asking Seibert to inform the Department "at a very 
early date what steps you propose to take to remedy the situation. •>94 
While government officials circulated memos regarding the logistics and cost of 
safety inspections, and issued vague threats to Seibert, conditions at St. Lawrence grew 
steadily worse. 
In 1938, flooding and other problems forced the Iron Springs operation 
underground, where conditions were reportedly worse even than those at Black Duck. 
The Iron Springs vein was exceptionally rich, but it was also very narrow, so much so that 
in many places the sides of wheelbarrows had to be bent inward to fit through the 
underground tunnels. One miner who worked underground at Iron Springs in the late 
1930s described conditions there: 
At Iron Springs dry hammers were also in use, and the drillers were forced 
to drill from a timbered scaffold .... The dust and smoke was always so 
thick that one could not see the driller until you walked right up to him. ... 
there were more drills in operation, and the fluorspar only averaged 30 
inches, which meant that the mine was exceptionally narrow with no space 
for expansion or thinning of the dust and smoke.... The miners had to walk 
up and down ladders and ... during the winter months the miners were 
94Department ofNatural Resources to Mr. W.E. Seibert, St. Lawrence Corporation, 
Nutley, N.J, GN38, S-1-11, File 1, (NR44-37), PANL. 
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forced, because of heavy snowstorms, to walk the three miles to and from 
the mine.95 
Mike O'Leary, who had started work as an ore-sorter when he was sixteen years old, 
made the move to underground work at Iron Springs when he was eighteen, as was the 
custom at that time. He also described conditions at Iron Springs as very bad, especially 
in tenns of dust and the lack of ventilation: 
No ventilation at all whatsoever.... When you'd drill off a round of ore, 
when you'd go back to look at it was right snow white ... just the same as it 
was after snowing in there, stuck all in the walls and everywhere. Nothing, 
no masks at all, one thing was never ever thought about was a mask. And 
they used to drill dry then in the late Thirties when I went down there and 
the early Forties ... A fellow come up from drilling you'd never know who 
he was when he came up, he'd be right snow white very bit of him. When 
you'd be eating you could feel the ore under your teeth, it was in your 
mouth and falling out of your hair and you could feel it grinding under your 
teeth.96 
After working at various capacities at both Black Duck and Iron Springs for a few years, 
O'Leary gave up mining and went back to fishing full time, a decision prompted in part by 
his belief that something in the mine was very bad for those who worked there and by his 
own experience of the health problems associated with work in the mines: 
I knew that there was something down there because when I went in the 
mine after fishing all the summer up to November ... after you'd get there 
for a couple of months you'd start losing your appetite and the strength 
would go, you'd start losing the strength in your legs, and you'd find it 
hard to breathe... No doctor here then, only a nurse.... Everyone knew 
95Slaney, More Incredible than Fiction, 6. 
96Interview with Mike O'Leary, Little St. Lawrence, 26 October 1997, conducted by 
the author. 
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there was something, but no one complained, that was their way of life and 
no one complained about it. If you didn't do that you do anything .... You 
had no other choice ... if you weren't set up for fishing. I'd be dead 40 
years ago only for my father, that's who kept me alive. He'd do the gear 
d rything . h . . 97 an eve m t e wmtertJ.Il1e .... 
The ANF operation was reportedly better equipped and better planned than were 
the Corporation mines. After acquiring its St. Lawrence properties in 193 7, ANF had 
sunk an 85-foot exploratory shaft at the Tarefare vein, but in 1938, the Tarefare work was 
discontinued and the focus shifted to the Director vein. By 1939 the developmental shaft 
at Director vein had reached 150 feet, and 800 feet of drifting (horizontal tunnelling) had 
been carried out. To this point, the work had been mostly developmental and exploratory, 
and while some ore had been mined and hoisted, none had been shipped. Workers at ANF 
reportedly had the benefit of mucking machines (used to transport broken ore), electric 
jackhammers and other powered equipment.98 
The ANF operation, while technically superior to the Corporation's, was not, 
however, without its problems in terms of health hazards. In Septemberl939, the 
Department of Public Health and Welfare tested water samples obtained by an official of 
the Department Natural Resources from the ANF mines, and found they contained "a high 
state of pollution." The Department noted that of the twenty men employed by ANF, five 
97Interview with Mike O'Leary, Little St. Lawrence, 26 October 1997, conducted by 
the author. 
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were seriously ill with diarrhoea, and that many of the Corporation's 100 employees were 
suffering from the same condition. The Department considered this a very serious 
situation and feared ''the possibility of an outbreak of typhoid. "99 
While the Department was concerned about this problem, there was little that 
could be done under the Public Health and Welfare regulations as they existed in 1939. A 
comprehensive Public Health and Welfare Act introduced in 1931 had given the 
Department the power to inspect all "mining, lumbering [and] wood cutting" 
establishments, and required operators to provide adequate ventilation, clean drinking 
water, toilet facilities, eating quarters, first aid facilities and, in establishments with more 
than 50 employees, a physician. 100 The 1931 Act would have empowered the Department 
to force operators at St. Lawrence to provide safe and adequate drinking and toilet 
facilities. In 1938, however, the 1931 Act was amended when the government passed 
regulations respecting medical and sanitary conditions in logging camps. The 1938 
amendment was meant to suppress growing unrest among loggers and to address the 
findings of a 1934 Commission oflnquiry into conditions at logging camps. 101 The 1938 
99<'Memorandum respecting the report by Dr. J. St. P. Knight regarding the condition 
of the water supplies at the workings of the American-Newfoundland Fluorspar 
Corporation," 4 December 1939, GN38, S-6-1-2, File 12. (PHW 13-39), PANL. 
1~ewfoundland Public Health and Welfare Act, 1931 (Cap. 12, Geo. 5), Section 418-
433. 
101The 1934 inquiry was highly critical of the pulp and paper companies' treatment of 
its workers and of the conditions in the camps. The government suppressed the report and 
enacted a few watered-down versions of its recommendations. See Peter Neary, "The 
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amendments, however, repealed Sections 418-433 ofthe 1931 Act, so that regulations 
regarding industrial sites now pertained exclusively to logging camps and no longer 
applied to mines and other industrial operations. 102 The Department of Public Health and 
Welfare expressed its frustration over this state of affairs to the Department of Justice in 
December 1939. Referring specifically to the situation at St. Lawrence, the Department of 
Public Health and Welfare pointed out that, 
You will note that it is the doctor's contention that this department should 
take some steps to enforce the correction of the condition mentioned by the 
Company concerned. We are not now in a legal position to do this. 
Before the act respecting medical treatment of loggers was passed there 
was a provision in the Health and Public Welfare Act empowering this 
department to deal with unsanitary conditions and conditions of ill health at 
any industrial camp. When the new act was passed this provision was 
wiped out altogether so that we now have no jurisdiction ... in connection 
with industrial undertakings such as those at St. Lawrence. 103 
The Department of Public Health and Welfare pointed out that in the absence of 
legislation the government could do little but hope that the companies involved would 
Bradley Report on Logging Operations in Newfoundland, 1934: a Suppressed 
Document," Labour/Le Travai/,16 (Fall1985), 193-232. On the history ofNewfoundland 
loggers and their labour activities, see Dufferin Sutherland, "A Social History of 
Pulpwood Logging in Newfoundland During the Great Depression," MA thesis, Memorial 
University ofNewfoundland, 1988; Dufferin Sutherland, ''Newfoundland Loggers 
Respond to the Great Depression," Labour/Le Travai/29 (Spring 1992), 81-116; and 
Dufferin Sutherland, '"We are only Loggers' : Loggers and the Struggle for Development 
in Newfoundland, 1929-1959," PhD thesis, Simon Fraser University, 1995. 
102 An Act Respecting Sanitation and Medical Attendance in Logging Camps, Act No. 
47, 1931. 
103Department of Public Health and Welfare to Department of Justice, 15 December 
1939, GN38, S6-2-1 , File 12, PANL. 
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look after such matters on their own initiative and out of concern for the health and safety 
of their workers. Apparently not convinced that operators would do so, the Department 
urged the restoration of the original legislation on industrial sites. 104 
2.4 Conclusion 
When the fluorspar mining industry had been established in St. Lawrence in 1933, 
economic circumstances meant that the people were willing to undergo extreme sacrifices 
in the hope of developing an industry for their town. These circumstances left the people 
of St. Lawrence vulnerable to exploitation by Seibert and the Corporation management, 
and contributed to the deplorable working conditions they were forced to endure 
throughout the 1930s. The one party upon which they might have relied for protection 
and support, the government, was at best ineffective and at worst a contributor to their 
plight. The mines regulations in place were inadequate, outdated and not enforced. There 
was no system for the regular inspection of mines and the government's concern with 
fiscal restraint deterred it from establishing such a system and hiring a qualified inspector, 
despite the fact that its own Geological Division and an inspector brought in from Ontario 
in 1936 urged it to do so. Moreover, the government' s overriding concern with the 
reduction of public relief expenditure made it very reluctant to take a hard stand on issues 
ofworking conditions and wages, and the public relief regulations also contributed to the 
104Department ofPublic Health and Welfare to Department of Justice, 15 December 
1939, GN38, S6-2-1, File 12, PANL. 
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vulnerability of workers in St. Lawrence. Workers did not, however, passively accept 
these conditions. On several occasions they voiced their concerns and demanded 
improvements. Despite these efforts, and those of other parties, including merchants and 
some government officials, by the end of the 1930s there had been no improvement. The 
introduction of underground mining had in fact exposed workers to worse health hazards 
than had been present in the open-cut mines, and by 1939 the effects of these working 
conditions were beginning to become apparent. 
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Chapter 3: Industry Fluctuation, Labour Relations, 
and Occupational Health and Safety during the Second World War 
Introduction 
This chapter examines the period from 1939 to 1945, a pivotal and complex one in 
the history of industry, labour, and health and safety in St. Lawrence. An increase in the 
demand for fluorspar accompanying the outbreak of war led to a rapid expansion ofthe 
mining industry, including the establishment of another major mining enterprise in St. 
Lawrence. Within the context of industry expansion and a general revival in the 
Newfoundland labour movement, in 1939 St. Lawrence workers formed their first union 
and were soon involved in a succession of labour disputes over issues of union 
recognition, wages, and working conditions. A series of strikes during 1941 led to 
government intervention under special wartime measures. Through the Trade Dispute 
Board hearings, and in subsequent collective agreements, the union won some important 
concessions in such areas as recognition and wages. A industry decline beginning in 1944, 
however, had a detrimental effect on its bargaining position, so that it could do little but 
try to hold on to the few advances it had won. Furthermore, while there were qualified 
victories in other areas, little progress was made in the realm of occupational health and 
safety. Explicit complaints and repeated calls for action by workers and the union 
throughout this period continued to be trivialized and dismissed. The government 
continued to ignore pleas from even its own officials to update health and safety 
legislation, introduce a proper inspection service , and upgrade medical facilities. 
3.1 The Establishment ofNewfoundland Fluorspar Limited 
After carrying out some developmental work on the properties it had acquired in 
1937, by 1939 ANF had decided that to start mining and shipping fluorspar from St. 
Lawrence would involve considerably more time and money than it was willing to invest. 1 
In December 1939, ANF reached a deal with Alcan for the sale of its St. Lawrence 
holdings, and on 21 December Alcan incorporated a subsidiary, Newfoundland Fluorspar 
Limited (''Newfluor") to oversee its St. Lawrence operations. 2 
Alcan originated in 1902 as Northern Aluminum Limited, a Canadian branch of the 
Pittsburgh Reduction Company, which by 1906 had established what was then one of the 
world's largest aluminum plants at Shawinigan, Quebec. In 1907, the Pittsburgh 
Reduction Company's name was changed to the Aluminum Company of America (Alcoa), 
and in 1925 Northern Aluminum became the Aluminum Company of Canada (Alcan). 
Taking advantage of a ready supply ofhydro-electric power (a key factor in aluminum 
production) in the Saguenay region, Alcan embarked on a major expansion of its Quebec 
holdings, including construction of an aluminum smelter and town site at Arvida (which 
got its name from company president Arthur Vining Davis). Raw materials for the Arvida 
smelter were shipped by sea to Port Arthur, and transported from there by Alcan' s 
privately-owned railroad. While the early 1930s were relatively lean years for Alcan, rapid 
1E.J. Lavino, E.J. Lavino and Company, to Warren Smith, Manager, American-
Newfoundland Fluorspar, St. Lawrence, 28 March 1939, AA. 
2
"Resume of negotiations for Newfoundland fluorspar properties," 31 July 1940, AA. 
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growth in aircraft manufacturing and other aluminum-consuming industries in the late 
1930s increased demand for raw aluminum in the United States, Great Britain and Canada. 
From 1937 to 1939, both the value of Alcan's assets and its net annual income doubled.3 
Alcan's interest in St. Lawrence fluorspar, therefore, was as a raw material for its 
Arvida aluminum plant. Alcan retained Warren Smith, who had directed the ANF 
exploration program, as manger ofNewfluor. Newtluor focused on the Director vein, and 
by July, 1940 the Director shaft was down to 150 feet with approximately 2,000 feet of 
3.2 Union Formation, the Struggle for Recognition. and Health and Safety, 1939-1941 
Coinciding with these industry changes, important developments were also taking 
place on the labour relations front. In August 1939, amid concerns about the state of 
drinking water and other health and safety issues, workers formed the St. Lawrence 
3See, Isaiah A. Litvak and Christopher J. Maule, Royal Commission on Corporate 
Concentration, Study No. 13: A/can Aluminum Limited (Ottawa: Carleton University, 
1977), 27-54; Luc Cote, Les Enjeux du Travail A L'Alcan, 1901-1951 (Hull: Editions 
Asticou, 1990), 82-93; Duncan Campbell, Mission Mondiale: Histoire d'Alcan (Ontario 
Publishing Company,1985), Volume 1, 333-4; Steven Kendall Holloway, The Aluminum 
Multinationals and the Bauxite Cartel (St. Martin's Press: New York, 1988), 12-13; and 
Sterling Brubaker, Trends in the World Aluminum Industry (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
Press, 1967), 101-23. On the establishment and growth of Arvida, see Jose Igartua, 
Arvida au Saguenay: Naissance d'une ville industrielle (Kingston and Montreal: MeGill-
Queen's Press, 1996). 
4
''Resume of negotiations for Newfoundland fluorspar properties, "31 July 1940, AA, 
and "History of Operations ofNewfoundland Fluorspar Limited," 1966, AA. 
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Miners and Labourers Protective Union (SLMLPU) under the leadership of a local 
businessman named Patrick Aylward.5 Aylward later stated that he had been asked by 
several miners during the summer of 1939 to help form a union, and that the union was 
officially registered shortly after its formation. 6 
While the formation of the SLMLPU was a direct response to conditions at St. 
Lawrence, it can also be viewed as part of a general resurgence of the Newfoundland 
labour movement during the latter half of the 1930s, as Newfoundland workers in many 
sectors began to rebel against the harsh working conditions, low wages, and repressive 
labour relations climate that had marked the Depression years. 7 One indication of this 
revival was the 1936 formation of the Newfoundland Trades and Labour Council (NTLC), 
which changed its name to the Newfoundland Federation ofLabour in 1939.8 From 1935 
5 Aylward was a merchant who also ran a cod-liver oil processing plant in the 
community; there is no indication that he was ever directly involved in the mining industry. 
6<•Report made by Magistrate N. Short on the subject of a dispute between the St. 
Lawrence Corporation ofNewfoundland Ltd., and the St. Lawrence Miners and 
Labourers Protective Union," 23 May 1940, GN38, S5-4-1, File 5, PANL. 
7Among the earliest and most militant participants in this revival were Newfoundland 
loggers, who organized under the Newfoundland Loggers' Association (NLA) and held a 
series of strikes and protests from 1934 to 1937 to demand improvements in wages and 
working conditions. See Sutherland, "Newfoundland Loggers Respond to the Great 
Depression," and Sutherland, "A Social History of Pulpwood Logging in Newfoundland 
During the Great Depression." 
8Following the NTLC's initial organizing drive, the 1938 Labour Day Parade in St. 
John' s was the biggest in 40 years, with over 4,000 participants from 22 unions joining in 
the march. Throughout the late 1930s, the NTLC exerted pressure on the Newfoundland 
government to introduce labour reforms, including a new Trade Union Act (which had 
undergone no substantial changes since its inception in 191 0), establishment of a separate 
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to 1939, total union membership in Newfoundland grew from 8,760 to 27,059, and on the 
eve of the Second World War Newfoundland had one of the highest rates of unionization 
in North America.9 The 1939 formation of the St. Lawrence union was therefore part of a 
wave of union organizing sweeping the island at that time. 
By December 1939, the St. Lawrence union had issued several demands to the 
Corporation for improvements in working conditions, particularly with respect to drinking 
water and sanitation. 10 The management initially responded with paternalistic measures 
designed to appease the workforce. The company hosted a Christmas party, for instance 
(attended by supervisory personnel and their wives), at which the manager announced a 1 0 
per cent wage increase, described as a "Xmas box," for all employees. One observer 
applauded the company for the gesture of "good will thus shown toward workmen," and 
noted that the wage increase was significant in that it was ''voluntary'' and thus 
contributed to "the happy relations so much to be desired between capital and labour."11 
Labour Department (whose duties were now subsumed under Public Utilities), and a new 
Mines Regulation Act. Gillespie, A Class Act, 69-75. 
9Gregory S. Kealey, "The History and Structure of the Newfoundland Labour 
Movement: Background Report Prepared for Royal Commission on Employment and 
Unemployment, Newfoundland and Labrador" (1986), 113, 16. 
10Ranger V.P. Du:ffs Report on Conditions at the Fluorspar Mine, St. Lawrence, 5 
December 1939, GN38, S6-1-2, File 40, PANL. The Ranger noted that neither the 
Corporation nor ANF had taken steps to provide adequate facilities for their employees. 
11Evening Telegram, 5 January 1940. The article did not mention that this 10 per cent 
was the increase Seibert had been promising since 1937 and was considerably less than 
that which the workers had been demanding for several years. 
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At least one other observer took a different view, asking why, if such good 
relations existed between the Corporation and its employees, 90 per cent of workers 
joined the union ''within three hours" of its formation in August 1939, and pointing to 
several instances of the Corporation's refusal to recognize and negotiate with the union. 
This observer also pointed out that the 10 per cent pay increase was 10 per cent less than 
that demanded by the union and would do little to bring the wages of St. Lawrence miners 
up to the level received by other Newfoundland miners. Some men in St. Lawrence, it 
was stated, received as little as 19 cents an hour. This person suggested that the pay raise 
was a direct response to the formation of the union, and an attempt on the Corporation's 
part to put a good public face on a bad situation. 12 
The pay raise also did nothing to address ongoing health concerns. In January 
1940, the Department ofPublic Health and Welfare expressed concern that conditions at 
the St. Lawrence mines were affecting the health of workers. The Department noted that 
possible cases of lung diseases, such as silicosis, were beginning to surface at Buchans and 
that similar problems might exist at St. Lawrence. Referring to conditions described in a 
Ranger Report of December 1939, the Department also expressed fear that, ' 'the insanitary 
surroundings and unhealthy water supplies are likely to cause an outbreak of typhoid or 
12
"St. Lawrence Mining Matters," Evening Telegram, 1 February 1940, 12-13. The 
letter is signed "Courage Sans Peur." 
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other communicable disease at any time."13 
This concern was compounded by the fact that there was still no hospital or doctor 
in St. Lawrence. According to the Department of Public Health and Welfare, the 
Corporation had been approached for assistance in establishing medical facilities, but had 
been "absolutely non-cooperative" in this regard. The Corporation, the Department 
noted, had made no provisions to deal with "any emergency that may occur as a result of 
the hazardous employment in which the men are engaged," and the government was 
powerless to force the company to provide medical services since ''we can do so only in 
connection with logging operations .... 14 
By the spring of 1940, relations between the Corporation and its employees had 
deteriorated to the point where the District Magistrate was ordered by the Commissioner 
for Public Utilities, Sir Wilfrid Woods, to conduct an investigation. 15 The magistrate's 
inquiry was held in St. Lawrence from 22 to 24 April, at which time the union had 240 
13Department of Public Health and Welfare to Department ofNatural Resources, 15 
January 1940, GN38, S6-1-2, File 40, P ANL. The Commissioner for Natural Resources 
was now John Henry Gorvin, who had replaced Ewbank in May 1939. A native of 
England, Gorvin had come to Newfoundland in 1937 to advise the Commission on rural 
reconstruction. Gorvin served as Commissioner for Public Utilities until June 1941, when 
he was replaced by Peter D.H. Dunn, a native of Scotland who had served in various 
capacities with the Commission since 1935. 
14Department ofPublic Health and Welfare to Department ofNatural Resources, 15 
January 1940, GN38, S6-l-2, File 40, PANL. 
15Woods, an Englishmen with ample experience as a colonial administrator, replaced 
Thomas Lodge as Commissioner for Public Utilities in Jariuary 193 7, and served in that 
post untill944. 
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members. This included 95 per cent of the 150 workers employed by the Corporation at 
that time, plus others who found periodic work, retaining their membership and paying 
back-dues when employed.16 
The inquiry revealed that Corporation management had steadfastly refused to 
negotiate with the union since its formation in August of the previous year. In October 
1939, for instance, Aylward had asked Corporation manager Donald Poynter (an 
American who had recently replaced Kelleher) to advise non-union employees then with 
the company (about 5 per cent of the workforce at that time) to join the union, as this 
issue was causing much agitation, especially to union members who were unemployed. 
Aylward also requested that official communications be established between the union and 
the company. In a statement indicative of his preference to keep labour relations at an 
individual, personal level, Poynter responded that, 
this office has always been open to any employee ... to discuss any problem 
whatever, and in view of this I cannot agree to meet with you to discuss 
anything but the general St. Lawrence welfare, and will discuss company 
and employee problems with company employees only.17 
Having made no progress dealing with Poynter, in March 1940 Aylward had approached 
Seibert, asking outright whether his company intended to recognize the union and warning 
him that, having tried peaceful means to establish relations, the union was prepared to take 
16<'Report by Magistrate Short," 23 May 1940. 
17
"Report by Magistrate Short," 23 May 1940. 
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an alternative route. There was no reply.18 
At the magistrate's inquiry, Aylward testified that only the "dread of poverty" had 
kept many men from complaining more openly about their working conditions. The 
problems he listed included a lack of proper sanitation facilities and drinking water, 
inadequate mine ventilation, which had caused "suffocation" in many cases, dangerously 
sub-standard hoisting equipment, and a common practice of working a man so hard that 
he soon became disabled and was simply replaced by another man. On all of these 
matters, he stated, the Corporation had refused to even enter negotiations. 19 
The eight employees who gave testimony at the inquiry substantiated Aylward's 
claims regarding working conditions and labour practices. One miner testified that the 
hoisting system at Black Duck was very dangerous and that his only source of drinking 
water was ''through the compressors," meaning that he got it from a hose that supplied 
water to cool the air compressors. Another man testified that at Iron Springs there was no 
ventilation apart from compressed air. That is, men sometimes removed an air hose from a 
piece of air-powered equipment and breathed the air from the hose. The air in the mine, 
he stated, was very bad, and recently a man had to be revived with compressed air when 
he passed out underground. Asked whose responsibility it was to monitor and oversee the 
ventilation of the mine, he replied that he did not know. Another stated that, "We have no 
18
"Report by Magistrate Short," 23 May 1940. 
19
"Report by Magistrate Short," 23 May 1940. 
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ventilation in our mine," and that two men had recently fainted illlderground for lack of 
air. Others testified that the manager had threatened to fire them if they complained about 
working conditions. For instance, one man, a shoveller in the mill, testified that when he 
had complained to his foreman that the work was too much for one man, he was told that 
if he could not do the work he could easily be replaced. Yet another stated that he was 
afraid to complain, "Because I have a family to support and I am unable to find any easier 
work. I won't make any complaints because I am afraid I would be fired." Another 
testified that he had recently been dismissed because he complained to the union about his 
working conditions, and was later told by Poynter that, "Well, you had a bad back and 
you're getting old .... [You are] no good for the mine any more." All who gave testimony 
stated that there were no toilet facilities, no sanitary drinking water, and no adequate 
eating facilities. 20 
The description offered by Aylward and by the workers certainly calls into 
question the opinion expressed by the Public Utilities Commissioner shortly before the 
magistrate' s inquiry, that a mines inspection service was unnecessary since, "There is 
every evidence that the various managements of our operating mines take their mine safety 
responsibilities very seriously.21 Furthermore, it is unclear upon what this assessment was 
based, since there had been no inspection ofNewfoundland mines since 1936. 
2o."Report by Magistrate Short," 23 May 1940. 
21Mem.orandum from Wilfred Woods, Commissioner for Public Utilities, 6 March 
1940, GN 38, 85-1-2, File 8, P ANL. 
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Poynter, the Corporation manager, presented a very different description of the 
situation from the one presented by Aylward and the workers. Poynter claimed that the 
correspondence he had received from the union had been so vague that it was impossible 
to respond to it. Poynter also quoted from a letter he had received from Seibert stating 
that "I have enough correspondence, threats, etc., from Pat Aylward where, if I greased 
him a bit he would refrain from organizing the union and such correspondence would hang 
him."22 Poynter denied that the Corporation was anti-union, and claimed that the 
management "looks forward to the day when a real union of miners is formed." He also 
disputed claims that the Corporation had taken disciplinary action against men who had 
complained of their working conditions. 23 
On the question of sanitation, Poynter attempted to deflect criticism away from the 
company by denigrating conditions in the miners' homes, stating that, 
Sanitary arrangements, drinking water arrangements, and conditions under 
which men work are in my opinion equal to, if not better than they have in 
their own homes. When the time comes when St. Lawrence will take an 
interest in its own sanitation and drinking water and show evidence of this 
interest in their own homes, this Company will gladly give them the equal 
in their working conditions. 24 
Regarding inadequate ventilation at the mines, Poynter stated that it was "more than 
22There was no indication, in that correspondence or at the inquiry, what Seibert 
believed he had on Aylward. 
23
"Report by Magistrate Short," 23 May 1940. 
24
"Report by Magistrate Short," 23 May 1940. 
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adequate" and added, vaguely, that, "The entire ventilation scheme of this mine is 
following a definite plan that was conceived by a trained engineer."25 
When it was brought to Poynter's attention that the rates of pay at St. Lawrence 
were lower than those at other Newfoundland mines, he again tried to deflect criticism 
away from the company by attacking the men, stating that, ''we have been unable to find 
or develop men who would qua.lifY as miners," and ''we have also had great difficulty in 
finding men who could shovel a normal quantity of ore in a day"26 
The inquiry's findings seemed to present an ideal opportunity for government 
authorities to take some action to address the St. Lawrence situation. In his final report to 
the government, however, the magistrate failed to mention any ofthe specific grievances 
raised by Aylward and the workers concerning ventilation, sanitation, and other health and 
safety issues. Nor was there any reference to the fact that the men interviewed all claimed 
to have been subjected to work that was not only dangerous but physically punishing, or 
that the labour relations environment was such that they did not complain for fear of 
losing their jobs. The magistrate focused instead on the actions of the union, concluding 
that it had proceeded improperly in its attempt to gain recognition and that the president 
was incapable of controlling the membership. Instead of viewing is as the product oflong-
standing grievances, the magistrate depicted the antagonistic relationship between workers 
25
"Report by Magistrate Short," 23 May 1940. 
26
"Report by Magistrate Short," 23 May 1940. 
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and management as the recent product of a hostile and inexperienced union. He 
concluded that, 
A feeling has been created against the St. Lawrence Corporation. If the 
Union is to succeed, it must be prepared to discard its warlike actions ... 
[and] frame its demands in a reasonable and intelligent manner and be 
prepared to discuss them in friendly cooperation with the Corporation. It 
must ... have some knowledge of mining technique.... The present 
misunderstanding between the Union and the Corporation has developed 
because the Union officials lacked the ability or tact to present a favourable 
impression of their objects to the Corporation. 27 
Because it took this approach, the magistrate's report did nothing to address the serious 
health and safety concerns presented at the inquiry, and demonstrated yet again the 
government's propensity to side with the employer and its reluctance to act on behalf of 
the workers. 
Nor was the government taking any meaningful action on its professed desire to 
upgrade health and safety regulations and establish a mines inspectorate. In June 1940, 
two months after the magistrate's inquiry, A.E. Cave of Ontario was back in 
Newfoundland for another mines inspection. During Cave's visit to St. Lawrence, some 
contract mining was still being carried out by small groups of men who were advanced 
explosives and other supplies by the company. There was also still some open-cut mining 
being done by hourly employees, notably at the Blue Beach mine, the largest of the 
remaining open-cut operations. The shaft at Iron Springs mine was now down to 195 
feet, and an electric hoist had been installed for transporting men and ore. At Black Duck, 
27
"Report by Magistrate Short," 23 May 1940. 
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the shaft had been extended to 200 feet, and while there was a hoist for raising ore, men 
still climbed up and down ladders, through what is known as a "manway."28 
At the time of Cave's visit, the Corporation' s original washing and sorting mill at 
Black Duck had been abandoned and a new mill constructed nearer to the Iron Springs 
mine. Ore from the Corporation's main mines was brought to this new facility, known as 
the "Pinch Mill," in trucks, or by horse and sled from the smaller, contract mines. The mill 
was equipped with a crushing plant, a series of meshed screens and rollers (known as 
'jigs") for crushing the ore to the required size, before it was sent to another component 
known as the Heavy Media Separator (HMS).29 At the time of Cave's visit, the 
Corporation employed about 150 workers. 30 
At the Newfluor operation, Cave noted that the Director shaft was now down to 
150 feet, and there a hoist for raising ore and a manway for the men. The Director mine 
also had a "dryhouse" (for changing and drying clothes and for storing gear) and an assay 
28A.E. Cave, "Inspection Report on the Mining Operations in Newfoundland," 5 June-
21 June 1940, 5-21, DME. 
29 A HMS operates on the principle that all substances have a "specific gravity," a point 
at which they will sink or float when immersed in certain solutions. From the crushing 
station, therefore, the ore was immersed in a mixture of water and certain chemicals 
calculated to raise the concentration of CaF 2 in the end product by separating it from the 
waste through this sinking and floating process. The HMS plant therefore produced 
several grades of fluorspar, ranging (in highest to lowest) from "sinks" to "middlings" to 
''floats." The lower grades might be sent back through the HMS again depending on the 
grade required. G.F. Carr. "The Industrial Minerals ofNewfoundland," (St. John' s, 
Newfoundland Department ofMines and Technical Services, 1958), 59-60. 
30A.E. Cave, "Inspection Report on the Mining Operations in Newfoundland," 1940. 
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laboratory (for analyzing ore). A new shaft and a mill were planned for the near future. 
No ore was being hoisted at Director during Cave's visit, and no work was being done at 
the Tarefare shaft. Newfluor employed approximately 50 workers at this time.31 
Cave's specific recommendations regarding the St. Lawrence mines focused on 
hoisting practices, explosives, rockfalls, and escape routes. He also pointed to the need 
for clean drinking water and toilet facilities. On a more general note, Cave reiterated his 
1936 observations about the inadequacy of the Newfoundland regulations, and urged the 
government yet again to appoint a qualified inspector and establish a regular inspection 
service.32 Again, however, the government, took no action on these recommendations. 
Meanwhile, workers at St. Lawrence grew more frustrated by the lack of progress 
in areas of working conditions, wages, and union recognition. In early 1941, union 
treasurer Aloysius Turpin took advantage of this frustration to mount a challenge to 
Aylward's leadership. Turpin had worked as a contract miner for the Corporation and 
was a carpenter at the Corporation' s Blue Beach mine when he made his bid for the 
presidency. 33 In addition to the lack of progress on specific grievances, Turpin charged 
that there was no evidence the union had ever been formally registered or affiliated with 
3 1A.E. Cave, "Inspection Report on the Mining Operations in Newfoundland," 1940. 
32 A. E. Cave, "Inspection Report on the Mining Operations in Newfoundland," 1940. 
33Govemment ofNewfoundland, Eleventh Census of Newfoundland and Labrador, 
1945; and Interview with Aloyusius Turpin, MUNFLA. 
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the NFL, as Aylward had been claiming. 34 According to Turpin, these factors had turned 
many of the men against Aylward.35 
As an indication of the climate of fear which prevailed in St. Lawrence at this time, 
Turpin stated that he waited until Poynter went to New York before he called a 
membership meeting on 15 January 1941. "Poynter," he said, ''was against labour .... He 
wasn't supposed to know about the new union." One week after the meeting, at which 
Turpin was elected president, the newly formed St. Lawrence Workers' Protective Union 
(SLWPU) had 156 members, employees ofboth the Corporation and Newfluor, and more 
signed up during the following weeks. 36 The SL WPU was registered on 15 March 
194137, setting the stage for St. Lawrence workers to continue the battle for recognition 
and to take more formal action on their many grievances. 
3.3 The Labour Disputes of 1941 
On 17 March, just two days after official registration of the union, Turpin called 
34 Aylward had claimed at the magistrate's inquiry in 1940 that the union had received a 
charter from the NFL. 
35lnterview with Aloyusius Turpin, Montreal, 24 June 1967. Coll84-224, Tapes 
C7239, 7240,7241, MUNFLA. This is part of a series of interviews with various 
Newfoundland labour leaders which were originally part of the Hattenhauer Collection at 
the Centre for Newfoundland Studies. In support of Turpin's contention, there is no 
evidence in the archival or the published record that the union was registered. 
361nterview with Aloyusius Turpin, MUNFLA. 
37Interview with Aloysius Turpin, MUNFLA. 
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workers at both companies off the job in a dispute ostensibly about whether or not St. 
Patrick's Day would be observed as a holiday.38 While it involved a minor issue and lasted 
just two days, the St. Patrick's Day dispute was the starting point for a series of 
confrontations about a range of far more serious issues over the ensuing months. 
The Corporation responded to the March walkout by suspending for three days all 
of its workers who had been involved, while Newtluor took no disciplinary action.39 To 
the workers, these different responses were another example of what they perceived to be 
a general contrast between the two companies. From its arrival in 1939, many workers 
had considered the Newtluor operation superior to that the Corporation, in its mining 
methods, its facilities, it equipment, and in the fact that Newtluor paid its workers more 
andincash.40 
Another point of contrast, from the workers' perspective, was Newtluor' s reaction 
to the formation of the union. About one month after the St. Patrick' s Day walkout, 
Newtluor Manager Warren Smith informed the union in writing that Newfluor agreed to 
recognize the union and to meet with a delegation to discuss matters affecting their 
38lnterview with Aloysius Turpin, MUNFLA 
39Government ofNewfoundland, "Settlement ofTrade Dispute Board appointed ... for 
the settlement of a dispute between the St. Lawrence Corporation ofNewfoundland and 
the St. Lawrence Workers' Protective Union," 1942, 21 , and Interview with Aloysius 
Turpin, MUNFLA 
40See, for example, Rennie Slaney, More Incredible than Fiction, 8. 
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employees.41 The Corporatio~ however, remained intransigent, and in late April Turpin 
called Corporation workers off the job again over the issues of union recognitio~ the 
presence of non-union workers, alleged anti-union intimidatio~ wages, and working 
conditions. 42 
The union was also now demanding that hiring preference be given to residents of 
St. Lawrence, as several men from nearby communities, such as Little St. Lawrence ( 4 km 
east of St. Lawrence) and Lawn (12 km west) were now on the Corporation payroll. This 
issue would resurface in future negotiations, and was likely related to both the immediate 
need for employment and the circumstances surrounding establishment of the mining 
industry in the early 1930s. The people of St. Lawrence doubtless felt that the sacrifices 
they had made in establishing the industry entitled them to certain rights in such areas as 
hiring preference. It also points to the emergence of what historian Greg Patmore terms 
"localism": "an identity associated with a particular geographic 'space' which provides 
employment and social interaction." According to Patmore, scarcity - or feared scarcity-
of jobs and resources can give rise to a situation in which people seek to exclude 
"outsiders" from access to those jobs and resources on the basis of geographic origin.43 
41Smith to Turp~ 24 April1941, SLMM. 
42Turpin to Poynter, 5 May 1941, SLMM, 
43Greg Patmore, "Localism, Capital and Labour: Lithgow, 1869-1932," in Raymond 
Harbridge, et al, eds., Current Research in Industrial Relations: Proceedings of the 12'h 
Annual AIRAANZ Conference (New Zealand, 1998), 505. For a discussion oflocalism in 
another Newfoundland industrial town, see Botting, "Getting a Grand Falls Job," 127-38. 
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After about one week off the job, the men agreed to return to work, a decision 
taken after consultation with the District Magistrate and "in view of the present war 
conditions. ,..w The agreement to return was also conditional on the Corporation 
recognizing the union. Poynter would agree only to recognize the union as "the 
bargaining agent of your members who are our employees," which excluded those 
employees who were not members of the union.45 
Despite the Corporation's response, the employees returned to work on 6 May, 
agreeing to hold matters over for a month. The union then drafted a collective agreement 
calling for the employment of union members only, a six-day week and eight-hour shifts, 
overtime pay, and payment in cash and on time. The proposed agreement also demanded 
that ''the present unhealthy form of equipment namely the Dry Jack Hammer" be abolished 
and replaced by "proper wet drifters." The union also demanded the establishment of a 
Safety Committee with an equal number of union and company representatives with the 
power to investigate conditions and make recommendations to management, and to have 
an outside authority decide on any health and safety matter on which this committee could 
not reach agreement. The proposed agreement was forwarded to Commissioner Woods 
along with a request for the appointment of a Board of Enquiry into the situation at St. 
Lawrence. The union, it was pointed out, agreed to continue production pending the 
44Poynter to Turpin 5 May 1941, SLMM. 
45Poynter to Turpin 5 May 1941, SLMM. 
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appointment of such an enquiry. 46 
The union's demand for government intervention came at a time when the 
government was grappling to formu1ate a response to the recent resurgence of the 
Newfoundland labour movement and the impact of war on the labour relations climate. 
The Commission of Government had been, as one historian put it, "caught by surprise" by 
the sudden burst of union organizing during the late 1930s. "It had no labour department 
and knew nothing about the size, history or character of the Newfoundland labour 
movement.'>47 In 1938, the government had obtained the services of a conciliation officer 
with the British Department of Labour to study and make recommendations on the labour 
relations situation in Newfoundland. The Liddell report recommended that the 
government adopt a set of policies based on the British mode~ but before it had time to 
react events had once again overtaken the government.48 When the United Kingdom 
declared war on Germany in September 1939, Newfoundland was automatically a 
participant, and Newfoundland's entry into the war would bring sweeping changes to the 
colony. 
46P.J. Lewis (of the law form Barron and Lewis) to Woods, 27 May 1941, GN38, SS-
4-1, File 6, P ANL. 
47Gillespie, A Class Act, 75. 
48The report was published as T .K. Lidde~ The Industrial Survey of Neli(oundland 
(St. John's: Robinson and Co., 1940.) 
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The outbreak of war must have appeared a mixed blessing to the Commission of 
Government: the economic recovery that accompanied the outbreak of war rescued the 
colony from the stagnation which had plagued it for much of the two decades preceding, 
but increased demand for workers, coupled with the recent increase in union organization, 
put Newfoundland workers in a stronger bargaining position than they had been in for 
many years. Lacking an adequate labour relations system to deal with this potentially 
volatile labour situation, the government ultimately came to rely on a combination of 
special wartime legislation and ad hoc measures. 49 
The Newfoundland government was not alone in this dilemma. The governments 
of Canada and Great Britain, for example, also had to cope with surging labour 
organization and unrest in this period. One key difference was that in those countries there 
was some legislation in place upon which to build. The Canadian government, for 
example, extended and strengthened measures such as those contained in the 1907 
Industrial Disputes Investigation Act (IDIA), the main principles of which were the 
appointment of a Board of Conciliation and Investigation in the event of a labour dispute 
and the "cooling off period" in which the dispute was suspended pending the outcome of 
an inquiry. The IDIA had provided the basis for the 1918 introduction of full compulsory 
arbitration, prolubiting strikes and lockouts in major war industries, which by 1920 had 
490ne exception to this general pattern was in the logging industry, where the 
government in April1940 established a Woods Labour Board with representation from 
the companies and unions involved in that industry. The primary aim of this Board was the 
avoidance of strikes through preemptive negotiations. 
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been extended to peacetime disputes. By the late 1930s, most provinces had passed 
legislation based on a combination of the IDIA and on the United States' 1935 Wagner 
Act, which protected workers' right to organize and provided mechanisms to deal with 
elections, certifications and recognition. Faced with mounting labour Wlfest across the 
country, the federal government in 1939 extended the IDIA, with its requirements for 
compulsory arbitration and the cooling-off period, to all industries determined essential to 
the war effort, effectively annulling any provincial legislation that ran counter to the 
principles of the IDIA.50 
In Great Britain, a somewhat different scenario unfolded. There, while there was 
also a major revival of the union movement during the late 1930s and the early years of 
the war, the coalition government was forced to recognize the political power which 
labour held by way of such organizations as the Trade Union Council. Labour was able to 
use this power to win concessions on such issues as wages, arbitration and inflation 
control. In other words, the British situation was defined more by appeasement than by 
50See, Gregory S. Kealey, "The Canadian State' s Attempt to Manage Class Conflict, 
1900-48," in Workers and Canadian History, 419-40; Laurel Sefton MacDowell, "The 
Formation of the Canadian Industrial Relations System During World War Two," 
Labour/Le Travailleur, 3 (1978), 175-96; Stuart Jamieson, Industrial Relations in 
Canada (Toronto: Macmillan, 1957), 104-11 ; and Frank Robert Anton, The Role of 
Government in the Settlement of Industrial Disputes in Canada (Don Mills, 1962), 83-
109. A National War Labour Board inquiry into the strike wave of 1941-43 resulted in 
Order in Council PC 1003, which superceded previous legislation while retaining 
provisions ofboth the IDIA and Wagner. See Kealey, Workers and Canadian History, 
362. 
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direct legislative interference. 51 
The measures adopted by the Commission of Government tended to reflect the 
Canadian legislation. At the start of war, on 1 September 1939, the Newfoundland 
government passed an Act for the Defence of Newfoundland, conferring on the 
government a wide range of powers. The same day, the government used the Defence 
Act to pass the Newfoundland Defence Regulations, which dealt with a broad spectrum of 
economic and defence issues. 52 After being forced to intervene in a strike by 
longshoremen at the St. John's waterfront in February 1940, in September 1940 the 
government passed the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act, sections of which were aimed 
specifically at labour disputes. 53 
The government's desire to establish a firmer grip on the labour relations scene 
during 1940 was also motivated by the recent conclusion of a deal to establish American 
and Canadian military bases at Argentia, Stephenville, and several sites around St. John's. 
In January 1941, the first legions of American servicemen began to arrive. Soon, an 
51 See, Dennis Barnes and Eileen Reid, "A New Relationship: Trade Unions in the 
Second World War," in Ben Pimlott and Chris Cook, eds., Trade Unions in British 
Politics (London, 1982), 149-70; and Mary Davis, Comrade or Brother?: A History of 
the British Labour Movement, 1989-1951 (London: Pluto Press, 1993), 185-201. 
52Neary, Newfoundland in the North Atlantic World, 113-5. 
53The Act gave the Governor the power to make "such regulations as appear to him to 
be necessary or expedient for securing the public safety, the defence of the realm, the 
maintenance of public order and the efficient prosecution of any war in which His Majesty 
may be engaged, and for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the 
community." Neary, Newfoundland in the North Atlantic World, 109-14, and 127-8. 
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estimated 20,000 Newfoundland civilians were employed in the construction of military 
bases. The combination of the so-called "base-building boom," the wartime revival in 
such industries as shipping, mining, and forestry, the fact that many Newfoundlanders had 
enlisted in the armed forces or had left Newfoundland to took advantage of labour 
shortages elsewhere (such as the United States), created an unprecedented demand for 
labour and potentially serious problems for employers and for the government. The 
government now also had to cope with the fact of two foreign governments (American 
and Canadian) importing their standards of work practices and wages into Newfoundland. 
Public Utilities Commissioner Sir Wilfrid Woods described the situation as a "golden 
opportunity" for the growth and spread of trade unions and for increased labour 
mili"tan 54 cy. 
It was not long before Woods was proven right, as several Newfoundland unions 
were soon demanding higher wages and better working conditions. Some of these unions 
represented civilian base workers, while others explicitly based their demands on the 
wages being paid on the bases. 55 The government initially responded by asking American 
s<~<'Memorandum for the Commission of Government from Sir Wilfred Woods," 17 
January 1941, GN38, S4-2-5, File 2, PANL. 
550n 14 February 1941, for instance, a group of St. John's unions drafted a series of 
resolutions condemning working conditions and wages for civilian workers at the Quidi 
Vidi base construction site and demanding that wages for unskilled labour be raised by to 
40 cents an hour from the 30 cents then being paid. In March civilian workers at Argentia 
formed a union to demand increased wages and improved working conditions, and in 
April a group of labour leaders from various industry sectors around the island began 
pressing for an hourly wage of 40 cents for all construction labourers in Newfoundland. 
101 
and Canadian employers to cooperate in keeping wages on a par with those paid by 
Newfoundland companies and the Newfoundland government (about 35 cents for 
common labourers in St. John's, and 25 cents elsewhere), but it was prepared to take 
more drastic measures if necessary. In statement revealing ofhis attitude toward 
Newfoundland workers, Public Utilities Commissioner Woods stated that should base 
workers go on strike, he was prepared to use government resources to "protect men 
willing to work at going rates from union intimidation. "56 
The SL WPU's demand for government intervention in May 1941 came, therefore, 
in the context of both increasing labour unrest throughout Newfoundland and increasing, 
if reluctant, government involvement in controlling that unrest. In response to the May 
request from the SL WPU, Woods initially attempted to avoid government intervention. 
Government Geologist Ambrose Howse had spoken with Poynter, Woods stated, and 
while Poynter was "very much perturbed" by the whole situation, he could do nothing but 
relay requests to Seibert. Poynter had asked to have matters held over until the last week 
in June, when Seibert would be in St. Lawrence again, and Woods asked Turpin to attend 
a meeting with representatives of the company and the government once Seibert arrived. 57 
"Minutes of meeting of City unions," sent to Puddester, Public Health and Welfare, 18 
February 1941, GN38, S6-5-2, File 3, PANL; and Neary, Newfoundland in the North 
Atlantic World, 157-8. 
56Neary, Newfoundland in the North Atlantic World, 158. 
57Lewis to Turpin, 27 May 1941, SLMM. 
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Turpin replied, however, that at a recent meeting the membership had unanimously 
decided that nothing short of an official Board of Enquiry would satisfy them, and he 
listed four issues for the consideration by such a Board: wage rates, "requisite 
safeguards"; employment of non-union labour; and ''working conditions in general."58 
When Turpin made this most recent demand for an inquiry, in early July, the 
government had recently passed additional legislation granting it the power to appoint 
such a board. Using the powers conferred by the 1940 Emergency Powers (Defence) Act, 
in June 1941 the government had passed the Defence (Avoidance of Strikes and 
Lockouts) Regulations. The Strikes and Lockouts Regulations gave the government 
several options in the event of a real or a threatened strike or lockout, including the 
establishment of a tribunal, the outright prohibition of a strike or lockout, the imposition 
of terms and conditions of work upon employers, and the power to change any rule or 
accepted practice with respect to employment and conditions of employment. 59 
Woods still, however, avoided formal intervention in the St. Lawrence dispute, 
informing the union that he had decided, "in the interests of all concerned" to meet with 
Seibert before taking any further action. 60 The government appeared once again prepared 
to let the company dictate the agenda and to accept the company' s view of the situation. 
58Woods to Barron and Lewis, 30 May 1941, GN38, S5-4-l, File 6, PANL, and 
Barron and Lewis to Woods, 14 July 1941, SLMM. 
5~eary, Newfoundland in the North Atlantic World, 169-70. 
60Woods to Barron and Lewis, 15 July 1941, GN38, S5-4-1, File 6, PANL. 
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This move on Woods' part made Turpin even more adamant. He warned Woods that 
while he had kept the men working "with difficulty" pending the appointment of an 
enquiry, they refused to work any longer with non-union men and demanded a "living 
wage" and to be ''treated as human beings. •>6I 
Shortly after the union made that demand, Woods met with Seibert. In response 
to the union's demands, Seibert promised that effective 15 July, the Corporation would 
raise wages to the level being paid at Newfluor, but that this increase was the "absolute 
limit to which we can possibly go." Regarding the presence of non-union men on the job, 
Seibert stated that while management had no objection to these men joining the union, it 
would not agree with any demand that they be forced to join or be dismissed as they had 
been "faithful employees.'>62 
On issues of health and safety, Seibert was less specific, vowing only to "do our 
best to comply with the spirit and letter of all laws and regulations," and to do "everything 
within reason to better the health and working conditions of our employees. '>63 "Doing 
your best," however, was no guarantee of compliance with the law or of ensuring a safe 
workplace, and what the Corporation considered "within reason" had given cause for 
doubt in the past. 
61Turpin to Woods, and Barron and Lewis to Woods, 17 July 1941, GN 38, SS-4-1, 
File 6, P ANL. 
62Seibert to Woods, 22 July 1941, GN 38, S5-4-1 , File 6, PANL. 
63Seibert to Woods, 22 July 1941, GN 38, S5-4-1 , File 6, PANL. 
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Woods, however, seemed satisfied with Seibert's response, pointing out that he 
had promised to raise wages, and agreeing with his position regarding non-union workers. 
As for health and safety, Woods stated that the Government Engineer had directed the 
Corporation to make some changes based on Cave's 1940 inspection, and that "certain 
minor matters still require adjustment." The union's demand that a Board of Enquiry look 
into ''working conditions in general," Woods claimed, was not specific enough to warrant 
an inquiry. Furthermore, he stated, he and Seibert had discussed the possibility of an 
inquiry, but Seibert had several objections to it, "into the merits of which I do not propose 
to enter now. •>M Refusing to conduct an inquiry because Seibert objected to it constituted 
a flagrant neglect of duty on Woods' part. 
While the union was not satisfied with Woods' response, the men stayed on the job 
through August. On 20 August, however, they learned of a government tribunal' s report 
on the labour dispute at the Buchans mines, and this seems to have renewed their 
resolve.65 On 4 September, the union sent Woods an ultimatum: guarantee appointment of 
64Woods to Barron and Lewis, 24 July 1941, GN38, S5-4-1 , File 6, PANL. 
65Lewis to Turpin, 20 August 1941, SLMM. Seven hundred members of the BWPU 
walked off the job in August 1941 over wages, hours, and working conditions. Though 
the strike was peaceful, the government initially reacted by sending 80 police officers to 
Buchans. Then Woods himself went to Buchans to try and persuade the men to return to 
work, before finally giving in and appointing a tribunal under the Strikes and Lockouts 
Regulations on 15 August, at which point the men returned to work. The Tribunal 
awarded the workers a cost-of-living increase of8 'l2 cents an hour, bringing the average 
wage at Buchans to 56 cents an hour, but dismissed concerns over health and safety and 
living conditions as unimportant. "Report of the Tnbunal in the Matter of the Strike at 
Buchans Mine, Newfoundland, August p• to 14th, 1941," unpublished document, CNS. 
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an inquiry by 15 September or the men would go on strike, something, it was pointed out, 
they had done their best to avoid thus fa.r.66 
Still, Woods refused, and in a telling memorandum of5 September, described the 
matters in the St. Lawrence dispute as consisting of two questions: the adequacy of the 
wage being paid by the Corporation, and the employment of non-union labour, both which 
he was satisfied had been satisfactorily resolved. Woods was now ignoring the health and 
safety issue altogether. Woods also pointed out that direct intervention in St. Lawrence 
might set a dangerous precedent, stating that, "If this sort of thing is encouraged, there 
will have to be a Board appointed for every wage dispute and the Government will be 
burdened with the cost of a very considerable staff to form some sort of Labour 
Department." Woods was prepared, at this stage, to let the union go on strike rather than 
accede to its demands. 67 
On 15 October, a month after the expiry of the deadline presented in the 
ultimatum, the men once again walked off the job, protesting ''unsatisfactory wage rates 
plus unhealthy and unsafe working conditions." The union also repeated its demands for 
recognition as "the sole bargaining unit in relation to labour, employment and working 
Also in August 1941, the government was forced to appoint a Tribunal under the Strikes 
and Lockouts Regulations in another labour dispute at the St. John's waterfront. 
66Barron and Lewis to Woods, 4 September 1941, GN38, S5-4-1, File 6, PANL. 
67Memorandum from Sir Wilfred Woods for the Commission of Government, 5 
September 1941, GN38, S5-4-1 , File 6, PANL. 
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conditions by the St. Lawrence Corporation," for prompt payment of wages, and for a 
cost-of-living bonus to keep pace with wartime inflation.68 
In Poynter's view, the crisis was the fault of the union executive, which was 
motivated by ''personal antagonism" rather than concern for the workers. He called upon 
the government to "step in and restrain these men," so that Corporation employees could 
return to work, ''unhampered by membership in this local union." Poynter also professed 
confusion at the union's actions since the Corporation was now paying Newfluor rates and 
"the question of safety is one that is covered by law.'>69 The union claimed, however, that 
workers' experience with the Corporation management had convinced them that the only 
solution to the crisis was third-party intervention, and they refused to return until such 
intervention was forthcoming. 70 
The October walkout coincided with the adoption of yet more stringent labour 
legislation. Shortly after having to intervene and settle another dispute involving St. John' s 
longshoremen, the government passed the Defence (Control and Conditions of 
68Memorandum from Sir Wtlfrid Woods for the Commission of Government, 25 
October 1941, GN38,, S5-4-1, File 5 (P.U. 71-41), PANL. The information on the 
events immediately surrounding the October walk-out is contained in two messages sent 
to Woods: a telegram from St. Lawrence merchant A.A. Giovaninni sent around 20 
September, and a letter from P.J. Lewis which Woods received on 23 October. Lewis had 
been in St. Lawrence and seen the situation :firsthand. 
69Poynter to Woods, 28 October 1941, GN38, S5-6-1, File 5 (PU 71c-41) PANL. 
70Barron and Lewis to Woods, 1 November 1941 , GN38, SS-6-1 , File 5 (PU 71c-41 ), 
PANL. 
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Employment and Disputes Settlement) Regulations. The Employment and Disputes 
Regulations conferred upon the Commissioner for Public Utilities far-reaching powers, 
including the power to appoint a "Trade Dispute Board" to settle labour disputes which 
could not otherwise be resolved, "in cases where it appears to be necessary to do so in the 
interests of the defence ofNewfoundland or the efficient prosecution ofthe war or for 
maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community .... " The 
Regulations stipulated that any dispute or impending dispute must be reported to the 
Commissioner for Public Utilities by either party when the dispute had begun or was 
imminent and that U: in the Commissioner's view, the dispute came under the mandate of 
the regulations and all other channels had been exhausted, the Commissioner could refer 
the matter to a Trade Dispute Board. Once a Trade Dispute Board had been appointed, 
any strike or lockout had to be suspended pending the Board' s rulings. A Board's 
decisions were to be binding upon both parties and to have the status of a contract, staying 
in effect "until varied by a subsequent agreement, decision or award .• m 
The new legislation had serious implications for labour relations, for, as Peter 
Neary put it, ''while this arrangement did not ban strikes and lockouts as such, it ensured 
that they would only occur when and where the government was willing to tolerate 
them. " 72 On the other hand, the legislation constituted a form of compulsory arbitration, 
71Defence (Control and Conditions of Employment and Disputes Settlement) 
Regulations, 1941. 
72Neary, Newfoundland in the North Atlantic World, 171. 
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allowing for third-party assessment of labour relations issues, and forcing employers to 
recognize and negotiate with unions. 73 The legislation might thus prove beneficial in 
situations such as that which existed at St. Lawrence, where labour relations had to this 
point been based on a combination of paternalism and fear. 
Though now armed with ample legislative tools to appoint an inquiry in the St. 
Lawrence dispute, Woods continued to delay doing so. Several developments in 
Novermber, however, brought increased pressure to bear on the government. Since the 
brief walkout in March 1941, workers at Newfluor had stayed on the job, but on 4 
November, they too walked off the job to demand a wage increase and to support their 
fellow members employed by the Corporation. 74 
The Corporation had managed to keep its mill running at reduced capacity through 
October and early November with about twenty non-union men using ore from stockpiles 
73Gillespie takes this view inA Class Act, 83, where he points out that the regulations 
functioned as a form of compulsory arbitration. 
74
"Fluorspar Miners Strike for More Pay," Evening Telegram, 7 November 1941. Five 
months earlier, on 1 June, Newfluor had agreed to recognize the union as the "sole 
bargaining agency," and to employ only ''union members as specified in an agreement." 
Warren Smith to SLMPU, 1 June 1941, SLMM. Alcan's early recognition of the union 
may have been prompted in part by the fact that it already had labour troubles elsewhere 
in 1941. Workers at Alcan' s aluminum plant in Arvida, Quebec, went on strike in July. A 
Royal Commission was later appointed to investigate the armed suppression of the strike. 
See Confederation des syndicats nationaux/Centrale de 1' enseignement du Quebec, 
Histoire du mouvement ouvier au Quebec,1825-1976 (Montreal: CSN/CEQ, 1978), and 
Royal Commission to Inquire into the Events Which Occurred at Arvida, P. Q., in July, 
1941. 
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at one of its small, open-cut mines, the "Lord and Lady Gulch."75 By mid-November, 
however, strikes at both were resulting in a serious fluorspar shortage and this, combined 
with the threat to shipping posed by the impending winter, was causing concern among 
Canadian consumers. 
On 3 November, Woods was informed that the Secretary of State for External 
Affairs in Ottawa was perturbed by the fluorspar shortage and wanted an end to the 
dispute caused by the labour unrest at St. Lawrence.76 Shortly after, Woods was informed 
that in the opinion of the Secretary of State, 
Continued supplies of Fluorspar from Newfoundland are of utmost 
importance for Canadian steel and aluminum industries in particular. 
Receipt of insufficient quantities prior to close of navigation might result in 
a reduction of steel output in Sydney before resumption of deliveries next 
spring. No reliable Canadian source of supply is available for this plant. 77 
Woods was also contacted by the president ofDOSCO, the Corporation's main customer, 
who informed him that DOSCO had advised the Canadian government that to maintain 
steel production throughout the winter, it was "absolutely essential" that DOSCO have 
75Hunt, Emerson, Stirling and Higgins (Corporation lawyers) to Woods, 6 November 
1941, SLMM, and Evening Telegram, 15 November 1941, 7. 
76C.J. Burchell, High Commissioner for Canada in St. John's, to Woods, containing a 
telegram from Burchell to Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, 3 November 
1941, GN38, S5-4-1 , File 5 (PU 71c-41), PANL. 
77C.J. Burchell, High Commissioner for Canada in St. John' s, to Woods, containing a 
copy of a telegram from the Secretary of State for External Affairs in Ottawa, 8 
November 1941, GN38, SS-4-1 , File 5 (PU 71d-41), PANL. 
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2,000 tons ofNewfoundland fluorspar before the close of navigation at the end of 
December. 78 
Woods had already conceded to the union that should labour unrest in St. 
Lawrence cause a serious fluorspar shortage, he might have to reconsider his position on 
appointing an inquiry.79 When the union learned ofDOSCO's concerns, it reminded 
Woods that the workers were aware of the importance of fluorspar to the war effort and 
of the implications of the labour dispute for the industries affected. 80 Under these 
circumstances, Woods finally gave in, and on 10 November informed the union that the 
government would establish a Trade Dispute Board at St. Lawrence. 81 
3.4 The Decisions of the Trade Dispute Board 
The Trade Dispute Board arrived in St. Lawrence on 17 January 1942. St. John's 
78 A. Cross, President, Dominion Steel and Coal Corporation, Montreal, to the Wilfrid 
Woods, Commissioner for Public Utilities, 7 December 1941, GN 38 S5-4-1 , File 5, (PU 
71d-41), PANL. 
7~arron and Lewis to SLMPU, 25 October 1941, SLMM. 
80Barron and Lewis to Woods, 1 November 1941, GN38, S5-6-1, File 5 (PU 71c-41), 
PANL. 
81Barron and Lewis to Woods, 10 November 1941, GN38, S5-4-1, File 5 (PU 71d-41), 
PANL, Woods to Lewis, 10 November 1941, GN38, S5-4-1 , File 5 (PU 71d-41), PANL, 
and Lewis to Turpin, 17 November 1941, SLMM. As an indication of the degree to 
which the wartime economy had freed St. Lawrence workers from complete dependence 
on the mines, many had taken base construction jobs at Argentia during the recent labour 
disputes. They returned to their jobs in St. Lawrence once the Board had been appointed 
and they were called back to work. Evening Telegram, 29 November 1947. 
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lawyer Thomas J. Lefeuvre represented the employers, while W.J. Walsh, who had served 
as Minister of Agriculture and Mines with the Alderdice government, represented the 
union. Professor A.M. Fraser of Memorial University College was the third, impartial 
member. The Board's Terms of Reference were union recognition, the employment of 
non-union men, wage rates, and delays in wage payments. 82 Health and safety was not . 
included on the official agenda. The Board examined 65 written submissions and heard 21 
witnesses, including Turpin, Poynter, ten union members, two non-union workers, and 
five merchants. Some of Poynter's testimony, regarding Corporation finances, ''was taken 
in private at the Manager's office."83 
On the issue of non-union employment, the Board stated that it could only agree to 
the union's demand for recognition as the sole bargaining unit (which would constitute an 
''unconditional closed shop") if it could be demonstrated that the union was ''under the 
guidance of wise and competent leadership," and that the members fully aware of the 
"grave responsibilities ofUnionism." After reviewing correspondence from the previous 
year and interviewing several employees, the Board decided that these conditions did not 
exist. Based on these conclusions, and on the fact that there were just eight non-union 
men then on the payroll (down from seventeen when the Board had been appointed in 
December), the Board ruled that the Corporation should recognize the SL WPU as the sole 
82Evening Telegram, 6 December 1941. 
83Settlement of the Trade Dispute Board, St. Lawrence, 3-4, 10. 
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bargaining agent, but that any non-union employee on the payroll as of 1 December 1941 
was not required to join the union. The second term of reference, the issue of the 
employment of non-union men, was in effect covered by this ruling. 84 
On the issue of wage rates, the Board noted the Corporation had been paying an 
average wage of 45 Y2 cents per hour since December 1941, under protest and pending the 
decision of the Board. This represented an increase of about 13 cents (or 40 per cent) in 
the average wage paid before that time. Poynter testified that on 28 December 1941 the 
Corporation had offered to pay a cost-of-living bonus subject to quarterly review, but that 
the union had rejected this offer and demanded the basic wage increase, which the 
Corporation had reluctantly been paying. Poynter pointed out that Newfluor had been 
paying an increase of about seven cents an hour since December, pending the decision of 
the Board, which was lower than that being paid by the Corporation. Newfluor had agreed 
to pay whatever rate the Board eventually settled upon. 85 
In an attempt to influence the Board's decision regarding a wage increase, the 
Corporation submitted evidence to the effect that 65 families had been removed from the 
relief rolls since the start of mining operations in 1933 and that its employees had built 38 
new homes in the community. While agreeing that the people of St. Lawrence were 
generally better off than those in many fishing outports, the Board pointed out that, 
84Settlement of the Trade Dispute Board, St. Lawrence, 30. 
85Settlement of the Trade Dispute Board, St. Lawrence, 32-3. 
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... St. Lawrence has now been completely transformed into a mining 
community, and should, therefore, in fairness, be compared with other 
mining towns. We are convinced that the standard of living at St. 
Lawrence is considerable below that of the miners in Buchans and Bell 
Island. Therefore, we feel that they are entitled to maintain the standard of 
living which the wage level of July 1941 would have enabled them to enjoy, 
if it had been in effect August 1939.86 
To settle upon an appropriate wage increase, the Board used the Canadian system 
then in effect, whereby the pre-war wage was taken as a benchmark, and the cost-of-living 
monitored at three-month intervals and wages adjusted accordingly. Ruling that the 
Corporation's average pre-war wage of23.3 cents an hour was "entirely unsatisfactory" 
as a basic rate upon which to base a cost-of-living increase, the Board took instead the 
average wage as of August 1941, 32.6 cents per hour, as the basic rate upon which to 
base a cost-of-living increase. The appropriate cost-of-living increase was determined to 
be 40 per cent, or 13 cents an hour. This would bring the average wage up to about the 
same amount as the protested wage the Corporation had been paying since December 
1941, the main difference being that the increased rate would now be paid as a cost-of-
living increase rather than an increase in the basic wage. After examining the 
Corporation's books and determining that it was quite capable of paying this increase, the 
Board ordered the Corporation to discontinue paying the protested rate and commence 
paying the rate of32.6 cents plus a 13-cent cost-of-living increase on 15 March 1942. As 
with the closed shop issue, this arrangement was to be binding on both parties for the 
86Settlement of the Trade Dispute Board, St. Lawrence, 34. 
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duration of the war, with two important conditions: that the maximum cost-of-living 
increase which the Corporation would be required to pay for the year 1942 was a total of 
50 dollars per man, and that should the Corporation experience a substantial increase in 
the cost of production or a major drop in sales or prices it could, after 15 March 1943, 
apply to have the cost of living bonus reduced or discontinued. 87 
The last issue on the Board's formal agenda was delayed payment of wages. 
While agreeing that delayed payment of wages had been a problem in the past, and noting 
that there still minor delays on occasion, the Board concluded that this problem had been 
largely eliminated when the Corporation's financial situation improved and it had begun 
paying its workers in cash in 1940. The Board therefore made no specific 
recommendations on this issue, but simply impressed upon the Corporation its legal and 
moral responsibility to pay wages promptly. 88 
In addition to the formal terms of reference, the Board also heard evidence 
regarding issues ofhealth and safety, which were relegated to a section of its report 
entitled "Miscellaneous Matters." These issues arose only because of complaints by the 
union president and by workers whom the Board had interviewed. The Board reported 
that the miners interviewed complained of''foul air" and a lack of ventilation underground, 
but concluded that, "in the most efficiently operated mines in the world, there is certain to 
81Settlement of the Trade Dispute Board, St. Lawrence, 30-40. 
88Settlement of the Trade Dispute Board, St. Lawrence, 44-5. 
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be foul air at times. "89 
The Board also pointed out that on their recent tour oflron Springs mine, they had 
noticed no foul air. When the Board members, accompanied by Poynter, Turpin, Lewis, 
and Corporation lawyer Gordon Stirling, had toured the Corporation mines upon arriving 
in St. Lawrence, many sections of the Iron Springs mine were still :flooded and 
inaccessible, while Blue Beach and Black Duck were completed flooded and could not be 
entered at all.90 A brieftour of the few accessible portions of just one mine was hardly 
sufficient to convey an accurate sense of underground conditions, especially since the oral 
evidence suggests that the effects of foul or insufficient air intensified with the length of 
exposure and with physical exertion. 
Regarding dust in the mines, several witnesses complained to the Board that the 
"dry hanuner" created large volumes of dust which was "injurious to the eyes and lungs." 
Poynter denied to the Board that the dry hammer was used in the Corporation mines, but 
the Board reported that the dry hammer was in use and urged that '"this type of hammer be 
89Settlement of the Trade Dispute Board, St. Lawrence, 48. 
90Settlement of the Trade Dispute Board, St. Lawrence, 6-7. These conditions had also 
prevented A.E. Cave from conducting a thorough inspection when he visited the St. 
Lawrence mines in November 1941, shortly after the New:tluor men had walked off the 
job. At that time, many areas of the Iron Springs and Blue Beach mines were flooded and 
inaccessible, while the Black Duck shaft was completely flooded and had been abandoned. 
The Director shaft, meanwhile, was flooded up to 120-foot level. While Cave could say 
little about specific hazards, he had reiterated the recommendation made in 1936 and again 
in 1940 that the government adopt and enforce an adequate set of regulations. A. E. Cave, 
"Mining Operations in Newfoundland, 1941: Inspection Report," 1941, D:ME. 
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no longer used except in those parts of the mine where ground water renders it 
innocuous." The Board also recommended that the Commissioner for Public Utilities 
amend the Regulation of Mines Act to provide for more frequent, regular inspections of 
Newfoundland mines to ensure that such orders were complied with.91 
The Board also noted that, given the possible hazards associated with the mining 
industry, the community was sorely lacking in medical services. A doctor had come to St. 
Lawrence in March 1941, with the Corporation, Newfluor, and the employees each paying 
a portion of the expenses (the employees paid 50 cents monthly). The doctor had left, 
however, in Decemberl941, so St. Lawrence still had no doctor or adequate medical 
facilities at the time of the inquiry. The men of the community had donated free labour to 
the partial construction of a building which might be used as a hospital, but there was no 
money for finishing or equipping it. Several workers and the union president expressed 
concern about the lack of medical facilities since they believed that mine dust was 
hazardous to workers' health, and wanted a medical practitioner to establish whether this 
was the case. 92 Turpin later stated that several men testified at the 1941 inquiry that they 
believed that "due to the conditions they would die eventually with lung trouble. '193 The 
union urged that until a more permanent arrangement could be established, provisions be 
91Settlement of the Trade Dispute Board, St. Lawrence, 48-9. 
92Settlement of the Trade Dispute Board, St. Lawrence, 50. 
93lnterview with Aloyusius Turpin, MUNFLA. 
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made to conduct chest x-rays on St. Lawrence miners. To this the Board replied that, 
"We are not competent to pronounce as to the necessity for such an examination, but we 
desire to place the Union's wishes on record, as they were expressed very strongly." The 
Board urged the companies and the union to cooperate in approaching the Department of 
Public Health and Welfare for advice in trying to obtain a doctor for the community, but 
there was no suggestion that the government provide anything other than advice to help 
meet this end. 94 
Coming as a result of months of persistent demands and job actions on the part of 
the union, the inquiry turned out in the end to have mixed results. It brought some 
benefits, in the areas of union recognition and wages, but ignored serious concerns about 
the impacts of working conditions on the workers' health. The Trade Disputes decisions 
therefore represent another neglected opportunity to address explicit concerns over 
serious health issues at the St. Lawrence mines. 
3.5 Industry Fluctuation, Labour Relations. and Health and Safetv. 1942-45 
Following the disruption caused by the labour unrest of 1941, the St. Lawrence 
mining industry continued to expand during 1942. Newfluor constructed a permanent 
headframe and crushing plant at Director mine, and by the end of 1942 moved from the 
exploration and development into mining and shipping fluorspar. After crushing, the 
94Settlement of the Trade Dispute Board, St. Lawrence, 49-51. 
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Director ore was shipped to Port Arthur and from there to Arvida, where it was further 
refined into acid-grade ore and used in the production of alwninum.95 
While Newfluor's fluorspar production at St. Lawrence was detennined by the 
demands of the Arvida plant, the Corporation continued to sell its product on the open 
market. From 1941 to 1943, American demand for acid-grade fluorspar doubled because 
of its increased use in the manufacture of high-octane aviation fuel, aluminum, and freon. 
As the war continued, a reliable supply of both acid-grade and metallurgical-grade 
flurospar became a major priority for the War Production Board (WPB) of the United 
States government. In 1942, the WPB became directly involved in the fluorspar industry, 
providing financial and technical assistance to a number of producers in the United 
States.96 
In August 1943, the WPB approached the Corporation about possible measures to 
increase production at St. Lawrence. The WPB apparently believed, however, that 
increasing production and the grade of ore would not be possible under the Corporation's 
existing management, and expressed this concern to the Ambassador in Washington, who 
relayed it to Governor Walwyn in Newfoundland. According to the Ambassador, the WPB 
was "quite willing to arrange finance and equipment provided they see reasonable prospect 
95
"History of Operations ofNewfoundland Fluorspar Limited," 2-3, AA. 
96Walter M. Hiley, Miscellaneous Minerals Division, War Production Board, U.S. 
Department ofNational Defence, ''Fluorspar Policies of the War Production Board and 
Predecessor Agencies, May 1940 to June 1945,"5-13. 
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of obtaining required Fluorspar as a result," but, "they do not see such results with present 
management. 97 When WPB representatives had earlier met with Seibert and discussed 
possible measures to increase efficiency and production, one of the conditions of its 
proposal was a change in mine management, to which Seibert would not agree.98 
Governor Walwyn was apparently agitated by the WPB's approach, and demanded 
to know its specific concerns about the current management of the Corporation mines. He 
also stated his intention to have the appropriate representative of the Commission of 
Government contact Seibert to get his side of the story.99 Walwyn may have felt that the 
WPB was acting inappropriately by meddling in Newfoundland's internal affairs without 
first consulting with the Newfoundland government. Also, Seibert evidently continued to 
enjoy the favour of the government. In August 1942, for example, when Seibert had 
applied for permission to conduct mineral surveys in Saglek Bay, Labrador, his record at 
St. Lawrence was cited as evidence in support ofhis application. 100 
97Charge d 'Affairs, Washington, to Governor ofNewfoundland, 16 August 1943, 
GN38, SS-4-1, File 6, PANL. 
98Charge d'Affairs, Washington, to Governor ofNewfoundland, 16 August 1943, 
GN38, SS-4-1, File 6, PANL. 
99Walwyn to the Charge d'Affairs, Washington, 17 August 1943, GN38 SS-4-1, File 
6, PANL. 
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"Application of Mr. Walter E. Seibert for the exclusive right to examine and survey 
25 miles from shore ofSaglek Bay, Labrador," 7 August 1942, GN38, S2-1-3, File 4 (PU 
86-42), P ANL. 
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In any case, the controversy was soon resolved, and the WPB made arrangements 
to install additional mining and milling equipment at St. Lawrence during the winter of 
1943-44, at a total cost of about $60,000, while the current management would be 
retained. The plan included measures to increase production of both acid and 
metallurgical grade fluorspar, primarily by upgrading and expanding the Corporation's 
mill. tot 
Much of the increased US government involvement in the fluorspar industry at this 
time was directed at meeting the demand for aluminum, and throughout the war several 
U.S. aluminum producers, firms, including Alcoa and Reynolds, benefitted directly from 
U.S. government investment in the industry.102 Alcan also took advantage of government 
assistance from various sources to support its wartime expansion program. In 1941, the 
governments of Great Britain, the United States, and Australia advanced the company 
large loans (over $50 million total in the case of the British and American governments) in 
exchange for a guaranteed supply of raw aluminum. In addition, the Canadian 
government granted the company financial assistance, through deferred taxes, totaling 
about $177 million over the course of the war.103 Alcan expanded its smelting facilities at 
101Hiley, "Fluorspar Policies of the War Production Board," 13. 
102Charles River Associates Incorporated, An Economic Analysis of the Aluminum 
Industry, Prepared for General Services Administration, Washington, 1971, 25. 
103Albert W. Whitaker, Aluminum Trail (Montreal: Alcan Press, 1974), 158-9, and 
Litvak and Maule, A/can Aluminum Limited, 48. 
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Arvida, Shawinigan, Beauhamois, Isle Maligne and La Tuque, increasing its aluminum 
ingot output capacity five-fold from 1940 to 1943.104 
In the context of industry expansion during 1942 and 1943, the union sought to 
have the Trade Dispute Board settlement replaced by conventional collective agreements. 
In October 1942, the SL WPU and Newfluor signed their first collective agreement, 
replacing the Board's settlement, but essentially embodying the same terms. The 
agreement was to be in effect until 31 December 1943.105 
In 1943, while negotiating for renewal of its 1942 agreement with Newfluor, the 
union was also seeking to sign its first collective agreement with the Corporation. 106 The 
key monetary issue at stake in both sets of negotiations was the cost-of-living bonus 
versus an increase in the basic rate. The union wanted to fonnalize an informal 
arrangement reached with the Corporation in early 1943, under which the cost-of living-
104By 1943, the Arvida plant was the largest single aluminum production plant in the 
world, nearly two miles long and employing about 2,000 workers. Litvak and Maule, 
Alcan Aluminum Limited, 47. 
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"Report ofLabour Relations Officer," 1944, 5. One exception was that the 
agreement did not contain the clause limiting the amount of the cost-of-living increase, 
which had been applied in the case of the Corporation "because of its financial position." 
The Commission of Government created the post ofLabour Relations Officer in May 
1942, under the Department ofPublic Utilities. The first person appointed to the post was 
Albert Walsh, the Assistant Secretary for Justice who had also served as chairman of the 
Woods Labour Board, an association of companies and unions in the forestry industry 
established in 1940. Walsh had also, in his capacity as Assistant Secretary of Justice, 
represented the government in the early stages of the Buchans miners strike of 1941. See 
Neary, Newfoundland in the North Atlantic World, 169-70, Gillespie, A Class Act, 82. 
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bonus was eliminated and the basic rate increased. 107 It also wanted Newfluor to eliminate 
the cost-of-living bonus and increase the basic wage. 108 One motivation for the union's 
desire in this regard was the fact that the cost-of-living bonus was not paid on overtime 
hours. 109 Given this, it is not surprising that during the 1943 negotiations Newfl.uor sought 
to retain the cost-of-living system.110 
While wages was a key issue in labour negotiations during 1942 and 1943, health 
and safety also continued to be an area of concern. The Governor noted in August 1942 
that the union was still complaining that health and safety concerns had not been 
adequately addressed by the Trade Dispute Board. Commenting on these complaints, the 
Governor stated that, 
107
"Report of the Labour Relations Officer," 1944, 5. It is unclear exactly when or 
under what circumstances the Corporation and the union reached this agreement. One 
source states that it was "early"in 1943, and that since that time the Corporation had been 
paying a fixed rate in the range of 52 to 81 cents per hour: Barron and Lewis to Eric 
Cook, Solicitor for Newfoundland Fluorspar Limited, 16 November 1943, SLMM. The 
Ranger reported in early 1944 that he still conducted quarterly reviews of the cost-of-
living, but that the bonus system only applied to Newfl.uor employees since the 
Corporation now paid its employees a fixed wage scale of 52 to 81 cents per hour agreed 
to "early last year": "Report of the Ranger, St. Lawrence Detachment, for January to 
June, 1944," ON 38, S2-5-2, PANL. 
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shift. After eight hours, however, he received just 45 cents an hour (the basic rate of30 
cents, plus 15 cents overtime pay) and no cost-of-living bonus -less than the 55 cents he 
received for his first 8 hours. 
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Following inspection by a duly qualified mines inspector it is understood 
that there is no reason for apprehension. Revision of our legislation dealing 
with the Regulation of Mines is under consideration and it is proposed to 
seek expert advice with a view to the adoption of a more comprehensive 
and modern mining legislation. The question of appointing a fully qualified 
inspector of mines who will make periodic inspection of all mines and 
require strict compliance with the regulations will also be considered.111 
The Trade Dispute Board's tour of the mines in 1942, however, did not include a 
"qualified inspector," and most underground areas were flooded and inaccessible during 
that tour and during Cave's inspection a few months earlier. In addition, there had been 
no attempt to investigate air quality, dust, inadequate ventilation or the other concerns 
raised at the Trade Dispute Board hearings. As for the promises to modernize the 
regulations and the inspection system, other authorities had been proposing this in 
response to health concerns at St. Lawrence for several years, with no tangible results. 
The union also continued to pressure the mining companies and the government to 
help provide a doctor for the cornmunity. 112 That medical services were inadequate was 
made clear by an incident in August, 1942, when Gus Haskell, a worker from the nearby 
town ofLamaline, was killed when he fell120 feet down the Iron Springs shaft. Workers 
retrieved his body in an ore bucket and laid it on a lunchroom table, where it was 
111Govemor Humphrey Walwyn to Clement B. Atlee Secretary of State for Dominion 
Affairs, 25 August 1942, GN38, S5-4-1 , File 5, PANL. (The Governor was required to 
forward Trade Dispute Board reports to the Dominions Office, and in this case Walwyn 
included an assessment of the reaction to the report. 
112Govemor Humphrey Walwyn to Clement B. Atlee Secretary of State for Dominion 
Affairs, 25 August 1942, GN38, S5-4-1, File 5, PANL. 
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examined by a member of the mine's supervisory staff, who pronounced the man dead. 113 
Even some government employees were openly appalled at the state of medical 
services in the community. In his report on the accident, the Ranger stated that he was 
appalled at ''the lack of medical aid in this place, where an operation of the nature and 
scale of the one now being carried on here." The District Magistrate, in his contribution 
to the accident report, supported the Ranger's view, and suggested that the medical 
situation in St. Lawrence was ''probably without parallel in the whole of the British 
Commonwealth." He urged the government to provide a legal basis requiring the 
establishment and maintenance of adequate medical services in St. Lawrence. 114 
In August 1943, the government tried a more formal solution to the problem of 
inadequate medical facilities in St. Lawrence and other mining centres, passing an 
amendment to the 1908 Regulation of Mines Act requiring employers to provide for 
medical attention to its workers. Under the 1908 Act, owners and managers were required 
only to send for the nearest medical practitioner in case of a serious accident. The 1943 
amendment provided for ''prompt treatment of all persons injured or taken ill." 
Commenting on the need for new legislation, the Commissioner for Public Utilities drew 
special attention to the situation at St. Lawrence, where ''for over a year and until recently 
113
"Report on Fatal Accident, St. Lawrence,1 9 August 1942," GN 4/1/D, G/100/1, 
PANL. 
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two mining companies employing six to seven hundred men were operating without 
resident doctors. " 115 
The reason Woods remarked that "until recently" there had been no doctor in St. 
Lawrence is that during the summer of1943, Dr G. Leclair had arrived there. His recent 
arrival was mentioned in a report on another fatal accident that occurred on 6 September 
1943, when James Branson, an electrician from Canada, was killed while repairing wiring 
in the shaft at Director mine.116 
The amendment required mine owners and agents to provide a qualified 
practitioner and medical supplies in all cases where the average number of persons 
employed for one month or more equaled or exceeded twenty, and to deduct from 
employees' earnings a monthly fee for the provision of medical treatment. In cases where 
the owner or manager demonstrated to the Conunissioner that the services of a qualified 
practitioner could not be obtained, the Commissioner had the right to direct the owner or 
manager to make other provisions. 117 
115
"Memorandum for the Commission of Government regarding a Draft Bill entitled 
"An Act to Amend Chapter 131 of the Consolidated Statutes (Third Series) entitled Of the 
Regulation ofMines,' 19 August 1943, GN38 (PU 124-43), PANL. 
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While, technically at least, the 1943 amendment addressed the problem of 
inadequate medical services, the Newfoundland govenunent continued to delay 
modernizing its mining regulations and inspection services. In October 1943, the 
government brought in another inspector, D.G. Sinclair, Assistant Deputy Minister of 
Mines for Ontario. At the time of Sinclair's visit, the Iron Springs shaft was still about 
300 feet deep, with over 1,000 feet of drifting carried out on its four levels. There was 
now a secondary escape route, but it was approximately 1000 feet east of the main shaft 
and connected to it only at the 60, 120, and 180-foot levels; it did not extend to the 
deepest level, the 240-foot. The Blue Beach shaft was 130 feet deep, with nearly 2,000 
feet of drifting on the lowest of the its three levels. A new shaft at Black Duck was down 
to just 60 feet deep during Sinclair's visit. Improvements to the Corporation's mill were 
still ongoing, and it was expected that the new mill would be completed during the coming 
winter (1943-44). In the meantime, ore from the Corporation mines was still being treated 
at the old mill. Newfluor' s Director shaft was down to 430 feet, and ore from this mine 
was still being crushed and stockpiled on the surface at the site. 118 
The most revealing component ofSinclair'sl943 report was the attached 
comments, directed to Government Geologist Claude K. Howse and later forwarded to 
the Commissioner for Public Utilities. Here, Sinclair offered a few opinions which in his 
118
"Report of Dr. D. G. Sinclair, Assistant Deputy Minister of Mines for Ontario on 
Mining Operations in Newfoundland,"circulated 29 January 1944, GN38, S5-1-3 (PU 17-
44), PANL. 
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view it might not be too ''politic" to express in the public version of report. Remarking on 
the relatively good accident record ofNewfoundland mines, for instance, he stated that, 
luck has been with the operators in the past for by and large the general 
impression I gathered of the mine workers is that they are too ignorant of 
mining hazards to recognize all possible dangers and thus afford themselves 
protection of a kind where none is given by the adherence to a modern 
mining code.119 
With regard to the St. Lawrence mines, Sinclair noted that there was "plenty of room for 
improvement," at the Iron Springs mine, and that "The layout and mechanical set up at the 
present [Corporation] mill is a disgrace to any operation. ... " 120 
On the more general state of mine safety in Newfoundland, Sinclair urged the 
government to repeal the outdated 1908 Act and replace it with a new Act to meet the 
many changes that had taken place in the industry. Even the inadequate regulations 
contained in the 1908 Act, he pointed out, were not being enforced, and the longer the 
matter was neglected, the more difficult it would be for operators to comply with a 
modernized code. He suggested that Newfoundland follow the process which had been 
used in updating the Ontario regulations, where both industry and labour had been given 
the opportunity to contribute to the drafting ofthe code. 121 
11~.G. Sinclair to Claude K. Howse, 27 October 1943, GN38 SS-1-3 (PU 17-44), 
PANL. 
120D.G. Sinclair to Claude K. Howse, 27 October 1943, GN38, SS-1-3 (PU 17-44), 
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Woods agreed with Sinclair's position that a new act was "an immediate 
necessity," as was the appointment of a qualified inspector. He suggested drafting a new 
code and circulating it to the management of various mines for their input -- but not to the 
unions, as Sinclair had also suggested. Based on the Ontario numbers, Sinclair had 
suggested that one inspector would be sufficient for Newfoundland's approximately 3,000 
workers. Woods requested from the Commission approval for the appointment of a 
qualified inspector, whom he hoped to recruit from Canada.122 
Woods' thinking on this matter was apparently motivated more by pragmatic 
considerations than by concern for the health and safety of workers. The recent growth of 
the labour movement in mining centres, he noted, meant that unions would likely soon 
"devote themselves to the matter of mine safety," and new regulations would be useful in 
governing the relationship between labour and management should disputes over health 
and safety matters arise. In addition, Woods believed new regulations could be important 
in protecting the government from possible criticism and b1ame in the future, "if 
circumstances leading to the disaster are shown even faintly to have been such that lack of 
control by the State has any bearing in the case."123 Despite Woods' professed support of 
122Memorandum from Sir Wilfrid Woods, circulated to the Commission of Government 
along with "Report of Dr. D.G. Sinclair, Assistant Deputy Minister of Mines for Ontario 
on Mining Operations in Newfoundland,"29 January 1944, GN38, S5-1-3 (PU 17-44), 
PANL. 
123Memorandum from Sir Wilfrid Woods, circulated to the Commission of Government 
along with "Report of Dr. D.G. Sinclair, Assistant Deputy Minister ofMines for Ontario 
on Mining Operations in Newfoundland,"29 January 1944, GN38, S5-1-3 (PU 17-44), 
129 
such measures, no changes of any consequence resulted from the Sinclair Report or from 
Woods' requests to his fellow Commissioners. 
Without the support of government, workers at St. Lawrence were thus left to 
continue fighting for better working conditions on their own, and in early 1944, an 
industry slump threatened to halt the progress the union had made to that point. With 
negotiations for the renewal of collective agreements with both companies still ongoing, 
Newfluor began curtailing production at Director mine. This was related to a drop in 
aluminum sales which had led to a decrease in production at the Arvida plant and, 
consequently, to reduced demand for St. Lawrence fluorspar. 124 In March, 1944, when 
the company had already stockpiled about half of its total anticipated shipment of30,000 
tons for that year, it began laying off workers. By the end of March the workforce was 
down to less than 200, compared with over 300 in March of 1943 (and a peak of 450 at 
one point in 1943).125 
In the context of declining production and continuing layoffs at Newfluor, the 
union signed collective agreements with both companies in May 1944.126 Both agreements 
PANL. 
124After reaching a record $290 million in 1943, aluminum sales decreased to $259 
million in 1944, and were projected to decrease further in 1945 (Litvak and Maule, A/can 
Aluminum Limited, 45), and after producing nearly 35,000 tons of aluminum in 1943, the 
Arvida plant produced just over 30,000 in 1944, and about half that in 1945 (Cote, Les 
Enjeux, 81 ). 
125List of men on Newfluor payroll, 1943 and 1944, SLMM. 
126
"Report ofthe Labour Relations Officer," 1944, 5-6. 
130 
contained wage increases, but differed in that the Corporation agreed fonnally to 
discontinue the cost-of-living bonus, while the Newfluor agreement retained it. 127 Another 
significant aspect of both agreements was a stipulation that "no workmen shall be entitled 
to any preference in the matter of employment, choice of work or promotion because of 
the fact that they come from St. Lawrence or from any other locality or place."128 This 
clause was a clear indication of the persistence oflocalism and of the companies' efforts to 
eradicate it. 
The 1944 agreements also contained clauses dealing specifically with health and 
safety and with medical services. Both agreements called for the appointment of one or 
more employees, chosen by the company on the basis of their competence, to be 
"responsible at all times that the mines were safe for the men to work." These safety 
duties were in addition to their regular duties. Both companies also agreed "in principle" 
with the need for a qualified doctor in the community and pledged to cooperate in 
securing one on a permanent, stable basis. 129 The agreement with Newfluor was to expire 
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on 31 December 1944, and the agreement with the Corporation on 10 May 1945.130 
Several factors initially shielded the workforce and the community :from the effects 
of layoffs at Newfluor. In June 1944, Newfluor began some mining on a small scale at the 
Tarefare site, and started exploration work on other claims. A hydroelectric project in 
nearby Little St. Lawrence absorbed some men. The inshore cod fishery also started out 
well in 1944, and many laid-off miners returned to the fishery. Also, most of the first 
workers to be laid off were not from St. Lawrence, but from neighbouring communities 
such as Lawn, Burin, Lamaline, and Marystown, a phenomenon also likely a function of 
localism --just as there was pressure to hire St. Lawrence residents first, there may have 
been pressure to lay them offlast. 131 
Some former Newfluor employees also found work at the Corporation. The 
Corporation's new mill went into production in March 1944, and by summer the 
Corporation was working four deposits - Iron Springs, Blue Beach, Black Duck, and a 
Newfoundland Fluorspar Limited and St. Lawrence Workers' Protective Union, 12 May 
1944. The companies agreed to contribute to the financial maintenance of a doctor to an 
amount not exceeding seventy-five cents per month for each employee on the payroll, 
provided that "the balance of the amount necessary is secured," meaning that neither 
company would be required to contribute its share if not enough money had been 
contributed from other sources to make up the full amount. 
130
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smaller site known as "Hare's Ears"-- and employing 235 men. The company claimed to 
have markets in the United States for all the ore it could supply.132 The Corporation also 
en:_joyed a peaceful labour relations climate during the summer of 1944, a fact one observer 
attributed to the scarcity of jobs, noting that, ''No doubt, the fact that jobs are not so 
plentiful as they were last year, is one of the main reasons why there is not likely to be so 
much trouble from now on. ... " 133 
The Newfluor operation, meanwhile, continued its precipitous decline. When a 
July lightning storm knocked out electricity in the area, the Director shaft flooded with 
pumps and other equipment submerged on the 400-foot level. In September 1944, 
Newfluor shipped its last cargo of fluorspar for the year and began another round of lay-
o:ffs.t34 
The Corporation, though still doing well in comparison to Newfluor, also began to 
curtail production in the fall of 1944. By October, Black Duck and Hare's Ears were shut 
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"Report ofthe Ranger, St. Lawrence Detachment, for January to June,1944," GN38, 
S2-5-2, PANL. The situation at St. Lawrence contrasted sharply with that across the 
island at this time. Following a period of relative peace in 1942 and '43, in 1944 there 
was another wave of strikes which saw over 2,000 workers out for nearly 12,000 person-
days (ten times as many as the previous year). Kealey, "The History and Structure of the 
Newfoundland Labour Movement," 112. 
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do~ leaving only Iron Springs and Blue Beach still in operation. 135 This, combined with 
the impending winter, the end of the fishing season, and the suspension ofNewfluor's 
prospecting program raised the specter of a return to widespread unemployment. One 
observer noted that, 
The reduction in employment has become quite noticeable here, already 
some of our local men are without jobs, there has been one application for 
able-bodied relief, very little further reduction is necessary to make it a 
tough winter in this area as there is no source of employment whatsoever 
outside the mining industry. 136 
Perhaps partly as a result of the deteriorating economic situation, the cost-shared 
medical system also broke down during the fall of 1944. The Corporation had stopped 
contributing to the fund for Dr. Leclair's services, and he had essentially become the 
Newfluor doctor. Though it is difficult to imagine even a bad medical service being better 
than none, the reported reason for the breakdown of the system was "dissatisfaction 
concerning the services rendered."137 
Scarcity of jobs during the fall of 1944 also resulted in increased tensions 
associated with localism. The Ranger noted that there was "dissatisfaction over the fact 
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that men from outside settlements were being kept on the job while local men were 
without work, [but] this problem ironed itself out gradually as outside men quit and went 
away." The report does not specify the motivation of the outside men for quitting their 
jobs and leaving town but it is possible, given the tone of the report, that they were 
intimidated into doing so. 138 
At the end ofl944, the future ofthe mining industry in St. Lawrence appeared 
uncertain and, to one observer, its benefits up to that point were questionable: 
Like the rest of the country, St. Lawrence has passed through a few years 
of prosperity with plenty work and high wages, now that the tide has 
turned one might ask 'what did that prosperity leave in the way of 
improvement and lasting benefit?' ... as I see it, apart from giving the people 
sufficient to eat during that time and allowing them to improve their homes 
and build a few new ones, the improvements to the settlement have been 
negligible, educational facilities are not much better than they were, 
medical facilities leave a lot to be desired and there is a total absence of 
recreational facilities for young or old, sanitary conditions are worse than 
ever, the fire hazard has been greatly increased, mail, travel and freighting 
facilities are still inadequate, there is no Public Building, the Public Wharf 
is a wreck and the settlement roads are neither fit nor safe to walk. 139 
The new year brought little improvement. By January 1945, the Corporation was 
working just the Iron Springs and the Blue Beach mines and employing a total of 185 
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men, while Newfluor employed just 80 men.140 Throughout the summer, the Corporation 
employed about 180 men and Newfluor about 70 in mining and another 40 in prospecting. 
Up to August the Corporation bad exported just one shipment of ore, while Newfluor 
shipped none to the Arvida plant in 1945~ choosing instead to stockpile its relatively small 
output.141 In November 1945, Newfluor lifted the pumps from Director mine and allowed 
the shaft to flood. Only six staff members were kept on the payroll. At the end of 1945, 
the Corporation employed just 150 men. 
Industry decline and unemployment no doubt played a role in negotiations for a 
new collective agreement between the union and the Corporation during late 1945.142 The 
Corporation manager bad begun preparing for upcoming negotiations in the summer of 
1945, warning that "in order to carry on at all its employees must be prepared to accept a 
considerable reduction in wages."143 In January 1946, union president Aloysius Turpin 
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Alcan' s aluminum sales for 1945 were less thanhalfthe previous year' s total, and 
production at the Arvida plant was further reduced. Litvak and Maule, A/can Aluminum 
Limited, 45; and Cote, Les Enjeux, 81. 
142The collective agreement with Newfluor had been automatically renewed, with no 
changes, in December 1944. 
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accepted a 10 per cent pay cut, raising the ire of some union members who claimed he had 
no mandate to accept a cut. 144 
Along with layoffs, wage cuts and other problems, workers continued to struggle 
with a lack of legislative protection and with inadequate medical facilities. The 
Newfoundland government had W.E. Bawden, Mines Inspector with the Government of 
Ontario, conduct an inspection of the St. Lawrence mines in October 1945, when 
conditions were once again far from normal because of a major reduction in activity at all 
mines. Bawden noted that in addition to inspecting Newfoundland mines, he had been 
asked by the government to seek input from operators on revising the mine safety 
regulations. Apparently, he had not been asked to seek input from miners' unions, as 
Sinclair had suggested. Having discussed the matter with the various operators, Bawden 
was of the opinion that they were making "a real effort" to bring their operations up to the 
Ontario standard. He did note that some operators feared that enforcement of a new code 
would be too expensive for them. As an example of a measure which some operators 
claimed would be too costly, he noted the lack of secondary shafts to provide escape 
routes and ventilation. 145 
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In response to Bawden's report, new Public Utilities Commissioner James S. Neill 
(who had recently been appointed as Commissioner for Public Utilities)146 stated that the 
inspections which had been conducted up to that time had been "instrumental in improving 
working and safety conditions" in Newfoundland mines and he therefore saw no need for 
new regulations or for the immediate appointment of an inspector. He pointed out, 
however, in what had become familiar refrain, that the government was "still investigating 
the possibility of securing a suitable man as Mines Inspector."147 
The lack of medical facilities also continued to be a problem, as indicated by the 
Relieving Officer's dilemma in trying to decide which of the many applicants for public 
relief should qualify. In denying reliefto some applicants deemed able-bodied, the 
Relieving Officer noted that, "In some cases it is questionable that some applicants are 
really able-bodied but there is no way for them to secure medical certificates without 
146 A native of Belfast, Ireland, Neill had served in various colonial posts, including in 
Tonga and Dominica, before coming to Newfoundland. His appointment in Public Utilities 
on 28 September 1945 was one of a number of personnel changes that took place around 
this time. Neill replaced Sir George London, an Englishmen who had served as Colonial 
Secretary of the Gold Coast before coming to Newfoundland. London had replaced 
Woods a year earlier, in September 1944. Also in September 1944, former Labour 
Relations Officer Albert Joseph Walsh took over from Sir Lewis Edward Emerson in 
Home Affairs and Education. In Natural Resources, Dunn was replaced by William H. 
Flynn in September 1945. See Neary, Newfoundland in the North Atlantic World, 102-4, 
125,242-3. 
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traveling to Grand bank or Burin for examination."148 
The increase in unemployment and in requests for relief that accompanied the 
decline of the mining industry during 1944 and 1945 indicate the general effects of decade 
of mining upon the community's economy: people had little to fall back on in case of 
decline or closure of the mining industry. Some had returned to fishing, but the fishery 
had clearly declined in importance. The number of boats and fishing rooms had decreased 
since 1935, and fishing was clearly less prominent within the economy of St. Lawrence 
than in that of other, nearby communities. The town of Lawn, for example, with roughly 
half the population of St. Lawrence, had more fishing rooms and only slightly fewer boats 
than St. Lawrence in 1945. The same was true of other communities along the coast.149 
There had been other changes as well. The population had increased by 33 per 
cent since 1935, compared to 2.5 per cent for the Burin district in the same period, and 11 
per cent in Newfoundland as a whole. 150 Because the Census Returns for 1945 included 
occupations reported in 1935, it is also possible to trace shifts from other areas into the 
mining industry by St. Lawrence residents. Table 3.1 shows the 1935 occupations of 1945 
mine employees. 
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Table 3.1: 1935 Occupations of 1945 Mine Employees 
Occupation in 1935 Number 
Fishing 102 
Mining 57 
Pupil 50 
None 18 
Other 26 
Source: Department of Public Health and Welfare, Eleventh Census of Newfoundland, 
1945. 
While the vast majority of employees in 1945 were native to St. Lawrence or 
nearby communities, much of the clerical, technical, and supervisory staff had been 
recruited from outside the area. For example, there was a 31-year-old accountant and a 
33-year-old warehouse clerk who had held similar jobs in the Grand Falls pulp-and-paper 
industry in 1935. Warren Smith, Newfluor' s chief geologist and mine manager, was from 
the United States, while Newfluor Mining Captain Murdock Jusdon was from Canada. 
One significant difference between the Corporation and Newfluor in this regard 
was the Corporation's propensity to rely more upon local men to fill supervisory positions. 
Hiring practices in this area were tied to the history of the industry and the role that 
certain families and individuals had played in that history. For example, the Farrell family, 
which had been instrwnental in cooperating with Seibert to open the first mine in 1933, 
had become an important source of supervisory staff for the Corporation. Howard Farrell, 
140 
who was involved in the 1933 deal, was a Mine Superintendent in 1945, earning $3,300 
per year.151 Corporation General Manager and Vice-President Donald Poynter reported 
an annual salary of$6,000.00 per year in 1945, roughly five times the income of a St. 
Lawrence miner. Table 3.2 shows the average income of St. Lawrence mine employees 
(excluding supervisory staff) and of male workers in mining and other industries around -
Newfoundland in 1945.152 
151Eleventh Census of Newfoundland, 1945. 
152The differences in annual incomes must be viewed in light of a number of mitigating 
factors, such as the average number of weeks workers in these industries were actually 
employed during the year. Workers at the Bell Island mines, for example, were 
unemployed for over thirteen weeks on average in 1945, Buchans workers for just six, and 
St. Lawrence workers for ten: Department of Public Health and Welfare, Eleventh Census 
of Newfoundland, 1945, Table 59. There were just three females employed by the St. 
Lawrence mining industry, as stenographers. All three were single and living in their 
parents' homes. Their annual income was $1,200.00-- $150.00 less than the men's. This 
was in keeping with the general trend. In 1945 there were just 30 females employed by 
the mining industry in all ofNewfoundland, out of a total of2,972 employees. They 
earned an average of$166.00 less per year than did the men: Department of Public Health 
and Welfare, Eleventh Census of Newfoundland, 1945. 
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Table 3.2: Average Annual Incomes for Male Employees 
in Selected Industries, Newfoundland, 1945 
Industry Average Annual Income 
Fluorspar Mining (St. Lawrence) $1,350.00 
Iron Ore Mining (Bell Island) $1,277.00 
Lead/Copper/Zinc Mining (Buchans) $1,600.00 
Fishing $558.00 
Manufacturing $1,342.00 
Sawmills/Woodworking $905.00 
Pulp and Paper $1,730.00 
Forestry/Logging $746.00 
Source: Department ofPublic Health and Welfare, Eleventh Census of Newfoundland, 
1945. 
The extent to which some people were able to use their connections to secure 
supervisory positions contrasts sharply with the apparent lack of mobility that marked the 
lives of those who did not enjoy such advantages. For example, one 32-year-old man was 
a mucker in 1935 and was still a mucker in 1945, while a 63-year-old man with no 
education remained a labourer from 1935 to 1945.153 These examples illustrate the impact 
of the mining industry on socio-economic divisions in the community. 
153Department ofPublic Health and Welfare, Eleventh Census of Newfoundland, 1945. 
142 
3.6 Conclusion 
In some areas, the period from 1939 to 1945 was one of momentous change. The 
mining industry underwent a period of rapid growth followed by an equally rapid decline. 
After forming their first union in 1939, workers were engaged for several years in a battle 
for union recognition, higher wages, improved working conditions, and adequate medical 
services. By 1943, the union had secured its first collective agreements and won 
concessions in such areas as wages. An industry decline beginning in 1944, however, had 
a detrimental effect on the union's bargaining position and on the economy of the 
community. 
There was little change, however, in the area of occupational health and safety. 
Despite repeated calls for action at the magistrate' s inquiry in 1939, during the work 
stoppages of 1941, at the Trade Dispute Board hearings in 1942, and in other contexts, 
workers' concerns continued to be downplayed or ignored. The Commission of 
Government still refused to update legislation on mine safety and inspections, and medical 
services remained woefully inadequate. The refusal to respond seriously to workers' 
repeated pleas for action throughout this period represents a tragically neglected 
opportunity to avoid much of the impending disaster. 
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Chapter 4: Change and Continuity in the Postwar Era, 1946-1956 
Introduction 
The decade following the end of the Second World War was a time of tremendous 
change for industry and labour in St. Lawrence. In the late 1940s, the mining industry 
entered a period of revitalization following the slump that began in 1944. By the mid-
1950s, both mining companies had embarked on expansion programs and fluorspar 
shipments were at an all-time high. In the late 1940s, Newfoundland labour organizations 
began the process of integrating with larger North American organizations, and in 1949 
the St. Lawrence miners' union joined this trend, three years after electing a new 
president. In addition, Newfoundland' s entry into confederation with Canada in 1949 
eventually brought important legislative changes in such areas as occupational health and 
safety regulations, mines inspections, and workers' compensation. At the same time, 
however, and despite these legislative changes and increasing awareness about the health 
effects of the mining industry, little progress was made in addressing health concerns or 
improving working conditions at St. Lawrence. This chapter explores this period of 
change and continuity. 
4.1 A Time ofTransition: Politics. Industzy, and Labour. 1946-52 
The economic growth which accompanied the Second World War had put 
Newfoundland in a better financial position than it had been in for many years. This gave 
rise to the question ofNewfoundland's future political status, for when the Commission of 
Government was appointed in the crisis atmosphere of 1934, it was understood that once 
the colony's situation had improved, the people would be given the option of returning to 
some form of elected government. In December 1945, it was announced that a National 
Convention would be held to examine the state of the colony and to establish the 
parameters for deciding Newfoundland's political future. In June 1946, Newfoundlanders 
voted for the first time since 1932, electing 45 delegates to represent them at the National 
Convention.1 
On 3 June 1948 , a referendum was held upon the three political options which 
grew out of the Convention's proceedings. In the June referendum, the option of 
returning to the status of a self-government under Responsible Government took the 
largest percentage of votes (44.5 per cent), Confederation with Canada came second (with 
41.1 per cent), and the option of returning to rule under Commission of Government third 
(with 14.3 per cent). The option receiving the lowest number of votes was then dropped 
from the ballot and on the second vote, held on 21 July 1948, Confederation with Canada 
received 52.3 per cent ofthe vote, and the return to Responsible Government 47.4 per 
cent. The Terms of Union under which Newfoundland became a province of Canada were 
signed 31 March 1949. The victorious confederates adopted the Liberal Party banner and, 
under leader Joseph Smallwood, won a landslide victory in Newfoundland's first 
1Neary, Newfoundland in the North Atlantic World, 241-312; and Noel, Politics in 
Newfoundland, 244-55. 
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provincial election on 27 May 1949.2 
The end of war and confederation with Canada also had a significant impact on the 
Newfoundland labour relations environment. In1946, the Commission of Government 
responded to a demand that labour organizations had been making for years and 
established Newfoundland's first Department ofLabour.3 The government also began 
dismantling its wartime labour measures, the last of which was removed in March 194 7. 
In October 1947, the Commission approved in principle the NFL's proposed Act to 
Regulate Trade Unions and Trade Disputes (but took no further action on the proposal) 
and in December 1947, a Minimum Wage Act was passed.4 Following his electoral 
victory of 1949, Smallwood fulfilled a campaign promise he had made to the NFL and 
introduced further legislative changes. The government appointed a Labour Advisory 
Committee with five members, four of whom were from the labour movement, and former 
NFL President Charles Ballam was named the province's first Minister ofLabour. Soon, a 
new Labour Relations Act and Trade Union Act were passed.5 
~oel, Politics in Newfoundland, 248-62; and Neary Newfoundland in the North 
Atlantic World, 313-45. The Liberals under Smallwood went on to dominate 
Newfoundland politics until the early 1970s. 
3The Department was not given its own Minister, but a Secretary, A.J. Walsh, was 
appointed. 
4Neary, Newfoundland in the North Atlantic World, 258. 
5Gillespie, A Class Act, 93-5. 
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Paralleling Newfoundland's political integration into Canada was a shift to a more 
continental orientation for Newfoundland's labour organizations. The NFL's 1948 
Convention, held just one month after the deciding confederation referendum, was 
occupied with the question of possible affiliation with a larger, North American labour 
organization. The two main contenders for the allegiance of the NFL and the 
Newfoundland unions were the American Federation of Labour-Trades and Labor 
Congress (AFL-TLC) alliance, and the Canadian Congress ofLabour-Congress of 
Industrial Organizations (CCL-CIO) alliance. 6 While the NFL and the AFL-TLC had ties 
dating back to the late 1930s, the CCL-CIO also had some key allies in Newfoundland. In 
1947, the CCL-CIO had sent its Atlantic Director, Donald Macdonald, on a tour of 
Newfoundland, and while he was treated with suspicion in some quarters because of the 
organization's reputation for being dominated by communists, he was successful in 
winning over one ofNewfoundland's largest unions, the 1,500-strong Wabana Mine 
Workers' Union, which voted overwhelmingly to break ties with the NFL and join the 
United Steelworkers of America (USWA), a CCL-CIO affiliate. Shortly thereafter, the 
Gander General Workers' Union, formed in 1946 and comprised largely of workers 
6The TLC was formed in 1886 as the Dominion Trades and Labour Congress, and 
became gradually integrated with the AFL during the early 20th century. The CIO was 
formed in 1938 by the Committee for Industrial Organization, a group of unions expelled 
by the AFL in 1936. The CCL was established in 1940 by several Canadian branches of 
CIO international unions which had been expelled from the TLC in 1939. In 1955, the 
AFL and the CIO merged, and in 1956, the TLC and the CCL united to form the Canadian 
Labour Congress (CLC). 
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employed at the Gander Airport, followed suit. 7 
The AFL-TLC lobbied hard at the NFL's 1948 convention, promising the 
Federation and its member unions increased financial and organizational resources. 
Because of lingering disagreements among some NFL members over the confederation 
issue, however, it was decided to postpone any formal decision on affiliation for one year. 
To strengthen its position in the meantime, in February 1949, the AFL-TLC appointed 
Cyril Strong its first full-time Newfoundland representative. Strong had been involved in 
the Newfoundland labour movement since 1941 and had served in several executive 
positions with the NFL. 8 By the fall of 1949, Strong had recruited twelve NFL member 
unions to the AFL-TLC and several non-NFL unions had joined as directly chartered 
members. Most unions represented at the NFL's convention in the fall of 1949 were 
affiliated with the AFL-TLC in some way, and the convention voted to make the NFL a 
provincial wing of the AFL-TLC. 9 The member unions in 1949 included the Buchans 
miners' union, which had been an NFL affiliate for several years. The Bell Island union, 
7Gillespie, A Class Act, 98. A number of large CCL unions were in fact under 
Communist leadership, including Canadian branches of the International Woodworkers of 
America, the International Union of Mine, Mill, and Smelter Workers, the United 
Automobile Workers, and the United Electrical Workers. Communists also held 
important leadership positions within the TLC. In late 1940s, the CCL took measures to 
purge Communists from leadership positions in Canada, while the CIO took similar steps 
in the United States. See Jamieson, Industrial Relations in Canada, 48. 
8My Life as a Newfoundland Union Organizer: The Memoirs of Cyril W Strong, 
1912-1987, (St. John's: Canadian Committee on Labour History,1987), 1-13. 
9Gillespie, A Class Act, 100-1. 
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however, remained a CIO affiliate.10 
While the many developments taking place in the political realm and at the 
institutional level of the labour movement would ultimately have repercussions for 
industry, labour, and health and safety in St. Lawrence, in the years immediately following 
the war workers there were more concerned with surviving the continuing slump in the 
mining industry. Because of reduced production at the Arvida plant, from the time the 
Director shaft was allowed to flood in late 1945 to the end of 1946, Newfluor produced 
no ore at St. Lawrence. In 1946 it was reported that increasing numbers of men, unable to 
qualify for able-bodied relief, were attempting to get medical examinations ' 'which might 
show that they cannot be classified as able-bodied." It is unclear which had increased --
the number of sick men or their determination to qualify -- but in either case the Relieving 
Officer had little sympathy for their plight, remarking that, "most of these people are of 
the type that only just managed to get along in the prosperous times for various reasons ... 
in a few cases, where the breadwinner has been certified as not able-bodied by a Doctor, 
relief has been issued. " 11 
While the end of war meant the loss of some important fluorspar markets and a 
temporary slump in the industry, wartime expansion had also placed producers in a good 
10
"List ofTrade Unions in Newfoundland, 17 December 1949," Collection 079 
(Hattenhauer Collection), File 1.4, CNSA 
11
"Report of the Ranger, St. Lawrence Detaclunent," February 1946, GN38, S2-5-
2, PANL; and "Report ofRanger, St. Lawrence Detachment," January 1946, GN38, S2-5-
2, PANL. 
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long-term position, as it had fostered technological advances in such areas as aluminum 
production and had introduced civilian consumers to the benefits of aluminum. The war 
had made Alcan one of the largest producers of raw aluminum in the world, and with its 
integrated network of production, transportation and electric power facilities, the 
company was well-placed to take advantage of these factors. To meet an increase in the 
demand for aluminum in 1948, Alcan opened a new, expanded aluminum plant at Arvida. 
The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 also spurred demand for aluminum and 
prompted a new phase of industry expansion While Alcan did not enter into any direct 
supply contracts with the United States government, American firms such as Alcoa and 
Kaiser Aluminum entered into contracts with Alcan to supply them with raw aluminum. 
To meet the growing civilian and military demand, Alcan expanded its production and 
hydroelectric facilities in Quebec, and began construction of an aluminum smelter and 
townsite at Kitimat, British Columbia. The Kitimat smelter went into production in 1953. 
Throughout this period of expansion, Alcan enjoyed a relatively stable labour relations 
environment, apart from one brief strike at the Shawinigan plant in 1951 and two at 
Arvida in 1954Y 
To supply the Arvida plant and meet the gradual increase in aluminum demand 
which began in 1947, New:O.uor opened the Tarefare shaft on a limited scale. By May 
12Litvak and Maule, Alcan Aluminum Limited, 49-50; and Duncan Campbell, 
Mission mondiale: histoire d'Alcan, Volume 1 (Toronto: Ontario Publishing Company, 
1985), 387-418. Mission mondiale, Volume 2, deals with the company' s international 
expansion during the 1950s, and with developments in Quebec and British Columbia. 
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194 7, the company employed 90 workers in mining and prospecting combined, and had 
made its first shipment of ore since the fall of 1945.13 Just a small quantity of fluorspar 
was produced at the Tarefare mine in this period, and that mine was shut down again in 
1948. Late in 1947, however, the Director mine was re-activated, reflecting a further 
increase in production at the Arvida plant. 14 In 1948, fluorspar production at Director 
nearly equaled the record amount of 1943.15 
The Corporation, meanwhile, was not as well placed to take advantage of rising 
demand for aluminum, and had lost much of its wartime market for fluorspar. It continued 
to operate on a reduced scale throughout the last half of the 1940s, with only its Iron 
Springs Mine and a few smaller mines operating on an intermittent basis. 16 A dramatic 
increase in American and Canadian demand for fluorspar beginning in 1950, however, 
provided an opportunity for the Corporation to go back into full production at St. 
Lawrence.17 It appears that after an exceptionally bad year in 1949, the Corporation had 
been on the brink of complete collapse when this industry revival began to take hold. In 
November 1949, Seibert had written directly to Smallwood stating that a major creditor, 
13Cote, Les Enjeux, 91. 
14Cote, Les Enjeux, 91. 
15
"History of Operations,"1966, AA. 
16Howard Farrell, "Report ofthe Mining Properties of St. Lawrence Corporation," 
1967, File 1L/14, DME. 
17United States, Minerals Yearbook, 1950, 1951, and 1952. 
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the Chemical Bank and Trust Company of New York, was demanding that the 
Corporation repay a debt $125,000. According to Seibert, there were only two ways this 
could be accomplished: to secure a loan or a line of credit, or to liquidate the St. 
Lawrence assets and shut down the operation. Seibert claimed that no bank in either the 
United States or Canada would give the Corporation a loan without a strong guarantee 
because "our working capital position is too thin." Shutting down the St. Lawrence 
operation, he pointed out, would put 150 men out of work. Seibert asked the government 
to help the company secure a loan or a line of credit for $250,000.18 
To determine the advisability of assisting the company, the government had an 
investigation of the Corporation's financial status conducted. The investigation covered 
the period from January 1946, to September 1949. In 1946, the Corporation had 
established a processing plant in Wilmington, Delaware, under the name St. Lawrence 
Fluorspar of Delaware, to treat fluorspar shipped there from its St. Lawrence mines before 
sending it on to American consumers. 19 Because the firm conducting the investigation 
treated both the St. Lawrence and the Delaware companies as a single entity in many 
respects, it is difficult to glean from its report details about the St. Lawrence company 
itself during the years in question. It is clear, however, that after showing losses during 
18Walter Seibert to J.R Smallwood, 7 November 1949, Coli 075 (Smallwood 
Collection), File 3.20.087, CNSA. 
1
'1>eat, Marwick, Mitchell and Company (Chartered Accountants), "Report on 
Application for Financial Assistance, St. Lawrence Corporation ofNewfoundland, 
Limited, and St. Lawrence Fluorspar Inc," January 1950, unpublished docwnent, CNS. 
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1946-4 7, the two companies combined began reporting substantial profits in 1948. The 
St. Lawrence company reported a total profit of $60,519 from 1946 to 1949.20 
The report also revealed that the Corporation was still spending as little as possible 
on equipment. For example, it had recently purchased "a number of items ... as scrap from 
the US Naval Base at Argentia." The company's frugality when it came to equipment did 
not extend to other areas, such as construction of a ''Staff House" to be used as the 
manager's residence and as a social club for staff members. It cost $25,000, at a time 
when the average value of a St. Lawrence miner's house was about $1,500.21 
Furthermore, the $25,000 spent on the Staff House during the period in question was 
more than 100 times the amount spent on a so-called "ventilation system" for the Iron 
Springs mine, which cost just $248.00, suggesting a great deal about the company's 
priorities. 22 
In the end, the firm which carried out the financial investigation agreed with 
Seibert that though the combined companies had begun to show a profit recently, their 
liabilities meant that, unless the company received some financial assistance, the Chemical 
Bank and Trust Company loan could not be paid off without threatening the St. Lawrence 
operation. The firm concluded that though a loan guarantee appeared risky from the 
20
"Report on Application for Financial Assistance," Exhibit B. 
21
"Report on Application for Financial Assistance," 13. The figure on the value of 
miners' houses is calculated from the Nominal Census for 1945. 
22
"Report on Application for Financial Assistance," Schedule 7. 
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strictly financial viewpoint, the government should also consider the importance of the 
industry to the community and to the province. On that basis, it recommended 
guaranteeing a loan of$250,000 if such a loan could be secured by the assets of both 
companies and by Seibert's personal guarantee. On 13 February 1950, Smallwood 
requested the Royal Bank of Canada in St. John's to begin the process of advancing the 
line of credit, secured by the government's guarantee.23 
Having secured financial assistance, the Corporation was able to take advantage of 
the increased demand for fluorspar. In 1950, the Iron Springs shaft was extended to 670 
feet and over 2,000 feet of drifting carried out at that level, and by 1952, the Iron Springs 
shaft was down to 780 feet. The Corporation also reactivated several other sites which 
had been shut down for several years, and developed some new sources of ore. During 
1950-52, the Iron Springs vein was mined from another, smaller shaft known as the West 
Extension, which was only about 100 feet deep. At the Blue Beach mine, the shaft was 
extended from the 130 to the 230-foot level, and a second shaft was sunk, down to the 
185-foot level. The Lord and Lady Gulch site, which had been abandoned in 1937 in 
favour of the Iron Springs mine, was also reactivated in the early 1950s, and the 
Corporation sank a small shaft on another vein, known as the "Grassy Gulch" vein. 24 At 
Newtluor, another shaft (known as ''Number 3") was started on the Director vein in 1950, 
23J.R. Smallwood to Royal Bank, St. John's, 13 February 1950, Coil 075, File 
3.20.087, CNSA. 
24Farrell, "Report ofthe Mining Properties of St. Lawrence Corporation," 1967. 
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and by July 1952, that shaft was 400 feet deep. Newfluor also constructed a new mill, 
which included a crusher and a HMS plant similar to the Corporation's. Newfluor' s new 
mill went into production in January 1951.25 Annual shipments from both companies 
increased substantially each year from 1949 to 1952.26 
Like Newfluor, the Corporation also benefitted directly from the increased 
demand for fluorspar resuhing from the outbreak ofthe Korean War. In 1952, the 
Corporation entered into a contract with the United States Defense Materials Procurement 
Agency to supply 150,000 tons of acid-grade fluorspar over the course of the next four 
years. As part of this agreement, the United States government agreed to advance the 
Corporation $1,250,000 to upgrade and expand its processing facilities at both St. 
Lawrence and Wilmington. The Corporation was to repay a portion of this money with 
the fluorspar itself: as a portion of each ton shipped. The expansion program included the 
addition of a new "flotation" section to the Corporation's St. Lawrence mill. The flotation 
process works on the same basic principle as the HMS, but involves stirring of the ore 
within the flotation solution. Also the ore going into a flotation process must be crushed 
much finer than that going into a HMS process. The Corporation's flotation plant was 
designed to produce a high CaF2-content product to be shipped to the Wilmington plant 
for further refining. The Wilmington plant thus remained the main destination for the 
25Warren S. Smith, "Fluorspar at St. Lawrence, Newfoundland,"1957 File 1 
L/4/16, DME. 
26United States, Minerals Yearbook, 1949, 1950, 195 1, 1952. 
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Corporation's product, but small amounts of metallurgical grade were sometimes shipped 
directly to steel plants in both the US and Canada. 27 
Industry expansion during the early 1950s created employment for over 500 
people in the St. Lawrence mines, including those employed in milling and stevedoring, 
and sparked a renewed sense of optimism for the industry and the community. One 
observer remarked in 1952 that, 
The people of St. Lawrence are enjoying a high level of prosperity, and 
many new modem homes have been erected in recent months. Over one 
hundred and fifty private motor vehicles are owned in the town, which has 
a population of 1700. This is the highest per capita rate for motor vehicles 
on the Burin Peninsula. 28 
While some of this celebratory tone can be attributed to Smallwood government 
propaganda, there is no doubt that by 1952 the industry had rebounded from the slwnp it 
had entered in 1944. 
Important developments were also taking place on the labour relations front in St. 
Lawrence during this period. In 1946, the local Ranger had predicted a challenge to 
Turpin's leadership in January after he had accepted a 10 per cent wage cut during 
negotiations for a new collective agreement. That challenge came in March 1946, from 
James Cusick, a 47-year-old local man and veteran miner, who had started as a driller in 
27Farrell, "Report of the Mining Properties of St. Lawrence Corporation," 15-40. 
28
"Prosperous Conditions," Newfoundland Journal of Commerce, 19, 11 
(November 1952), 39. 
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1935 and had risen to become driller foreman by 1945.29 Cusick later claimed that he 
challenged Turpin's leadership because he objected to his methods, going back to the way 
he had taken over the presidency from Aylward in 1941. Cusick claimed that when he 
challenged for the leadership in March 1946, he wanted a vote by secret ballot, but that 
Turpin refused and again insisted on having the men go to one side of the meeting room or 
the other, depending on whom they supported. In this case, the majority supported 
Cusick.30 
Perhaps due in part to the scarcity of jobs, the labour relations scene at St. 
Lawrence was quiet in the first year or so of Cusick's presidency. Newfluor's reactivation 
of Director mine in 1947, however, raised the issue of renewing its collective agreement 
with the union.31 During negotiations for renewal of the contract, a disagreement arose 
over the issue of union membership and hiring. The clause at issue required the company 
to give hiring preference to union members in cases where union members capable of 
performing the required work were available. The union wanted to remove the condition 
29Department ofPublic Health and Welfare, Tenth Census of Newfoundland and 
Labrador 1935; and Eleventh Census of Newfoundland and Labrador, 1945. 
30Interview with James Cusick, St. Lawrence, 13 October 1968. Coll84-224, 
Tapes# C7253-7254, MUNFLA. (This interview is part of the same series that contains 
the interview with Aloysius Turpin cited in the previous chapter). 
31S.H. Parsons, Labour Relations Officer, to James Cusick, SL WPU, 7 February 
1948, SLMM. Selby Parsons was promoted to Labour Relations Officer after serving as 
Acting Labour Relations Officer when Walsh became Commissioner for Home Affairs and 
Education in July 1944. Neary, Newfoundland in the North Atlantic World, 185, 242. 
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whereby preference was given to union members where qualified members were 
available, and replace it with a stricter clause, requiring the hiring of only union members 
where available. 32 In other words, the union wanted an unconditional closed shop. 
In May 1948, the union notified Newfluor of its intention to go on strike on 1 June 
if the company continued to deny this demand. Newfluor manager Warren Smith then 
asked the union to drop the demand in exchange for having the company carry out the 
dues check-off(deducting employees' union dues from the payroll), something the 
company had refused to do up to this point.33 The union refused but, at the request of the 
Labour Relations Office, delayed the strike a few days past the 1 June deadline. After a 
visit by a Labour Relations Office representative, the dispute was settled in early June. The 
original membership clause was retained, and the company agreed to carry out the union 
check-off.34 Cusick had taken on his first challenge as president, and while the check-off 
was a concession on the part of the company, he had lost on the main issue, the closed 
shop. 
In January 1949, Cusick had a chance encounter with Cyril Strong, the AFL-TLC 
representative, in St. John's. Strong convinced Cusick to take his suggestion that the St. 
32James Cusick, SL WPU, to W.S. Smith, Newfluor, 8 January 1948, SLMM. 
33W.S. Smith, Newfluor, to James Cusick, SL WPU, 26 May 1948, SLMM. 
34<'Miners Call OffThreatened Strike," Daily News, 12 June 1948. The newspaper 
story stated that a Labour Relations Office representative went to St. Lawrence on 2 June. 
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Lawrence union affiliate with the AFL-TLC back to his membership. 35 According to 
Cusick, the vote to affiliate was unanimous, and on 12 May 1949, the SLWPU became 
Federal Labour Union (FLU) 24530, a directly chartered affiliate of the AFL.36 Cusick 
later stated that his support for the affiliation was motivated by his belief that an 
independent union simply lacked the power to negotiate successfully with the companies 
in St. Lawrence, and that Turpin's insistence on an independent union had simply been 
playing into the companies' hand.37 
On 26 April1949, the union's new status was put to the test when 120 workers at 
Newfluor went on strike to protest a reduction in the cost-of-living bonus. The immediate 
background to the April strike goes back to December 1948, when the union informed 
Newfluor that it wished to revise the collective agreement then up for renewal. The union 
35Strong, My Life as a Nelifoundland Union Organizer, 36-8. 
36The 12 May date is from an article which appeared in the Evening Telegram, 20 
May 1949. FLUs were directly affiliated with the AFL, as opposed to coming under the 
AFL by way of membership in an AFL-affiliated international union. In theory, FLUs 
were to be a temporary phase, a way of getting workers organized and affiliated with the 
AFL before affiliating them with an AFL international. Some internationals, however, 
argued that FLUs circumvented their jurisdiction, and were an encroachment on their 
territory. FLUs therefore often found themselves caught in jurisdictional squabbles 
between the AFL and its member internationals. Also, much of the research facilities and 
other infrastructure was handled not by the AFL itself but by the internationals, so the 
FLUs were not as well served in this regard. For a description of the origins and politics 
ofthe FLUs, see Robert H. Zieger, Madison's Battery Workers, 1934-52: A History of 
Federal Labour Union 19587 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1977), 1-38; and Philip 
Taft, The A. F. of L. from the Death of Gompers to the Merger (Harper and Brothers: 
New York, 1959), 98-108. 
37Interview with James Cusick, MUNFLA. 
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sought an across-the-board increase of5 cents per hour, and the abolishment of the cost-
of-living bonus and the incorporation of an equal amount into the basic rate of pay. 
Negotiations broke down on 31 March 1949, but work continued until3 April, when a 
review of the cost-of-living index resulted in a decrease of2 cents per hour in the cost-of-
living bonus, at which point Newfluor workers walked off the job.38 The men held out for 
over a month, until 3 June, when, under a settlement mediated by the Labour Relations 
Officer, Newfluor agreed to abolish the cost-of-living bonus and incorporate an equal 
amount into the basic rate. Furthermore, the union won a pay increase of 4 cents per hour 
for underground workers and 2 cents for surface workers. 39 This would bring the average 
rate of pay at Newfluor to 82 cents per hour, with wages ranging from 51 cents to $1.04 
per hour. The average wage of82 cents per hour paid to Newfluor employees under the 
1949 agreement was considerably less than the average wage of$1.02 per hour for all 
workers in the Newfoundland mining industry in that period. 40 The new agreement was 
signed on 2 June and was due to expire on 31 March 1951.41 While the wage settlement 
38Evening Telegram, 14 May 1949. 
39Canada, Department of Labour. "Report on Industrial Dispute Termination," 20 
June 1949, RG 27, Volume 473, NAC. 
40lndustry average calculated from Newfoundland Statistics Agency, Historical 
Statistics of Newfoundland and Labrador, Volume II, July, 1981, Table M-5, 
"Employment and Earnings, Mining Industry, by Mineral Class, Newfoundland and 
Labrador, 1949 to 1978." Calculation based on 48 hours per week, 52 weeks per year. 
41
"Union Agreement between Newfoundland Fluorspar Limited and St. Lawrence 
Workers' Protective Union,1949," AA. The lowest-paid group was "sorters," 16 to 18-
year-olds who sorted ore by hand as it entered the mill area. 
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fell short of the union's original demand, it represented an important victory after several 
years ofthe status quo (or, in the case of the Corporation, wage rollbacks). It was also, to 
Cusic~ a demonstration of the benefits of affiliation. Strong had come to St. Lawrence as 
soon as the strike started, and Cusick later stated that had it not been for the support of 
the parent organization and Strong's expertise, the union could never have held out long 
enough to win such a settlement. 42 Corporation workers, on the other hand, did not fare 
so well in their negotiations during this period. In December 1949, they entered into a 
new collective agreement which, with a few minor amendments, contained the same terms 
as the 1944 agreement. That agreement was due to expire in March 1951 .43 
The union continued to demand the workers' share of industry resurgence during 
the early 1950s. When it entered negotiations for renewing contracts with both companies 
in 1951, the union's main demand to both the Corporation and Newfluor was for an 
across-the-board increase of 16 cents per hour. 44 Seibert responded, on behalf of the 
Corporation, that to agree to this ''would surely lead to bankruptcy" and that the 
Corporation was in a position to agree only to ' 'reasonable" demands. Asking Cusick to 
42Interview with James Cusic~ MUNFLA. 
43No copy of this agreement exists. This information is contained in a letter from 
Donald Poynter, St. Lawrence Fluorspar Corporation, to James Cusick, SL WPU, 8 
December 1949, SLMM. 
44James Cusic~ SL WPU, to Donald Poynter, St. Lawrence Fluorspar Corporation, 
1 February 1951, SL:MM; and James Cusick, SLWPU, to W.S. Smith, Newfluor, 1 
February 1951, SLMM. 
161 
take into account the expenses the Corporation had incurred in recent expansions and 
improvements and not to threaten the fragile prosperity which the industry was 
experiencing, Seibert countered with an offer of8 cents per hour.45 Cusick had AFL 
research staff investigate the Corporation's financial state, and while it was difficult to 
obtain much financial information on the company, researchers found that its income had 
risen approximately 32 per cent in the two years preceding May 1951, and that there had 
been an major increase in both volume of sales and the profit margin.46 Cusick went back 
to Corporation management with this information and got it to agree to a 12-cent across-
the-board increase (a figure halfway between the demand and the counter-offer). An 
unprecedented concession contained in the new agreement was a provision for one week 
of annual vacation for employees having at least one year of continuous service. 47 
Newfluor, meanwhile, responded to the union's 1951 demand with an offer of a 10 
per cent increase (meaning a raise as low as 5 cents per hour for some employees).48 The 
union countered that it would accept the 10 per cent increase provided that each employee 
got a minimum increase of 10 ten cents per hour. In making this demand, the union drew 
45Walter Seibert, St. Lawrence Fluorspar Corporation, New York, to James 
Cusick, SLWPU, 1 March 1951, SLMM. 
46AFL Research Staffto James Cusick, SLWPU, 12 May 1952, SLMM. 
47
"Amendments to the Agreement signed 24 February 1944 and as subsequently 
amended between the St. Lawrence Corporation ofNewfoundland and the St. Lawrence 
Workers' Protective Union presently known as St. Lawrence Federal Labour Union, No. 
24530, AF ofL," 23 June 1951, SLMM. 
48W.S. Smith, Newfluor, to James Cusick, SLWPU, 4 June 1951, SLMM. 
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upon the contrast between the two companies, and demanded that "tradesmen in the 
employ of [Newfluor] receiving less wages than tradesmen of similar capabilities in the 
employ of the St. Lawrence Corporation [should] have their wages brought up on par 
with the higher paid men.'>49 The company's reply to this was apparently unsatisfactory, 
as the union requested the intervention of a Conciliation Officer from the Department of 
Labour. Soon, an agreement was reached embodying essentially the same terms as those 
in the agreement just signed with the Corporation: 12 cents per hour across the board and 
one week's paid vacation for qualifying employees. 5° Both agreements were to be in effect 
until 31 March 1952. 
4.2 Legislative Changes: Mines Regulations, Mines Inspections. and Workers' 
Compensation. 1949-52 
While the revival of the mining industry in the late 1940s and early 1950s provided 
much-needed employment, and the union won some qualified victories in terms of wage 
increases and other benefits, there was little progress on the health and safety front. At 
the legislative level, the government continued to delay drafting mine safety regulations 
and establishing a provincial inspectorate, and continued to rely on inspectors brought in 
from outside the province. In November 1949, Ontario Mines Inspector A.V. Corlett was 
in St. Lawrence as part of an inspection of Newfoundland mines, the first one since 1944. 
49James Cusick, SLWPU, to W.S. Smith, Newfluor, 9 June 1951, SLMM. 
5~otice to members ofSLWPU (FLU No. 24530), 30 June 1951, SLMM. 
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During Corlett's 1949 visit, Newfluor was mining at the Director site only. Corlett made 
some routine observations on safety concerns in the Director mine, and at the surface 
facilities and power plant. He noted that a "raise" (a vertical opening) was being driven 
from the 250-foot level to the surface at Director mine, which the management stated 
would eventually provide ventilation. 51 As for the Corporation mines, Corlett was 
appalled at the hoisting system in use at Blue Beach, which he described as, "completely 
unsuitable for mine hoisting work and not be acceptable under any modem code of mine-
hoisting requirements." In what had become a familiar move, the Corporation had 
temporarily suspended operations at Iron Springs during the inspection, and Corlett did 
not visit the underground there. He was assured by Mine Captain Rennie Slaney, 
however, that in response to suggestions arising from previous inspections, the 
Corporation was in the process of driving raises to provide for emergency exit ways and 
for ventilation. 
One issue about which Corlett expressed serious concern was a clause in collective 
agreements with both companies calling for the appointment of a "safety man" drawn from 
the workforce whose job, in addition to his regular duties, was to report upon workplace 
hazards. In Corlett' s view, such a measure might have the effect of"absolving the 
company and the company administrative stafffromresponsibility for mine safety." 
Corlett also noted that the lack of proper mining plans and various other problems at the 
51
"Driving" is the common mining term for this process. 
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St. Lawrence operations demonstrated the necessity of adopting new regulations and of 
exerting the government's authority over Newfoundland's mining operations as quickly as 
possible. He stated that while the Newfoundland government claimed that operators were 
using the Ontario code as guide, 
... some are quite prepared to disregard it if it does not meet with their own 
ideas. This attitude is easy to understand when it is considered that the 
only authorized code is the old Newfoundland Mining Code which has 
become so out-of-date that it is no longer of any use in mining. 52 
Corlett observed that for the government engineer responsible for the task, enforcing the 
old mining regulations was a "sideline" and that ''those operators who chose to have 
worked on the assumption that there was no mining authority in Newfoundland." He 
suggested that, at the very least, the government appoint a Mining Engineer until a full-
time Mines Inspector was appointed, and that new mine safety regulations be adopted. 53 
Approximately a year later, the Newfoundland government, having still not 
instituted Corlett's recommendations on regulations and inspections, brought him back to 
Newfoundland for another mines inspection. Corlett arrived in Newfoundland in 
August, 1950, and was able to travel to St. Lawrence by vehicle over a new road down the 
Burin Peninsula. At Newfluor, he inspected the surface plant and the Director mine, and 
52
"1nspection ofNewfoundland mines for safety of workmen and operating 
features," submitted by A.V. Corlett, Mining Engineer, Kingston, Ontario, to Claude K. 
Howse, Government Geologist, Department ofNatural Resources, St. John's, 
Newfoundland, 30 November 1949, unpublished document, CNS. 
53
"Inspection ofNewfoundland mines," 1949. 
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his remarks were mostly in keeping with those made during previous inspections. His 
report made minor recommendations regarding explosives and the electrical system at 
Newfluor, and reiterated the need for a stench warning system, which had still not been 
installed. The 1950 report contained similar observations with respect to the Corporation 
workings. Once again, the mill was shut down and mining scaled back at the Corporation 
during the inspection period, this time reportedly because of a power shortage. In the 
underground at Iron Springs, the only shaft being worked at this time, Corlett noted that 
on one level there had been an accidental breakthrough from a stope into the shaft 
opening. This inadvertent action, Corlett remarked, had a beneficial effect in that ''the air 
was much better in the stopes [here] than on the 560 level where no ventilation raises have 
been driven." He noted that on his tour of the unventilated 560-foot level, ''there was 
some gas in evidence in the stopes." He did not indicate what type of "gas" or in what 
way it had been made evident -- through an odour, some effect on the men, or in some 
other way. He recommended, based on his tour of the 560-foot level and the apparent 
benefits of the accidentally-created ventilation on the 450-foot level, that in the future a 
raise be driven to serve as a ''manway, means of exit, service raise, and ventilation raise" 
before beginning to stope on any level. 54 
A year later, in August 1951, Corlett was back in Newfoundland again to conduct 
what turned out to be the final inspection before establishment of a provincial code and 
54A.V. Corlett, "Inspection ofNewfoundland mines for the safety of workmen and 
operating features," 1950, DME. 
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inspection service. Corlett inspected the new HMS plant and other surface works at 
Newfluor, as well as the Director mine itself. He noted that two new raises had been 
driven to the surface, one of which was being used for ventilation and the other as an 
escape way. He was told, however, that this was a temporary arrangement: eventually, 
these openings would be used as a "backfill" channel and as a water pumping route and 
escape-way.55 Significantly, Corlett had been told in 1949 that one ofthese raises would 
be used for ventilation, but apparently this was not the company's ultimate intention. At 
the Corporation, mining operations were being carried out at Iron Springs, Blue Beach, 
and at the new West Extension mine. Corlett noted that there were still no mine plans for 
any of the Corporation mines, no ventilation raises at the Iron Springs mine and, despite 
repeated requests to bring it up to standard, serious problems with the hoisting equipment 
at all shafts. 56 
Corlett noted that while the figures were not entirely reliable because of the lack of 
uniformity in the way companies kept statistics at this time, it was clear that the 
Corporation continued to have the highest accident index among Newfoundland mining 
companies-- six times that of the Buchans and the Bell Island mines. Newfluor's accident 
rate was second only to the Corporation's. Corlett stated that he was not surprised at the 
55
"Backfill" refers to crushed stone which is sometimes sent into mined areas to 
support the walls and ceilings. 
56A.V. Corlett, "Inspection ofNewfoundland mines for the safety of workmen and 
operating features," 1951, DME. 
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Corporation's accident rate since, despite repeated requests to address safety concerns, 
the management there, in his view, simply did not take mine safety seriously. Its usual 
response to criticism, he noted, was to claim that a lack of capital prevented the company 
from carrying out the necessary improvements. In that case, Corlett suggested, some 
action should be taken with the directors and owners of the company, who continued to 
saddle the local management with the job of explaining why improvements were not 
carried out. He suggested that the situation at the Corporation mines had reached the 
stage where some "drastic steps" might be necessary. Following the 1951 inspection, 
Corlett noted to the manager that while the Corporation had for years failed to carry out 
improvements when instructed to do so and had been able to get away with it because of 
the absence of adequate legislation, new mine safety regulations were being drafted and 
the Corporation would have a lot of catching up to do in order to bring its operation up to 
the proposed standards. 57 
The regulations to which Corlett referred in his 1951 report were those he had 
been helping the provincial government draft since his 1949 inspection. The Act 
Respecting the Safety of Workmen in Mines was finally passed by the House of Assembly 
in June 1951, and regulations made under the Act became law in September 1951, just 
after Corlett's inspection of that year. The regulations covered a wide variety of issues, 
including age limits, signaling systems, timbering, hoisting equipment, hauling equipment, 
57
"Inspection ofNewfoundland mines for the safety of workmen and operating 
features," 1951. 
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flooding, fires, explosives, and electrical installations. Section 88( 1) stated that, "The 
ventilation in every mine shall be such that the air in all its workings that are in use or are 
to be used by workmen is free from dangerous amounts of noxious impurities, including 
dust, and contains sufficient oxygen to ensure the health of anyone employed in the mine." 
Section 88(2) required that, ''In any mine where paragraph (1) cannot be complied with by 
natural ventilation, means for mechanical ventilation shall be provided and kept in 
operation until the workings have been abandoned or until satisfactory natural ventilation 
is secured." Other sections required operators to "supply to workmen masks of a type 
approved by the chief inspector and designed to protect workers who are exposed to dust, 
gas, and irritating and dangerous fumes." The operator was also required to sterilize these 
masks at least once a week and appoint a competent person to inspect all masks at least 
once a month. 58 
While the 1951 legislation was an improvement on what had prevailed up to that 
time, the regulations were still lacking in some regards, compared with those in other 
jurisdictions. In the past, Newfoundland operators had been encouraged to emulate the 
standards set by the Ontario regulations. The Newfoundland regulations passed in 1951 
differed, however, from the Ontario regulations in several important respects. The 
Ontario legislation, for example, set out very stringent guidelines for medical examination 
58AnAct Respecting the Safety ofWor.kmen in Mines (Act No. 85 of1951). 
Regulations passed under the Act became law in September 1951. The Sections referred 
to here are 3(1) of the Act, and 267, 288, 153, 156, and 157 of the Regulations. 
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of workers in designated "dust exposure occupations," which included all underground 
mine workers. Persons applying for employment in these occupations in Ontario were 
required to undergo an examination to ensure that they were free from all diseases of the 
respiratory system. Applicants passing the initial examination were issued a certificate 
which had to updated, based on annual examinations, in order to be eligible for continued 
employment. The Ontario regulations also contained requirements for the suppression of 
dust in the underground by the supply of pressurized fresh water to all dusty areas. The 
Ontario regulations also required that operators keep detailed ventilation plans for 
underground workings, including air routes and fan locations. The ventilation plans were 
to be updated every six months, and made available to the Chieflnspector.59 The Nova 
Scotia regulations also required that pressurized fresh water be supplied to all working 
areas to suppress dust where required, and also stipulated that "No person shall work or 
remain, or be permitted or required to work or remain, in any place in any mine if the air 
contains dust, fumes or smoke perceptible to the senses." The Nova Scotia regulations 
also contained a specific requirement for the use of wet drilling equipment. 60 
While the Newfoundland Act required written notice to the Minister of Mines of 
any lost-time accident, this section was very brief and vague compared to other 
59 An Act to Amend the Ontario Mining Act, 1948. Sections 155, 160(119), and 
167(d). 
~ova Scotia, Metalliferous Mines and Quarries Regulation Act, 195 1, Sections 
242 and 243. This Act covered all mines and quarries other than coal, for which there was 
a separate act. 
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jurisdictions. One specific requirement absent from the Newfoundland regulations and 
contained in both Ontario's and Nova Scotia's was the requirement to report "any 
asphyxiation effecting a partial or total loss of physical control. •>6I It is also significant that 
while the Nova Scotia and the Ontario legislation contained requirements referring 
specifically to the suppression of dust and Newfoundland's did not, neither Nova Scotia's 
nor Ontario' s contained the Newfoundland requirement for the supply and wearing of 
masks. It is as if those who drafted the Newfoundland code were resigned to the presence 
of dust in the mines, and rather than attempt to reduce or eliminate that condition, simply 
adopted measures to protect workers from it effects. 
Responsibility for enforcement of the new regulations and for mines inspections 
rested with the Mines Branch of the provincial Department of Mines and Resources.62 In 
1952, the government appointed its first Chieflnspector ofMines, Fred Gover. A native 
of Port Rexton, Trinity Bay, Gover had been educated at Memorial University and at the 
Nova Scotia Technical College, and held a Bachelor of Science degree. He had worked as 
61For Newfoundland, Section 3 ofthe 1951 Act, for Nova Scotia, Section 6(e) of 
the 1951 Act, and for Ontario, Section 164 (f) ofthe 1948 Regulations. The wording for 
Nova Scotia and Ontario is identical. 
62The first Minister of Mines and Resources was Fred W. Rowe. The Mines 
Branch and the Resources Branch had their own Deputy Ministers, and the first Deputy 
Minister of the Mines Branch was former Government Geologist Claude K. Howse. The 
official duties of the Mines Branch were described as: administration of the Regulations of 
Mines Act, coordination of the government's diamond drilling services, and other related 
services: Department of Mines and Resources," Annual Report of the Department of for 
the Year ended 31 March 1953." 
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a Mining Engineer from 1945 to 1952, and his most recent job before taking up the Chief 
Inspector's post was coordinating an expansion and modernization program at the Bell 
Island iron ore mines. 63 
In a telling letter to the Minister shortly after his appointment, Gover made clear 
where his priorities lay with respect to the various duties of the inspectorate. Stressing the 
importance of ensuring the maximum return on the province's mineral resources, Gover 
stated, 
That the general primary purpose of[Regulations ofMines] acts is to 
protect the human resources engaged in mining, none will deny. However, 
a limited sense of responsibility, which appears to be not unpopular 
nowadays, seems to be leading up to place so much importance on this 
primary purpose, that we are apt to forget that a Regulations of Mines Act 
is the only instrument which society employs to ensure that none of 
nature's mineral gifts will be plundered or wasted in the process of 
extraction. 64 
Gover believed, in other words, that this increasing "limited sense of responsibility'' to the 
province's resources had skewed the balance between protection of resources and 
protection of workers, causing too much emphasis to be placed on the latter. He clearly 
63Biographical sketch in Coli 075, File 3.05.012, CNSA The Inspector was 
empowered to issue written orders to operators, indicating any violations of the 
regulations and specifying what steps the operator must take to correct the condition. 
Section 267 of the regulations stated that any "operator, manager or other person" failing 
to carry out the written orders of the Inspector was guilty of an offence, and subject to a 
maximum fine of$1,000.00, or in default of payment a maximum of three months 
imprisonment. 
64F. Gover, Chieflnspector ofMines, to F.W. Rowe, Minister ofMines and 
Resources, 8 February 1953, File NFLD/0083, DME. 
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felt that part of his job as Chieflnspector was to correct this perceived imbalance. 
In addition to the new mine safety regulations, another important piece of 
legislation passed shortly after Newfoundland's entry into confederation was a new 
Workmen's Compensation Act.65 The evolution of workers' compensation legislation in 
Newfoundland followed the general pattern in other jurisdictions, the defining feature of 
which was a transition from what is known as ''individual liability'' compensation to 
"collective" compensation. The earliest type of worker's compensation in North America 
and Europe was administered under the common law, through such channels as master-
servant acts, which required proof of negligence on the part of the employer. Originating 
in Great Britain in the early 19th century, this type of compensation law had become widely 
accepted in Canada and the United States by the late 19th century. By then, however, the 
common law system had become widely recognized as inadequate, partly because the 
system had become impossible to manage with the rapid increase in the number of claims 
arising from workplace injuries in the context of rapid industrialization, and partly as a 
response to demands by unions for a better system. As a result, Great Britain in 1880 
introduced the Employers' Liability Act, which solved some of the problems inherent in 
the old legislation. The Canadian provinces soon introduced similar legislation. The 
Liability Act did not, however, eliminate the onus on the injured worker to prove 
65The Act was not called the more generic term Workers' Compensation Act until 
the 1980s. In this thesis, ''workmen's" is used when referring to the Act itself, and 
''workers" in more general contexts. 
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negligence on the part of the employer, and still required that claims be made on a case-
by-case basis, either before the courts or in a private arrangement between employee and 
employer. In 1881, Germany introduced the first system of compulsory compensation, 
which made industry groups liable for workplace injuries within their category. Great 
Britain introduced a version of compulsory legislation in 1897, but the 1897 Act made 
individual companies liable for compensation and permitted employers to also carry 
private insurance.66 Great Britain passed an updated, collective and compulsory Act in 
1906. Between 1902 and 1911, most provinces of Canada passed acts based loosely on 
Britain's 1897 Act, but these provincial Acts were not compulsory and were limited to 
certain industries. 
The transforming event in the history of workers' compensation law in Canada was 
the report of the Meredith Commission appointed in Ontario in 1910, which one historian 
has argued came about largely as a result of demands by trade unions for better 
compensation coverage.67 In its 1913 report, the Meredith Commission recommended 
compulsory compensation, and the creation of a central body of government to collect 
fees from employers and administer benefits to injured workers or their surviving 
660n the evolution of the British legislation in the 19th century, see Reasons, 
Assault on the Worker, 161-2. 
67Logan, Trade Unions in Canada, 501 . 
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dependents in the case of death. 68 As in Great Britain, many employers did not oppose the 
introduction of compulsory, collective compensation, as it removed the somewhat 
arbitrary nature of the older, court-administered system, and they believed it would 
ultimately result in lower costs to them. Some, however, such as the Canadian 
Manufacturer's Association (CMA), wanted a requirement for direct financial 
contnbutions from employees, which was not granted, and a seven-day "waiting period" at 
the beginning of a claim when no benefits would be paid, which was granted. The CMA 
also objected to Meredith's proposal to include industrial diseases in compensation 
coverage, but the Ontario Workmen's Compensation Act, passed in 1915, contained the 
same Schedule of Industrial Diseases as did the 1906 British Act. Eventually the rest of 
the provinces passed legislation based on Ontario's --Nova Scotia in 1915, Manitoba in 
1917, Alberta in 1918, New Brunswick in 1919, Saskatchewan in 1929, Quebec in 1931, 
and Prince Edward Island in 1949.69 
In addition to the standardizing of compensation procedures and benefits, the 
elimination of costly litigation, and the lifting of the burden of proof from the claimant, 
another perceived benefit of the new system was that employers would have an incentive 
to make their workplaces safer because premiums were based on claim rates within 
68Michael Piva, "The Workers' Compensation Movement in Ontario," Ontario 
History, 67 (1975), 39-56. 
6~easons, Assault on the Worker, 163-4. 
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industry groups. 70 Many have questioned, however, whether the modem compensation 
system has had any beneficial effect on workplace health and safety, pointing out that the 
increased premiums that result from high accident or disease rates are in many cases lower 
than an employer might spend to eliminate such hazards, and that industry continues to 
escape much of the financial responsibility for workplace injuries and disease. 71 
As with other jurisdictions, Newfoundland relied on the common law and 
Employers' Liability law during the 19th century.72 Newfoundland's first Workmen's 
Compensation Act, passed in 1908 and based on the 1906 British Act, required employers 
to pay compensation directly to injured workers (or in the case of death, their dependents) 
once claimants had either come to a private arrangement with the employer or had the 
70David G. Hanes, The First British Workmen's Compensation Act, 1897 (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); Terence G. I son, Workers' Compensation in 
Canada, {Toronto: Butterworths, 1989), 1-2; Terrance J. Bogyo, "Workers' 
Compensation: Updating the Historic Compromise," in Chronic Stress: Workers' 
Compensation in the 1990s, Terry Thomason, et. al., eds., (Ottawa: C.D. Howe Institute, 
1995), 92-100; and Richard P. Chaykowski and Terry Thomason, "Canadian Workers' 
Compensation: Institutions and Economics," in Richard P. Chaykowski and Terry 
Thomason, eds., Research in Canadian Workers' Compensation (Kingston: IRC Press, 
1995), 1-5. 
71Reasons, Assault on the Worker, 174-75 and 197-98; Sass, "The 
Underdevelopment of Occupational Health and Safety in Canada," 73, Doug Smith, 
Consulted to Death: How Canada's Workplace Health and Safety System Fails Workers 
(Wmnipeg: Arbeiter Ring Publishing, 2000); and Daniel M. Bennan, Death on the Job: 
Occupational Health and safety Struggles in the United States (New York: Monthly 
Review Press, 1978), 70-1. 
~ewfoundland's first Employers' Liability Law was passed in 1880. 
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claim settled in court.73 According to a committee later appointed to study the workers' 
compensation system in Newfoundland, the very few claims ever made under this Act 
were "settled by compromise [private arrangement] usually to the detriment of the 
worker."74 While Canadian provinces made the transition to a collective, government-
administered system in the years immediately following the Meredith Commission, 
Newfoundland retained the 1908 Act, with a few modifications, until the late 1940s.75 In 
1948, the Commission of Government , in one of its last acts as government, passed a new 
and more comprehensive Workmen's Compensation Act. The 1948 Act provided for the 
appointment of stipendiary magistrates as Compensation Commissioners, created the 
position ofRegistrar of Workmen's Compensation, set out more detailed procedures for 
medical examination of claimants and for the calculation of benefits, designated all children 
73 An Act with Respect to Compensation to Workmen for Injuries Suffered in the 
Course oftheir Employment, Act 8, 1908. 
74Irving Fogwill, "report of the Workmen's Compensation Committee of 
Newfoundland on the Organization and Administration of a Workmen's Compensation 
Board for Newfoundland," 1950, 2-3, unpublished document, CNS. 
75 Amendments passed in 1926, for example, increased benefits in some cases, and a 
1935 amendment changed the time limitation on giving notice of an iiijury. Under the 
1908 act, a worker was required to give notice of an accident as soon as was practical to 
do so and before the worker had "voluntarily left the employment in which he was 
injured," and then make a compensation claim within six months of the accident. In the 
case of death, the dependents were required to make the claim within six months from the 
time of death, and within two years from the time of the accident (in cases where, for 
example, a worker died from the injuries sustained earlier). The 1935 amendment 
stipulated that the time limitation could be waived in cases where it could be shown that 
the claimant did not make the claim within the specified period because of a "mistake" or 
"other reasonable cause." Cap. XVIII, Geo. V, 1926, and Act 48, 1935. 
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under sixteen as dependents, and established a formula for compensation in cases of total 
or partial incapacity. The 1948 Act still required that compensation be paid directly by the 
employer, however, and gave claimants the option of pursuing a settlement outside in 
court or through a private arrangement. The 1948 Act also gave the employer the right to 
apply to the Registrar of Workmen's Compensation, or come to an agreement with the 
claimant, to pay a lump sum in cases where benefits had been paid for a period longer than 
six months. 76 The 1948 Act, which came into force on 1 January 1949, was therefore 
essentially a mixture of the old, individual liability system and the newer legislation which 
had been passed in Canada and Great Britain. 
In 1950, the provincial government passed Newfoundland's first compulsory, 
collective Compensation Act. In keeping with the standard in other provinces, the 1950 
Act provided for the right to compensation "in lieu of all rights and rights of action, 
statutory or otherwise, to which a workman or his dependents are or may be entitled 
against an employer." In other words, injured workers or dependents covered by the Act 
could not pursue other legal channels, such as a lawsuit or private arrangement, to obtain 
compensation. The 1950 Act also provided for the appointment ofNewfoundland's first 
Worker's Compensation Board (WCB) to administer the Act. Under the new Act, 
76An Act Relating to Compensation to Workmen for Injuries Suffered in the 
Course of their Employment, Act No. 30, 1948. Section 4(3) of the 1948 Act designated 
certain persons, including domestic servants, as exempt from the act. While nothing in 
this Section explicitly excluded women, the Act nonetheless referred only to ''widows" 
where it referred to surviving dependents. 
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employers paid into an "accident fund" according to a system of assessment and 
classification based on the potential for injury within an industry group. The Act required 
that all applications for compensation be accompanied by a medical certificate and 
physicians were required to provide the WCB with periodic updates on a claimant's 
condition upon request. Physicians were also required to assist claimants in filing 
applications. The Act also stated that where an accident occurred during employment, it 
would be assumed that the accident was caused by the employment, and that in cases 
where there was doubt as to whether a workplace accident was responsible for an injury, 
that doubt would be resolved in favour of the worker and the onus would not be on the 
claimant to prove such a connection. 
Newfoundland's 1950 Act, like those in other provinces, also granted the WCB 
certain powers in the area of workplace health and safety. The WCB was empowered to 
investigate places of employment to determine whether suitable safety devices or other 
measures should be adopted for the prevention of accidents or industrial diseases. The 
WCB could also make rules and regulations designed for the prevention of accidents and 
industrial diseases, provide information to employers and employees on the prevention of 
accidents and industrial disease, order the installation of any safety devices deemed 
necessary for the prevention of accidents and industrial disease, and shut down any 
operation which refused to comply with such an order within a time period specified by 
the Board. 
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Industrial diseases were dealt with under Section 78 ofthe Act. For purposes of 
administering the Act and claiming compensation, diseases arising from employment were 
to be treated in the same manner as accidents. The Schedule oflndustrial Diseases in the 
1950 Act was the same as that in the 1948 Act and, like the 1948 Act, the 1950 Act stated 
that if a worker was employed in an occupation listed in the Schedule during or 
immediately prior to becoming disabled with a disease, and the industrial disease was listed 
alongside that occupation, it was to be assumed that the illness was "due to the nature of 
that employment unless the contrary is proved." Nothing in the Act, however, precluded a 
worker from pursuing compensation for a disease not specifically listed in the Schedule, 
provided the other requirements for claiming compensation under the Act were met. 
Persons claiming compensation with respect to an industrial disease could be ordered by 
the WCB to undergo a medical examination to determine whether the claimant was 
affected by an industrial disease and, if so, to undergo examinations to monitor the 
progress of the disease. The 1950 Act repealed the 1948 Act, but did not prohibit claims 
being made under the 1948 Act with respect to accidents occurring before the 1950 Act 
came into force. 
To assist in fulfilling the requirement for the establishment of a WCB and the 
passing of Regulations under the 1950 Act, the government appointed a committee headed 
by Irving Fogwill, labour activist and former member of Smallwood' s Labour Advisory 
Board. Fogwill was subsequently appointed the WCB's first Commissioner, and in March 
1951, the Newfoundland government passed the Workmen's Compensation Regulations 
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based in part upon the committee's findings. The regulations established specific rules 
such as benefit rates for claimants and dependents. Compensation payable in the case of 
permanent total disability would equal 66213 per cent of the average weekly earnings 
during the12 months preceding the disability. In the case of permanent partial disability, 
the benefit was calculated as 66213 per cent of the difference between the average weekly 
earnings of the workman before the accident and the average amount the workman is 
earning or "is able to earn in some suitable employment or business" (italics added). The 
loss of earning capacity was to be determined through regular medical examinations. In 
cases where a widow was left as the sole dependent, the widow would receive a lump sum 
of $100.00 and a $50.00 per month pension. In cases of a widow with dependent 
children (children under 16) the benefit would be the widow's allowance plus $10.00 per 
month per child. Where the surviving dependents were children only, each child under 16 
received $20.00 per month. The 1951 Regulations also stated that where a widow 
remarried, monthly payments would cease and the widow would receive a lump sum equal 
to monthly payments for one year, payable within one month after marriage, and benefits 
to the dependent children of the widow would cease. 77 
4.3 Industry Expansion and Labour Relations, 1953-56 
The industry recovery that had begun in 1950 continued at both mining companies 
77 An Act to Amend the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1950, 30 March 1951. 
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throughout the mid-1950s, resulting in further expansion. During the winter of 1954-55, 
for example, the shaft at Iron Springs mine, which continued to be the Corporation's 
primary producer, was extended to the 890-foot leve~ and a substantial amount of drifting 
was carried out at that level. Expansion also continued at the Blue Beach mine, and 
another smaller vein near Blue Beach, known as the "Haypook" vein, was discovered in 
1953. In 1955, the Blue Beach shaft was connected to the Haypook vein by a cross-cut, 
and a separate shaft was then sunk on the Haypook vein. A new headframe and other 
additions were made to the Hare's Ears site.78 At Newfluor, the Director shaft was de-
watered on the 400-foot level in 1954, and in 1955 the shaft was deepened to the 550-foot 
level.79 
Shipment levels remained high for both companies during the mid-1950s. In 1954, 
the Corporation shipped about 56,000 tons, all to the Wilmington plant, while all of 
Newfluor's approximately 52,000 tons went to the Arvida plant. In 1955, shipments by 
both companies increased substantially, to nearly 80,000 tons for Newfluor and just over 
60,000 for the Corporation. The opening of other deposits by the Corporation had also 
reduced the proportion of the Iron Springs supply, from about 70 per cent of the 
Corporation's total production in the early 1950s to 40 per cent by 1955. Shipments 
78Farre~ "Report ofthe Mining Properties of St. Lawrence Corporation," 15-40, 
48-51. 
79Smith, "Fluorspar at St. Lawrence, Newfoundland," 74-6. 
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remained high during 1956 -- about 70,000 tons for each company. 80 
This industry expansion was reflected in employment levels. In 1949, the 
Corporation had employed a high of 145 workers, and Newfluor 1 08; from 1954 to 1956 
they each employed approximately 250 unionized men 81 From 1951 to 1956, the 
population increased from 1,451 to 1,837, a growth rate of20 per cent. The 
Newfoundland rate for the same period wasl3 per cent.82 While the vast majority of these 
workers were residents of St. Lawrence, many from neighbouring communities continued 
to find work when it was plentiful. Many of those who did not commute to and from their 
home communities slept in small shacks constructed near the mine sites, especially in 
winter when travel was difficult. These men lived in very rough conditions, sleeping on 
wooden bunks or on the floor during times of overcrowding, with a steel drum their only 
source of heat. 83 
The lack of housing and basic facilities for this group highlights a more general 
problem with the development of the community. Because it was not established and 
planned as a resource community (unlike, for example, Arvida or Kitimat), St. Lawrence 
SOUnited States Minerals Yearbook, 1954, 1955, and 1956. 
81The figures for 1949 are from union lists, SLMM. The other figures are from 
Annual Reports of the Newfoundland Department of Mines and Resources, 1954-57. 
82Government ofNewfoundland and Labrador, Economic Statistics Division, 
Department ofFinance, "Historical Statistics ofNewfoundland and Labrador," 1970, Vol 
I (1), Table A-1 and Table A-17. 
83lnterview with Leo James, St. Lawrence, 15 October 2000, conducted by the 
author. 
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lacked the infrastructure to deal with such fluctuations in population. As Douglas Baldwin 
has pointed out in reference to mining towns in northern Ontario, in the absence of 
planning and investment from a single employer or from some level of government, 
resource towns tend to develop in a haphazard fashion, with people responding to needs 
as they arise, which often creates problems in such areas as housing and sanitation.84 St. 
Lawrence had no municipal government until1949 and even then there was little in the 
way of town planning that could cope with the effects of dramatic fluctuations in industry 
and population. Also, apart from some housing and other amenities for its supervisory 
staff: neither company took much interest in the issue. 
The resurgence of the mining industry in the 1950s also once again altered the 
composition of the community's labour force. After many had returned to fishing during 
the postwar slump, in 1955 only three people in St. Lawrence reported fishing as their 
primary occupation. Most other adult males in the community were engaged in 
occupations associated with the mining industry. 85 Another notable development during 
this period was an increased tendency for women to enter the paid workforce. In 1955, 
twenty women reported "domestic" as their occupation, while others were employed as 
84Douglas Baldwin, "The Development of an Unplanned Community: 1903-1914," 
in Roy T. Bowles, ed., Little Communities and Big Industries: Studies in the Social 
Impact of Canadian Resource Extraction (Toronto: Butterworth's, 1982), 112-28. For a 
contrasting case in the Newfoundland context, see Botting, "Getting a Grand Falls Job," 
which examines the Anglo-Newfoundland Development Company's strict planning of that 
pulp and paper mill town. 
8~ewfoundland, Official List ofElectors, 1955, 95-115. 
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store clerks, stenographers, and in other clerical and service occupations. 86 
Another new avenue of paid employment for women at this time was a new 
hospital which was opened in 1954. Several women reported being employed as nurses in 
1955.87 Ironically, while the union and others in the community had been lobbying the 
Newfoundland government and the mining companies for years to assist in establishing 
medical facilities, the hospital came from a foreign government and as a result of yet more 
sacrifice and work on the part of people in the area. The hospital was a gift from the 
American government to the people of St. Lawrence and Lawn who had risked their lives 
to rescue hundreds of seamen from two warships that ran aground near the communities in 
1942. In 1943, a representative of the US Navy proposed construction of a hospital at St. 
Lawrence as a gift of gratitude88 but construction was delayed for several years because of 
the war and because of difficulties in working out the details of financing, maintenance, 
staffing and other administrative matters. 89 
~ewfoundland, Official List ofElectors, 1955, 95-115. 
8
'Newfoundland, Official List ofElectors, 1955, 95-115. It is also probable that 
some of those who reported employment in clerical jobs or food service jobs were 
employed at the hospital. 
88J.E. Revelle, Lieutenant Commander, United States Royal Navy, to Government 
ofNewfoundland and Labrador, 16 June 1943, GN 38, S5-1-2, File 5, PANL. 
89For a popular account of the shipwrecks and the American response, see Cassie 
Brown, Standing into Danger: a Dramatic Story of Shipwreck and Rescue (Garden City, 
N.Y.: Doubleday, 1979). 
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In the context of continued industry expansion through the 1950s, the union 
continued to press for increased wages and other concessions. In May 1953, after the 
1952 contract had expired, Newfluor agreed to the union's demand for an increase which 
brought wages to between $1.08 per hour and $1.75 per hour, and the average wage to 
$1.33 per hour. 90 The union opened negotiations with the Corporation in the spring of 
1953 by demanding either an increase of35 cents per hour, or a 40-hour week for the 
same pay as a 48-hour week plus an increase of 10 cents per hour. Here, negotiations did 
not go as smoothly as with Newfluor. Cusick made it clear to the Corporation 
management that he was prepared to take a hard line, and routinely cited specific sections 
of the Labour Relations Act to support his claims.91 Cusick continued to be supported 
and assisted by Strong. 92 
The Corporation responded to the union's 1953 request for a wage increase in 
typical fashion. Seibert pleaded with Cusick to "see the importance of permitting our 
Company to make a reasonable profit," and insisted that ''the modest profits we have 
made have all been poured back into St. Lawrence to create more and more jobs and to 
continually increase our wages." Seibert offered an increase in the range of 2 to 5 cents 
9<Newfoundland Fluorspar Limited, Wage Scale, Effective 1 April1953, SLMM. 
91James Cusick, SLWPU, to Donald Poynter, St. Lawrence Corporation, 15 May 
1953, SLMM. 
92James Cusick, SLWPU, to George Meany, President, American Federation of 
Labor, Washington, 19 August 1953, SLMM. 
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per hour.93 The Union apparently tried again, through the AFL, to obtain financial 
information on the Corporation in order to determine the validity of its claims concerning 
its profits and its ability to pay higher wages, with little success.94 Faced with apparent 
intransigence on the part of the Corporation, the union requested the appointment of a 
Conciliation Board by the Department of Labour. 
At the conciliation meetings, Corporation representatives repeated the claims that 
the company was unable to meet the union's demands, but increased its counter-offer to 5 
per cent across the board. The union pointed out that even with a 5 per cent increase, 
wages at the Corporation would be well below those at Newfluor, to which the 
Corporation gave the standard response that Newfluor was owned and operated by one 
of the largest firms in the world, while the Corporation was a small, cash-poor company 
putting its meager profits back into the operation. 95 
Cusick, clearly unimpressed by these claims, pointed out that the Corporation' s 
financial difficulties, if it had any, should not be shouldered by its employees. The assets 
the Corporation had built up in St. Lawrence over the years, he argued, were ''the 
93Walter Seibert, St. Lawrence Corporation ofNewfoundland, to James Cusick, 
SLWPU, 3 July 1953, SLMM. 
94Boris Shishkin, Director of Research, American Federation ofLabor, to James 
Cusick, SLWPU, 24 July 1943, SLMM. 
95
"Report of the Conciliation Board in the matter of a dispute between St. 
Lawrence Federal Labour Union No. 24530 and the St. Lawrence Corporation of 
Newfoundland, Limited," submitted to Charles H. Ballam, Newfoundland Department of 
Labour, 24 October 1953, SLMM. 
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Company's assets and it is compulsory for it to have such for their own benefit, it will 
always be their own and not the employees." Furthermore, Cusick pointed out, very few 
of the "improvements" on which the Corporation claimed to have spent its profits accrued 
to those who had generated those profits -- the employees. The so called "dryhouse" at 
Iron Springs, he describe as "a room with steel drum in the centre for burning old wood 
taken up from the mine." There was nowhere for the men to wash themselves or to dry 
wet work-clothes, and sanitary facilities consisted of "one broken down toilet with no 
flush to take care ofthree shifts of men." Furthermore, Cusick charged, for all the 
Corporation's talk of improvements, the blower system for mine ventilation had never 
been installed, and what little ventilation existed in places was a "haywire setup. •>96 The 
workers, he concluded, were simply tired of compromising on wages and working 
conditions to support the Corporation, especially during times of industry expansion and 
increased production. 97 
In the end, however, the Conciliation Board agreed with the Corporation's 
argument that while its financial position could be expected to improve considerably in the 
near future as a result of its contract with the U.S. Defense Materials Procurement 
Agency, the expected benefits of that deal would not begin to accrue until the winter of 
964
'Haywire" is a local term for haphazard or out of control. 
97
"Report of the Conciliation Board in the matter of a dispute between St. 
Lawrence Federal Labour Union No. 24530 and the St. Lawrence Corporation of 
Newfoundland, Limited," 24 October 1953, SLMM. 
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1953-54. The Board therefore advised the union to accept the Corporation's offer of a 5 
per cent increase retroactive to 1 July 1953. The board also suggested, however, that any 
future improvement in the Corporation's financial position should be reflected in wage 
rates, and that the Corporation should improve the lunchroom, dryhouse and sanitary 
facilities at its operations. 98 The 5 per cent raise brought the average wage at the 
Corporation to $1.22 per hour, compared with $1.33 at Newfluor. 
During Cusick's term as president, the union had won some wage increases and 
had stood up forcefully to both companies during contract negotiations. In doing so, it 
had taken advantage of its affiliation with the NFL/ AFL-TLC in terms of both negotiating 
assistance and research services. In March,1954, however, Cusick suddenly resigned from 
his position as union president to take a job at the newly opened U.S. Memorial Hospital. 
Cyril Strong, for one, was disappointed by this move, and felt it marked a turn for the 
worse for the union. 99 Cusick was initially replaced by union vice-president Gregory 
Giovaninni, who served as president for about one year. 
In April 1955, when the position of president came up for election, Aloysius 
Turpin once again ran for and won the position.100 In the negotiations for contract renewal 
in 1955, the union demanded an increase of30-50 cents per hour from the Corporation, 
9s.'Report of the Conciliation Board," 24 October 1953. 
99Strong, My Life as a Neli(oundland Union Organizer, 37. 
100Jnterview with Aloysius Turpin, MUNFLA. 
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but eventually settled for an average hourly increase of3.8 cents per hour. 101 The union 
also requested an increase of30-50 cents from Newfluor, which initially responded that it 
would grant no wage increase.102 Significantly, Turpin at this point requested assistance 
from the AFL, but specifically asked for assistance not from Strong but from an "AFL 
representative from the mainland." It was suggested to him that Strong was more familiar 
with the situation and better able to assist than any of the mainland representatives, but 
Turpin apparently did not agree. 103 The union eventually settled for an average increase of 
about 9 per cent, or 9 to 14 cents an hour, considerably better than the Corporation 
settlement, but far less than the original demand. 104 
In the spring of1956, before expiration of the 1955 contracts, Turpin moved to 
break affiliation with the AFL-TLC, something he had apparently been wanting to do since 
he took the presidency again in 1955. Less than two months after re-taking over the 
presidency, for instance, Turpin complained to the Regional Director of the AFL about 
Strong's performance, blaming him for the fact that the union was unaware that it was 15 
101 Aloysius Turpin, SL WPPU, to Donald Poynter, St. Lawrence Corporation of 
Newfoundland, 4 June 1955, SLMM. and Walter Seibert, St. Lawrence Corporation of 
Newfoundland, to Aloysius Turpin, SL WPU, 29 June 1955, SLMM. 
102Aloysius Turpin, SLWPU, to W.S. Smith, Newfluor, 28 April1955, SLMM, 
and W.S. Smith, Newfluor, to Aloysius Turpin, SL WPU, 3 May 1955, SLMM. 
103 Aloysius Turpin, SL WPU, to George Meany, President, American Federation of 
Labor, Washington, 12 May 1955, and Russell Harvey, Regional Director, AFL, Toronto, 
to Aloysius Turpin, SLWPU, 19 May 1955, SLMM. 
104W.S. Smith, Manager, Newfluor, to Aloysius Turpin, SL WPU, 27 August 1955, 
SLMM. 
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months in arrears on per capita dues, and claiming that he did not agree in principle with 
paying the per capita dues anyway. 105 Cusick later claimed that Turpin thought the 
payment of per capita dues was a waste of money, and that he and Strong simply did not 
get along. 106 Turpin himself stated that he did not like Cyril Strong, and suspected that he 
was secretly allied with Poynter. Where Turpin got such an idea is difficult to say, but in 
any case he clearly wanted from the outset to break the affiliation, and early in his term he 
told Union lawyer P.J. Lewis that as soon as possible he was getting the Union "out from 
under the AFL."107 Strong later suggested that Turpin might have been influenced by the 
local priest, Father Connolly, who had recently replaced Father Thome. 108 Turpin himself 
stated that, "Father Connolly agreed with me that I should break off affiliation."109 Also, 
in September 1955, Father Connolly had written to Turpin and congratulated him and the 
union members on the "restrained and reasonable manner in which the recent dispute 
[with] one of the companies was conducted." Implicitly contrasting the Union's approach 
under Turpin with that under Cusick, Connolly stated that, 
105 Aloysius Turpin, SL WPU, to Russell Harvey, Regional Director, AFL, Toronto, 
25 May 1955, SLMM. 
106Interview with James Cusick, MUNFLA. 
107lnterviewwithAloysius Turpin, Montreal, 24 January 1967, MUNFLA, Coll84-
224, Tape C7239. 
108Strong, My Life as a Newfoundland Union Organizer, 38. 
109Interview with Aloysius Turpin, MUNFLA. 
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In these times when much of the world's good will towards unionism, so 
dearly bought down through the years ... is being lessened by hasty and ill 
considered action, it is encouraging to meet a group that is able to see the 
whole picture rather than one little comer, and is prepared to act in the 
interest of the greater good for the greater number. 110 
In March 1956, Turpin got his opportunity to break the affiliation when Cyril Strong 
wrote to request payment of overdue per capita fees, an issue he claimed to have 
repeatedly raised with Turpin but received no reply. 111 Shortly after, on 26 March, a 
general membership meeting was called at which the membership voted to break affiliation 
and revert to independent status. 112 A few days after the meeting, application was made to 
the Labour Relations Board to fonnally withdraw the affiliation and register the union as n 
independent. 113 
4.4 Industrial Disease and Occupational Health and Safety 1953-56 
While the industry and the union at St. Lawrence were going through important 
changes during the mid-1950s, crucial developments were also taking place on the 
occupational health and safety front, including an increasing awareness of the toll that 
11
°Father Connolly, St. Thomas Aquinas Presbytery, to Aloysius Turpin, SL WPU, 
St. Lawrence, 3 September 1955, SLMM. 
lllCyril Strong, Organizer, AFL-CIO, to Adam Mullins, Financial Secretary, 
SLWPU, 16 March 1956, SLMM. 
112Minutes of meeting, SL WPU, 26 March 1956, SLMM. 
113 Application for Certification as Bargaining Agent, by St. Lawrence Workers' 
Protective Union, Registered as a Trade Union under the Trade Unions Act, 15 March 
1941, 29 March 1956, SLMM. 
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working conditions was beginning to take on the mining population. From its 
establishment in 1952, the provincial mines inspectorate attempted to focus attention on 
such issues as the tabulation of accident frequencies and investigations of fatal accidents --
on easily identifiable and quantifiable safety hazards rather than on more insidious and 
complex disease-causing hazards such as dust and other contaminants. 114 The inspectorate 
did, however, conduct some tests of the air in Newfoundland mines during 1953. The 
report on those tests noted that a sampling of underground air to test for carbon dioxide, 
carbon monoxide, and oxygen levels had been carried out, the result of which was that 
"more is known about air conditions underground than was known since mining first 
began in Newfoundland [and] the consequence of this is a feeling of confidence 
throughout the industry that our mines are safe and healthy places to work."115 
Significantly, there is no indication of what exactly the 1953 survey revealed. The 
Inspectorate seemed more interested in creating a ''feeling of confidence" than in revealing 
and addressing problems. Referring to those sections of the regulations dealing with mine 
ventilation, the report noted that mine air across the province had also been tested for 
dust, and that mine managers had been "advised of the results of this survey with the 
expectation that such action as appeared necessary would be taken by him without further 
114Department of Mines and Resources, Annual Report for the Year Ended 31 
March 1953. 
115Department of Mines and Resources, Annual Report for the Year Ended 31 
March 1954, 66-7. 
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notice from the Inspectorate." Furthermore, the Mines Branch intended to have all future 
air tests conducted by the operators and to assume responsibility only for the analysis. 
Even for the task of simply analyzing the samples, however, the Mines Branch conceded 
that it was not properly equipped and had to send the samples to the Quebec Department 
of Mines for analysis. This reportedly resulted in some breakage as well as a problem with 
dust settling in sample flasks during shipping. To correct this, the Mines Branch planned 
to construct and equip its own laboratory in St. John's as soon as possible. 116 In sum, 
unspecified problems with air quality had been discovered during the 1953 tests, 
responsibility for future tests was being handed to mine operators, the Department was not 
equipped to analyse such tests anyway, but the recent testing of mine air had created "a 
feeling of confidence." 
That feeling of confidence is evident in a letter the Corporation manager sent to 
the St. Lawrence union in 1954, claiming that, according to information received from 
Gover, "a man would have to work for 197 years in our mines, under our worst 
conditions, to accumulate sufficient silica in his lungs to exceed the 'safe' amount."117 
Many people in St. Lawrence, however, were far from confident, and suspected that 
working conditions were taking a heavy toll on the mining population. Harry Spencer 
116Department ofMines and Resources, Annual Report for the Year Ended 31 
March 1954, 65-7. 
117Donald Poynter, St. Lawrence Corporation ofNewfoundland, to Gregory 
Giovaninni, Acting President, SL WPU, 25 October 1954, SL:MM. 
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grew up in St. Lawrence and lived in St. John's as a high school student in the late 1940s, 
when he visited patients at the sanitarium on a regular basis. He later recalled that in 
1949, there were often more than twenty St. Lawrence miners there at the same time. It 
became so common for miners to be admitted to the sanitarium, he stated, that people 
began referring to their condition as "miners' TB." Furthennore, according to Spencer, . 
these patients were often treated for tuberculosis and, after some initial improvement, 
were sent home, where they usually died shortly after. His uncle was one of those 
cases.118 
Another St. Lawrence man recalled a similar scenario. Ed Ryan said that when he 
went to St. John's in 1950 to visit his uncle at the sanitarium, "here were all these men 
from St. Lawrence, and the ones who were there before had come home and died, while 
men from Grand Bank and other places treated for TB were recovering." One former 
tuberculosis patient, he recalled, even went back to work at the mine, and died two 
months later. As Ryan put it, "In the early '50s we knew people were dying but we didn't 
know what they were dying from."119 
The Report of the Mines Branch for 1953, while it claimed that a ''feeling of 
confidence" was being created by the inspectorate's efforts, did note that there was 
118Interview with Harry Spencer, St. Lawrence, 13 October, 2000, conducted by 
the author. 
119lnterview with Ed Ryan, St. Lawrence, 7 February 2000, conducted by the 
author. 
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concern with possible silicosis hazards associated with Newfoundland mines, and the 
Branch vowed to address the problem. According to the report, 
Because of certain medical information obtained in 1953, permission was 
requested from Government, and granted, that the method of studying a 
procedure for the identification and handling of silicosis should begin 
between the Department ofHealth, the Workmen's Compensation Board, 
and the Mines Branch..... It is hoped that meetings in 1954 might lead to 
recommendations to Government for consideration of enactment into law. 
Before presentation to Government, however, it is proposed that all mine 
managers shall have an opportunity to examine, and comment on, the 
proposals.... It is the opinion of the Inspectors that the Government with 
the industry can produce an efficient and thorough procedure for the 
detection and handling of silicosis and silicotic hazards. 120 
Once again, there was no suggestion that workers or their unions have a voice in this 
process --just government and mine management. 
Silicosis is a respiratory disease caused by the inhalation of fine dust created by 
grinding or drilling of rock. Because it can be caused by many types of silica dust, silicosis 
is not confined to the mining of any particular ore. In fact, it is more often caused by the 
dust arising from drilling in the rock, such as granite or quartz, surrounding ore veins than 
by the dust arising from the ore itself. The harmful dust created by such processes is 
inorganic, ''free silica" dust, meaning that the particles are not mixed with other substances 
which might make them more prone to dissolution once inhaled. These dust particles 
infiltrate and clog the bronchial tubes and lungs, and because of their hardness, especially 
in the case of granite silica, scar the tissue of these organs. The early symptoms of 
1200epartment ofMines and Resources, Annual Report for the Year Ended 31 
March 1954, 66-7. 
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silicosis are persistent coughing and shortness of breath. which grow more incapacitating 
over time. 121 The exposure time required to develop the disease varies greatly, from less 
than five years up to forty years, depending on the severity of exposure and other factors. 
The average time between exposure and diagnosis is currently about 23 years. Retention 
of silica dust in the lungs has been known to create silicosis long after dust exposure has 
ceased. Though the symptoms can be alleviated somewhat, silicosis is incurable. 122 
In Ontario, the Canadian jurisdiction where there has been the longest recorded 
history of silicosis as a health problem, and where the most thorough studies of the issue 
have thus far been carried out, silicosis was added to the workers' compensation Schedule 
oflndustrial Diseases in 1926, and it had been included in the Schedule of the in the 1950 
Newfoundland Act. In 1928, the Ontario mining code was amended to make pre-
employment and annual chest examinations mandatory. Between 1926 and 1951, there 
were 1,069 recognized cases of silicosis recorded in Ontario and, of these, 545 had died 
by 1951. 123 (In this context, "recognized" refers to compensable cases, as WCBs are the 
main source of such statistics.) By 1974, there were 1,812 recognized cases in Ontario.124 
121See I. Webster, "The Pathology of Silicosis," in John. M. Rogan, ed., Medicine 
in the Mining Industries (London: William Heinemann Medical Books, 1972), 20-38. 
122Graham H. Gibbs and Paul Pintus, Health and Safety in the Canadian Mining 
Industry (Kingston: Queen's University Press, 1978), 76-8. 
123N.F. Parkinson, ''Silicosis in Canada," American Medical Association Archives 
of Industrial Health (12 July 1955), 55-62. 
124Mcintyre Research Foundation, Silicosis Tables, Mining Industry, province of 
Ontario to December 31, 1974 (Toronto: Mcintyre Research Foundation, 1975). 
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In the 1920s, the average age of death from silicosis in Ontario was about 44, but by 1951 
this had increased to about 62. Over the same period, the number of recorded cases per 
year decreased, and the time between diagnosis and death increased (from about 0.5 years 
to 12 years), indicating the benefits of employee screening, improved safety measures, and 
better diagnosis and treatment methods. 125 One significant fact about the Ontario case, 
however, is that after declining from the 1920s to the 1950s, the incidence rate remained 
fairly stable or in some years increased slightly after that, which some researchers have 
attributed to increased mechanization and deepening of mines, which created more dust 
and made ventilation more difficult. 126 In Quebec, recognition ot: and response to, the 
disease followed a similar pattern. There, 200 of the 574 compensation claims made 
between 1937 and 1973, mostly arising from silicosis caused by drilling in quartz in gold 
mines, were approved. In Manitoba, 26 claims were approved between 1965 and 1974, 
and in British Columbia, 164 during the same time period. 127 
In Great Britain, silicosis was recognized as a compensable industrial disease 
earlier than in Canada. There, a Workmen's Compensation (Silicosis) Act was passed in 
125N.F. Parkinson, "A Statistical Study ofthe Known Cases of Silicosis in the 
Mining Industry of Ontario," unpublished paper presented at Fifth Conference of Mcintyre 
Research Foundation (Chicago, 1953). 
126Gibbs and Pintus, Health and Safety in the Canadian Mining Industry, 88. 
127Gtbbs and Pintus, Health and Safety in the Canadian Mining Industry, 84,95-9. 
It is difficult to get detailed historical data for all provinces because of the manner in which 
statistics are complied by the various WCBs. 
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1918, after it had been recognized for some time that dust and inadequate ventilation were 
the main causes of the disease among miners. 128 In the United States, though respiratory 
ailments among miners and quarry workers had been documented since the 19th century, 
diseases such as silicosis gained wider attention in the 1930s, when the general public and 
the labour movement became more involved in the campaign to address the problem In 
the 1930s the American labor movement argued that for too long workers had been 
excluded from efforts to understand and eliminate disease hazards in the workplace, and 
the Department of Labor shared labour's belief that, as one historian put it, ''management 
would not voluntarily (original emphasis) improve working conditions. There had to be 
some coercive pressure brought by government or labor to force management to 
reform"129 There ensued a long and sometimes acrimonious process oflegislative reform 
and a public relations battle over the silicosis issue. 130 One of the most striking cases of 
128Edgar L. Collis and Major Greenwood, The Health of the Industrial Worker 
(New York: Amo Press, 1977), 144, 300-01. (First published London: J. and A. 
Churchill, 1921). 
12~avid Rosner, and Gerald Markowitz, "Research or Advocacy: Federal 
Occupational Health and Safety Policies During the New Deal," in Rosner, and 
Marckowitz, eds., Dyingfor Work: Workers ' Safety and Health in Twentieth-Century 
America (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1987), 96-7. 
130See Rosner and Markowitz, Deadly Dust: Silicosis and the Politics of 
Occupational Disease in Twentieth-Century America (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1991.) Alan Derickson's Black Lung: The Anatomy of a Public Health Disaster 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), while it deals primarily with coal mining, is a 
thorough case study of the Bureau of Mines' approach to occupational illness and the role 
of public relations in the campaign for improved working conditions and compensation. 
See also Alan Derickson, "'On the Dump Heap' : Employee Medical Screening in the Tri-
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silicosis among miners ever recorded was at a small fluorspar mine in France in the 1920s. 
There, of34 miners studied, 19 showed severe symptoms of dust-induced respiratory 
illness. Seven of these cases bad developed the disease after just 2 years of exposure. 
One died at the age of24, and another at 23, following just 2 Y:z years of exposure. The 
only apparently unusual thing about the mine was that, like the Iron Springs mine at St. 
Lawrence, it was exceptionally narrow. Also, workers in this French mine had used dry 
drills to drill into the granite surrounding the fluorspar vein. 131 
The recognition of, and response to, silicosis in Canada, Great Britain and the 
United States in the early 20th century illustrates that the causes and symptoms of silicosis, 
and the best methods for preventing it -- such as ventilation and wet drills -- were well 
known and documented long before 1953, when the Newfoundland Department ofMines 
began to express fear over the issue because of"certain medical information" which came 
to its attention. This information had arisen in connection with a specific case which had 
been unfolding in St. Lawrence for several years at that point. During his visit to St. 
Lawrence in 1950, Corlett became involved in the case oflssac Slaney, a former employee 
of the Corporation who was in the sanitarium (the hospital for tuberculosis patients) in St. 
John's, and who was believed to have developed tuberculosis "as an after result of 
State Zinc-Lead Industry, 1924-1932," Business History Review, 62 (Winter 1988), 656-
77; and Derickson, "Federal Intervention in the Joplin Silicosis Epidemic, 1911-1916" 
Bulletin of the History of Medicine, 62 (1988) 236-51. 
131P. Luton and J, Cbampeix, "A Study of Pneumoconiosis in Fluorspar 
Workings," Archives malade professionelle, 12 (1951), 505. 
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contracting silicosis." 132 
A pathological connection between silicosis and tuberculosis had been strongly 
suspected since the beginning of the 201h century, and by the 1920s researchers had 
confirmed the link between the two. In fact, the connection between silicosis and 
tuberculosis became so widely accepted during the first half of the 201h century that the 
term "silico-tuberculosis" had emerged to describe the condition. Simply put, silicosis 
reduces the capacity of the respiratory system to combat the effects of tuberculosis-
causing germs. The shortness ofbreath and other symptoms of the two illnesses are very 
similar, making it difficult in some cases to distinguish between them. 133 
In the report on his 1950 inspection, Corlett discussed the diagnosis of silicosis in 
Slaney's case at some length, and rejected the diagnosis on several grounds. First of all, 
he pronounced that it was "highly unlikely that a miner would contract silicosis in the 
extremely wet mines that prevail at St. Lawrence .... " He stated that someone had noted 
132A.V. Corlett, "Inspection ofNewfoundland mines for the safety of workmen and 
operating features," 1950, DME. 
133See Rosner and Markowitz, Deadly Dust, 15-38, Webster, "The Pathology of 
Silicosis," 27, P.A.B. Raflle, ed., Hunter's Diseases of Occupations, 81h Edition (London: 
Edward Arnold, 1994), 423-4; G.W.H. Schepers, "Silicosis and Tuberculosis," Industrial 
Medicine and Surgery (June 1964), 381-99. For a discussion of the earlier difficulty in 
establishing the connection between the two, and in diagnosing tuberculosis in the 
presence of industrial lung diseases during the 181h and 191h centuries, see George Rosen, 
The History of Miners' Diseases: A Medical and Social Interpretation (Schuman's: New 
York, 194 3 ), 125-8. One researcher attributed a decline in the incidence of silicosis in 
Canada in the mid-20th century partly to a decline in the incidence of tuberculosis: Gibbs 
and Pintus, Health and Safety in the Canadian Mining Industry, 89. 
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that Issac Slaney had worked at dry-drilling in the Black Duck mine in the 1930s and early 
1940s and might have developed silicosis through dust exposure there. Corlett countered, 
however, that ''the Black Duck operation was carried on as an open cut and it is 
improbable that he could have contracted silicosis there." As already described, however, 
some of the earlier open cuts, especially larger ones such as that at Black Duck, were 
quite deep and much of the dust generated by dry drilling and other operations would have 
stayed within the working area. Furthermore, the Black Duck mine underwent the 
transition from open cut to underground mining relatively early, in 1935, and the evidence 
presented with respect to the 1930s and 1940s attests to the extremely dusty, unventilated 
conditions in which Black Duck miners had worked. Corlett also remarked that ''wet 
drilling is practiced at St. Lawrence."134 While that was the case in most places during 
Corlett's visit, it certainly was not the case during the 1930s or the early 1940s, when 
Issac Slaney had worked in the mines. 
Corlett also questioned the procedure by which the case had been diagnosed. The 
preliminary diagnosis had been made by Dr. J.J. Pepper, who had come to St. Lawrence in 
1948. Pepper based the initial diagnosis on X-rays taken by the The Christmas Seal, a 
traveling health clinic which visited isolated communities as part of the anti-tuberculosis 
campaign ongoing at this time. According to Corlett, Pepper stated that he had sent the 
X-rays to a colleague in Ottawa, who agreed with Pepper's diagnosis. Pepper also stated 
134
"lnspection ofNewfoundland mines," 1950. 
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there were several other cases of miners and former miners in St. Lawrence whom he 
strongly suspected were silicotic. Corlett requested the opinion of Dr. Bennett at the 
sanatorium in St. John's on the Slaney diagnosis. Bennett replied that sanatorium doctors 
lacked sufficient experience with the disease to confirm or deny the diagnosis. Corlett 
described this reply as being "entirely at variance with the statements offered in St. 
Lawrence," which of course it was not. Corlett then contacted a Dr. Riddell of the Ontario 
WCB, whom Corlett described as having more experience in silicosis than any man in 
Canada, "except perhaps the doctors in Ontario who have been specializing in this work 
for many years, but for whom he acts as a referee," a description which raises some 
questions as to Riddell's actual qualifications in this area. Like Bennett, Riddell replied 
that he was unable to confirm the diagnosis one way or the other, which Corlett again 
wrongly described as a refutation of Pepper's initial diagnosis. Corlett's own ignorance of 
the subject is indicated by his statement that silicosis "is not usually considered to be fatal 
in itself but it does usually lead to tuberculosis on account of the lowered resistance of the 
respiratory organs." Silicosis was, of course, known to be fatal, and it did not ''usually" 
lead to tuberculosis, but it often did in situations where tuberculosis was already prevalent. 
Corlett conceded that there was a high incidence of tuberculosis at St. Lawrence, but 
stated that it was not related to mining. He claimed, furthermore, that "the attitude that 
any man who has worked in a mine and who develops tuberculosis must be a silicosis 
victim is unfair to the mining industry." Corlett did point out that discussions with the 
mine operators and with the doctor revealed that dust samples taken in the underground 
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were "sufficiently siliceous to be dangers," but he concluded, somewhat vaguely, that it 
was "improbable that any dust in the mine picked up as a sample would yield any useful 
information." Nonetheless, he advised that it might be a good idea to "pay attention to 
mine ventilation in the St. Lawrence area," because a change in conditions might require 
the removal of"dangerous concentrations of dust."135 In his report of the following year, 
1951, Corlett noted that Issac Slaney had been released from the sanitarium and that no 
further investigation on his case had been done up to that time. 136 
Issac Slaney died in December 1952, at the age of 46. While he was being waked 
in his home, Harry Spencer, a St. Lawrence man employed by the Corporation, was asked 
by Dr. Pepper to pick up a package at Burin hospital and return it to him at St. Lawrence. 
According to Spencer, Dr. Pepper had been trying for some time to convince the 
Corporation manager, Poynter, that miners in St. Lawrence were sick and dying from 
silicosis. Spencer brought the package from Burin to Pepper, and was then asked ifhe 
would join the local RCMP officer in witnessing an autopsy on Issac Slaney (the package 
contained surgical materials). Spencer "didn't feel up to it" and Pepper then asked Rennie 
Slaney, a mine captain with the Corporation at the time, if he would be a witness. Slaney, 
knowing that his position with the company was at risk, agreed. That night, Spencer sat 
outside the door to the room where Issac Slaney' s corpse was being waked, to prevent 
135
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anyone from entering, while Pepper performed the autopsy, witnessed by Rennie Slaney 
and the RCMP constable. Pepper then sent a sample of Slaney's lung tissue to an expert 
in the United States, who confirmed that it was silicotic. 137 
Under mounting pressure to address the issue of industrial disease in St. Lawrence 
following the Issac Slaney diagnosis, the Newfoundland government attempted to 
formulate a response. An Executive Council Order of 13 October 1953 called for a three-
phase approach: (1) a meeting between officials of the WCB, the Department of Health 
and the Department of Mines to draft legislation regarding silicosis, (2) the submission of 
the proposed legislation to industry operators, and (3) the drafting of amendments to the 
appropriate legislation.138 In October 1953, officials of the WCB, Department ofMines, 
and the Department ofHealth and Welfare met to discuss a possible course of action, but 
the only thing they could agree on was that in addressing health concerns in the mining 
industry, 
... the welfare of the residents of a mining community must be weighed 
against the possible financial liability of the mine owners should silicosis 
become prevalent to the point where heavy compensation is necessary. 139 
137Interview with Harry Spencer, St. Lawrence, 13 October, 2000, conducted by 
the author. 
138Fred Gover to Leonard Miller, Deputy Minister of Health, and to Irving Fogwill, 
Chairman, WCB, 13 October 1953, GN 78/1/B, 51 , PANL. 
139
"Proceedings of meeting on the subject of detection and handling of silicosis 
held in the office ofthe Chieflnspector ofMines, 30 October 1953," GN 78/1/B, 51 , 
PANL. 
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In other words, the various government departments took the position that any response 
must include protection for mining companies from the financial liability they might incur 
because of increased compensation premiums, should their operation be associated with a 
high claim rate. 
Shortly after that October meeting, Newfoundland Deputy Minister of Health 
Leonard Miller contacted G.C. Brink at the federal Department of Health and Welfare 
expressing concern over a ''possible" case of silicosis in St. Lawrence and "increasing 
evidence that something will have to be done." Knowing that Ontario had instituted a 
system of pre-employment and annual testing for respiratory ailments among miners in 
1928, Miller was concerned that if screening were introduced at St. Lawrence, many St. 
Lawrence workers might lose their jobs.140 Brink simply replied that in Ontario it had 
been found that pre-employment and annual screening, combined with adequate 
ventilation, were the keys to reducing silicosis, and he suggested that all miners and 
former miners at St. Lawrence be given x-rays immediately. 141 
The government took no immediate action on these suggestions, however, though 
pressure to do something continued to mount. In March 1954, Rennie Slaney, the former 
Mine Superintendent with the Corporation who had witnessed the Issac Slaney autopsy, 
wrote to Dr. RB. Bennett of the St. John's sanitarium regarding his brother who had been 
140Miller to G.C. Brink, Department of Health and Welfare, Ottawa, 10 November 
1953, GN 78/1/B, 51, PANL. 
141Brink to Miller, 19 November 1953, GN 78/1/B, 51, PANL. 
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a patient at the sanitarium since January 1953. Rennie Slaney stated that his brother had 
worked with dry drills at the Corporation mines during the 1930s and that, even after wet 
drills were introduced in most St. Lawrence mines after 1941, conditions were still very 
bad as ventilation was "far from adequate." Rennie Slaney listed four St. Lawrence miners 
who had died after being treated at the sanitarium, nine others who were currently in the 
sanitarium, several others who were never admitted to hospital and had died from 
undetermined "lung trouble," and others who were currently ill. According to Rennie 
Slaney, once they had become ill these men, like his uncle, "were cut off from any financial 
assistance from the company, although some had given up to 20 years ofservice."142 
Bennett forwarded Slaney's letter to Miller, who forwarded it to Mines Minister Fred 
Rowe. 
Apart from circulating letters and soliciting advice from outside experts, upon 
which they did not act, officials of the Newfoundland government continued to do little to 
address the problem.143 In July 1954, the Department ofHealth received the results of the 
latest tuberculosis survey, which showed that the incidence of tuberculosis among the 
142Rennie Slaney, St. Lawrence, to Dr. R.B. Bennett, Superintendent of St. John's 
Sanitarium, 25 March 1954, GN 78/1/B, 51 , P ANL. 
143In June, 1954, an official ofthe federal Department ofHealth and Welfare had 
advised Miller that adequate mechanical ventilation systems and an adequate supply of 
water to suppress dust had been standard features of the Ontario response to the problem 
of dust in mines for many years. Ross also reminded Miller that in Ontario wet drills had 
been required by law since 1917. C.R. Ross, Industrial Hygiene Engineer, Department of 
Health and Welfare, Ottawa, to Miller, 23 June 1954, GN 7811/B, 51, PANL. 
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general population in St. Lawrence was twice that of the nearby fishing community of 
Fortune.144 Shortly after, government officials met again to discuss the St. Lawrence 
situation. The results of the most recent dust analysis suggested that the concentration of 
dust in the Corporation mines would not likely harm "normal persons" - those not already 
suffering from a respiratory ailment. It was noted, however, that of four samples sent to 
Ottawa for examination-- the Newfoundland Department of Mines still did not have a 
laboratory in which to conduct the analysis -- only one could be analyzed. The high 
incidence of tuberculosis in the community and the fact that dust concentrations in the 
mines might harm persons already afflicted by respiratory ailments once again raised the 
question of employee screening, but officials at the meeting were perplexed as to where to 
draw the line for rejecting applicants and for taking employees out of the mines.145 
There was also the problem of how to deal with possible compensation claims as a 
result of silicosis and/or silico-tuberculosis. The Newfoundland WCB was uncertain how 
to handle such a situation in terms of diagnosis and the determination of the per centage of 
disability, and sought advice from the WCB of Ontario, which suggested that 
representatives of the Newfoundland Board visit Ontario to see how the silicosis issue had 
144
"BCG Testing and Vaccination, July 1954," GN 78/1/B, 51, PANL These tests 
were conducted on the general population; it is probable that the incidence among the 
mining population would have been higher. 
145
"Meeting of Committee on Silicosis," 19 August 1954, GN 78/1/B, 51, PANL. 
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been dealt with there. 146 The Issac Slaney case continued to be an important issue in terms 
of compensation, as it had still not been settled by the WCB and might come to be looked 
upon as a precedent for future claims. Because Issac Slaney had terminated his 
employment before the Workmen's Compensation Act came into force, the only recourse 
for his widow was to sue the Corporation, which she had successfully done and had been 
awarded a cash settlement. Fogwill explained to Poynter that she might still have the 
option of filing a claim with the WCB, but it was unclear whether it would be accepted. 
"The whole silicosis thing is very complicated from the legal standpoint," Fogwill 
explained, "and also because of factors like TB."147 
By April, 1955, seven months after the meeting was proposed, Fogwill had 
established the agenda for the meeting with officials of the Ontario WCB. It included the 
procedure for establishing a Silicosis Referee Board in Newfoundland based on the 
Ontario one, the question of mines inspections and dust control in mines, a chest survey of 
St. Lawrence miners, and possible amendments to the relevant Newfoundland 
legislation. 148 Apparently little immediate action resulted from the May meeting, as in 
146WCB of Ontario, to Irving Fogwill, Chairman ofWCB ofNewfoundland, 31 
August 1954, GN 7811/B, 51, PANL. 
147lrving Fogwill, WCB, to Donald Poynter, St. Lawrence Corporation, 13 
November 1954, GN 78/1/B, 51, PANL. 
1481rving Fogwill, "Agenda for Toronto meeting proposed for 2 May 1955," 5 
April1955, GN 78/1/B, 51, PANL. The Silicosis Referee Board refers to a group of 
experts who adjudicate diagnoses and claims for the WCB. 
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August of the following year the St. Lawrence union contacted the Department ofMines 
and the Department of Health pointing out that there had been several deaths among St. 
Lawrence miners in the past year, and that five others had been diagnosed with silicosis 
and tuberculosis. According to the union, the situation had become "extremely urgent" 
and the government was asked to take immediate action in investigating the health statuS 
of miners and conditions in the mines.149 
The fact that the union contacted the government in this regard in 1956 points to a 
significant contrast in the union's handling of the health and safety issue during the tenure 
of Cusick and that ofTurpin. During Cusick's term as president, from 1946 to 1954, the 
health and safety question did not figure prominently in the union's relations with 
management and government or in its other activities. It had consistently been an 
important issue during Turpin's term from 1941 to 1946, however, and resurfaced in 
1956, shortly after he had re-taken the presidency. Perhaps this simply represented a 
difference in priorities between the two men, or perhaps its was related to the affiliation 
issue, with the union having less latitude in setting and acting upon its own priorities while 
affiliated. In any case, it does appear as a discernible difference between the two 
presidencies. 
The relative lack of references to health hazards in the union records during the 
period 1952 to 1956 is certainly not an indication that none existed, though one might be 
14
'1>.J. Lewis to W.J. Keough, Deputy Minister ofMines, and to Miller, 30 August 
1956, GN 78/1/B, 51, PANL. 
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led to believe so from the official annual reports of the mines inspectorate. The Annual 
Report for 1954, for instance, did not mention dust hazards or problems with air quality at 
the St. Lawrence mines, but stated that in Newfoundland mines "the presence of a good 
supply of oxygen is also ensured by constant examination and ventilation. " 150 By the time 
of the report for 1955, Gover had been promoted to Deputy Minister of Mines and the 
position ofChieflnspector taken over by Frederick Lukins. The change in personnel did 
not, however, change the focus of the inspection service or the tone ofthe reports. The 
analysis lab was still not completed, and there were continuing vague references to 
unspecified "steps" being taken to reduce potential gas and dust hazards in Newfoundland 
mines, and to the cooperation of mine operators in these efforts. The inspectorate's 
apparent reluctance to take a firm stand with operators was in contrast to its treatment of 
workers who violated the safety regulations. It was reported that in 1955 two men who lit 
a fire to help strip out some hose fittings in the underground at St. Lawrence were charged 
and convicted before a stipendiary magistrate for a violation of the Regulations of Mines 
Act. 151 This was in keeping with a general trend in the enforcement of occupational health 
and safety legislation, in which penalties for violations are rarely applied to employers, but 
1500epartment of Mines and Resources, Annual Report for the Year Ended 31 
March 1955, 76-9. 
151Department ofMines and Resources, Annual Report for the Year Ended 31 
March 1956, 98-100. 
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often to employees. 152 
The report for 1956 deviated little from previous ones. It reported that a man had 
been killed at Blue Beach mine when he fell 140 feet down the shaft. The accident was 
attributed to "error in judgement on the part of the deceased." It was also noted that 
diesel-powered tram cars which had been introduced in 1955 at Director mine, to 
supplement the electric and hand-drawn ones already in use, were proving highly effective, 
with ''no adverse reports" ofhealth effects (from, for example, carbon monoxide). 153 A 
striking feature of the inspection reports from this period is the way in which they were 
used to report on technological advances in the mining industry and how they had 
improved efficiency and productivity. There was also a clear tendency to treat the 
inspection reports as a way of easing fears and instilling a sense of confidence, rather than 
as a way of actually revealing and addressing health and safety concerns. In that sense, the 
annual inspection reports functioned more as a public relations device -- as a way of 
creating the impression of safe and healthy conditions, rather than the actual conditions. 
That the official annual reports did not convey the reality of the situation in the St. 
Lawrence mines is demonstrated by the testimony of those who actually worked there in 
the 1950s. Jim Roberts was born in St. Lawrence in 1930 and went to work as a driller at 
the Iron Springs mine in 1951. Asked about conditions there during the 1950s, he replied, 
152Reasons, Assault on the Worker, 205-08. 
153Department of Mines and Resources, Annual Report for the Year Ended 31 
March 1957, 127-9. 
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Unbelievable. I was gassed every day I was there. I'd have to come up out 
of the mine half the time. Not only me. There was as high as twenty of us 
had to come up the one time. All they used to say was, 'can't go down 
there, too much gas down there. You go down and you'd start to get a 
headache, real bad as soon as you'd get there, sometimes you wouldn't be 
able to stay a halfhom. But if you got the water hose going and got the 
air, then you kind of cleared it up, and you'd manage to go back and spend 
a shift, but you'd have this headache all day. 154 
Roberts also stated that drillers often dry-drilled when no water was available or when 
there was insufficient water pressme to reach working areas. There was also the problem 
of fumes from diesel fuel that was burned in some equipment, such as compressors, 
combined with the complete absence of ventilation in many working areas. The inhalation 
of diesel exhaust is known to cause various illnesses, including lung cancer.155 Men were 
reluctant to complain about these conditions, he stated, for fear oflosing their jobs.156 
Ed Ryan, who went to work with the Corporation in 1952, also described 
conditions very different from those depicted in the official annual reports. Because he 
had completed high school, Ryan was hired to assist in surveying and mapping the 
Corporation mines and was therefore very familiar with layout and facilities. He described 
154Interview with Jim Roberts, St. Lawrence, 28 November 1998, conducted by the 
author. 
155Marc B. Schnecker, et.al., "Lung Cancer and Occupational Exposmes to Diesel 
Exhaust: a Pilot Study of Railroad Workers," in William L. Wagner, William N. Rom and 
James A. Merchant, eds., Health Issues Related to Metal and non Metallic Mining 
(Boston: Butterworth, 1983), 379-92, Robert B. Reger, "Diesel Emissions and Associated 
Respiratory Health Effects in Mining,"in Health Issues Related to Metal and non Metallic 
Mining, 393-411, and Health and safety in the Canadian Mining Industry, 168-71. 
156Interview with Jim Roberts. 
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conditions in the 1950s as "terrible." The drifts at Iron Springs were so narrow, he stated, 
that workers often had to work bent over, shoveling ore by hand straight back over the 
shoulder. Ryan stated that there simply was no ventilation in the Iron Springs mine, and 
that once workers moved away from the shaft and farther out into the drifts, there was 
very little air. According to Ryan, 
When you got away from the shaft , you could forget about lighting a 
cigarette.... If you heard the elevator rushing down the shaft and you 
wanted a smoke bad enough you ran back to the shaft because she'd push a 
certain quantity of air down ahead ofher, so you had to hurry up and light 
the match and then you'd keep puffing the cigarette to keep it lit... Over a 
period of time the boys devised their own ways of getting air ... Far out in 
the tunnel where there was no such thing as air, they would open a valve 
every now and then [from air supply lines to drills and other equipment] 
and breathe in that way, and the boys up in the stope would unscrew the 
hose from the end of the drill and get so much air and then hook it up 
again, and when you were drilling you'd get a certain amount of exhaust 
from the drill but nothing compared to what you should have for breathing 
properly.l57 
Other workers who did not have access to such air supplies, he stated, were often 
overcome and would 'just collapse on the track. .. just pass out." When that happened, 
they would be brought to the surface and laid out on the dryhouse floor: 
I counted twenty-one men one time just laying there.... The surface air 
would bring them around but they'd have this temble splitting headache. 
He [the Mine Captain] would give them an aspirin and a drink of water 
and they'd go over to the shaft, all their rubber clothes would be there ... 
and they'd dress up and go down again.. .. They'd work and pass out again 
sometimes. 158 
157Interview with Ed Ryan. 
158Interview with Ed Ryan .. 
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Ryan recalled that the dust was often so thick that you could not see a person working 
next to you, and the light from his hat would be a dim orange glow. ''Nobody wore 
masks," he stated, "at the Corporation or at Alcan, underground, in the lab or in the mill." 
At Blue Beach, Ryan stated, conditions were a bit better since there was a lot of water and 
the veins were wider than at Black Duck. At other, stmller sites which the Corporation 
developed throughout the 1950s, such as Hare's Ears, however, conditions were very bad 
because of the practice of using equipment (such as dry drills) that had been worn out at 
larger operations such as Iron Springs and Blue Beach. 159 
Conditions at Newfluor' s Director mine were reportedly not much better. Leo 
James went to work as a mucker at Director in 1953, when he was just 17 years old. 
Technically, he stated, he was not old enough to work underground, but he was "big 
enough." According to James, conditions at Director were similar to those at Iron 
Springs: 
Oh, Jesus, conditions were bad. No ventilation. We were only down 250 
then because the 400 was flooded, then they pumped that out.... I saw it 
down there south on the 400 and ... a match wouldn't bum. You had to 
walk five or six hundred feet out in the drift back towards the shaft to get 
bit of air.160 
James stated that dust was a constant problem and that many men, including him, were 
plagued by persistent headaches. Conditions were made worse, he explained, by the 
159Interview with Ed Ryan.. 
160Interview with Leo James. 
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increase in production throughout the 1950s, since the mine was then run on three shifts a 
day with no break between shifts. As a result, men going down for their shift entered a 
workplace filled with smoke and dust from the blasting carried out at the end of the 
previous shift. James stated that no workers were issued masks. According to James, the 
inspection service was largely useless since the company always had ample notice of an 
inspection visit and were able to deal with any obvious problems, at least for the duration 
of the inspection. Workers' suspicions that employers and inspectorates often act in 
collusion to cover up workplace hazards are a common feature of the system, and erodes 
whatever confidence might have otherwise existed.161 James expressed a version ofthis 
belief when he stated that, 
They [the company] knew when they [the inspectors] were coming. Three 
or four days before they came, places that there was people working, they 
were taken out of it, and when they were gone over the hill [out of town], 
they were back in there again .... Everything would be tidied up and there'd 
be signs up here and signs up there. 162 
When James first started mucking in 1953, he shoveled ore into buckets that were then 
placed on hand-drawn cars and taken to the hoist. Later, he loaded electric and then 
diesel-powered tram cars. Contrary to the inspectorate's assurances that the use of diesel 
trams at Director had no adverse heahh effects, James stated that the fumes from the 
burning diesel were ''bad, really bad," and that after being around these machines 
161Reasons, Assault on the Worker, 214. 
162Interview with Leo James. 
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underground, a worker's nasal system would become clogged with black soot. 163 It is 
clear from the accounts of James and other workers that what was reported in the official 
inspection reports was not what was actually going on in the Lawrence mines. 
4.5 Conclusion 
The industry revival which began in the late 1940s and continued into the 1950s 
provided much-needed employment in St. Lawrence, where the economy had entered a 
serious slump in 1944. The union, under newly elected president Cusick, was able to take 
advantage of industry expansion to win wage increases and other concessions, and was 
aided in these efforts by its affiliation with the NFL/ AFL-TLC. After Turpin regained the 
presidency in 1954, however, the union quickly reverted to independent status, and made 
little progress in such areas as wage rates after that. On the other hand, the crucial issue 
of occupational health and safety, which had not been prominent in labour relations during 
Cusick's tenure, resurfaced after Turpin took over the presidency again. Confederation 
with Canada brought legislative change in key areas, such as mines regulations and 
inspections, but little actual progress was made on the health and safety front. In fact, 
there was a marked discrepancy between the Department ofMines' depiction of working 
conditions at St. Lawrence in the 1950s and what conditions were actually like. While the 
govenunent continued to evade the issue and forestall action, health and safety became 
163Interview with Leo James. 
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more pressing as the effects of working conditions became more evident to people in the 
community. The diagnosis of silicosis by autopsy in 1953 seemed to confirm people's 
long-held beliefs, but still various government departments failed to act, and by 1956 
nothing of any significance had been done to address the problem. As with the war years, 
the decade following the Second World War was a time of great change on the industry 
and labour relations fronts at the St. Lawrence mines. In other areas, however, such as 
denial and inaction from government and industry regarding health and safety problems, 
the status quo prevailed. 
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Chapter 5: A Turning Point: Corporation Shutdown, Dust and Radiation, 
and Labour Unrest, 1957-1962 
Introduction 
The period from 1957 to 1962 was a turning point in the history of mining, labour 
and health and safety in St. Lawrence. With the expiration of its contract with the United 
States government in 1956, the Corporation entered a period of decline ending in 
complete closure of its St. Lawrence mines in 1962. Tests carried out by federal officials 
from 1957 to 1960 confirmed what many in St. Lawrence already suspected -- that 
conditions at the mines were extremely hazardous to health. In 1959, however, came the 
revelation that in addition to disease-causing dust, the mines were also heavily 
contaminated with cancer-causing radiation. These developments forced the provincial 
government to introduce new legislative measures. Combined with other, ongoing 
grievances they also broke the fragile labour truce which had existed for much of the 
1950s and sparked several acts of protest on the part of the union. 
5.1 Corporation Decline and the TariffRuling of 1958 
After several years of expansion and record production levels, in 1957 the 
Corporation entered another period of decline with the expiration of the four-year contract 
into which it had entered with the US Defense Materials Procurement Agency in 1952. 
Anticipating that expiration of that contract would spell trouble for the Corporation, 
Seibert had written to Smallwood in late 1955, describing the difficulties which his 
company faced in competing for fluorspar markets on the international level, and seeking 
the government's assistance to protect industry and jobs at St. Lawrence. As Seibert 
pointed out, producers in other nations, such as Italy and especially Mexico, had recently 
been capturing a larger share of both the Canadian and the US markets for fluorspar. In 
Canada, this situation was encouraged by the fact that the Canadian government imposed 
no import duties on foreign fluorspar and thus offered no protection to domestic 
producers.' The extent ofthe growth of foreign competition in the North American 
market is indicated by the fact that in 1950, Canadian consumers imported just 579 tons of 
fluorspar from Mexico; in 1956, they imported 26, 523 tons.2 Similarly, in the United 
States, consumers imported 5,306 tons from Mexico in 1950, and 100, 827 tons in 1956.3 
The union was also concerned about the impending expiration of the contract and 
the fate of the Corporation employees, and apparently did not trust the information 
provided by the Corporation. In July 1956, Turpin wrote to the Defense Materials 
Procurement Agency in Washington, asking for details of exactly when the contract would 
'Walter Seibert, St. Lawrence Corporation, to Smallwood, 27 December 1955, 
Coli 075, File 3.20.087, CNSA. 
2Canada. Department of Mines and Technical Surveys, Mineral Resources 
Division, The Canadian Mineral Industry, 1950 (Ottawa, 1953), 145; and The Canadian 
Mineral Industry, 1956 (Ottawa, 1952), 275. 
3United States, Minerals Yearbook, 1950, 535; and Minerals Yearbook, 1956, 
503. 
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expire and whether it might be possible to extend the deal 4 Around the same time, Turpin 
also demanded the assistance of the area's Member ofParliament, C.W. Carter, pointing 
out to him that the people of St. Lawrence had supported Confederation with Canada in 
1949, through which Canada had in effect acquired the St. Lawrence fluorspar deposits as 
a domestic supply, and the workers now expected in return some protection from foreign 
competitors who were dumping cheap fluorspar into the Canadian market. 5 
When the Corporation's American contract expired at the end of 1956, however, 
no progress had been made in securing a market for its St. Lawrence fluorspar, or in 
protecting it against international competitors. The result of this was quickly felt at the 
local level. The first mine to be shut down was the Lord and Lady, where production 
ceased in the summer of 1956. In December, 1956, the Corporation began phasing out 
the Iron Springs mine, its largest, longest running, and richest producer. By the spring of 
1957, Blue Beach mine which, like Iron Springs, had undergone major expansion and 
development in the few years previous, had also been phased out. 6 The curtailment and 
eventual shutdown at the Corporation mines naturally resulted in a drastic reduction in 
employment levels. After employing 200 to 250 workers per year since 1951, by April 
4Aloysius Turpin, SLWPU, to Defense Materials Procurement Agency, 
Washington, 31 July 1956, SLMM. 
5Aloysius Turpin to C.W. Carter, Liberal M.P., House of Commons, Ottawa, 25 
July 1956, SLMM. 
6Farrell, "Report ofMining Properties of St. Lawrence Corporation," 24-47. 
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1957 the Corporation had just 135 left on the payroll. 7 In early June 1957, the Haypook 
and the Hares' Ears mines were shut down, and all but ten of the Corporation employees, 
retained to provide basic maintenance, were laid o:ff.8 
Though New:fluor continued to employ nearly 200 unionized workers, the closure 
of the Corporation mines provoked a lot of public interest and concern for the future of 
the mining industry and for the community itself, as well as criticism of the lack of action 
on the issues of foreign competition and tariffs. An editorial in the Newfoundland Journal 
of Commerce, for example, asked whether St. Lawrence was doomed to become a "ghost 
town," and whether it was right that, 
an important industrial community, the hub of an important economic area 
ofNewfoundland should be made suffer because people in other parts of 
the world [i.e. Mexico] are satisfied to be ill-fed, ill clothed, ill-housed, and 
to live under conditions of economic slavery so that the product of their 
toil and sweat can successfully compete with the product of Canadians who 
would never tolerate such living and working conditions~ 
Others pointed out that while it might easily be suggested that the 250 men who had lost 
their jobs at the Corporation return to fishing, many of the younger workers had little 
7List ofEmployees on Corporation Payroll, 15 April1957, SLMM. 
8Farrell, "Report ofMining Properties of St. Lawrence Corporation," 42-50; and 
"Markets Lost, Fluorspar Mine Announces Shutdown," Evening Telegram, 6 June 1957. 
9
''Will St. Lawrence become a Ghost Town?," Newfoundland Journal of 
Commerce, 24, 6 (June 1957), 5. Similar views were expressed in an editorial, ''St. 
Lawrence Closedown," Evening Telegram, 8 June 1957. 
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experience in the fishery, and most lacked boats, gear and shore facilities to engage in the 
:fishery.to 
Throughout the summer of1957, the Newfoundland government directed its 
attention to trying to find someone willing to purchase and operate the Corporation mines. 
In July, for instance, apparently in response to a solicitation from the government, a 
representative of the Nichols Chemical Company of Montreal informed the government 
that it was not interested in the properties, but that he knew someone who was if the price 
was right. 11 Shortly after, another Montreal businessman informed the Newfoundland 
government that he knew of a possible purchaser "representing European money," and 
requested any information available on the properties. 12 Seibert, meanwhile, who had 
apparently not been consulted by the government before it began seeking potential buyers, 
insisted to the government that a sale of the properties was unlikely given the state of the 
international market, and that the only real solution to the problem lay in the imposition of 
a tariff on the importation of fluorspar into Canada, and he asked the Newfoundland 
10
"Government Moves to Re-open Mines Again," Evening Telegram, 8 June 1957, 
3. The title of the article was a reference to a claim by the Member of the House of 
Assembly for Burin District, Eric Jones, that the Newfoundland government was 
promising whatever assistance it could provide in reactivating the mines. 
11E.P. Aikman, Nichols Chemical Company, Montreal, to G.K. Goundrey, 
Provincial Economist, Government ofNewfoundland, 18 July 1957, Coll 075, File 
3.20.087, CNSA. 
12Mac Stephens, Ayers Limited, Lachute, Quebec, to G.K. Goundrey, Provincial 
Economist, Government ofNewfoundland, I September 1957, Coll 075, File 3.20.087, 
CNSA. 
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government's assistance in pursuing that possibility.13 Until such action was forthcoming, 
Seibert seemed content to do nothing. 
The shutdown of the Corporation mines coincided with another industry 
development which, while its effects were far less severe, nonetheless contnbuted to the 
deteriorating employment and economic situation in the community. In September 1957, 
Newfluor suspended normal mining operations to carry out changes at its underground 
and surface works. This interruption coincided with a four-month strike over working 
conditions and wages by 7,000 Alcan employees at the Arvida and Shawinigan plants. 
The workers, members of the Canadian and Catholic Confederation of Labour, succeeded 
in obtaining better working conditions and in winning a raise that brought the basic wage 
up to $1.68 per hour. 14 Since the Arvida plant consumed no fluorspar during this period, 
Newfluor took advantage of the opportunity to install an underground crusher, an 
underground conveyor system (for transporting ore to the loading points at the shaft), and 
new hoisting equipment. Also, the main shaft was extended from the 400 to the 550-foot 
level (whereas previously these two were connected by a small auxiliary shaft), and 
changes to the milling system meant that a higher grade of ore could be produced. 15 The 
13Walter Seibert, St. Lawrence Corporation of Newfoundland, to G.K. Goundrey, 
Provincial Economist, Government ofNewfoundland, 1 September 1957, Coli 075, File 
3.20.087, CNSA. 
14CSN/CEQ, The history of the labour movement in Quebec, 177. 
15Department ofMines and Resources, Annual Report for the Year Ended 31 
March 1958, 156; and United States, Minerals Yearbook, 1958. 
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general effect of these changes, in terms of productive output, was that ore from the 
Newtluor mine could be delivered to the surface faster and in a more refined state than 
previously possible. By January 1958, 4 7 men had been laid off at Newtluor, and many of 
these layoffs were directly attributed to the introduction of new equipment and methods at 
the mine. Wrth these layoffs, the total number on the Newtluor payroll was down to just 
140 (from about 250 during the same month the previous year), while the Corporation still 
retained a skeleton crew of just ten men. 16 
A glimmer ofhope for the future of the Corporation appeared in January 1958 
when the federal Minister of Finance announced that in response to "representations to the 
effect that fluorspar is being imported into Canada in such quantities and under such 
conditions as to cause serious injury to Canadian production and employment," the 
Canadian Tariff Board would conduct an inquiry and make a ruling upon the question of 
imposing a tariff on fluorspar entering Canada. All interested parties were invited to 
submit written statements or to appear in person before the Board in Ottawa on 6 May 
1958.17 The mood among union and government officials, however, was far from 
optimistic. In a strongly worded letter to the district :MP in January 1958, Turpin thanked 
him for his work in helping get the tariff issue put before the Board, but expressed 
16
"7 More Miners Laid Off:" Evening Telegram, 9 January 1958, 20; and "Only 10 
Men at One Mine," Evening Telegram, 31 January 1958, 3. 
17Report by the Tariff Board Relative to the Investigation Ordered by the Minister 
ofFinance Respecting Fluorspar," 10 September 1958, 7, unpublished document, CNS. 
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ambivalence at the prospect of helping Seibert and the Corporation at the same time: 
You know Mr. Carter, we the people are fed up with the St. Lawrence 
Corporation ofNewfoundland Limited, and at times feel you are only 
fighting a battle for Seibert, who's not after all worth fighting for.... His 
old shoestring and penny-pinching are still with us, and the rank and file, 
my union men see no future under [that management]. We didn't see it in 
1941, and no better today, only worse .... conditions were of the worst at all 
times, and you know all his faithful friends or employees got silicosis ..... 18 
The Newfoundland government was also losing patience with Seibert, and accused 
him of doing nothing but waiting for the Tariff Board's ruling while the government and 
the union attempted to find a solution to the crisis. 19 It is not surprising, therefore, that at 
a meeting held on 19 February 1958, and attended by representatives of the government, 
the union and the company, the mood was not one of cooperation and fellowship. Seibert 
restated his position that the Corporation mines had been shut down for the simple reason 
that the US contract had expired, and without the imposition of a tariff, the company 
could not compete with foreign interests who had much lower labour and other 
production costs. In the meantime, he could only offer an unorthodox and temporary 
solution: he proposed that the Government ofNewfoundland buy $250,000 worth of 
fluorspar from the Corporation and then sell it back later when the Corporation needed it, 
thus providing temporary employment for 50 to 75 men. There was no reply to this 
suggestion. 
18Turpin to C.W. Carter, M.P., House of Commons, Ottawa, 29 January 1958, 
SL:M:M. 
19Smallwood to Walter Seibert, 5 February 1958, Coil 075, File 3.20.087, CNSA. 
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The Provincial Economist in attendance stated that differential wage rates alone 
did not account for the Corporation's inability to compete in the Canadian market, and 
that other factors, such as Corporation's inefficient methods and substandard equipment, 
were also responsible. He concluded that the Corporation had lost the Canadian market 
because it had concentrated on the short-term but highly profitable US contract. Deputy 
Minister of Mines Fred Gover supported the Provincial Economist's position and pointed 
out that the Corporation had run its St. Lawrence mines in a badly planned manner and 
with substandard equipment. Turpin, on behalf of the union, added that another 
contributing factor was the animosity which many workers harboured toward the 
Corporation. "Lack of good will between the management and labour," he stated, "leads 
to a persistent, though generally unwitting, paSsive resistance among miners .... " As an 
indication of the depth to which this acrimony had become ingrained over the years, this 
was described as ''not a malicious effect ... merely instinctive." Turpin still, however, 
offered to cooperate in whatever way possible to get the mines running again. Theo 
Etchegary, a former mill Superintendent at the Corporation who had recently been elected 
Mayor of St. Lawrence, requested a decision or some action one way or the other so that 
unemployed men could at least make a decision about what to do. Seibert restated his 
claim that, unless the government wanted to take him up on his earlier suggestion, the 
shutdown was inevitable until market conditions improved to the point where the mines 
were profitable. The conference thus concluded with little accomplished apart from the 
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airing of criticisms and grievances.20 
About a month after the February meeting, Mayor Etchegary pointed out to the 
provincial government that with no fishing facilities or equipment, no other avenue of 
employment, and Unemployment Insurance benefits running out, many St. Lawrence men 
and their families were in dire need of assistance. He implored the government to 
intervene and help get the mines reactivated.21 A few weeks later, the government 
responded by making Seibert an unsolicited offer of a government loan guarantee for up to 
$75,000. In return, the government wanted a guarantee that the Corporation would 
resume mining and deliver 3,000 tons of fluorspar to the St. Lawrence loading dock within 
90 days. Another condition of the offer was that the Corporation mortgage its mineral 
lands to the Newfoundland Government, and that the mortgage be "renewable at 
government discretion so long as it appears that production may continue pro:fitably."22 
Seibert, apparently reluctant to mortgage the properties, declined the offer, and repeated 
his view that the only practical solution to the problem was the imposition of a tariff by the 
2<X•Conference on Closed Down Mines of St. Lawrence Corporation of 
Newfoundland Limited, St. Lawrence," 19 February 1958, Coll 075, File 3.20.087, 
CNSA 
21Theo Etchegary, Mayor, St. Lawrence, to Smallwood, 12 March 1958, Coll 075, 
File 3.21.048, CNSA. 
22W.J. Keough, Minister of Mines and Resources, Government ofNewfoundland, 
to Walter Seibert, St. Lawrence Corporation ofNewfoundland, 24 March 1958, Coll 075, 
File 3.20.087, CNSA. 
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Canadian government. 23 
Meanwhile, the closure of the Corporation mines and the layoffs at Newfluor were 
beginning to have a detrimental effect on the workforce and the economy of the 
community. It appears that displaced miners pursued several options. Some who had 
come to St. Lawrence along with their families from nearby communities relocated back to 
their home towns.24 Many others found work at other, newly opened mining centres, 
especially the new iron ore mines at Knob Lake in Labrador West and the revived copper 
mine in Tilt Cove. From February to December of 1958, there were at least 40 references 
in the "St. Lawrence Personals" column of the St. John's newspaper to St. Lawrence 
miners departing for, or returning to visit from, Knob Lake or Tilt Cove.25 Another option 
was a return to the inshore cod fishery, which was reported to be particularly good in 
1958 and found a ready market for fish at a newly opened processing plant in nearby 
23P.J. Lewis to Aloysius Turpin, SL WPU, 11 Apri11958, SLMM. 
24There are references throughout the year 1958 in the "St. Lawrence Personals" 
section of the Evening Telegram, to former miners returning to their home communities. 
For example, the "Personals" section for 8 May (p.15) and 5 July (p. 9), notes that several 
families had relocated back to Marystown, Lamaline, and Terrenceville (on the Fortune 
Bay side of the Burin Peninsula). 
25Evening Telegram, "St. Lawrence Personals," 5 February, 20; 6 March, 11; 22 
March, 19; 5 March, 9; 11 March, 7; 2 April, 11; 25 April, 19; 16 May, 12; 14 July, 11; 4 
August, 3; 12 August, 3; 28 August, 15; 4 September, 16; 9 September, 8; 12 September, 
11; 2 October, 2; 3 October, 5; 24 October, 14; 13 December, 10. Each of these 
references is to a different person. 
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Burin. Many former miners secured boats and equipment and engaged in the fishery. 26 By 
the late fall of 1958, however, the fishery was winding down. As an indication of the 
extent to which the employment situation had deteriorated, in November it was noted that 
several St. Lawrence men had returned from St. John's where they had been WlSUccessful 
in finding work, and that the Welfare Officer was visiting St. Lawrence for the first time in 
several years. 27 
The future of the Corporation mines seemed to hinge on the outcome of the Tariff 
Board's hearing. While the union was naturally concerned about the hearing's potential 
consequences for the workforce, and had been invited by the federal Department of 
Labour to attend the May hearing in Ottawa, Turpin nevertheless declined to participate 
or even make a written submission. He claimed that he and other members of the union 
executive were ''perhaps not qualified" to make a representation on what appeared to be 
such a complex issue. 28 This response is revealing in that this may have been an occasion 
on which the union would have been better positioned had it retained its affiliation with 
the NFL and the AFL-CIO, which possessed research capabilities. As it stood, Turpin and 
26
"Miners Return to Fishing," Evening Telegram, 22 March 1958, 19; "Fisheries 
Dept Surveying Land," Evening Telegram, 9 May 1958, 2; and "Burin Area Prosperous, 
Peninsula Economy Good," 3 July 1958, 3. 
27
"St. Lawrence Personals," Evening Telegram, 26 November 1958, 17; and 
"Fishing Fleet Dwindles," Evening Telegram, 26 November 1958, 17. 
28A.H. Brown, Department ofLabour, Ottawa, to Aloysius Turpin, SLWPU, 11 
March 1958, SLMM; and Aloysius Turpin, SLWPU, to Michael Starr, Minister of 
Labour, Ottawa, 9 April 1958, SLMM. 
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the union could do little but wait. 
At the May 1958 hearings, representations were made by two flourspar producing 
firms and several key Canadian consumers. The two producers that presented briefs were 
the St. Lawrence Corporation and Huntingdon Fluorspar Mines Limited, which still ran a 
small fluorspar mine near Madoc, Ontario. Compared to the St. Lawrence producers, 
Huntingdon was still a very minor player in the fluorspar industry. In 1958, it was the 
latest of several companies which had produced relatively small amounts of fluorspar in 
the Madoc area intermittently since the First World War. During the Second World War, 
the Madoc mines produced a total of around 28,000 tons. From 1952 to 1958, 
Huntingdon produced less than 1,000 tons annually, and employed an average of 17 
workers.29 The Canadian fluorspar consumers represented at the tariff hearing were: 
Algoma Steel, Sault Ste. Marie; Atlas Steels, Weiland; Steel Company of Canada (Stelco), 
Hamilton; Alcan; and Dominion Glass, Montreal. Other consumers, including Dominion 
Steel and Coal (DOSCO) of Sydney, submitted written briefs. 
Both the St. Lawrence Corporation and Huntingdon requested a tariff of $10.00 
per ton on fluorspar imported into Canada. The evidence and arguments presented in 
support of and in opposition to the tariff request reveal a great deal about the 
Corporation's status and involvement in the international fluorspar industry, about the 
pressures brought to bear by the parties involved, and about the priorities of the federal 
29
"Report of the TariffBoard," 19-20. 
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decision makers. The main opposition to the proposed tariff came from the chief 
Canadian consumers. These consumers testified that the Corporation's product could not 
compete with the imported product in any case because it did not meet their specific 
needs, and that the Corporation bad until recently shown little interest in the domestic 
market. These consumers also argued that while the Canadian consumption of fluorspar 
bad increased from 41,000 to 96,000 tons from 1947 to 1956, most of this increase was 
due to an increased use of acid-grade fluorspar, the result of a growing aluminum industry, 
while the consumption of metallurgical grade had remained relatively constant. 30 The 
consumers of metallurgical grade fluorspar also argued that improvements in the steel-
making process bad substantially reduced the amount of fluorspar needed per ton of steel. 
As for acid-grade fluorspar, it was pointed out that the biggest consumer was Alcan, 
which supplied its own needs from its St. Lawrence mine.31 In other words, even if the 
Corporation could produce a suitable product, it seemed unlikely that Canadian demand 
for either metallurgical or acid grade fluorspar could absorb it. 
The Canadian consumers also argued that once the Corporation had entered into 
the contract with the U.S. Defense Materials Procurement Agency in 1952, it began to 
concentrate solely on supplying acid grade fluorspar by way of its Wilmington plant to its 
American market. Once that contract expired, the Corporation bad tried to re-enter the 
30
''Report of the Tariff Board," 15. 
31
"Report ofthe TariffBoard," 15. 
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Canadian market and found that Canadian consumers bad entered into arrangements with 
other, foreign suppliers, with whom the Corporation was unable to compete. The 
Corporation, represented by Seibert himself: responded that the main reasons it could not 
compete with foreign suppliers was that they were paying a fraction ofNewfoundland 
labour rates and paying no import duty, and that given a suitable import duty, the 
Corporation could re-enter the Canadian fluorspar market. 32 
The evidence presented by the individual consumers was revealing, especially 
regarding the Corporation's own involvement in the Mexican fluorspar industry. The 
Stelco brief: for example, stated that it bad been offered no fluorspar from domestic 
suppliers since 1952, and that furthermore, the St. Lawrence Corporation had offered to 
supply Stelco with "Mexican fluorspar" in 1955, 1956, and 1957. DOSCO stated in a 
written submission that the Corporation bad quoted that company a price on Mexican 
flourspar in 1955, saying it could be supplied ''through their Mexican connections." 
Algoma testified that in 1954, 1955, and 1956, offers of"Mexican fluorspar" were made 
' 'from St. Lawrence Corporation's associated producer in Mexico."33 
The Corporation, it was revealed, bad been involved for some time in the Mexican 
fluorspar mining industry, as were other Canadian and U.S. firms. Mexico was a relative 
newcomer to the fluorspar industry, emerging during the Second World War to help meet 
32
"Report ofthe TariffBoard," 22. 
33
"Report of the TariffBoard," 24-5. 
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the demands of both U.S. and Canadian consumers, but since that time the Mexican 
:fluorspar industry had grown substantially. The two largest Mexican :fluorspar mines were 
La Cosentida mine, operated by Minerales y Metales Industriales, a subsidiary of 
Pennsault International Corporation of Philadelphia, and La Compania Minera Las 
Cuevas mine, owned by Empresa Fluorspar of Toronto. Empresa was jointly owned by a 
number of Canadian mining companies and had been for several years operating a 
:fluorspar mine in Mexico under a company known as Copania Minera Las Cuevas. This 
was a major operation, larger than either St. Lawrence producer, and exported about 
60,000 tons of metallurgical grade and 12,000 tons of acid grade annually. Empresa's 
Mexican operation was a major supplier of metallurgical grade fluorspar to Canada and, 
not surprisingly, Empresa opposed the proposed tariff. 
The Corporation, meanwhile had a "sizeable investment" in a Mexican producer 
known as Compania Minera Julieta. This subsidiary had been operating a mine and a 
heavy media mill at Fraustro in northern Mexico for several years. It was on behalf of this 
firm that Seibert had been soliciting business from Canadian consumers. It is unclear how 
long the Corporation had been involved in this Mexican mine, but several factors made the 
fluorspar there cheaper to produce than the St. Lawrence fluorspar. The ore veins at the 
Julieta mine were surrounded by limestone rather than the granite, and the ore was very 
low in silica content. It was therefore easier to mine and contained fewer impurities than 
the St. Lawrence fluorspar. 
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These factors, in addition to lower labour costs, meant that it could be delivered to 
Canadian consumers much cheaper than the St. Lawrence ore. The Tariff Board estimated 
that the price per ton of metallurgical grade ore delivered from St. Lawrence to Hamilton 
and to Sydney was 40 and 37 dollars per ton respectively. The same ore from Mexico to 
Hamilton and Sydney cost 25 and 21 dollars respectively. The Board therefore concluded 
that a $10-per ton tariff would do little to improve the Corporation's ability to compete 
with the Mexican producers. 34 
In addition to the comparative costs of production and delivery, the Board took 
other factors into account in arriving at its decision. Alcan opposed the proposed tariff on 
grounds that it might increase the price of its finished products if it had to import foreign 
fluorspar, and might also invoke retaliatory tariffs by consumer countries such as Mexico, 
which was becoming an important market for Alcan aluminum products. Representatives 
of the Nichols Chemical Company, which had recently begun operating a hydrofluoric acid 
plant, which required acid-grade fluorspar, in Valleyfield, Quebec, argued that a tariff 
would increase that company' s production costs and thus threaten a small but growing 
Canadian industry.35 Taking into account all these factors-- the fact that the Corporation 
had largely ignored the Canadian market over the course of its U.S. contract and then 
offered Canadian consumers Mexican fluorspar, the interests of fluorspar conswners, and 
.34<•Report of the TariffBoard," 32-4. 
35
"Report ofthe TariffBoard," 26-7. 
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the apparent superiority of the Mexican product -- the Board denied the tariff request. 
While the Board was clear on why it denied the tariff request (even if some of its 
justification was debatable}, this leaves open the question of why Seibert, given his 
financial interest in the Mexican industry, requested the tariff in the first place. If he was 
making a move into exporting fluorspar from Mexico into Canada, what did he hope to 
gain by having a tariff imposed on that fluorspar? The TariffBoard also seemed to be 
perplexed by this question, and suggested that what Seibert was perhaps ultimately after 
was a tariff sufficient to allow for a small profit within the Canadian metallurgical-grade 
market, which would help subsidize the Corporation's re-entry into the more profitable 
U.S. acid-grade market. The inability to determine exactly the Corporation's motives is 
due in large part to the lack of a clear financial picture of the company and its affiliates. In 
a written submission to the Board, Seibert stated that the Corporation had made a profit 
every year from 1936 to 1956 inclusive, and that 1954 to 1956 were especially prosperous 
years, but beyond that he offered little information.36 The Tariff Board itself conceded 
that, 
As regards the financial position of the St. Lawrence Corporation of 
Newfoundland today, the Board is of the opinion that its fluorspar 
production operations in Canada are so integrated with related interests 
and activities in other countries -- including fluorspar production in Mexico 
-- that it is not in a position to comment with any degree of preciseness 
36Walter E. Seibert, "Brief Supporting a TariffRequest on Fluorspar Entering 
intoCanada," submitted to the TariffBoard of Canada, Ottawa, Ontario, 10 April1958, in 
"Report of the TariffBoard." 
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upon the profitability or otherwise of the fluorspar mining activities of the 
St. Lawrence Corporation ofNewfoundland, per se. 
The lack of financial information makes it difficult to say how the Mexican and 
Newfoundland operations compared in terms of profit and cost, the extent of Seibert's 
financial involvement in the Mexican operation, and what benefits he might have seen to 
having the tariff imposed. One important consideration is the relative size and importance 
of the Mexican operation in which he was involved. The available sources, such as 
national annual reports from both Canada and the U.S. for the period in question, 
summarize the position of most major foreign producers. In both cases, especially in the 
U.S. government reports, the major Mexican producers are discussed; the company with 
which Seibert was said to be affiliated is not mentioned. This suggests that the company 
was likely a minor player in the Mexican fluorspar industry, and raises the possibility that 
Seibert saw little future with that connection. It is also apparent from the evidence 
presented by the Canadian consumers whom Seibert had approached that he had not been 
successful in securing a Canadian market for the Mexican product. This may also help 
explain his apparent willingness to forgo the Mexican connection in favour of a tariff. 
While the TariffBoard submitted its findings to the Minister ofFinance on 10 
· November 1958, the final decision was still to be made by the federal cabinet. Both Seibert 
and the Newfoundland government, meanwhile, were working on an alternate plan to 
reactivate some of the Corporation·s St. Lawrence properties. Under the proposed deal, 
the government would guarantee a line of credit for up to $200,000.00 to be used in 
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reactivating the most appropriate mines on a small scale, with an eye to expanding as 
market conditions allowed.37 The collateral for this loan guarantee would be the ore itself, 
and the money was to be advanced in installments based on the market value of the ore as 
it was delivered to the stockpile at the wharf. The loan was to be repaid as the stockpiled 
ore was sold. Gordon Pushie, the Director General of Economic Development, was 
apparently not entirely certain of Seibert's integrity, and saw this as the only system which 
would avoid "enabling him to lay bands on the guarantee without delivering the ore." 
Another condition of the deal was that if at the end of a three-year period the ore was not 
sold, the government had the right to seize the ore and sell it for whatever price could be 
obtained.38 
While Seibert accepted this arrangement, he saw it as a temporary solution. He 
continued to insist that only an import tariff would secure the future of the Corporation' s 
St. Lawrence mines, and apparently held out hope that a favourable ruling would 
eventually be secured. In fact, he suggested to Pushie that, for strategic reasons, they 
delay taking any immediate action toward re-opening, or in making the loan guarantee 
deal public: 
37Walter Seibert, St. Lawrence Corporation ofNewfoundland, to Gordon Pushie, 
Director General ofEconomic Development, Province ofNewfoundland, 3 November 
1958, Coll 075, File 3.20.087, CNSA. 
38Gordon Pushie, Director General of Economic Development, Province of 
Newfoundland, to Joseph Smallwood, 3 November 1958, Coll 075, File 3.20.087, CNSA. 
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As you know, Gordon, I was a bit apprehensive of reopening the mines in 
advance of a tariff ruling and I didn't want anyone in Ottawa to feel that 
they could abandon us at St. Lawrence hearing that the mine was reopened 
so it may be just as well that nothing did happen for the present. If we do 
get a favourable ruling it is my plan to open up St. Lawrence immediately 
and of course we will start in a small way. 39 
On 15 December 1958, however, the :final decision on the tariff ruling was made public: 
the status quo would be maintained, and no tariff would be applied on fluorspar coming 
into Canada. 40 
Once the federal government had made public its ruling on the fluorspar tariff 
application, the Corporation made public its intention to restart some of its St. Lawrence 
mines. This news was greeted by the union with a mixture of relief and skepticism. Turpin 
commented that: 
We are glad to learn ... that Mr. Seibert has decided to reopen the mines, 
and we hope our Department of Mines will see that the Mining Laws are 
carried out to the letter, in order that our miners may live longer.41 
The District MP was also skeptical of the Corporation and of the prospects for any long-
term revival of its St. Lawrence mines. He expressed his doubts in this regard to Turpin, 
while responding to Turpin's suggestion that the federal government appoint someone to 
39Walter Seibert, St. Lawrence Corporation ofNewfoundland, to Gordon Pushie, 
Director General of Economic Development, Province ofNewfoundland, 17 November 
1958, Coil 075, File 3.20.087, CNSA. 
40
"$10 a Ton Duty Refused, No Fluorspar Protection," Evening Telegram, 15 
December 1958, 3. 
41Aloysius Turpin, SLWPU, to P.J. Lewis, 10 February 1959, SLMM. 
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monitor the operation: 
Personally, I see no future for the fluorspar industry at St. Lawrence as 
long as the mines are owned and operated by the St. Lawrence 
Corporation. Unfortunately, Mr. Seibert owns this property in fee simple 
and there is no way by which it can be confiscated except by special 
legislation which might prove harmful in that it might discourage other 
mining companies from coming to other parts ofNewfoundland. Since Mr. 
Seibert owns the property in fee simple, the Federal Government would 
have no authority whereby it could place a man to oversee the operation as 
you suggest. The only solution is to try and get this property away from 
Mr. Seibert altogether and I can assure you that no stone will be left 
unturned in an effort to find some means ofbringing this about.42 
The Corporation plan was to reactivate the Hare's Ears mine, one of those which 
had undergone exploratory and developmental work during the mid-1950s, but had been 
shut down in June 1957. This mine apparently offered the best hope for profitable 
revival. 43 The management aimed to reopen the mine in May 1960, and to "highgrade" the 
ore, extracting only the easily accessible, highest grade ore, an approach which is often 
profitable in the short term but wasteful in the long term. Seibert apparently hoped that, 
by highgrading, the company could market the ore as metallurgical grade to the surging 
United States steel industry, and avoid trying to compete in the Canadian market.44 
42C.W. Carter, House ofCommons, Ottawa, to Aloysius Turpin, SLWPU, 19 
March 1959, SLMM. 
43Farrell, "Report of the Mining Properties of St. Lawrence Corporation," 49-51. 
44Walter Seibert, St. Lawrence Corporation ofNewfoundland, to Aloysius Turpin, 
SLWPU, 2 April1959, SLMM. 
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5.2 Labour Relations and Health. and Safety, 1957-58 
The closure of the Corporation's mines in the spring of 1957, along with the 
reduction of the workforce at Newfluor, affected not only the employment situation, but 
also relations between the union and both mining companies. The decline of the 
Corporation coincided with the expiration of the union's collective agreement with 
Newfluor, and Newfluor seems to have tried to take advantage of shrinking employment 
opportunities to gain the upper hand during the re-negotiation process. In May 1957, the 
union issued several demands in the areas of overtime pay, annual vacations, and statutory 
holidays, as well for as an across-the-board wage increase of10 cents per hour.45 The 
Company gave no ground on most demands, but did counter-offer on wage rates and 
Statutory Holidays, with important qualifications. Instead of the 10-cent increase in 
wages, Newfluor offered an increase calculated on the same pay for a 40-hour week as for 
the standard 44 hours. Furthermore, this concession would be granted only if the union 
entered into a two-and-a-half year agreement. The proposed agreement would therefore 
expire on 31 December 1959. The Company refused the union's demand on the Statutory 
Holiday issue, but offered two additional days during the last year of the agreement only, 
provided that the union agreed to the proposals on wage rates and on the two-and-a-half 
45 Aloysius Turpin, SL WPU, to R. Wiseman, Newfoundland Fluorspar Limited, 27 
May 1957, SL.MM:. 
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year term. 46 The union put up little opposition to this counter-offer, and these provisions 
were, with some minor adjustments, embodied in the Collective Agreement signed by 
Newfluor and the union on 7 October 1957. The agreement was set to expire, however, 
on 30 June 1959, and not 31 December 1959, as Newfluor had initially demanded.47 
The union was also apparently aware, even before the Tariff Board began its 
hearings, that Seibert had been negotiating to sell Mexican fluorspar to Canadian 
consumers for several years. Not surprisingly, this increased animosity between the union 
and the Corporation. In fact, it became a focal point around which a number of lingering 
issues coalesced. In Aprill957, for instance, Turpin thanked MP Carter for his efforts in 
trying to salvage the Corporation mines, but expressed ambivalence about the prospect of 
simultaneously assisting Seibert and the Corporation. While Turpin assured Carter that 
because of the dire need for employment in the community, neither he nor the membership 
would hamper any efforts towards restarting the industry, they did not like seeing the 
Corporation "pulling off business tricks.', Turpin reminded Carter that while Seibert was 
undercutting the St. Lawrence mines by trying to market Mexican fluorspar, many men 
had given not only their labour but their lives in opening and working those mines: 
"Young men died, without knowing exactly the cause of their death, some we knew had 
46R. Wiseman, Newfoundland Fluorspar Limited, to Aloysius Turpin, SLWPU, 19 
June 1957, SLMM. 
47Collective Labour Agreement between Newfoundland Fluorspar Limited and St. 
Lawrence Workers' Protective Union, 17 October 1957, AA. 
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TB, they didn't last long underground, and them that were able bodied soon followed ... a 
few years from now you'll have a job to find a man over forty years old in St. 
Lawrence. •..ts Turpin was also outraged that St. Lawrence men were ''walking about 
dying of silicosis" while Seibert was investing in the Mexican fluorspar industry to put 
them out ofwork.49 Seibert, meanwhile, attempted to placate Turpin by assuring him that 
his Mexican dealings had nothing to do with the shutdown in St. Lawrence, and that 
closing the St. Lawrence mines was ''tearing my heart out as I know many of our faithful 
employees who have been with us for many years are going to suffer financially and 
otherwise. "50 
It is unclear what Seibert meant by suffering "otherwise," but it was increasingly 
obvious that men were suffering and dying from various work-related ailments, while 
discussions about the dangers of respiratory diseases associated with mining conditions in 
Newfoundland mines dragged on. The extent of the bureaucratic delay that marked this 
issue is indicated by the fact that in February 1957, the Chieflnspector of Mines reminded 
the Deputy Minister of Health and the chairman of the WCB of the three-phase plan that 
had been formulated in 1953, and informed them that the first phase (a meeting of 
representatives from WCB and the Departments ofHealth and Mines) had now been 
48Aloysius Turpin, SLWPU, to C.W. Carter, Ottawa, 22 Apri11957, SLMM. 
49Aloysius Turpin, SLWPU, to P.J. Lewis, 28 January 1958, SLMM. 
50Walter Seibert, St. Lawrence Corporation ofNewfoundland, to Aloysius Turpin, 
SLWPU, 2 June 1957, Coli 079, File 7.39, CNSA. 
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completed. and he had just received the comments of the operators whose input had been 
solicited. 51 In keeping with what had become standard practice, none of the unions 
associated with the various mines had been asked for input. The main issue at stake in 
these discussions was possible amendments to the regulations to provide for detection of 
respiratory diseases in potential and current employees in "dust exposure occupations. "52· 
Six Newfoundland companies had been asked for input on the issue of possible 
amendments to the mines regulations, including the introduction of pre-employment and 
annual screening for respiratory illnesses. The American Smelting and Refining Company, 
which ran the lead and zinc mines at Buchans, had "no comment." The Dominion Steel 
and Coal Corporation, operators of the Bell Island iron ore mines, suggested that older 
employees be exempted from the annual examination process, for fear that loss of 
employment would lead to financial hardship, and that prospective employees be required 
to obtain a certificate only after being hired. The Department of Mines responded that, 
while the first suggestion was in keeping with the practice elsewhere when screening was 
introduced, the second defeated the purpose and would only result in unnecessary 
confusion as workers were taken off the job. The manager of the Iron Ore Company of 
Canada mines in Labrador West, which had gone into production in the mid-1950s, 
51 B. Lukins, Chieflnspector of Mines, to Leonard Miller, Newfoundland 
Department ofHealth, and to Irving Fogwill, Workers' Compensation Board, 27 February 
1957, GN 78/1/B, 51, File 290/G/07, PANL. 
52Lukins to Miller and to Fogwill, 27 February 1957, GN 78/1/B, 51, File 
290/G/07, P ANL. 
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suggested that mine managers be given the right to decide what was and was not a "dust 
exposure occupation." The Maritime Mining Company, which ran the newly re-opened 
Tilt Cove copper mine, suggested that the annual examination was unnecessary and that if 
a worker, during course of his employment, was found to be suffering from a respiratory 
disease, he should simply be taken off the job by a physician. The management of both 
Newtluor and the St. Lawrence Corporation stated that they felt "exactly the same as does 
the Maritime Mining Corporation at Tilt Cove." The Department ofMines countered that 
this was a dangerous practice as it would "allow a mining company to dispose of its 
liabilities to its workmen at almost any stage of incapacity by reason of his having 
contracted a respiratory disease." In other words, there would be no check against the 
development of respiratory diseases, and employees would simply be taken off the job 
once they became obviously ill. The Department suggested that during annual 
examinations of workers already on the job, only tuberculosis should be grounds for 
disqualification from continued employment, but that during pre-employment screening 
any respiratory disease should be grounds for disqualification. 53 Obviously, this was an 
attempt to prevent mass disqualifications among St. Lawrence miners, by letting those 
with silicosis who were already on the job remain employed, but screening out potential 
employees with respiratory ailments. 
53Lukins to Miller and to Fogwill, 27 February 1957, GN 78/1/B, 51 , File 
290/G/07, PANL. 
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The proposed change to the regulations to address the issue of respiratory hazards 
in mining apparently did not get much beyond the discussion stage up to mid-1957, as it 
was not included in a new set of mine regulations which became effective 1 July of that 
year. The 1957 regulations reportedly were meant to address new concerns arising from 
the increased use of modernized equipment and of different mining methods. 54 Most of 
the changes therefore addressed issues surrounding the introduction of new electrical, 
haulage, and hoisting equipment. Other sections were apparently meant to deal with the 
establishment of large open pit operations, such as the iron ore mines of Labrador West. 
One notable change from the 1951 Regulations was a section which dealt with ''Maximum 
Extraction," which gave the Chieflnspector the power, subject to the safety provisions, to 
stop any mining method deemed unsuited to extracting the fullest value of the resource. 
Other new sections dealt with health concerns associated with the growing use of diesel-
powered equipment in underground mines. This section set maximum allowable limits on 
carbon monoxide gases and required the use of mechanical (forced) ventilation in all 
underground areas where internal combustion engines were in use. With regard to such 
issues as dust conditions and medical examinations, however, the 1957 Regulations 
introduced no new legislation. 55 
54Newfoundland Department of Mines and Resources, Annual Report for the Year 
ended 31 March 1958, 162. 
55The Mines (Safety of Workmen) Regulations, 1957. 
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While the proposed legislative changes regarding dust exposure and medical 
examinations were not introduced, the government did bring in an industrial hygienist from 
the Occupational Health and Safety Division of the federal Department of National Health 
and Welfare to conduct a series of dust surveys at St. Lawrence. Dr. J.P. Windish was in 
St. Lawrence from 27 April to 5 June 1957, and conducted dust surveys in the 
underground and the mill at Newfluor's Director mine. Windish arrived in St. Lawrence 
just two weeks after the closure of the last of the Corporation mines, so no dust studies 
were conducted at any Corporation site. At the time of Windish's visit, Newfluor 
employed 226 men -- 134 underground, 12 in the mill, and the remainder on the surface 
and in transportation and loading jobs. The mill was being run on two eight-hour shifts 
per day and the underground on three eight-hour shifts, six days a week (to stockpile in 
anticipation of the temporary shutdown for refit in the fall). The 250, 400, and 550-foot 
levels were open and accessible. The main shaft at this time was at the 400-foot level, but 
the 550-foot level was accessed by an auxiliary shaft from the 400-foot. At the time of 
Windish's visit, most mucking was being done by mucking machines -- small, electric-
powered loaders that scooped up broken ore and loaded it into tram cars. The ore was 
then taken by these tram cars, powered by battery or diesel, to ore chutes and dumped 
down the chutes to the loading pocket. In one stope, on the 250-foot level, mucking was 
being done with a "slusher": a large, electric-powered scoop attached to the stope walls 
and ceilings by cables and pulleys, and dragged across the floor of the stope to pull out 
broken ore. The only forced air ventilation in evidence was on the 250-foot level, where it 
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was believed to be required because of exhaust from the diesel trams. Windish noted that 
only some of the drills in use at Director were equipped with standard combined air and 
water throttles, so many could still be run without a supply of water. 56 
Blasting in the stopes was usually done between shifts, but blasting also went on 
during shifts, especially what was known as "chute blasting." This was done when ore that 
was being sent down a chute from one level to another became jammed in the chute and 
had to be blasted in order to clear the blockage. 57 Both practices, regular blasting to break 
down ore at the end of shifts and chute blasting, produced a lot of dust and fumes. One 
miner who worked underground at Newfluor at this time remarked that when the mine 
operated on three shifts per day with no break between shifts, men going on shift entered 
an atmosphere thick with dust and smoke created by blasting at the end of the previous 
shift. 58 That this created a potentially harmful condition had been recognized in collective 
agreements dating back to 1949. The 1949 agreement stipulated that men would not be 
required to return to the area of a major blast until it was safe to do so, and that in any 
event they were not required to return until at least 30 minutes had expired. This did not 
56 J.P. Windish, Laboratory Services, Occupational Health Division, Department of 
Public Health and Welfare, Ottawa, "Dust Hazards in the Mines ofNewfoundland: 
Newfoundland Fluorspar Limited, St. Lawrence, Newfoundland," 2 May 1958,2-3, 
unpublished document, CNS. 
57J.P. Wmdish, "Dust Hazards in the Mines ofNewfoundland," 3. 
58Interview with Leo James. 
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apply to chute blasts and other "minor blasts" conducted during shifts. 59 This clause was 
retained in collective agreements up to and including that signed in 1956.60 In the 1957 
Agreement, however, this clause was changed so that the only requirement was that 
"major blasts will be fired only at the end of a shift.'o<>1 In the 1957 agreement, there was 
no stipulation on how much, if any, time had to elapse between blasting at the end of one 
shift and the entry of another shift. In fact, with the mine on three eight-hour shifts per 
day, it is difficult to see how any time could elapse to allow for the settling of the dust and 
fumes created by blasting. 
Windish collected 93 dust samples which were analyzed within 24 hours of being 
collected for concentrations of free silica (unlike the earlier samples taken by the 
Newfoundland Inspectorate which were often spoiled or damaged being shipped to the 
mainland for analysis). The amount of free silica in a given quantity of air is expressed as 
millions of particles per cubic foot of air, or "MPPCF." For different percentages of free 
silica, there are different threshold limit values or TL V s, defined as "that concentration of 
a material to which, it is believed, a workman may be repeatedly exposed day after day 
without suffering demonstrable physiological damage." For the percentage of free silica in 
5~nion Agreement between Newfoundland Fluorspar Limited and St. Lawrence 
Workers' Protective Union, 2 June 1949, AA. 
60Labour Agreement between Newfoundland Fluorspar Limited and St. Lawrence 
Workers' Protective Union, 19 July 1956, AA. 
61Collective Labour Agreement between Newfoundland Fluorspar Limited and St. 
Lawrence Workers' Protective Union, 17 October 1957, AA. 
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the dust samples taken at Newtluor, it was determined that the TLV was 20 MPPCF.62 
In the underground, several readings taken during drilling operations on 550-foot 
level were in excess of the limit. While these were not extremely excessive readings, 
Windish noted that the dust produced was especially harmful because the drill was often 
directly above the driller's face, causing the driller to inhale a lot ofthe dust. The free 
silica content also increased during upward drilling because of the reduced water flow to 
the drill bit. The high readings on the 550-foot leve~ Wmdish noted, were in an extremely 
wet area. According to Windish, this indicated "the fact that the mere presence of plenty 
of water in an area is not sufficient to suppress dust." Another problem he noted with 
regard to drilling operations on the 550-foot level was an inadequate supply of 
compressed air to power the machines, which meant that drilling took longer and thus 
produced more dust. Some of the highest readings encountered in the underground were 
during such operations as chute building (constructing ore chutes from one level to 
another). At Director, much of this work was done with a "pavement breaker" (a 
jackhanuner) which was not supplied with water. During one such operation, very 
excessive readings -- up to 710 x MPPCF, or 35 x TL V -- were recorded. High readings 
were also recorded during drilling operations on the 400-foot leve~ and Windish noted 
that this stope, like many others, was ventilated "solely by exhaust from the drills." That 
is, there was no ventilation system as such, and the only air movement was that created by 
62J.P. Windish, "Dust Hazards in the Mines ofNewfoundland," 6. 
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the compressed air which powered the drills when it left the machine as exhaust air. 
Several samples taken in an unfinished raise from the 400-foot level also gave very high 
readings, up to 35 x TL V. Wmdish noted that no ventilation was provided during raising 
operations. Other areas where high readings were recorded were during mucking and 
chute-blasting. 63 
Some of the highest readings recorded were in surface operations, especially in the 
mill. In the crusher house, where the ore was crushed into smaller pieces before being 
conveyed to the HMS plant, readings were below or only slightly above the TL V during 
most daily operations. Each morning, however, dust accumulating on the crusher motors 
and other equipment was blown off using a blast of compressed air. This created 
extremely high readings of up to 1,200 x TL V. Similar readings were obtained in the HMS 
plant, where the motors and equipment were also cleaned each morning. It was noted that 
these readings were taken in September, with all the doors and windows of the buildings 
open. In winter, the doors and windows were usually kept closed, so there was not even 
that very limited natural ventilation. Wmdish noted that the solution to this dust problem 
in the crusher house and HMS plant was a simple one and had been adopted at most 
similar operations in Canada: enclosing the equipment motors so that they did not require 
daily cleaning, and installing ventilation equipment to remove the dust. 64 
63J.P. Windish, ''Dust Hazards in the Mines ofNewfoundland," 9-11. 
64 J.P. Windish, "Dust Hazards in the Mines ofNewfoundland," 15-17. 
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Windish concluded from his findings that there was a "serious dust hazard" 
associated with nearly every aspect of the underground and milling operations tested. The 
high readings at Newfluor, he noted, were based on the adoption of a relatively high TL V 
of20 MPPCF, while in fact many Canadian and American operations had adopted 5 
MPPCF as their target level in an attempt to reduce the silicosis risk.65 It is also important 
to note that these findings were based on a survey of the Newfluor mine only. What might 
the results of such tests have been at the Corporation mines, where there was not even the 
very limited ventilation which existed at Director mine, and where drilling and other 
equipment was even more substandard? Conveniently, the Corporation mines were shut 
down just in time not to find out. Regarding the possible health effects of conditions at 
Newfluor, Windish concluded that, "The ultimate criterion against which the hazard of the 
working environment must be assessed will of course be the health of the miners after, say, 
20 years of exposure to mining conditions. •>66 Those health impacts were already known 
among workers and others at St. Lawrence. 
By the time the report of Windish' s dust survey was released in May of 1958, 
government and medical authorities, as well as the union, were becoming more concerned 
with another apparent health problem; in addition to respiratory diseases such as silicosis 
and tuberculosis, which were linked to dust conditions, there seemed to be an abnormally 
65J.P. Wmdish, "Dust Hazards in the Mines ofNewfoundland," 18-19. 
66J.P. Windish, "Dust Hazards in the Mines ofNewfoundland," 18. 
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high rate oflung cancer among the mining population. In January 1958, for instance, 
Turpin indicated local awareness of this issue when he pledged support on behalf of the 
union to the chairman of a cancer convention being held in St. John's: 
Without doubt in the near future, we will be called on to do our utmost to 
contribute to your ever worthy cause. A large number of our miners died 
with Cancer and Silicosis. Government can't be to severe with Companys. 
The miner learned the hard way. 67 
By June 1958, provincial health authorities were becoming concerned with this 
issue as well, and Deputy Minister of Health Leonard Miller contacted federal health 
authorities and Alcan's Chieflndustrial Medical Officer, Frank Brent, requesting any 
information or advice they might offer.68 According to Miller, during the 1950s, "an 
altogether disproportionate number of deaths from carcinoma of the lung have emanated 
from the town of St. Lawrence," and there seemed to be no obvious explanation for it. He 
noted that of fourteen male deaths from carcinoma of the lung in Newfoundland in 1956, 
three were St. Lawrence miners and, of these, two were in their early forties. 69 While 
federal authorities agreed that this seemed to be a ''very high" rate, they could point to no 
67 Aloysius Turpin, SL WPU, to Chairman of the Cancer Convention, St. John's, 28 
January 1958, SLMM. 
68Leonard Miller to Dr. E.A. Watkinson, Chief of Occupational Health Division, 
National Health and Welfare, 30 June 1958, GN 78/1/B, 51 P ANL; Leonard Miller to 
G.C. Brink, Director, Division of Tuberculosis Prevention, National Health and Welfare, 
30 June 1958, GN 7811/B, 51, PANL; and Leonard Miller to Dr. F.D. Brent, Chief 
Industrial Medical Officer, Alcan, Montreal, 30 June 1958, GN 78/1/B, 51, PANL. 
69Miller to Brink, 14 July 1958, GN 78/1/B, 51, P ANL. 
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known connection between cancer and the mining offluorspar.70 Alcan's medical officer, 
Frank Brent, replied that though he had made some observations in this regard during a 
visit to St. Lawrence in 1957, he could offer no explanation for it. He was careful to note, 
however, that though some of the men so far believed to have died from cancer had 
worked for Newfluor, all of them had worked for the Corporation at some point.71 
In the aftermath of these exchanges, Dr. A.J. deVilliers, an Industrial Hygienist 
from the Occupational Health Division of the federal Department ofHealth and Welfare, 
made several visits to St. Lawrence during 1958-59. Based on information gathered 
during these visits, Devilliers proposed a detailed study on occupational hazards at the 
mines. 72 The union was obviously glad that some official attention was :finally being paid 
to the issue, but indicated that it was long overdue and a lot of men had become ill and 
died in the meantime. Turpin pointed out that his union had been trying to draw some 
serious attention to the issue of health hazards in St. Lawrence for nearly 20 years, since 
70A.H. Sellers, Division of Medical Statistics, National Health and Welfare, to G. C. 
Brink, 25 July 1958, GN 78/1/B, 51, PANL; and G.C. Brink to Leonard Miller, 25 July 
1958, GN 78/1/B, 51, PANL. 
71F.D. Brent, Alcan, to Miller, 18 July 1958, GN 78/1/B, 51, PANL. In one, 
company-sponsored history of Alcan, in which the subject of industrial disease in St. 
Lawrence receives scant attention, Brent is given slightly more credit than is due for his 
role in addressing the occupational health question at St. Lawrence: Duncan C. Campbell, 
Mission Mondiale: Histoire d'Alcan, Volume III (Ontario Publishing Company, 1990), 
1232-4. 
72Patterson to Miller, 2 April1959, GN 78/1/B, 51, PANL. 
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the 1941 strike, and that meanwhile "half the membership" was dead, many of them were 
never compensated, and widows and children were forced to survive on welfare. All things 
considered, he concluded, "We are not treated half as good as the Mexican miners. "73 
Federal authorities were advised of the need to press ahead with the proposed study as 
soon as possible, as the union had been in contact with various provincial officials 
indicating ''their knowledge of and interest in the apparent abnormal incidence of lung 
cancer in that area "74 Meanwhile, the evidence mounted and the death toll increased. In 
September 1959, Alcan's Dr. Brent noted that of 43 dead miners from both companies on 
whom medical information was available, 17 had officially died from lung cancer, and in 
November Turpin informed Ballam that ''The bell still tolls, two more miners [just] died of 
cancer of the lung. "75 
The study into a possible occupational cause of cancer was begun in November 
1959 under the direction of J.P. Windish, who had also conducted the 1957 dust survey. 
According to Windish, the 1959 study was undertaken primarily at the request of the 
Newfoundland Department of Health in response to information which had come to light 
during and after the 1957 dust study: 
73 Aloysius Turpin, SL WPU, to James McGrath, Minster of Health, Government of 
Newfoundland, 30 June 1959, GN 78/1/B, 51, PANL. 
74Miller to Patterson, 16 July 1959, GN 78/1/B, 51, PANL. 
75Brent to Miller, 24 September 1959, GN 7811/B, 51, PANL; and Turpin to C. 
Ballam, Minister ofLabour, 23 November 1959, SLMM. 
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... an apparently high incidence of cancer of the lung among the mining 
popu1ation in this area was reported to members of the Division and in 
order to establish the true occupational significance of this incidence the 
Newfoundland Department of Health asked the Occupational Health 
Division to plan and direct a complete study of this problem. 76 
It is also clear, however, that the union played an important role in persistently pointing to 
the urgency of the situation and in forcing provincial authorities to help arrange the 
federal study. 
In setting out to investigate a possible cancer-causing agent in the workplace, 
Windish focussed on the possibility of radiation. In tests conducted :fromNovember1959 
to January 1960, concentrations of the radioactive gas radon-222 ''much in excess of the 
currently accepted maximum permissible concentration were found in all levels of the 
mine." In addition, "radon daughters," created by radioactive decay ofradon-222, were 
also found to be ''much in excess" of the Safe Working Level (SWL) "in all levels of the 
mine. "77 According to Windish, the health hazard associated with this environment arose 
from the fact that the solid ''radon daughters" created by the decay of this gaseous radon-
222 became attached to dust or condensation in the air and were deposited on the lungs 
when inhaled. Depending on the concentration and duration of exposure, these radon 
76J.P. Windish, Occupational Health Division, Department ofNational Health and 
Welfare, Ottawa, "Health Hazards in the Mines ofNewfoundland: Radiation Levels in the 
Workings ofNewfoundland Fluorspar Limited, St. Lawrence, Newfoundland," 9 May 
1960, 1, unpublished document, CNS. 
77J.P. Windish, "Health Hazards in the Mines ofNewfoundland," 1-2. 
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daughters could over time lead to the development of cancer, particularly of the lungs. 78 
There was a lot of variation in concentrations of both radon-222 and its daughters in the 
Director mine, from less than 1 x SWL in some places, up to 193 x SWL. Table 5.1 shows 
the readings obtained at various locations. 
Table 5.1: Radon and Radon Daughter Readings at Newtluor, 
November 1959-January 1960. 
Range of Radon Readings Range of Radon Daughter 
Location (expressed as multiple of Readings (expressed as 
MPCa) multiple ofSWL) 
150' level 0.26 - 2.7 1.2-6.9 
250' level .06- 1.2 0.5-5.5 
400' level 2.6- 13.1 0.33-8.0 
550' level 3.71-31 2.5- 193 
Underground Crusher not measured 3.9-6.4 
In the shaft not measured 1.8- 4.2 
Shaft ore bin not measured 0.89- 1.6 
At water dam on 250' 15.1 8.9- 11.0 
level 
1 00 feet up the 250' drift llO 84 
180 feet up the 250' drift 133 not measured 
Source: J.P. Windish, "Health Hazards in the Mines ofNewfoundland,"12-13. 
78J.P. Windish, "Health Hazards in the Mines ofNewfoundland,"12-13. 
257 
There were various reasons for these different readings, but the primary one was 
variations in the amount of ventilation in different parts of the mine. It was noted, for 
instance, that in one drift on the 550-foot level, where a very high reading was taken, there 
was no ventilation of any kind, and that in fact "there was not enough oxygen present to 
support combustion.'m In one area, Windish conducted an experiment which showed a -
dramatic increase in radon concentrations as the airflow from a temporary ventilating 
system was gradually reduced. It was also noted that the lowest group of readings 
obtained in the underground was from the 250-foot level, where the introduction of diesel-
powered locomotives had required a forced air ventilating system. The rest of the mine 
was either unventilated or was ventilated by limited natural draft.80 Windish's two main 
recommendations based on these findings were for the introduction of a system to monitor 
the radiation hazard and the installation of forced air ventilation in all underground 
working areas. 81 
As for the source of the radon gas in the mine, Windish could only say for certain 
that its original source could only be uranium, as radon-222 is a product of the decay of 
uranium. There was no indication of exposed uranium in the mine, and tests did not 
indicate any radioactivity in the fluorspar itself Windish concluded that the most likely 
79J.P. Windish, "Health Hazards in the Mines ofNewfound.land," 13. 
80J.P. Windish, "Health Hazards in the Mines ofNewfoundland," 5. 
81J.P. Windish, "Health Hazards in the Mines ofNewfoundland," 21. 
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explanation was that the radon originated in a source outside the mine and was carried 
into the mine with the water, in which radon-222 is highly soluble. Tests indicated that the 
amount of water coming into the mine was more than sufficient to carry enough radon-
222 to contaminate the whole mine. 82 
While the official report of the Windish study was not released until June 1960, 
provincial authorities were informed of the findings at the conclusion of the survey, in 
December 1959. An official ofthe federal Department ofHealth and Welfare informed 
Miller on 30 December 1959 that Windish had discovered high levels of radiation in the 
Newfluor mine, and that Alcan was having its own technicians come to St. Lawrence to 
take readings. As for the Corporation, it was noted only that it had temporarily ceased 
operations, which "alleviates some of the emergency aspects of the problem for the time 
being."83 While the findings were not included in the public report, however, the 
accessible portions of the Corporation mines were tested, and found also to contain 
dangerous levels of radiation. Many areas were inaccessible because of flooding and 
disuse, and the main mines, Iron Springs, Black Duck, and Blue Beach, were never 
tested.84 
82J.P. Windish, ''Health Hazards in the Mines ofNewfoundland," 23. 
83Patterson to Miller, 30 Dec 1959, GN 78/1/B, 51, PANL. 
84James McGrath, Minister of Health, Government ofNewfoundland, to Turpin, 4 
March 1960, SLMM . McGrath made similar statements in "Cancer Tragedy Deadly 
Mystery in Newfoundland," Financial Post, 12 March 1960, 41 . 
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In January 1960, Alcan's technicians verified Windish's findings at Newfluor, and 
at this point Alcan's Dr. Brent seemed to become more concerned with protecting his 
employer than with getting to the truth of the matter. He became very concerned, for 
instance, with clarifying the position ofNewfound.land Health Minister McGrath and with 
ensuring that McGrath made no public statements without first informing the company. 
Referring to an earlier conversation with McGrath, Brent sought confirmation that what 
had been agreed to was that McGrath hoped that ''no cause will arise requiring a statement 
from you," that if required to give a statement on the matter, McGrath would "advise us in 
advance ofthe situation and of [your] proposed statement," and that McGrath was in 
agreement with Brent that there existed no ''proof positive" of the link between cancer and 
working conditions at St. Lawrence. 85 The fact that a physician employed by a private 
corporation and the province's highest-ranking public health official entered into such an 
arrangement is indicative of the kind of collusion which inhibited an open and honest 
investigation of the St. Lawrence situation. 
On 1 March 1960, at a meeting attended by government, union and company 
representatives, the results of the Windish survey were made known. Immediately, 
confusion ensued. On 3 March, Miller contacted his federal counterpart requesting 
information on whose jurisdiction the radiation hazard came under. As Miller put it, the 
province was ill-equipped to deal with the problem: "We have nobody, either in our 
85Brent to McGrath, 22 January 1960, GN 78/1/B, 51, PANL. 
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department or in the Department of Mines, who knows very much about this problem."86 
Miller's confusion over the jurisdictional question was understandable, not only because 
the St. Lawrence problem was unprecedented in Newfoundland, but because of a general 
lack of certainty surrounding the issue. In Canada, up to this time, concern about the 
health impacts of radioactivity in mines was confined largely to the uranium mining 
industry. Since the establishment of the first uranium mines in such places as Port 
Uranium, NWf, in the early 1930s, the uranium mining industry had posed some special 
jurisdictional questions in the area of occupational health. Simply put, this was related to 
fact that successive national governments had sought to keep the nuclear industry under 
exclusive federal control. This was the impetus behind, for instance, the 1944 creation of 
Eldorado Nuclear, a Crown Corporation with exclusive rights over exploration and 
development of uranium reserves, and the 1946 establishment of the Atomic Energy 
Control Board (AECB), a regulatory body with sweeping powers over the nuclear 
industry, including the uranium mining sector. 
In 1952, in response to a rapidly expanding nuclear industry, the federal 
government created another Crown corporation, Atomic Energy Canada, Limited 
(AECL), which came under the jurisdiction of the federal Minister of Energy, Mines and 
Resources. In 1955, partly because of a desire on the part of provincial governments, 
such as Ontario's, to facilitate the growing nuclear industry, federal and provincial 
86Miller to G.D.W. Cameron, Deputy Minister of Health, Government of Canada, 
3 March 1960, GN 78/1/B, 51, PANL. 
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authorities reached a compromise whereby the enforcement of health and safety 
regulations in all mines would be a provincial matter, but national and international 
authorities would set the standards for such things as Safe Working Levels. One of the 
effects of this development, as one commentator put it, was that jurisdiction over 
occupational health in one of the most potentially deadly industries in the world was 
handed over to provincial authorities which were often ill-prepared or reluctant to tackle 
adequately the health issues involved and who, "given their interest and expertise, focused 
more on the engineering aspects of mine safety than on the long-term effects of silica dust 
inhalation and ionizing radiation exposure."87 It has also been noted that allowable 
radiation exposures for workers in the uranium mining and nuclear industries have always 
been higher than for the general public. 88 
87Ian Robinson, The Costs of Uncertainty: Regulating Health and Safety in the 
Canadian Uranium Industry (Centre for Resource Studies, Institute oflntergovernmental 
Relations, Ottawa, 1982), 7. 
88Reasons, Assault on the Worker, 44. The consequences of these factors became 
clear in, for example, the case of uranium miners at Elliot Lake, Ontario. Thel976 Report 
of the Royal Commission on the Health and Safety of Workers in Mines, 79-80, stated 
that the mining population at Elliot Lake from 1955 to 1974 was twice as likely as the 
general male population to die from lung cancer. See also D. Hewitt, "Radiogenic Lung 
Cancer in Ontario Uranium Miners, 1955-1974,"in Report of the Royal Commission on 
the Health and Safety of Workers in Mines; Ian Robinson, The Costs of Uncertainty, 4-
11; Graham W. Gibbs and Paul Pintus, Health and Safety in the Canadian Mining 
Industry (Kingston: Queen's University Centre for Resource Studies, 1978),188-200; 
Nonnan Williams, "Hazards of Mining Uranium and Some Rarer Ores and the Use of 
Vibrating Tools," in John M. Rogan, ed., Medicine in the Mining Industries (London: 
William Heinemann Medical Books, 1972), 99-127; R.W. Thompkins, "Radioactivity and 
Lung Cancer: A Critical review of Lung Cancer in the Miners ofSchneeberg and 
Joachimsthal," Journal of the National Cancer Institute, 5 (1944); V.E. Archer and J.K, 
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While the issue of occupational cancer in mining tended to focus on uranium 
mining, radiation and its effect on miners in the non-uranium sectors were also gaining 
attention during the 1950s. A 1953 study of nearly 50 non-uranium mines in Colorado 
revealed dangerously high levels of radon in several, including metal, clay and coal mines, 
while a 1954 study reported similar findings in several non-uranium mines in New York 
State. 89 Windish was clearly aware of cases where high levels of radiation had been 
discovered in non-uranium mines and referred to several such studies in his report. 90 
Citing several cases in Colorado similar to the St. Lawrence case, where water entering 
non-uranium mines carried with it large volumes of radon from an unknown source, 
Windish concluded that, "The finding ofR-222 in the Director mine should therefore not 
Wagoner, "Lung Cancer Among Uranium Miners in the United Sates," Health Physics, 25 
(October 1973), 351-71; and M. J. Duggan, "The Exposure of United Kingdom Miners to 
Radon," British Journal of Industrial Medicine, 27 (1970), 106-9. 
8
"P.W. Jacoe, "Occurrence of Radon in Non-Uranium Mines in Colorado," 
Archives of Industrial Hygiene and Occupational Medicine, 8 (August 1953), 118-24; 
and S.J. Harris, ''Radon Levels Found in Mines ofNew York State," Archives of 
Industrial Hygiene and Occupational Medicine, 10 (July 1954), 54-60. 
90Many other cases have come to light since, including those studied in: J. T. Boyd, 
"Cancer of the Lung in Iron Ore (Haematite) Miners," British Journal of Industrial 
Medicine, 27 (1970), 27-105; N.J. Duggan, D.M. Howell and P.T. Soilleux, 
"Concentrations ofRadon-222 in Coal Mines in England and Scotland," Nature, 219, 
1149; Anna Baltic Lawler, JackS. Mandrel, Leonard M. Schuman and Jay H. Lubin, 
"Mortality Study of Minnesota Iron Ore Miners: Preliminary Results," in William L. 
Wagner, et.al., eds., Health Issues Related to Metal and Non-Metallic Mining (Boston: 
Butterworth's, 1983), 211-26; and J.K. Wagoner, R.W. Miller, F.E. Lundin, J.F. 
Fraumeni, and M.E. Haij, "Unusual Cancer Mortality Among a Group of Underground 
Metal Miners," New England Journal of Medicine, 269 (1963), 284-9. 
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be considered an extraordinary or unique occurrence."91 What distinguished St. Lawrence 
from those other cases , he noted, was that the concentration of radon there was 
considerably higher than that reported from other non-uranium mines up to that time, and 
six times higher than the highest reading obtained in any non-uranium mine in the U.S.92 
5.3 The Wildcat Strike ofMarch-April1960 
The reaction ofthe union to the issue of monitoring and controlling the radiation 
hazard at St. Lawrence was shaped by its experience with the handling of occupational 
health and safety issues during the preceding years. Two days after the March 1960 
meeting, at which the findings of the Windish survey were revealed, representatives of the 
union paid a visit to Mines Minister W.J. Keough, asking what action they should take if 
the ventilation and monitoring issue was not quickly and adequately addressed. Their 
concern, according to Keough, was based on the "alleged tardiness" on the part of the 
companies in the past ''to take steps to ensure the welfare of mineworkers at St. 
Lawrence." Keough urged McGrath to help clarify whether the radiation issue came 
under federal or provincial jurisdiction, and remarked tellingly that he hoped that not both 
would be involved, since his department was of the opinion that "one enforcing authority 
91J.P. Windish, "Health Hazards in the Mines ofNewfoundland," 23. 
92J.P. Windish, "Health Hazards in the Mines ofNewfoundland," 23. 
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is enough for mine operators to have to contend with. '>93 The Minister's belief that the 
inspectorate was something that companies had to "contend with" was surely not an 
attitude likely to produce the best possible results in the area of occupational health and 
safety, and this remark is revealing of the Department ofMines' lack of regard for the 
protection of workers. 
Public revelation of the Windish findings drew unprecedented attention to the St. 
Lawrence situation and sparked a war of words in the press. St. John's newspapers, for 
example, reported -- correctly -- that radiation in some parts of the Director mine was 
nearly 200 times the permissible level, and that an average of three miners had died of 
cancer each year since 1948.94 Over the ensuing days, various parties offered different 
interpretations of the issue. St. Lawrence Mayor Theo Etchegary, who had also long held 
a supervisory position with the Corporation, stated that, "The men knew all along this 
condition existed and considered it an ordinary hazard of mining." He was supported in 
this view by Corporation Mine Captain Murdock Judson, who claimed that the men knew 
that such hazards were "all part of the game. "95 How the men could have known about 
93W.J. Keough, Minister ofMines, to McGrath, 3 March 1960, GN 78/1/B, 51. 
PANL. 
94
"Government Officials Meet to Discuss Radiation Hazard in Fluorspar Mines," 
Daily News, 2 March 1960, 3 and 16; and "Miners Get More Cancer," Evening Telegram, 
2 March 1960, 2. 
95
"Miners ' Wait and See' as Cancer Cause Checked," Evening Telegram, 3 March 
1960. 
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and accepted radiation as a health risk in their work is unclear; it had never been known to 
exist in a fluorspar mine and they had never had any experience with such a hazard, and 
were never informed that it might exist. 
The unio~ meanwhile, grew increasingly impatient with what they perceived to be 
unnecessary delays in responding to the radiation problem. Turpin began hinting that the 
men were considering walking off the job until the additional ventilation and increased 
monitoring which had been recommended and promised were introduced. He also pointed 
out with respect to the more general issue of industrial disease and workers' 
compensatio~ that of the many miners who had become ill and died over the years, only 
six cases had been compensated, all for silicosis. 96 This corresponds to the number given 
in the official record of successful compensation claims for silicosis up to that time. There 
were of course no reported claims for cancer, and cancer was not covered by the 
Workers' Compensation Act as it then stood.97 
On I 0 March 1960, the union met to discuss the radiation issue, and all but one of 
the underground employees supported a motion to walk off the job and stay off until 
adequate ventilation was installed. Turpin said that he was especially "proud of the men" 
for taking this move given that the union had no strike fund and the men were unlikely to 
96
"Mine Improvement Must Come, Union ChiefHints Walkout" Evening 
Telegram, 9 March 1960,9. 
97Annual Reports of the Workers' Compensation Board ofNewfoundland, 1953-
1958. 
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qualify for Unemployment Insurance benefits, since technically they had left their jobs 
voluntarily.98 When the walkout began, Turpin informed Smallwood of the workers' 
intention to stay off the job until adequate ventilation and monitoring measures were 
introduced, and noted that as an indication of the union's good will, eighteen underground 
employees had complied with the Company' s request to enter Director mine on a rotating 
basis to help prepare for the installation of the ventilating equipment. The Corporation, 
meanwhile, was reportedly getting its blower fans out of storage and planning to install 
them at its operating mines. 99 
About a week into the dispute, Newfluor management attempted to downplay the 
danger, stating that the situation was not as bad as initially described and that at the time 
of the survey radiation levels were only "slightly above" the limit on one leve~ the 400-
foot level,100 a direct contradiction of the information contained in the Windish report. 
Newfluor manager Wiseman added that since the Windish survey auxiliary fans had been 
installed on the 400-foot level and that until the men returned to work, the necessary 
98
"Miners Back Request as Walkout Endorsed," Evening Telegram, 11 March 
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3401, Strike 39, NAC. 
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modifications could not be made to allow for the installation of more ventilation 
equipment. 101 Wiseman also claimed that most of the fear associated with the situation 
was due to a "distortion of the facts by the press," and expressed his hope that the men 
would return to work when realized they were in no real danger. 102 St. Lawrence Mayor 
and Corporation staff member Theo Etchegary, meanwhile, insisted that there was no 
conclusive proof that radiation in the mines was linked to recent cancer deaths in the 
community. The union was not swayed or reassured by such talk, and on 24 March, two 
weeks into the walkout, the men continued to insist that they simply would not return until 
the ventilating equipment was installed. Without access to a strike fund or to 
Unemployment Insurance benefits, however, they were obviously in a precarious 
position. 103 
Apart from occasional comments from Etchegary, in which it was unclear whether 
he was acting in his capacity as Mayor or as Mill Superintendent, the Corporation tried to 
stay out of the public controversy during the walkout. In a letter to the Unemployment 
Insurance Commission on 28 March, however, in response to a request for infonnation on 
striking workers, Poynter descnred at some length his version of events and of the 
101
"Fluorspar Mines OK, Asks End to Walkout," Evening Telegram, 18 March 
1960, 46. 
102
"Radiation Picture at St. Lawrence Overemphasized Says Wiseman," Daily 
News, 18 March 1960, 2. 
103
"Miners Stay Out, Seek Jobless Aid," Evening Telegram, 24 March, 1960, 3. 
268 
Corporation's record on occupational health. In Poynter's view, Dr. McGrath's 
announcement had unfortunately and unnecessarily created panic "in this little village." 
"Over the years," Poynter claimed, ''we have had the rare case of silicosis blamed on 
conditions here, and as a result we have, in conjunction with the Inspection Division ofthe 
Mines Department in St. John's and the Federal Health boys in Ottawa, kept a better than 
average watch on dust conditions, and we have invariably been given a clean bill of 
health .... " As for radiation, he claimed that the survey had found some "odd spots" in 
some of their mines, but that the results were erratic and inconsistent. The one spot where 
radiation was found in an operating Corporation mine, he stated, was blocked off "and of 
no importance." Poynter also remarked, cryptically, that in other mines where radiation 
bad been found, "Everyone has level-headedly tackled the problem as we were and there 
has been no problem." It is unclear what he meant by "as we were." To when or to what 
was he referring? As for the apparently high death rate among the mining population, 
Poynter stated that "We had a tendency to believe, and still believe, that the troubles were 
based on an abnonnal rate ofT.B." In any case, he claimed, installing ventilation at the 
Corporation mines would be a relatively easy matter since they had all the equipment to do 
so in storage. He added, flippantly, that there would then be sufficient ventilation to 
"blow all those nasty little radiation bugs clear out to sea [and] we hope then that one of 
the Ottawa boys will come in, read his magic instruments, and make the electrifying 
announcement that the place is now safe, then everybody will return to work." The 
current labour dispute could have been averted, he concluded, if the union had met with 
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the Corporation management, in which case the workers would have been reassured that 
everything possible would have been done to ensure their health and safety. Furthermore, 
Poynter claimed, the walkout had done little but delay the necessary improvements 
anyway, and that ''the difference of a few weeks at work would have meant nothing" in 
terms of the radiation hazard. 104 
Meanwhile, both companies were exerting pressure on the government to help end 
the walkout. Claiming that he had orders for 20,000 tons of :fluorspar that had to be filled, 
Poynter demanded to know how much ventilation his company was required to install, and 
who would then assure the men that it was safe to return to work. 105 Likewise, Newfluor 
Manager WISeman informed the Department of Mines on 25 March that temporary fans 
had been installed on the 400-foot level in response to the "alleged radiation hazard," and 
that his company believed that there was now no radiation hazard in areas where men 
would be asked to work. Wisemen, like Poynter, wanted this fact confirmed by a 
radiation check, "so that we can contact them [the union] and avoid any further 
unnecessary delays."106 
104Donald Poynter, St. Lawrence Fluorspar Corporation, to N.S. Batten, 
Unemployment Insurance Commission, St. John's, 28 March 1960, RG27, Vol. 540, Reel 
T-3401, Strike 39, NAC. 
105Keough to McGrath, 23 March 1960, GN 78/1/B, 51, PANL. 
106Wiseman to Gover, 25 March 1960, GN 78/1/B, 51, PANL. 
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The underground workers stayed off the job for the remainder of March, and by 1 
April both companies had reportedly installed ventilation equipment. 107 On 3 April, 
Wmdish contacted the union directly with the results of a radiation survey which had been 
conducted at the Corporation and the Newtluor mines since the installation of some 
ventilation equipment. Tests conducted at the Corporation's Haypook, Hare's Ears, and 
Red Head mines showed radon daughter levels ranging from 0 to 0.4 x SWL, while the 
readings at Director ranged from .06 to 1.63 x SWL. The excessive figure at Director was 
reportedly an anomalous reading from an unused area in a drift on the 250-foot level, and 
not considered important. 
There were several important qualifications attached to this most recent radiation 
report. Windish explained that, "Because of time limitations, I was able to take samples 
only in those places where the miners, according to information given to me by mine 
officials, will be asked to work." While he did not state what these "time limitations" were, 
presumably it was related to the desire to get back into production as soon as possible: all 
four mines were tested on the same day. Windish noted, for example, that no readings 
were taken on the 550-level at Director, as he was told no men would be working there 
when production resumed. 108 On 4 April, the first of the underground workers began 
107
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returning to their jobs, and the walkout was officially ended on 5 April. 109 
Not all those who had walked off: however, would go back. About 30 Newfluor 
men refused to return at the official end of the walkout. Wiseman, in an obvious attempt 
to goad them into returning, charged that they were simply "scared," though, according to 
him, they had nothing to be afraid of. The union pointed out that though Newfluor was-
anxious to replace these men and to meet its annual target of90,000 tons (the highest it 
had ever set), the company was refusing to hire any of the approximately 100 workers 
displaced by layoffs at the Corporation because, "The Company feels the unemployed 
miners may have contracted radiation and it would be responsible for their health." For 
that reason, Turpin charged, Newfluor was hiring only "green hands" (inexperienced 
men). According to Turpin, the 30 Newfluor men would likely stay off the job and take 
up fishing for the summer, but perhaps return to mining in the fall. 110 Apparently, the 
Corporation did not encounter the same difficultly as Newfluor in getting its men back to 
work. Poynter claimed that this was because the Corporation was just starting up again 
after a shutdown, had ''very minute amounts of radioactivity" reported in its mines, and 
that "distorted stories" in the press about workers refusing to return to the job did not 
1~abour Canada, "Report on Industrial Dispute Termination: Dispute between St. 
Lawrence Corporation ofNewfoundland, Newfoundland Fluorspar Limited, and St. 
Lawrence Workers' Protective Union," RG27, Vol. 540, Reel T-3401, Strike 39, NAC; 
and "St. Lawrence Miners Go Back to Work," Evening Telegram, 4 April1960, 3. 
110
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apply to his company. 111 By II April, all but I6 of the 30 Newfluor men bad returned to 
work. 112 
That Newfluor and the Corporation were forced to install ventilation systems at 
their mines in the wake of the Windish report and the ensuing walkout points to what is 
really the crux of the matter. Lost in the rhetoric surrounding the issues of radiation and 
ventilation was the fact that a requirement for adequate ventilation in all underground 
areas was embodied in the Mine Safety Regulations of 1951, that workers had been 
complaining for years that ventilation was inadequate, and that, apart from vague 
assurances that everything was fine, neither government nor company officials bad done 
anything to address the problem. That in 1960, men were working 550 feet underground 
at Director mine, in areas where there was not enough air to keep a match burning, is 
indicative of the neglect and inertia that company and government officials had displayed 
over the years. While it might be countered that no one knew about the existence of 
radiation in the mines, the fact is that a lack of knowledge about that particular hazard had 
no bearing on whether a ventilation system should have been installed and used, as 
required by working conditions and by the law. It is obvious from Windish's findings that 
a forced-air ventilation system would have done much to reduce the radiation hazard, 
whether it was known to exist or not. As for the Corporation, if it bad ventilation fans in 
111Poynter to Batten, Unemployment Insurance Commission, 4 May I960, RG27, 
VoL 540, Reel T-3401, Strike 39, NAC. 
112
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storage in 1960, as the management claimed, they must not have been used at mines such 
as Black Duck, Iron Springs, and Blue Beach. The archival and oral evidence consistently 
shows that there was never anything approaching adequate ventilation at those mines. By 
the time the radiation hazard was detected and made public, those mines were closed, so 
we will never know about possible levels of radiation in the Corporation's main mines. 
5.4 Legislative Change. Labour Unrest. and the Demise of the Corporation. 1960-62 
Newfluor's need to hire new men, both to replace those who would not return to 
work and to increase its workforce, coincided with the coming into effect of new 
regulations regarding the medical screening of job applicants and employees in dust 
exposure occupations. This amendment to the regulations, which government and 
industry officials had been discussing since 1953, was made public in September 1959, but 
was not due to come into effect until1 April1960 --in the middle, as it turned out, of the 
St. Lawrence strike. 113 The amendment was based on the proposals the government had 
made in the 1957 meeting with industry officials. The regulation defined a "dust-exposure 
occupation" as any underground mining, as well as surface work involving the crushing or 
grinding of rock. The regulation required that all applicants for employment in such an 
occupation undergo an examination, including a chest x-ray, by a qualified Medical 
Examiner. The Medical Examiner could then issue or refuse to issue a medical certificate 
113Newfoundland Gazette, 29 September 1959. 
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for employment based on whether the applicant was "free from active disease of the 
respiratory organs," had no known history of active tuberculosis, and was otherwise fit for 
employment in a dust exposure occupation. In order to keep the medical certificate in 
good standing, the holder was required to undergo an annual examination. For the annual 
renewal, however, the Medical Examiner could renew the certificate "if the holder is free 
from tuberculosis of the respiratory organs." In other words, to acquire a certificate an 
applicant had to be free from all respiratory illnesses, but to renew it an employee had to 
be free only from tuberculosis. Therefore, a Medical Examiner could issue an annual 
renewal even if an employee had, since initially acquiring the certificate, contracted, for 
example, silicosis, provided he was free from tuberculosis. A mine operator was 
prohibited from employing anyone not in possession of a valid certificate, except in cases 
where a person had "been continuously employed in a dust exposure operation since the 
date of coming into force of this regulation."114 
Because no official Medical Examiner had been appointed in St. Lawrence for the 
purpose of issuing certificates, Wiseman had anticipated a problem in hiring recruits once 
the amendment came into effect on 1 April. On 25 March he had contacted Miller about 
the need to have Medical Officer appointed to screen recruits, since some ofNewfluor's 
underground men claimed that they would not return to work even after some ventilation 
114The Mines (Safety ofWorkmen) (Amendment) Regulations, 1959. This 
amendment became Section 120A ofThe Mines (Safety ofWorkmen) Regulations, 1957. 
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was installed.115 The response to Wiseman's request was swift, in striking contrast to the 
response to the many demands and requests which had been made by the union and by 
others for legislative change. An amendment published on 29 March, which came into 
effect just three days later, on 1 April, permitted operators to hire applicants without a 
certificate in cases where an applicant was not able to get a medical certificate because no 
Medical Examiner was available to give him one, and in cases where the applicant had not 
since the regulation came into force been engaged in a dust exposure occupation without a 
medical certificate. 116 In cases where no Medical Examiner had been available, the 
applicant had three months from the date of hiring to acquire a medical certificate. To 
ensure that men hired in St. Lawrence would meet this requirement, and the company 
could hire men in the meantime without the certificate, Miller -- again with unprecedented 
speed-- appointed Dr. Cyril Walsh, resident physician at St. Lawrence, as Medical 
Examiner as of 31 March 1960.117 Thus amended, the new regulation in fact required a 
medical certificate for a relatively small percentage of employees and potential employees. 
Medical certificates were not required for either anyone employed in a dust exposure 
occupation before the regulation came into effect on 1 April, or anyone not employed in a 
dust exposure occupation since the Regulation came into effect. The only group for 
115Wiseman to Miller , GN 78/1/B, 51, 25 March 1960, P ANL. 
11~he Mines (Safety ofWorkmen) (Amendment) (No.1) Regulations, 1960. 
117Miller to Wtseman, 31 March 1960, GN 78/1/B, 51, P ANL. 
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whom the certificate was required therefore, were applicants who had worked in a dust 
exposure occupation since I Aprili960. 
When the wildcat strike officially ended in April I960, work resumed, on a limited 
scale, at the Corporation's Hare's Ears mine. During the summer of I960, the shaft was 
extended to 275 feet, and 400-foot drift established on that level In November 1960, 
however, the Hare's Ears shaft flooded, submerging all underground equipment and 
putting I5 men out of work. 118 Attention then shifted to the Haypook shaft, another small 
mine which had been worked for a few years in the mid-I950s, and then shut down in June 
1957. Work was also carried out on re-opening the Red Head mine, which had first been 
worked on a small scale and then abandoned in the I930s. The ore produced from these 
mines during I959 and I960 was shipped via the Wilmington plant to American 
consumers. 119 By the end of 1960, the Corporation had about 40 unionized employees on 
the payroll. 120 
Meanwhile, anticipating an increase in demand for I96I and seeking to make up 
for time lost during the March-April strike, Newfluor moved quickly to put the Director 
118Farrell, "Report ofMining Properties of St. Lawrence Corporation," 40-41. 
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mine back into full production. The Company put the mine on three shifts per day, and by 
July 1960, the workforce had increased to 200. 121 During the summer of 1960, Newfluor 
introduced a new "cut-and-fill" method of mining at Director. With this syste~ sand 
produced at a crushing plant on the surface was sent down into the mine through chutes 
and used to support the walls and ceilings of mined out areas. Cut-and-fill mining, while it 
entails an up-front cost for infrastructure and equipment, allows for the extraction of more 
usable ore from a stope, since the mined area can be supported with fill, and it eliminates 
the ongoing cost and labour involved in supplying and installing timbers. 122 
While the industry, especially at Newfluor, was recovering and even expanding in 
the wake of the March-April walkout, there were ongoing concerns over health and 
safety. In fact, concerns about the radiation issue intensified an already bad labour 
relations climate, and its effects were felt long after the dispute officially ended. Several 
issues and events contributed to this continuing labour unrest. Newfluor Manager 
Wiseman stated in early April, when he was anxious to get the underground men back to 
work, that no men would be working on the 550-foot levels in the near future, so 
ventilation was not a major concern there. By mid-May, however, men were working 
there, without ventilation. On 18 May, the union contacted the Chieflnspector ofMines 
and informed him that men were working on the 550-foot level and that ventilation had 
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still not been installed anywhere on the 550 or in the north drift of the 400-foot level, 
which made for especially bad conditions when the mine was being run on three shifts per 
day with very little break between shifts.123 Windish confirmed that the union's fears were 
well-grounded when, shortly after Turpin's complaint, he informed Miller that radiation 
checks conducted at the Newfluor and the Corporation mines in July, "indicated that 
further improvements must be made," especially on the 550-foot level at Director.124 On 7 
July 1960, a worker was killed when struck on the head by a falling plank at the Director 
mine, and later that same month, Turpin contacted Miller about what he described as 
deplorable sanitary conditions and drinking water, and the complete absence of basic 
facilities at the Corporation mines. 125 
Clearly, the labour relations environment was tense in the immediate aftennath of 
the walkout. The employment situation, however, especially at the Corporation, 
continued to be precarious, and this no doubt contributed to the union's relatively 
acquiescent approach to re-negotiation of the collective agreement in July 1960. On 14 
July, the union and the Corporation entered into a three-year contract which contained no 
pay increase as such, but reduced the work week from 44 to 40 hours, for the same pay, 
123Turpin to B.J. Trevor, Chieflnspector ofMines, Department of Mines and 
Resources, 18 May 1960, SLMM. 
124Windish to Miller, 28 July 1960, GN 78/1/B, 51, PANL. 
125Newfoundland Department ofMines and Resources, Annual Report for the Year 
Ended 31 March 1961, 78; and Miller to Trevor, 27 July 1960, GN 7811/B, 51, PANL. 
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for the first two years of the contract, and contained an across-the-board increase of 5 
cents per hour in the third year. In arriving at this settlement, the Corporation had claimed 
it faced serious marketing problems and was in a precarious financial situation, and 
produced figures showing a loss of over $100,000 in both 1958 and 1959.126 No figures 
were produced for the years 1936 to 1956 when, according to Seibert's own testimony at 
the 1958 TariffBoard hearing, the Corporation had made a profit for every year, including 
the especially prosperous years 1954 to 1956.127 Given the state of the Corporation' s St. 
Lawrence operations, however, and the information available to it, it is understandable 
that the union felt that it "did very well under present conditions."128 
The monitoring of the radiation hazard was also an area of ongoing concern in the 
wake of the March-April walkout. The St. Lawrence case added a new twist to the 
already complex jurisdictional question of radiation monitoring, since here the regulatory 
system for monitoring radiation in uranium mines did not apply because the material mined 
was not itself radioactive. The Newfoundland Department ofMines was, by its own 
admission, neither trained nor equipped to deal with such a hazard. Federal and provincial 
officials had met in March 1960, during the St. Lawrence walkout, to discuss a system to 
126Walter E. Seibert to St. Lawrence Workers' Protective Union, 12 July 1960, 
SLMM. 
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280 
monitor the St. Lawrence situation. The Occupational Health and Safety Division of the 
Federal Department of Health and Welfare agreed to assist the provincial authorities until 
someone could be trained within Newfoundland to carry out the required tests. 129 For the 
summer of 1960, radiation checks at St. Lawrence were conducted by an engineering 
student from Memorial University, but once the student left St. Lawrence in August, no 
one was taking radiation readings. The union complained that the men had no idea what 
the radiation levels were and that men working on the 550-foot level at Director were 
especially concemed.130 
On 10 October 1960, another worker was killed at Director when he fell down an 
ore chute while dumping a tram car. 131 The inspector's report stated that the accident was 
''primarily due to an unsafe act performed by the deceased,"132 but the union blamed it on 
a lack of supervision. 133 This October fatality, combined with ongoing grievances 
concerning occupational health and safety matters, led to a further deterioration of the 
already hostile labour relations climate. On 13 October, just three days after that fatality 
129McGrath to Keough, 29 March 1960 GN 78/1/B, 51, PANL. 
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occurred, another event triggered yet another wildcat strike. The October walkout began 
with what was in fact a routine action by a Newfluor supervisor. An underground worker 
rang the bell to signal the hoistman to move the cage, an action which only certain persons 
were authorized to take. When the worker returned for his shift the following day, he was 
issued a routine disciplinary note, which he was ordered to acknowledge by signing. 
When he refused to do so, he was refused entry to the underground. His fellow workers 
then said they would not go to work unless this man could do so without acknowledging 
the disciplinary note. The company took the position that the dispute should be taken up 
through the grievance procedure embodied in the collective agreement, as ordinarily it 
would have been. After a two-hour standofl: the men agreed to return to work, but only if 
paid for those two hours. The company refused, and the underground workers stayed at 
the change house, refusing to go underground. (Surface workers continued to work for 
this day.) When the underground evening shift arrived at 4 p.m., they joined the others in 
the change house and refused to go to work, and soon the entire group went home. No 
one showed up for the midnight shift. After 14 October, only 36 unionized workers 
stayed on the job at Newfluor -- pump operators, diesel operators and hoistmen who 
stayed to prevent the mine from flooding. The others, 185 surface and underground 
workers, stayed out. 134 
134Canada, Labour Canada, "Report on Industrial Dispute Commencement," RG 
27, Vol. 543, Reel T3402, Strike 202, NAC. 
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In the days following the walkout it became clear that the disciplinary issue which 
ostensibly caused the dispute was not the main point at issue. Specifically, the union 
demanded that two men be assigned to slushing operations, as had been the practice up 
until 1959. This was a safety issue, as the second man on a slushing operation generally 
acted as a "spotter," watching out for loose rock and other possible dangers in the 
working area. 135 The management took the position that it was well within its rights to 
change mining methods and that this and the union's ' 'many other grievances" should have 
been pursued through the grievance procedure.136 On 26 October, the company and the 
union agreed to abide by the decision of a qualified third party. 137 The arbitrator agreed 
upon was Dr. A.V. Corlett, former Chief Inspector with the Ontario Department of Mines, 
who had conducted several mines inspections for the Newfoundland government in the 
late 1940s and early 1950s. Corlett sided with the company on the slusher issue, and the 
men returned to work on 2 November. Apparently, however, some compromise was 
reached, as the official report on the settlement stated that, "While decision was in favour 
of Company (i.e. one worker on slushers) the workers returned to work with two workers 
135
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on slushers."138 
More important than the details of the settlement, however, is what the dispute 
signified about the labour relations climate, and in that sense it was remarkable in a 
number of ways. First, it was the second wildcat strike staged specifically over an 
occupational health and safety issue in less than a year. Also significant is the fact that the 
event which initially triggered the strike was routine and relatively minor in nature. 
Granted, the disciplinary issue was simply the trigger for the dispute, but that the men 
were willing to walk off the job over such a relatively minor matter indicates the extent to 
which the labour relations climate had deteriorated. Another remarkable thing about this 
dispute is the solidarity shown. That 185 underground and surface workers, without a 
strike fund to rely upon, were willing to walk off the job and stay off for over two weeks 
demonstrates the degree to which the health and safety issue had come to affect them all. 
The October 1960 walkout must be understood against the backdrop of those events and 
conflicts which preceded it, especially the walkout of March-April, the deaths of two 
workers on the job in 1960, and ongoing concerns over heath and safety. 
During early 1961, the Corporation, while still operating, was obviously struggling 
and had not advanced far beyond the stage it had been at the same time a year earlier. 
During 1960, the Corporation had shipped only about 8,000 tons of fluorspar, and in 
138Canada, Labour Canada, "Report on Industrial Dispute Termination," RG 27, 
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January 1961, employed only 3 8 workers. 139 Already in a precarious position, the 
Corporation was dealt another blow in June 1961, when Seibert died suddenly. Seibert's 
obituary provides a rare glimpse at his corporate connections and his social standing. In 
addition to the St. Lawrence Corporation ofNewfoundland and the St. Lawrence 
Fluorspar Company (the WJJmington affiliate established in 1946), Seibert's holdings 
included the Wilmington-St. Lawrence Shipping Company and the Great Lakes-St. 
Lawrence Fluorspar Company. These latter two firms were presumably used to transport 
the St. Lawrence fluorspar to the United States and Canada. Seibert had maintained a 
residence in Florida, and he had been a member of the Lawyers' Club ofNew York and 
the Hackensack Golf Club. 140 While Seibert had spent many years claiming that the 
Corporation was unable to improve wages and working conditions in St. Lawrence 
because of :financial constraints, he had obviously been doing quite well for himseJf 
Two weeks after Seibert's death, his sons visited St. Lawrence and decided to shut 
down the Red Head mine. 141 That left just the Hare's Ears mine in operation and further 
reduced the Corporation workforce, down to just 25 by July 1961. By the end of 1961, 
13~nited States, Minerals Yearbook, 1960. Table 10, 481, and St. Lawrence 
Corporation ofNewfoundland, List of Employees From Whom Union Dues Were 
Collected for the Month of January 1961, SLMM. 
140The New York Times, 11 June 1961. 
141Farrell, "Report of Mining Properties of St. Lawrence Corporation," 54. 
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the Corporation had just four unionized men on the payroll. 142 Newtluor, meanwhile, 
continued to be in a much more stable position. At the beginning of 1961, that company 
still employed 200 men, and was making plans to extend the Director shaft to 950 feet in 
order to meet the increasing demand for fluorspar at the Arvida plant.143 Newfluor's 
workforce remained fairly stable, at around 200, throughout 1961,144 and in that year 
Newfluor shipped about 66,000 tons of fluorspar from St. Lawrence, while the 
Corporation managed only just over 2,000 tons. 145 
Compared to 1960, 1961 was a relatively quiet year on the labour relations front. 
There were minor disputes over such things as working conditions at the Corporation and 
job categorization at Newtluor, but these did not erupt into open hostility. In the area of 
occupational health, the most important development of 1961 grew out of an amendment 
to the Mines Safety Regulations which came into effect in November 1960, requiring that, 
Every operator and manager shall at the request of the chief inspector carry 
out such tests of the air in all workings that are in use or to be used by 
workmen as the chief inspector may require, and shall report to the chief 
142St. Lawrence Corporation ofNewfoundland, List of Employees From Whom 
Union Dues Were Collected for the Month of July 1961, and For the Month ofNovember 
1961, SLMM. 
143 Engineering and Mining Journal (March 1961 ), 151-2. 
144Newfoundland Fluorspar Limited, Lists ofEmployees, January 1961 to 
December 1961, SLMM. 
145United States, Minerals Yearbook, 1961, 574, and 1962, Table 10, 574. 
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inspector in writing the results of such tests. 146 
Under this new regulation, Newfluor was ordered on 30 January 1961 to begin conducting 
such tests as of 1 Apri11961, and to report any radiation readings in excess of the SWL to 
the Chieflnsepctor ofMines.147 The system established for the frequency ofthese tests 
was as follows: every week in areas where the previous reading was 0.6 x SWL, every 
month when less than 0.6 but more than 0.3, every 3 months when less than 0.3, and 
initially every week in new working places. Tests were also to be conducted by the 
Department ofMines ''when occasion permits." For 1961, of282 readings reported by the 
company, and 130 reported by the Department of Mines, 14 were in excess of the SWL. 
It was reported that in all cases where the reading was in excess of the SWL, the 
contributing condition was identified and corrected. Some common causes of high levels 
noted were malfunctioning fans, wrongly routed airflow and collapsed or damaged vent 
tubing.148 At the end of 1961, the union was notified by the Department of Mines that it 
was satisfied that Newfluor was doing a good job of monitoring and controlling the 
radiation hazard. 149 
14~e Mines (Safety of Workmen) (Amendment) (No.4) Regulations, 1960. 
147Lukins, Chieflnspector ofMines, toR Wiseman, Newfluor, 30 January 1961 , 
SLMM. 
148Lukins to Newfoundland Department of Mines and Resources, 3 Apri11961 , 
GN 78/1/B, 51 , P ANL; and Lukins to Deputy Minister of Mines, 2 May 1962, GN 
78/1/B, 51, P ANL. 
14
'1<.eough to Turpin, 30 November 1961, SLMM. 
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There were several problems with this monitoring system. The most obvious one 
was that the correction of a condition causing a dangerous build-up of radiation was of 
little benefit to those already exposed. Another important aspect of the reported readings 
was that they were in fact the average of a number of readings taken in a particular area 
over a period of time. Thus, it was possible to have readings both well in excess of and 
well below the SWL for the same area, calculated into the average reading reported for 
that area. A miner working in an unventilated stope might be exposed to radiation in 
excess of the SWL, therefore, while another working nearby, where there was more 
ventilation, might be exposed to little or no radiation. The reported average reading, 
however, would be the same for both, and perhaps below the SWL. Also, there was no 
mention of any radiation readings having been taken at the Corporation mines after April 
1960, or of that company being ordered to conduct readings. Granted, during 1961 the 
Corporation was running just two small mines and employing a relatively small number of 
men, but that does not mean that those men were not exposed to radiation, or that the 
company should have been absolved of its responsibility in that regard. 
In early 1962, the fragile labour truce which had held through 1961 was broken by 
yet another wildcat strike, again triggered by a dispute over discipline. On 29 January 
1961, 170 Newfluor workers walked off the job to protest a shift-boss' s disciplinary 
action against an underground worker. The issue which triggered the walkout was again 
relatively minor in nature. The shift boss ordered the worker to stop smoking as his shift 
had not yet ended and he was not to smoke on company time. When the worker resisted, 
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the shift boss allegedly threatened him with physical force. At an emergency meeting 
called to discuss the issue, the union membership voted unanimously to walk off the job 
and stay off until the shift boss was dismissed. The union charged that the shift-boss had a 
history of being abusive to the men, and that he was not qualified for his position. He had 
only been put in the position, the union claimed, because he had several years of 
experience in the military. The shift boss countered that the men regularly refused his 
orders, and that he felt he had to "drive his men." The union claimed that it was 
understood that the collective agreement contained a no-strike clause, but that "in view of 
union feeling that the company is using this stipulation to abuse employment rights, a 
strike was called with authorization of the full membership."150 After the union and the 
company agreed to conduct further interviews with the parties involved and to possibly 
pursue the matter through the grievance procedure, the men returned to work on 7 
February, after being out for six days. 151 As with the dispute in October 1960, what was 
significant about this walkout was that it indicated the extent to which the disciplinary 
system had broken down, and the degree to which the company's authority over the 
workforce had been eroded. 
150Canada, Labour Canada, "Report on Industrial Dispute Commencement," RG 
27, Vol. 550, Reel T3405, Strike 23, NAC. 
151Canada, Labour Canada, "Report on Industrial Dispute Termination," RG 27, 
Vol. 550, Reel T3405, Strike 23, NAC. 
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1broughout the remainder of 1962, while there were no open disputes or 
walkouts, workers at Newfluor continued to worry about radiation levels at Director 
mine, and company and government officials continued to try to allay those fears and to 
downplay the danger. In May 1962, for instance, the Chieflnspector informed the 
Department ofMines that the Newfluor management was seeking its help to "counteract 
the unwarranted bad publicity arising out of this subject and affecting the efficiency of the 
mining operations."152 A week later, the Department complied; the Minister stated 
publicly that the mines at St. Lawrence were now safe and the radiation problem was well 
under control. 153 Shortly after, Health Minister McGrath sent the same assurances to the 
St. Lawrence Parish Priest and to the union's lawyer. 154 In May 1962, came the final blow 
for the Corporation mines, when the Hare's Ears mine, which was being run in a 
haphazard way by a small group of men with almost no supervision, flooded when the 
pumps were left unattended. 155 There was no attempt to recover the equipment or to 
revive the mine, and after nearly 30 years, the Corporation's St. Lawrence mining 
operations came to an end. 
152Lukins to Deputy Minister ofMines, 2 May 1962, GN 78/1/B, 51, PANL. 
153
"Radiation Levels Safe in St. Lawrence Mines,"Daily News, 8 May 1962, 4. 
154McGrath to Father Hogan, Parish Priest, St. Lawrence, 5 April1962; and 
McGrath to P.J. Lewis, 5 Aprill962, GN 7811/B, 51, PANL. 
155Farrell, "Report ofMining Properties of St. Lawrence Corporation," 51. 
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5.6 Conclusion 
The decline and closure of the Corporation mines over the period 1957-1962 
demonstrated the pitfalls of reliance upon a resource extractive industry whose survival 
depended on the vicissitudes of international markets. The fact that the Corporation had, 
for several years prior to the closure of its St. Lawrence mines, been an active player in the 
Mexican industry which eventually undercut St. Lawrence fluorspar's place in the North 
American market became a :flashpoint for several long-festering grievances, including the 
high instance of death and disease among the mining population. The dust tests conducted 
in 1957 brought official confirmation for what many had long believed and argued - that 
dust levels at the mine and mill were well above safe working levels. Though the union 
and other parties clearly believed that cancer deaths among the mining population were 
disproportionately high, revelations about the presence of radon gas during 1959-1960 
was a more unexpected and shocking development, sparking a series of wildcat strikes and 
intensifying the suspicion and hostility which had come to mark the labour relations 
environment. Rather than demonstrating its commitment to health and safety in St. 
Lawrence, government's response to these hazards, in terms of the legislative measures 
introduced in such areas as medical screening and ventilation, in fact illustrated its past 
negligence of the issue. The need for ventilation in deep underground mines was not a 
novel idea and had been recognized even in the Newfoundland legislation dating back to 
1908 and in the new regulations introduced in 1951. Workers and others had been 
pointing to problems with dust and inadequate ventilation in the St. Lawrence mines for 
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over 25 years at this point, and the government's response to developments during this 
period was a clear case of crisis response coming after years of ignoring the problem, 
attempting to put a good public face on it, and handing it along to the companies to do the 
same. The events of this period were both a culmination of the past and harbinger of 
things to come. 
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Chapter 6: 1963-1969: Labour Relations, Industrial Disease, 
Workers' Compensation, and the Royal Commission on St. Lawrence 
Introduction 
During the 1960s, Newfluor maintained high levels of production and in 1968 re-
opened the Tarefare mine to meet the sustained demand for fluorspar. Alcan also 
purchased the fluorspar claims and other St. Lawrence assets of the defunct St. Lawrence 
Corporation, amid some controversy. A major development on the labour relations scene 
was the union's decision to once again abandon its independent status and affiliate with an 
outside organization, this time with the Quebec-based Confederation ofNational Trade 
Unions (CNTU), a process which was completed in 1963. On the labour relations front, 
the remainder of the 1960s was relatively peaceful compared to the period from1960 to 
1963, at least in terms of open disputes such as strikes and lockouts. The labour relations 
climate continued to be marked by suspicion and hostility, however, as the union and 
management clashed over a variety of issues. Rampant disease and death among the 
workforce and controversy over such issues as radiation monitoring intensified an already 
strained relationship between the union and the company. Ongoing concerns over health 
and safety, combined with inadequate financial support for victims of disease and their 
dependants, also led to increased pressure for the provincial government to take action in 
response to the St. Lawrence crisis. In 1966, the government appointed a Royal 
Commission to investigate "Radiation, Compensation, and Safety at the Fluorspar Mines, 
St. Lawrence." In the midst of increasing publicity about the St. Lawrence situation, 
especially after the appointment of the Royal Commission, the company embarked upon a 
concerted public relations campaign. Such measures did little, however, to ease the fears 
and doubts of the union and the workforce. This chapter examines developments in 
industry, labour relations, occupational health and safety, workers' compensation and 
public relations during this period. 
6.1 Newfluor's Acquisition of the Comoration's Holdings 
The expansion and mechanization program which Newfluor undertook during the 
late 1950s, combined with a sustained high demand for aluminum, allowed the company to 
maintain high levels of production throughout most of the 1960s. In 1964, Alcan moved 
to strengthen its hold on the St. Lawrence fluorspar mining industry -- and in effect on 
most of the commercially viable fluorspar deposits in Canada -- by purchasing the mineral 
properties and other St. Lawrence assets of the St. Lawrence Corporation. When the 
possibility of this occurring had surfaced before, in 1962, it had drawn criticism from, 
among others, the mayor of St. Lawrence, who argued that such a move would give 
Newfluor complete control over the fluorspar resource, which they might choose never to 
develop, and this would be contrary to the long-term interests of the town and the 
province. 1 At that time, Premier Smallwood informed the president of Alcan that in the 
government's view such a development would constitute "a severe blow struck at the 
1Theo Etchegary, Mayor of St. Lawrence, to Smallwood, 12 November 1962, Coli 
075, File 3.20.025, CNSA. 
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interests ofNewfoundland," and would not be looked upon favourably by his 
government.2 According to Smallwood, Alcan's president had stated that the company 
had no plans to purchase the Corporation holdings at that time, but that position might 
change depending on the dictates of supply and demand.3 
In 1964 the company had apparently decided it might want to acquire the 
Corporation's assets, and began the process of entering into an option agreement giving it 
the right to do so. Newfluor management was obviously aware of the controversial nature 
of this issue, and assured Premier Smallwood that, should Alcan exercise its option and 
purchase the mineral properties, the company would likely develop at least some of them 
in the future. He also attempted to forestall any potential government opposition to the 
move by reminding Smallwood that, ''Our relationship with your Government has always 
been very cordial. We value this relationship highly and we trust that if we do in fact 
acquire the Seibert properties it will be viewed favourably by your Government. •>4 
Throughout the summer and fall of 1964, while Newfluor carried out assessment work on 
the Corporation's St. Lawrence properties,5 the Union and others continued their 
2Smallwood to the President, Aluminum Company of Canada, 13 November 1962, 
Coli 075, File 3.20.025, CNSA. 
3Smallwood to Etchegary, 15 November 1962, Coli 075, File 3.20.025, CNSA. 
4F.G. Barker, Managing Director, Newfluor, to Smallwood, 30 July 1964, Coli 
075, File 3.20.087, CNSA. 
5Department of Mines, Agriculture, and Resources, Annual Report for Year Ended 
31 March 1965, 125. 
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opposition to the impending sale. Turpin impressed upon Smallwood the moral as well as 
the economic issues at stake and suggested that the sacrifices made by the people of St. 
Lawrence, in terms of work labour, disease, and death, 
should prick the conscience of Mrs. Seibert [nominal President of the 
Corporation after her husband's death] to release some of her concession 
for a reasonable amount of money to some Company who would be willing 
to invest in it and I'm sure there's a moral obligation on the part of 
government to see that it should be done under such circumstances without 
fear or favour.6 
Despite these arguments, however, in October 1964 Newfluor entered into an option 
agreement with the Corporation which gave Newfluor first rights to acquiring the assets. 7 
In April 1965 Newfluor informed the Corporation of its intention to purchase the 
assets.8 At a meeting held in June 1965, the Corporation's "affiliated creditors" 
(shareholders and affiliated companies to whom the Corporation owed money) agreed that 
any proceeds from the sale, after taxes and other fees, would first be used to pay debts to 
non-affiliated creditors. Any funds remaining would be used to pay the debts owed to 
affiliated creditors, which included: St. Lawrence Fluorspar, Inc. (the Wilmington affiliate 
which was still, in 1965, processing imported fluorspar for the American market), 
6Turpin to Smallwood, 28 August 1964, Coil 075, File 3.20.025, CNSA. 
7
"Excerpts from Minutes ofMeeting ofBoard ofDirectors of St. Lawrence 
Fluorspar, Inc. held June 9, 1965," AA. 
~ewfoundland Fluorspar Limited to St. Lawrence Fluorspar Inc., St. Lawrence 
Corporation of Newfoundland, and Estate of Walter E. Seibert, Wilmington, Delaware, 6 
April1965, AA. 
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Newfoundland-St. Lawrence Shipping, Ltd. (a Panamanian registered company) and a 
number of individual stockholders (including former manager Donald Poynter).9 The 
purchase deal was finalized in July 1965, when Alcan paid the Corporation $210,000, the 
balance remaining on the purchase price.10 
6.2 Affiliation with the CNTU and the Labour Relations Environment, 1962-65 
Late in 1962, the SL WPU once again sought to affiliate with an outside 
organization While not made explicit, the reasons for this move might be inferred from 
developments during the period since the union had broken its affiliation with the 
NFL/ AFL in 1956. For instance, Turpin himself conceded in 1957 that neither he nor 
anyone else on the union executive was competent to make a submission to the Tariff 
Board hearings on fluorspar. Also, the union had made few advances in terms of wages 
and working conditions after it reverted to independent status in 1956, and during the 
work stoppages of 1960-62, the drawbacks of the Union's independent status were made 
clear by the fact that workers had no strike fund. In 1959, Turpin had hired a Montreal 
research firm to provide information on wages paid to Alcan workers at Arvida -- which 
turned out to be an average of$1.95 per hour plus a cost-of-living bonus, compared to an 
9St. Lawrence Corporation ofNewfoundland, Creditors Agreement, 15 June 1965. 
AA. 
10J.R. Turgeon, Aluminum Company of Canada, Montreal, to Ross T. Clarkson, 
Montreal (representing the Corporation's New York solicitor), 23 July 1965, AA. 
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average wage of just $1.55 per hour at Newfluor. 11 Also, when findings of radiation in the 
St. Lawrence mines began to be made public in February 1960, Turpin had contacted the 
International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers (Mine-Mill) seeking infonnation 
on radiation hazards in mines. Mine-Mill responded with a report on radiation hazards at 
the Elliot Lake uranium mines. 12 It is not surprising, therefore, given its increasing 
reliance on outside assistance during the late 1950s, that the Union sought to affiliate with 
an outside body in 1962. 
The organization to which the union eventually affiliated was the Confederation of 
National Trade Unions (CNTU). A Quebec-based organization, the CNTU was founded 
in 1921 as the Confederation des Travailleurs Catholiques du Canada (CTCC), an 
amalgamation of 88 Catholic unions. Formed, according to one account, as a ''fearful 
response" by the Catholic church to the increasing influence and the radicalism of 
international unions, such as the AFL, in Canada, 13 the CTCC was originally conservative 
in nature. The Catholic clergy played a direct role in CTCC locals, and strikes were 
11Research Associates Limited, Montreal, to Turpin, 27 June 1959, SLMM. 
12International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers, Toronto, to Turpin, 25 
February 1960, SLMM. 
13Black Rose Books Editorial Collective, "Introduction," in Quebec Labour: The 
Confederation of National Trade Unions Yesterday and Today, Revised 2nd Edition, 
edited by Black Rose Books Editorial Collective. (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1975), 
14. (First published in Montreal by Black Rose Books, 1972). 
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viewed as a last resort. 14 Throughout the 1930s and 1940s, the CTCC battled other 
groups, such as Congress oflndustrial Organizations (CIO), the Canadian Labour 
Congress (CLC), the Trades and Labor Congress (TLC), the AFL, and the Federation 
Provincial du Travail (FPT) for the allegiance of the Quebec unions. After losing many 
members to these various organizations during that period, a shift to a more radical stance 
resulted in a major growth in CTCC membership during the late 1940s. 15 During the 
1950s, over 40 per cent of the unionized labour force in Quebec belonged to the CTCC. 16 
Strikes became more acceptable and widespread, and the CTCC began to be regarded as a 
threat to conservative forces in Quebec, such as the Duplessis government. By 1960, the 
organization had over 94,000 members in 442 locals and had changed its name to the 
Confederation des Syndicats Nationaux, or Confederation of National Trade Unions. 17 
From its inception in 1921, the CNTU had represented workers from a wide range 
of industries, including pulp and paper, the service industry, clerical and office trades, the 
textile industry, metal trades, and mines. Local unions within these industry groups were 
organized into Federations. During the early years of the CNTU's existence, the mining 
14It has been alleged that this position played into the hands of corporations like 
Alcan, which preferred dealing with CTCC affiliates in such places as Arvida, where the 
company kept wage levels low by agreeing to the "inexpensive, nationalist demands of the 
clergy and the CTCC." Black Rose Books Editorial Collective, Quebec Labour, 16. 
15Jacques Rouillard, Histoire de Ia CSN, 1921-1981 (Montreal:Boreal 
Express!CSN, 1981), 113, 167. 
16Black Rose Books Editorial Collective, Quebec Labour, 16. 
17Rouillard, Histoire de Ia CSN, 167. 
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sector represented a relatively small proportion of the membership. In 1931, the CNTU 
had just one miners' union, with 115 members. That had increased to five unions with 
2,863 members by 1946. The Metal Trades Federation (MTF), to which workers at 
Alcan's aluminwn smelting plants in Quebec were affiliated, had more unions than the 
Miners Federation but was comparable in the nwnber of individual members. 18 
Throughout the 1950s the miners and metal trades unions won valuable gains in wages, 
hours and benefits. Membership also grew rapidly: by 1960, the Mine Workers Federation 
(MWF) had 12 unions with nearly 5,000 members, while the MTF had 47 unions with 
over 15,000 members.19 
Thus, when the SL WPU approached it about possible affiliation 1962, the CNTU 
had, during its 40-year history up to that point, gone from being a relatively insular, 
conservative, religious-based organization to a more radical and secular one, with a broad 
base of support. While the possible reasons for the SL WPU seeking some sort of 
affiliation at this time have already been touched upon, its reasons for approaching the 
CNTU in particular were neither clear nor explicit. The information which the SL WPU 
received from Research Associates of Montreal in 1959 on wage levels at Arvida may 
have piqued its interest in the CNTU, since those workers were CNTU members and were 
employed by Newfluor's parent company, Alcan. Turpin later claimed that he had 
181n 1946, the Metal Trades Federation had 22 unions and 2,738 individual 
members. Rouillard, Histoire de La CSN, 184. 
1~ouillard, Histoire de La CSN, 184. 
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contacted his son, who was living in Montreal in 1962, and asked him to look into the 
status of the Quebec unions who had collective agreements with Alcan, and had come to 
the CNTU by this route. The CNTU, he stated, was not the only organization seeking to 
affiliate the SL WPU in the early 1960s; the CLC was also interested, and the Bell ls1and 
miners' union, which was affiliated with the CLC, approached the SL WPU to join that 
organization. In fact, Turpin later iniplied that had he not already entered into a verbal 
agreement with the CNTU when the Bell Is1and union approached him in late 1962, he 
would have steered the St. Lawrence union toward the CLC. 20 
Having apparently already entered into an informal agreement with the CNTU, in 
October 1962 the SLWPU held a Special General Meeting and voted 132 to 2 in favour of 
a motion that "a request be made to the Confederation of National Trade Unions ... for 
affiliation. "21 The CNTU replied favourably to the formal request, informing the Union 
that there was "no doubt that, as far as the CNTU is concerned, we accept your 
affiliation," and that it was siniply a matter of working out the procedural details.22 CNTU 
vice-president Ted Payne, who was appointed Technical Advisor to the St. Lawrence 
union, informed Turpin that his organization was "deeply impressed by the militant efforts 
of your local to iniprove the deplorable conditions of work and health hazards to which 
20Jnterview with Aloysius Turpin, MUNFLA. 
21Extract of the Minutes of a Special General Meeting of the St. Lawrence 
Workers' Protective Union held on October 29 1962, SLMM. 
22Marcel Pepin, Secretary General, CNTU, to Turpin, 8 November 1962, SLMM. 
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the workers ofNewfoundland Fluorspar Limited are subjected," and promised to assist the 
Union in every way possible.23 Once some minor legal matters regarding the certification 
vote and conformity to the Labour Relations Act had been dealt wi~ the union in its 
newly affiliated status was officially certified on 22 January 1963.24 
The CNTU Federation to which the St. Lawrence Union was affiliated was the 
National MTF, which in 1963 was comprised of approximately 50 unions representing 
workers in the metal fabrication, foundry, and smelting industries, including aluminum 
workers at Arvida, Shawinigan, Baie-Comeau, Levis, and Beauharnois. 25 The most likely 
rationale for affiliating the SL WPU to the MTF rather than the MWF was that many 
Quebec workers within the MTF were also employed by Alcan, and the Newfluor mine 
was directly linked to the Quebec aluminum industry through the Arvida connection. 
Affiliating the SL WPU to the MWF Federation, on the other hand, might have had certain 
advantages not offered by affiliation with the MTF, particularly when it came to the issue 
of occupational health and safety. Unions in the MWF were familiar with the legislative 
and industrial relations aspects of occupational health and safety issues, since they had 
their roots in the asbestos mining industry in such places as Asbestos, Thetford, and East 
23Ted Payne, Vice-President, CNTU, to Turpin, 8 November 1962, SLMM. 
24T.A. Blanchard, Chief Executive Officer, Newfoundland Labour Relations 
Board, to St. Lawrence Workers' Protective Union, 22 January 1963, SLMM. 
25Rouillard, Histoire de Ia CSN, 245, states that there were 47 unions in the Metal 
Trades Federation in 1960. A list of member unions from May 1964 has 54 unions. 
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Broughton. In the 1940s, for instance, what was then known as the National Catholic 
Mining Federation (of the CTCC) had spearheaded a campaign to pressure the Quebec 
government into taking action on the potential health impacts of the asbestos industry.26 
Whether the SL WPU would have ultimately been better served by affiliation with the 
MWF as opposed to the MTF is impossible to say with certainty, but given the fact that 
the Newfluor operation was a mine where a good knowledge of occupational health and 
safety concerns in the mining industry was crucial, there is certainly some grounds for 
believing so. 
While the SL WPU was going through the process of affiliating with the CNTU, it 
was also negotiating a new collective agreement with Newfluor (the collective agreement 
having expired in November 1962). Negotiations during the fall of 1962 did not go well, 
and reached a stalemate in December. Negotiations were restarted in February, with Ted 
Payne, as well as John McLellan, Vice-President of the Arvida Aluminum Workers Union 
and Secretary ofthe MTF, assisting and advising the executive ofthe SLWPU. The new 
collective agreement, reached in March 1963, embodied some important gains for the 
Union. It improved and standardized the seniority system and contained improved 
provisions in such areas as overtime and grievance procedures. The agreement also 
provided for two wage increases, one of six cents per hour effective 9 March 1963, and 
another of seven cents per hour effective 30 September 1963. These two increases 
26Rouillard, Histoire de Ia CSN, 132-3. 
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combined would bring the average salary to $1.87 per hour. It was to be in force unti130 
September 1964.27 
At the outset, relations between the SL WPU and the parent body were very 
amicable, and Turpin's relationship with the CNTU was in sharp contrast to his earlier 
relationship with the NFL/ AFL-TLC. He conveyed his appreciation for the CNTU' s 
assistance in reaching the collective agreement and, again in sharp contrast to the attitude 
he displayed about paying such fees during the 1950s, claimed that it was with "great 
pleasure" that he forwarded the first installment of the per capita fees from the SL WPU. 28 
The Union membership was also apparently pleased with the CNTU' s assistance in 
negotiating the 1963 contract; in February 1964 the membership unanimously supported a 
resolution to have representatives from the NMTF and the Arvida aluminum workers' 
union assist in negotiations to renew the collective agreement, set to expire in September 
of that year.29 
The CNTU also apparently believed it had much to gain from its relationship with 
Turpin and the SL WPU, and saw the affiliation as an opportunity to gain other 
Newfoundland unions. Turpin was apparently assigned the task of seeking out other 
27Collective Agreement between Newfoundland Fluorspar Limited and St. 
Lawrence Workers' Protective Union, 9 March 1963, AA. 
28Turpin to S.T. Payne, Vice-President, CNTU, 21 March 1963; and Turpin to 
Dion, Treasurer, CNTU, 22 March 1963, SLMM. 
29Copy of Resolutions at a General Meeting of the St. Lawrence Workers' 
Protective Union (CNTU) 22 February 1964, SLMM. 
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possible affiliates in Newfoundland. In September 1963, for instance, he was asked 
whether he had contacted truck drivers at Comer Brook (a pulp and paper town on the 
island's west coast) about the possibility of affiliating with the CNTU: 
We, in the CSN are anxious to know how much we can gain in 
Newfoundland. Brother Proude was asking me the other day how far you 
advanced in organizing or contacting other workers .... We will give you all 
the help you need as Ted Payne and I told you before.30 
It is unclear how much effort Turpin or the CNTU actually put into this campaign. In July 
1964 Turpin volunteered to visit other Newfoundland mining towns to gauge interest in 
the idea of affiliation, 31 but if he went, nothing concrete came of it, as no other 
Newfoundland or Labrador miners' union ever joined the CNTU. 
In the months leading up to the expiration of the 1963 agreement, relations 
between the union and the company continued to be very strained. There were numerous 
disagreements and grievances concerning job descriptions, discipline, safety and a host of 
other matters. Turpin blamed these ongoing problems on the attitude ofNewfluor 
manager Wiseman, whose "dictatorial attitude, since the contract was signed ... means a 
continual cold war between employees and management. ,,n Given this atmosphere, it is 
not surprising that negotiations for a new collective agreement, which began in August 
1964, dragged on for nearly six months before an agreement was reached in January 1965. 
30John McLellan, Secretary, MTF, to Turpin, 13 September 1963, SLMM. 
31Turpin to Dion, CNTU, 28 July 1964, SLMM. 
32Turpin to Parent and Proude, MTF, 1 February 1964, SLMM. 
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The new agreement contained several adjustments in the areas of seniority, grievance 
procedures, annual vacations, and health and safety.33 It also provided for three across-
the-board wage increases over the life of the agreement, which was set to expire on 30 
September 1967: seven cents per hour as of January 1965, five cents per hour as of 
September 1965, and four cents per hour as of September 1966.34 This was a moderate 
improvement on the company's offer of increases of 4, 5 and 4 cents per hour for the same 
periods.35 These increases would raise the average wage to $1.94, $1.99, and then $2.03 
per hour over the life of the agreement. 
While the Union was apparently pleased with the wage increases and other 
improvements won during the first few years of its affiliation with the CNTU, there was 
continuing hostility on the labour relations front. According to Turpin, Newfluor 
management resented the presence of the CNTU, and would have preferred dealing with 
an independent union. At the conclusion of negotiations to renew the collective 
agreement in 1965, for instance, Turpin remarked that, 
When negotiations had to be delayed from time [during 1964], Mr. 
Wiseman, Manager, called me on the phone and asked me, who' s running 
this affair, he thought it was Newfoundland Fluorspar, Ltd., and the St. 
33The health and safety provisions of this agreement will be dealt with in more 
detail in the next sub-section. 
34Memorandum of Agreement between the St. Lawrence Workers Protective 
Union and the Newfoundland Fluorspar Company, 19 January 1965, SLMM. 
35Company Offer, 18 January 1965, SLMM. 
306 
Lawrence Workers' Protective Union, I said no we both have some higher 
ups looking after both ofus .... 36 
Obviously, the Union was coming to see the labour relations situation in increasingly 
polarized terms and to view its affiliation with a powerful external body as an appropriate 
response to New:fluor's affiliation with a powerful parent company. 
One area of continuing concern and controversy was occupational health and 
safety. While the government and the company took measures aimed at alleviating 
workers' concerns about health and safety, especially with regard to the radiation problem, 
relations in this area continued to be marked by suspicion and hostility. One former miner 
who worked underground at Director during this time stated that while the company had a 
monitor who checked radiation levels, it was widely believed that "they could rig that" so 
that the reported level would be lower than the actual one: "I didn't believe the readings, 
not really, that the company would take ... no one trusted it, no sir." This former miner 
also recalled that if workers in a given area were believed to have been exposed to a high 
level of radiation, they were supposed to have been taken out of that area until the level 
was reduced. Asked if the company followed that policy, he replied, "Sometimes."37 
The union sought to have some of its health and safety concerns specifically 
covered in collective agreements. In the 1963 agreement -- the first one signed under 
CNTU affiliation -- the union won the right to have two designated union members trained 
3~urpin to Adrian Proude, Secretary, MTF, 9 March 1965, SLMM. 
37Interview with Leo James. 
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at company expense in the operation and reading of monitoring equipment, and to have 
them participate in the monitoring of radiation and dust levels at least every two weeks. 
The agreement also required that in cases where radiation or dust exceeded the Safe 
Working Levels (SWLs), all employees were to be immediately removed from the affected 
area, except those required to enter in order to rectifY the situation. The 1963 agreement 
also required the fonnation of Safety Committee with two company and two union 
representatives, whose responsibility it was to conduct periodic tours of the underground 
and surface areas and report on potential hazards. 38 
The union also continued to make complaints to government authorities and to 
demand action on what it believed to be unacceptable conditions and practices. The 
Department of Mines was less than cooperative in dealing with these complaints. In April 
1963, for instance, the Minister gave what the union's solicitor described as a ''truculent" 
reply to a number of complaints -- a reply which implied that responsibility for ensuring 
that the mine regulations were enforced rested with the company, and that the union was 
outside its rights in demanding action on health and safety issues from his department. 39 
When the Department of Mines insisted that the Union's ''vague indictments" were not 
sufficient grounds for investigation, the union responded with a list of specific grievances: 
men being moved at the company' s convenience from their regular jobs to others for 
38Collective Agreement between Newfoundland Fluorspar Limited and St. 
Lawrence Workers' Protective Union, 9 March 1963, AA. 
39Lewis to Turpin, 11 Apri11963, SLMM. 
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which they were unqualified; workers being ordered off the job for going to the lunch 
room for drinking water because all other water in the underground was contaminated by 
radiation; men working out of sight and sound of other workers; the union' s ventilation 
monitor being pressured to concur with the company on radiation and dust readings; and 
the company interfering in the appointment of the Union's monitor in order to get a man 
more amenable to the company's position. Add to this the number of injuries routinely 
sustained on the job, the union charged, and the result was that the men had become 
"slaves" and the workplace a "sweatshop. '"'0 
Newfluor's official lost-time accident frequency for 1963 was in fact much higher 
than that of the Buchans lead and zinc mine, and more than double that of the Bell Island 
Iron ore mines.41 The union also charged that the official rate, high as it was, was actually 
lower than the actual rate, because the company often neglected to report lost-time 
accidents in order to keep down compensation premiums. There are reports of a similar 
practice taking place at other Canadian mines. Testifying before the Ham Commission on 
Health and Safety in Ontario mines in 1975, for instance, a union representative claimed 
that many accidents went unreported at the International Nickel Company's (INCO's) 
mine in Sudbury where, to avoid reporting lost-time accidents to the Workers' 
4orurpin to W.J. Keough, Minister, Mines, Agriculture, and Resources: "Union 
Report with Regards to the Fluorspar Industry Operated by the Newfoundland Fluorspar 
Company," 16 April1963, SLMM. 
41Department of Mines, Agriculture and Resources, Annual Report for the Year 
Ended 31 March 1964, 171, DME. 
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Compensation Conunission, ''these walking wounded still received their wages. '~2 A 
smelter worker in Sudbury at the time corroborated this claim, stating that in one instance 
he was brought to and from work by the company and sat in the office for three weeks in 
order to avoid recording a lost-time accident, partly because the company was "trying for 
an award.'~3 To the allegation that Newfluor had adopted this practice in St. Lawrence, 
the Mines Minister vaguely replied that the regulations required that all lost-time accidents 
be reported, and that ''the safety of workmen in the mines of St. Lawrence is of prime 
importance to my Department. ,,.w 
In 1963, Newfluor issued a comprehensive set of accident prevention measures.45 
These rules were broken down by occupation or task and dealt mainly with the prevention 
of accidents during drilling, hauling, hoisting, riding cages, welding, working with 
electrical equipment or explosive devices, and so on. 46 While the only reference to air 
quality in the 1963 rules was a directive not to tamper with ventilation equipment, this was 
a continuing source of controversy. In January 1964, for instance, the Union informed the 
42Quoted in Clement, Hardrock Mining, 224. 
43Clement, Hardrock Mining, 224. 
44Keough to Carter, 26 August 1963, and forwarded to TUIJ)in, 20 September 
1963, SLMM. 
45Companies were permitted, under the regulations, to issue such rules, provided 
they were designed to accompany, and not replace, any provincial regulations. 
46Newfoundland Fluorspar Limited, St. Lawrence, "Plant and Mine Safety Rules 
and Instructions for the Prevention of Accidents," 1963, AA. 
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Department of Mines that a month previous two men had been "gassed" in the 
underground, one to the point where he had to leave his job. The Department ofMines 
simply replied that it had not been informed of any such incident, and that if it had 
occurred the Company was required to report it as a lost time accident, in which case it 
would appear in the Annual Report. 47 The alleged incident did not appear in the Annual 
Report.48 Throughout the winter of 1963-64, the Union complained repeatedly that there 
were serious problems with air quality and ventilation and charged that the government' s 
inspectors were indifferent and "incompetent. '>49 The Department's responses grew 
increasingly defensive and even dismissive. It defended its inspectors and its general 
handling of the St. Lawrence situation, and claimed that until Turpin was willing to trust 
someone else's assessment and to offer constructive criticism, his claims would not be 
considered or addressed: 
It is evident from Mr. Turpin's letter that he is not prepared to accept the 
views or assurances of this Department or the Department ofHealth or the 
Workmen's Compensation Board.... We do not propose to enter into any 
further discussion or correspondence with him, or with anyone acting on 
his behal( unless his complaints are specific, verifiable, reasonable, and 
47Carter to Turpin, 15 January 1964, re: reply from Keough to Carter,IO January 
1964, SLMM. 
48Because the incident allegedly occurred after September 1963, it should have 
appeared in the Annual Report for 1964, which it did not. Accident statistics were broken 
down by type, one of which was "Asphyxiation or Noxious and Toxic Gasses." 
49Turpin to C.H. Ballam, Minister ofLabour, Government ofNewfoundland, 11 
March 1964, SLMM. 
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applicable, and unless his suggestions, if he has any, are specific, reasonable 
and applicable. 50 
Turpin replied with a number of specific complaints: that to cut costs the company 
shut down the ventilation system during weekend and holidays so that men returning to 
the workplace after such breaks entered an atmosphere filled with ''fumes, dust, and 
radiation," that men were sent back into radiation-contaminated areas shortly after others 
had been taken out, that ventilation equipment was in some cases inadequate and too 
easily tampered with and that blasting was carried out all through working hours. 51 The 
union was then infonned that a telephone call to the mine manager had "confirmed" that 
the ventilation system was in continuous operation, and that as the radiation level was 
checked every two weeks by the company and periodically by the government inspector, 
there was no cause for concern and no need to issue further recommendations to the 
company.52 
The company' s own monitoring, however, reported at least three excessive 
readings during 1963, one of which showed a radiation level nearly 7 x SWL. There were 
also several excessive readings during 1964, including one of more than 4 x SWL, and 
seven during 1965, including three in July alone. Some explanation was usually offered in 
5
'Xeough to Lewis, 24 March 1964, SLMM. 
51For example: Turpin to Lewis, 31 March 1964, SLMM. 
52Lewis to Turpin, 26 May 1964, re: Deputy Minister ofMines to Lewis, 14 May 
1964, and Brian J. Trevor, Chieflnspector of Mines, to Keough, 28 May 1964, SLMM. 
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such cases, such as damaged vent tubing or malfunctioning fans, and it was stated that 
workers were removed from such areas as soon as the danger was discovered. 53 Also, 
company and government officials could claim that levels were within allowable limits 
because the final results of surveys were calculated as an average of the individual 
readings. The results for the week of21-25 July 1965, for instance, show three readings 
in excess of the SWL, but the average of all the readings for that week was just 0.59 x 
SWL.54 Periodic tests by the Chief Inspector showed similar results: on two occasions 
during 1964 the Inspector reported readings in excess of the SWL, but that the average 
reading was just under 0.30 x SWL.55 For 1965, when there were at least seven readings 
in excess ofthe SWL, the reported average for 645 readings was just 0.20 x SWL.56 
Such instances demonstrate that despite such measures as increased ventilation and 
monitoring, workers continued to be exposed to dangerous levels of radiation, and that 
the radiation problem was a highly unpredictable one -- readings for the same area could 
fluctuate a lot in a matter of days. They also point to the fuct that the average reading 
reported was simply a mathematical calculation; miners worked in areas where the 
53Results of Mine Ventilation Surveys Conducted by Newfoundland Fluorspar 
Limited, 1963, 1964, and 1965, SLMM. 
54Results ofMine Ventilation Surveys Conducted by Newfoundland Fluorspar 
Limited, 21-25 July 1965, SLMM. 
55Trevorto Keough, 15 June 1964, and 23 November 1964. SLMM. 
56
"Survey Lung Cancer of St. Lawrence Miners," GN78/1/B, 220, File 290/G/07, 
PANL. 
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radiation level was below or above the average reading -- no one actually worked in the 
average reading. As the company's weekly tests were observed by a union representative 
every second week and the results forwarded to the union, it is safe to asswne that the 
workforce was aware of such readings, and that this contributed to the suspicion and 
hostility that marked the union's relationship to the management and to the govenunent. 
In addition to affiliation with the CNTU in 1963, another important development 
for the SLWPU in the 1960s was the ousting ofTurpin and the election of a new president 
in 1966. The reasons for this change are unclear, but Turpin himself later claimed that he 
had come under some mild criticism because his wife was being paid to clean and paint the 
union offices. 57 What is clear is that Turpin did not approve of the man elected to replace 
him or the procedure by which he was elected. According to Turpin, the man who 
replaced him, Leo Slaney, had worked with Newfluor just three years, and won on a 
secret ballot by just 15 votes. By Turpin' s account, there were just 84 union members 
present at the meeting during which the vote was held, on 3 April 1966, as well as some 
non-union men who also cast votes. After Slaney' s election, Turpin said, he simply "got 
out oftown."58 He moved to Montreal, where he stayed for the remainder of his life. 
57lnterview with Aloysius Turpin, MUNFLA. 
58lnterview with Aloysius Turpin, MUNFLA; and Turpin to J.Malone, Department 
ofLabour, St. John's, 5 April1966, SLMM. Turpin was fairly accurate about Slaney' s 
experience with the company, as a Seniority List from 31 December 1964 shows he had 
been employed at that point for 18 months. 
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Immediately after his election, Slaney signaled to the CNTU his intention to 
establish a new working relationship between the St. Lawrence union and the parent 
organization, including more communication with and assistance from the CNTU. He also 
implied that he was willing to take a strong stand when necessary: one of the first 
questions he put to the MTF executive was how much money was in the SL WPU' s strike 
fund. 59 This initial correspondence implies that Slaney, at least, felt that Turpin did not 
demand enough attention and assistance from the MTF and was not willing to take 
decisive measures, such as strike action, when necessary. While this does not necessarily 
mean the membership also felt that way, it may partly explain why Turpin was challenged 
for the leadership and voted out. 
Under Slaney's leadership, the union continued to be concerned with working 
conditions, and especially with possible exposure to radiation. In May 1966 the 
Newfoundland government began to direct more attention to this issue as well, by 
appointing a radiation monitor, David Rex, to take daily readings at the St. Lawrence 
mines. Shortly after, in June, Gerald Drover arrived to take up the position as Newfluor's 
Safety Officer, whose duties included weekly monitoring of mine air. Drover trained under 
his predecessor, John Tosney, for about three months before Tosney left in September 
1966. This was his only training in this type of work; before coming to St. Lawrence he 
had worked for three years in the Safety Division of J.C. Pratt, a St. John's construction 
5~o Slaney, to S.T. Payne, MTF, 4 May 1966, SLMM. 
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supply company.60 
With the government's appointment of the daily monitor, the monitoring system 
reportedly worked like this: Rex took readings at selected sites - not every site -- every 
day and Drover took readings once a week. Drover was accompanied every two weeks 
by a union representative, in accordance with the collective agreement. The results of 
both these sets of readings were sent to Newfluor's ChiefEngineer, Claringbull, and to the 
union. Newfluor manager Wiseman received the weekly average of these daily and weekly 
readings. The Department of Mines received these weekly averages on a quarterly basis, 
except for instances where the reading was in excess of the SWL, which were supposed to 
be reported to the department immediately. In cases where the reading exceeded the SWL, 
workers were supposed to be removed from area and not allowed back until adjustments 
were made and further tests showed that level had returned to at or below the SWL.61 
The fact that there were any excessive radiation readings, however, continued to be a 
source of concern for the workforce. The monitoring system and even the appointment of 
a daily monitor by the government did little to ease their minds or to improve relations in 
that area. Asked later whether the introduction of daily readings in 1966 had improved 
~ranscript of a public hearing ofthe Royal Commission on Radiation, 
Compensation, and Safety, at the Fluorspar Mines, St. Lawrence, Newfoundland 
(hereafter called "Royal Commission on St. Lawrence"), held at St. Lawrence, 27 
November 1967, 188, GN 6, 2, PANL. 
61Transcript of a public hearing held at St. Lawrence, 27 November 1967. 
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morale among the workforce, Wiseman simply replied, ''Not that I've noticed.'.c.2 
An important legislative change regarding the monitoring of the radiation hazard at 
St. Lawrence was introduced by an amendment to the mines regulations which came into 
effect in July 1967, setting more specific allowable limits for exposure to radiation than 
those in effect up to that point. Allowable limits up to this time were determined by a 
combination of the general requirement contained in the regulations of 1957, which 
required the removal of harmful amounts of dust and "noxious impurities" and the 
supplying of adequate ventilation to "ensure the health of anyone employed in the mine," 
and the 1960 amendment requiring operators to "carry out such tests of the air in all 
workings that are in use or to be used by workmen. '.c.3 The 1967 amendment grew out of 
recent changes in regulations governing radiation exposure in the United States. There, 
studies conducted in 1962 and in 1964 had found that uranium miners were still dying 
from respiratory cancer at a rate five to ten times that of the general population, despite 
various measures which had been introduced in the 1950s. In 1967, the United States 
introduced a new radiation exposure standard in response to this trend. The new standard 
shifted the emphasis from the maximum allowable concentration of radiation in the air, to 
the maximum allowable dosage to which a worker could be exposed. 64 This distinction 
62Transcript of a public hearing held at St. Lawrence, 27 November 1967. 
63The Mines (Safety ofWorkmen) Regulations, 1957, Section 91(1) and the Mines 
(Safety of Workmen) (Amendment) (No.4) Regulations, 1960. 
64Tataryn, Dyingfor a Living, 78-9. 
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can be translated as the difference between the Working Level (WL) itself and a Working 
Level Month (WLM). A WLM is defined as exposure to 1 WL for 4% weeks of 40 hours 
each. Thus, the 1967 Newfoundland amendment required that: "Occupational exposure to 
radon daughters in underground mines shall be controlled so that no individual will receive 
an exposure of more than 1.8 working level months in any consecutive three-month period 
and no more than 3.6 working level months in any consecutive 12-month period.'-<i5 
Because the emphasis was now on exposures, the amendment required not only the taking 
and recording of air tests, but also the monitoring of which areas workers were in at any 
given time and thus how much radiation they were exposed to over a given period. While 
it was introduced ostensibly to provide further protection, the shift from levels to dosages 
could be seen as a way of dealing with the ongoing problem of readings in excess of 1 WL 
and the suspicion and unrest they generated. The WL could now be above 1 at a given 
time or place but, because the emphasis was on employee exposure rather than the level 
itself, individual readings in excess of 1 WL could be justified on the grounds that other 
readings, below 1 WL, meant that an employee's exposure over a given period did not 
exceed the maximum dosage. The shift also made is more difficult to monitor exposures 
and to protect workers, since it required an account ofhow long workers had been in 
particular areas and what the level had been during that time, an extremely difficult task 
65The Mines (Safety ofWorkmen) (Amendment) (No.1) Regulations, 1967 (which 
became Section 96B of the Mines (Safety ofWorkmen) Regulations, 1957). The new 
standard was also adopted for uranium mines in Canada. See Tataryn, Dying for a Living, 
78-9. 
318 
when levels were not constantly monitored and with workers constantly moving through 
the mine. 
6.3 Industrial Disease and Worker's Compensation, 1960-1966 
Other factors contributing to the atmosphere of mistrust and conflict during the 
first half ofthe1960s were continuing illness and death among the workforce and further 
official confirmation ofthe number of workers who had already died. While those close to 
the situation had been aware for many years that miners were becoming ill and dying in 
disproportionate numbers, the matter began to receive systematic study only in the wake 
of the 1960 revelations about radiation levels in the mines, when a team of experts from 
the National Department of Health and Welfare undertook research into illness and 
mortality patterns.66 In 1964, de Villiers and his research team released the official results 
of their study of St. Lawrence miners begun in 1960. It was confirmed that from 1933 to 
1961 there were 119 deaths among all employees ofboth mining companies. Of these, 22 
were attnbuted to tuberculosis and/or silicosis (including 12 in this category from 1949 to 
1958), 26 to cancer of the lung, 17 to other cancers, 21 to diseases of the circulatory 
system, 29 to other causes, and 4 to unknown causes. The study found that the average 
age of death for lung cancer victims among the mining population was 46.8 years, and that 
the youngest victim up to that point was just 33 years old and the oldest 56. The average 
66
"Survey Lung Cancer of St. Lawrence Miners," GN78/1/B, 220, File 290/G/07, 
PANL. 
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duration of underground exposure for lung cancer victims was I2.5 years. The average 
"induction period" (the time from first exposure to death) was I9 .I years, and the average 
"lag period" (the time from last exposure to death) was just I.8 years. The rate of death 
from lung cancer among St. Lawrence miners was nearly 29 times the provincial 
average.67 
Comparing the St. Lawrence case with cases associated with mines in other parts 
of the world, the study found that the death rate from lung cancer in St. Lawrence miners 
was worse even than some of the most notorious cases known up to that time. In the 
uranium mines of Jachymov, Gennany, and Schneeberg, Czechoslovakia, rampant illness 
in miners exposed to uranium was confirmed as lung cancer in I879. There, the average 
age at death for miners with lung cancer was higher than that in St. Lawrence, and the 
average induction period several years longer.68 The de Villiers study noted that in the 
uranium mines of South Africa, the percentage of lung cancer deaths among the mining 
population was just 3.5, compared to 45 per cent in St. Lawrence, and that the average 
age at death for lung cancer victims in the South African case was I 0 years higher than 
67AJ. de Villiers and J.P. Windish, "Lung Cancer in a Fluorspar Mining 
Community: Radiation, Dust and Mortality Experience, British Journal of Industrial 
Medicine, 21 (I964), 94-109. 
68R W. Thompkins, "Radioactivity and Lung Cancer: A Critical review of Lung 
Cancer in the Miners ofSchneeberg and Joachimsthal," Journal of the National Cancer 
Institute, 5 (1944). 
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that at St. Lawrence. 69 
The de Villiers team also studied the health status of the 280 men employed at the 
mines in August 1960, as well as that of nearly 100 former miners. These men were given 
clinical tests and completed questionnaires regarding such factors as smoking and diet. 
This study concluded beyond a doubt that exposure to radiation was the explanation for -
the high incidence oflung cancer among the mining population.70 By 1963, six more 
miners had died from cancer of the lung and respiratory system, bringing the total to 
thirty-two.11 In addition, in 1965 it was confirmed that 41 others were suffering from lung 
cancer, and that the peak incidence had shifted to a younger group, likely signaling an 
impending decline in the average age of death. 72 Furthermore, since the average induction 
period was nearly twenty years, and many men had developed cancer after less than ten 
years underground, others would likely become ill in the near future. 
The rate of disease and death associated with the mines and the government's 
handling of the situation to that point had understandably created a deep-seated suspicion 
69de Villiers and Windish, "Lung Cancer in a Fluorspar Mining Community," 94-
109. 
70W.D. Parsons, A.J. de Villiers, L.S. Bartlett, and Margaret R. Becklake, "Lung 
Cancer in a Fluorspar Mining Community: Prevalence of Respiratory Symptoms and 
Disability," British Journal of Industrial Medicine, 21, 1964, 110-116. 
71A.J. de Villiers, "Cancer of the Lung in a Group ofFluorspar Miners," 
Proceedings of the Sixth Canadian Cancer Research Conference, Honey Harbour, 
Ontario, 1964, 6 (1966), 460-474. 
72
"Lung Cancer- Progress Report," 18 November 1965, GN78/1/B, 220, File 
290/G/07, P ANL. 
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and resentment of government representatives on the part of the people of St. Lawrence. 
One instance which illustrated the depth of this feeling occurred in 1966, when a team of 
students hired to assist in a health survey of several communities on the Burin Peninsula 
encountered a lot of resistance in St. Lawrence, in contrast to the other communities they 
entered. It was reported that they had so much trouble getting any cooperation in St. 
Lawrence that they were on the verge of quitting. 73 
Rampant illness and death among the male, bread-winning workforce also had 
devastating economic consequences. Many miners incapacitated by industrial disease, as 
well as many widows, had little or no means to support themselves and their families. 
Lung cancer arising from exposure to radiation was included in the Workmen's 
Compensation Act's Schedule of Industrial Diseases under an amendment which came into 
effect on 5 July 1960.74 While the 1960 amendment was retroactive to 1951 (when the 
original Act was passed), so that cases arising from 1951 to 1960 could also be 
compensable, it did not cover claims for death or disability before 1951. When 
Workmen's Compensation Board Chairman Irving Fogwill visited St. Lawrence in 1960 to 
assess the situation firsthand and to get some idea of the potential costs involved in 
covering claims, he pointed out that even with limited retroactivity, the cost associated 
73L.G. Vey, Senior Administrative Assistant, Department ofHealth, Government 
ofNewfoundland, to de Villiers, 16 July 1966, "Health Survey- Burin Peninsula," GN 
78/1/B, 220, File 290/G/01, PANL. 
74An Act to Amend the Workmen's Compensation Act (1951), 5 July 1960. 
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with pending and future claims associated with industrial disease in St. Lawrence would be 
"staggering." It was decided, in fact, that the Workmen's Compensation premiums paid 
by the mining industry itself could not be expected to cover the cost, and that the money 
would have to come from the Board's Disaster Reserve Fund, a fund into which a portion 
of premiums from all industries was directed. 75 
In making the decision to compensate St. Lawrence cancer claims from this fund, 
the WCB in effect absolved the mining companies of their financial responsibility for the 
cancer tragedy, since their compensation premiums would not increase. This decision was 
therefore a blatant example in support of the argument that employers are often protected 
from much of the financial liability for their negligence, and an undermining of the 
principle that employers would take an active role in promoting health and safety in order 
to keep their premiums to a minimum. Newfluor manager Wiseman later stated that this 
decision by the WCB prompted Newfluor to change its policy on refusing to hire former 
Corporation miners after confirmation of the radiation problem in 1960. Wtseman claimed 
that Newfluor was initially reluctant to hire former Corporation miners because it did not 
want its compensation assessment to increase because of claims arising from lung cancer 
cases among those who had worked in the Corporation mines. After Newfluor was 
assured that the claims would come out of the Disaster Fund and therefore not affect the 
75
"Report of a Visit to St. Lawrence, 18-22 September 1960, by Irving Fogwill," 
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company' s assessment, he stated, that policy was changed.76 
In addition to the cost involved, Fogwill also argued that making lung cancer 
claims retroactive to before 1951 was complicated by the difficulty in assessing the 
credibility of all retroactive claims: 
The present Act cannot be held to include those miners who died prior to 1 
April 1951, or those who tenninated their mining employment at dates 
antecedent to 1 April, 1951, only to become ill and die, perhaps years later, 
from lung cancer, since the fatal lesion may have been quiescent for years 
merely awaiting a type of chemical or metabolic change in the person to 
become activated. 77 
That argument could, of course, equally apply to claims arising after 1 April 1951 and 
considered legitimate under the legislation; in those cases, a pre-existing condition might 
also have contributed to the development ofthe compensable disease. More importantly, 
because the 1951 Act treated industrial diseases in essentially the same manner as 
industrial accidents, the time of disablement was assumed to be the time at which a worker 
left his job. Therefore, anyone who had left the job, even because of disablement, before 1 
April 1951 was not entitled to compensation, and nor were the dependents of a deceased 
worker who bad left the job or died because of a workplace accident or industrial disease 
before I Aprill951. As would become clear in the St. Lawrence case, however, the limit 
on retroactivity bore little relation to the real circumstances under which workers grew 
76Transcript of a public hearing held at St. Lawrence. St. Lawrence. 27 November 
1967. 
77
"Report of a Visit to St. Lawrence, 18-22 September 1960, by Irving Fogwill," 
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too ill to work and eventually died, and to the hardship to which surviving widows and 
children were left. 
In addition to the limit on retroactivity, another serious problem with the 
compensation system was the inadequacy of benefits, especially in cases where a widow 
had a number of children under her care. While there had been several moderate increases 
in benefits since the original amounts were set in 1951, in 1961 payments were still very 
low. The monthly amount paid to the widow of a deceased worker (provided she did not 
remarry) had been increased by just $25.00, up to $75.00 in 1961, while the monthly 
amount paid to dependent children (under 16 years old) had increased by just $15.00, to 
$25.00. The maximum amount payable per month, regardless of the number of dependents 
or, in the case of living, disabled workers, wages before the disability, was $250.00 per 
month in 1961. The strict limit on retroactivity, the low level of benefits and other features 
of the legislation would become increasingly pressing problems and the source of much 
hostility and resentment in St. Lawrence during the 1960s. 
While many in St. Lawrence and surrounding communities struggled on a daily 
basis with industrial disease and inadequate financial support, the issue only began to gain 
wider public attention in 1965, when it was brought to the notice of a committee 
appointed to review the Workmen's Compensation Act. Unlike other Canadian 
jurisdictions, where regular, independent reviews of provincial Acts had been a 
requirement since their introduction in the early 20th century, until1962 the Newfoundland 
government relied upon the WCB and its chainnan to assess the effectiveness of the 
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Newfoundland Act and to shape policy accordingly.78 When a newly consolidated Act 
was passed in 1962, it contained a requirement that the Lieutenant-Governor appoint a 
committee every five years, retroactive to 1959, to "review, consider, report and make 
recommendations upon such matters respecting this Act and the regulations and the 
administration of each as the committee deems fit. "79 The :first such committee was 
appointed in 1964 and began its review in 1965. 
The Review Committee received and responded to a number of submissions on a 
variety of topics in the course of its proceedings. There was one brief in particular, 
however, which in the committee's words was "so extraordinary," and "so startling" that 
it demanded special attention.80 This brief was submitted in February 1965 by St. 
Lawrence resident Rennie Slaney. Slaney had been one of the original Corporation 
workers. He later moved into a supervisory role and then a clerical position with that 
company, before taking a clerical job with the Town Council until his retirement. He had 
also been a witness to the Issac Slaney autopsy in 1952. Slaney' s brief described working 
conditions from the start of mining in St. Lawrence and the impact of industrial disease on 
miners and their families. Slaney recounted how men had begun to get sick and die 
7s.'Report of the Review Committee Appointed to Review, Consider, Report Upon 
and make Recommendations Respecting the Workmen's Compensation Act," 1966, 
unpublished docwnent, CNS. 
7~orkmen's Compensation Act, 1962, Section 104(2). 
80
"Report of the Review Committee on Workmen' s Compensation Act," 1966, 42. 
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around 1945, and how many were sent to the sanitarium to be treated for tuberculosis but 
never recovered. His submission included a list of 84 names of dead miners, more than 70 
of whom, he claimed, had died from lung cancer and respiratory diseases. Slaney claimed 
that in only about 25 cases had dependents received any compensation. He also listed 
thirteen cases of living, former miners too sick from cancer and respiratory diseases to 
work, only six of whom were being compensated. 81 
While conceding that these figures were uno:fficia4 the Review Committee 
nonetheless accepted them as "fairly reliable" given Slaney's interest in, and first-hand 
knowledge ot: the subject. 82 Information that the Review Committee requested from the 
WCB, however, indicated that the first recorded death from industrial disease associated 
with the St. Lawrence mines occurred in 1952, and that from then until 1965 there were 
34 deaths from lung cancer in St. Lawrence miners, as well as four deaths from 
silicosis/tuberculosis. In addition, the WCB's records showed just seven cases of silicotic 
miners still living, with varying degrees of disability. Regarding the apparent discrepancy 
between Slaney's figures and those provided by the WCB, the Review Committee stated 
that the explanation was "a simple one": that many cases, especially in the pre-1951 
period, simply had not been counted and therefore had not been compensated. The 
81
"Report of the Review Committee on Workmen's Compensation Act," 1966, 42-
3. 
82
"Report ofthe Review Committee on Workmen's Compensation Act," 1966,43-
9. 
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Review Committee claimed that the figures provided by Slaney were ''much nearer the 
truly ghastly total than the fifty-odd in the Board's files."83 Based on this belie±: the 
Review Committee concluded that "if every claim that has really been created were 
evaluated," the payments due would far outstrip the capacity of the Board, and that "the 
tragedy of St. Lawrence, its very dimension and character, has far exceeded the scope of 
the Act." Calling the St. Lawrence case a ''national disaster," the Committee made a 
decisive recommendation: 
The only positive recommendation we can make, but it is one which we 
feel is our duty to make, is that the whole history of fluorspar mining at St. 
Lawrence, from its start in 1933, be investigated and examined in the 
utmost detail and in its every aspect. What form the inquiry should take it is 
for the proper authorities to decide, whether it be by the appointment of a 
Royal Commission or in some other way. 84 
Only such an inquiry, the Committee insisted, could uncover not only the medical and 
scientific aspects of the St. Lawrence case but also the "the sociological and human side of 
the tragedy, the tale of which has been only partially and superficially told."85 
6.4 "Keeping the Company's Skirts Clean": Labour Relations, Public Relations, and the 
Proceedings of the Royal Commission, 1967-1969 
In February 1967 the Newfoundland government, forced to take action by the 
83
"Report ofthe Review Committee on Workmen's Compensation Act," 1966, 50. 
84
"Report of the Review Committee on Workmen's Compensation Act," 1966, 51. 
85
"Report of the Review Committee on Workmen's Compensation Act," 1966, 51. 
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sheer magnitude of the problem and by the harsh and decisive conclusions of its own 
Review Committee, announced that a Royal Commission would be appointed to 
investigate matters of industrial disease and workers' compensation associated with the St. 
Lawrence fluorspar mines. The Royal Commission's composition and Terms ofReference 
were made official on 7 March 1967.86 The Commission was to be headed by St. John's 
lawyer Fintan Aylward, a native of St. Lawrence (and son of Patrick Aylward, who had 
started the first "union" in 1939). The other original members of the Commission were: 
Dr. Bliss Murphy, a prominent Newfoundland radiologist; Frederick Gover, Deputy 
Minister of Mines and former Chief Inspector of Mines; and Irving Fogwill, former 
Chairman of the Workmen's Compensation Board. Just a month after his appointment, 
however, Fogwill resigned from the Commission, stating that investigating past actions by 
the WCB might give the appearance of a conflict of interest and call into question his 
objectivity. He was replaced by Dr. David Parsons, who had assisted de Villiers in earlier 
investigations ofthe radiation/cancer issue at St. Lawrence.87 The Commission's original 
Terms ofReference were: 
1. To investigate all Workmen's Compensation claims from any miner or dependant of a 
deceased miner who had at any time worked in any of the St. Lawrence mines and make 
recommendations based upon the findings of that investigation. 
2. To determine the number of dependants of miners not receiving compensation in cases 
86The Nev.foundland Gazette, Vol. XLII, 7 March 1967. 
87T. Alex Hickman, Minister of Justice, Government ofNewfoundland, to Leo 
Slaney, 6 April1967, SLMM. 
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where "the husband or father apparently died of lung cancer or any other industrial disease 
from the date of commencement of mining activities in St. Lawrence and to make 
reconunendations with regard to the same." (emphasis added) 
3. To determine whether the Workmen's Compensation Board has been accepting the 
claims of miners who are suffering from or apparently suffering from lung cancer, and if 
necessary to recommend changes for more rapid and efficient handling of such claims, and 
to establish the number of claims from miners and dependants thus far rejected by the 
Board and the reasons for rejection. 
4. To determine whether the mines of St. Lawrence are now safe and if not to recommend 
any changes necessary to ensure that workers are free from health risks arising from 
radiation or other industrial hazards. 
5. To determine what, given that fluorspar itself is not radioactive, is the cause of the 
radiation problem at the St. Lawrence mines. 
6. To examine any features in around the town, in addition to the mines, which may be 
hazardous to the health of the residents. 88 
The establishment of the Royal Commissio~ combined with disclosure of the 
findings of the Workmen's Compensation Review Committee, intensified both internal and 
public debate over the handling of the industrial disease and workers' compensation issue 
in St. Lawrence. A newspaper article using the Review Committee's phrase "national 
disaster" to descn"be the situation in St. Lawrence, for instance, drew criticism from the 
provincial Department of Health, and from Premier Smallwood himself.89 An official with 
the Department of Health suggested that the article was an example of how the situation 
at St. Lawrence had been "blown out of proportion." He also complained of the fact that 
88The Newfoundland Gazette, Vol. XLII, 7 March 1967. 
89
"Tragedy Termed 'National Disaster'," Evening Telegram, 31 March 1967. 
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for all the publicity given to St. Lawrence, no one had mentioned the "vast sums of money 
pumped into the St. Lawrence mines project" by the Newfoundland government.90 
Smallwood criticized media coverage of the St. Lawrence case as "greatly exaggerated," 
and dismissed much of it as "history.'>91 
That Newfluor management saw that the Royal Conunission was shaping up to be 
partly a public relations campaign is indicated bythe fact that on 17 February 1967, 
Wiseman issued a press release to try to present what was, in his view, a more balanced 
view of the situation. To Wiseman, the publicity given the St. Lawrence situation had been 
''very much one-sided, with the grim side of the picture being highlighted and exaggerated, 
and the brighter side of the picture being entirely eliminated." The result, he claimed, was 
that the general public, especially outside of the St. Lawrence area, had been "grossly 
misinformed." Wiseman went on to give a brief account of the economic benefits the 
mining industry had brought to St. Lawrence, and to defend Newfluor's health and safety 
record.92 The "grim side of the picture," however, continued to be displayed, no doubt to 
the consternation of the company and the government. A television special aired on 2 
~.G. Vey, Senior Administrative Assistant, Department ofHealth, Government 
ofNewfoundland, to de Villiers, 16 February 1967, "Health Survey- Burin 
Peninsula,"GN 78/1/B, 220, File 290/G/01, PANL. 
91Vey to de Villiers, 17 February 1967, "Health Survey- Burin Peninsula," GN 
78/1/B, 220, File 290/G/01, PANL. 
92
"Press Release Issued by Mr. R Wiseman, General manager, Newfoundland 
Fluorspar Limited, 17 February 1967," GN 6, 3, PANL. 
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March 1967, for instance, explored the history of mining and industrial disease in the 
community. On 31 March, a lengthy and scathing newspaper article by Rennie Slaney 
described the history of working conditions in St. Lawrence, the toll it had taken on the 
people, and the government's mishandling of the issue.93 Shortly after, Newfluor brought 
in an expert, Harry Ethridge of Alcan's Public Relations Department, to assist in its public 
relations campaign and in drafting Newfluor's submission to the Royal Commission.94 
While the public relations battled raged, and the Royal Commission proceeded 
with its work, the union focused on the preparation of its brief for the Royal Commission 
and on day-to-day issues. In February 1967, Leo Slaney informed the district's MHA, 
Justice Minister T. Alex Hickman, that the workforce was still concerned that individual 
radiation readings were often well in excess ofthe SWL, and that in many cases men had 
worked in contaminated areas for several days. Slaney also disputed management's claim 
that a decrease in production in 1966 was due to a shortage of skilled miners. Production 
did drop by about 20,000 tons in 1966,95 but according to Slaney, the decrease was caused 
not by a shortage of skilled men, but by the continuing problem of''rockbursts" at 
93
"Compensation Should be Paid Says St. Lawrence Miner," Evening Telegram, 
31 March 1967. 
94Harry Ethridge, Public Relations Manager, Newfluor, to John C. Crosbie, 
Minister ofHealth, Government ofNewfoundland, 10 May 1968, "Survey Lung Cancer 
St. Lawrence Miners," GN 78/1/B, 220, File 290/G/07, PANL. 
95Department of Mines, Agriculture and Resources, Annual Report for the Year 
Ended 31 March, 1967, 193. 
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Director mine.96 Defined simply, a rockburst is a sudden shifting of the surrounding rock 
in an underground area. The results can range from the harmless splitting of a rock face to 
a major fall of rock. Rockbursting had been a source of concern at Director since at least 
1959, when the company first began studying the problem.97 It was also an important 
daily safety concern for workers. One veteran miner recalled an incident from the mid-
1960s when he and a fellow driller heard the noise that often accompanied rockbursting 
while working underground at Director mine. The two decided to get out of the area and 
were walking out the drift when they met an assistant superintendent, a ''mainland" man. 
The assistant superintendent asked where they were going and when the two explained 
that they believed a rockburst was coming, they were told that unless they returned to 
their work they would be fired. The two replied that if that was their choice, they 
preferred to be fired. They continued walking out the drift when they heard the sound of a 
rockfall. This fonner miner recalled that when he went back in to investigate, nearly 1 00 
tons of rock had fallen in the area where they had been working. The assistant 
superintendent, he said, told him he was "one lucky man," to which he replied, ''No thanks 
to you ... Ifl'd listened to you I'd be under that now." Eventually, he said, the 
rockbursting got so bad he could not sleep at night, and in 1966 he and several other 
96Leo Slaney to T. Alex Hickman, Minister of Justice, Goverrunent of 
Newfoundland, St. John's, 13 February 1967, SLMM. 
9~ewfoundland Fluorspar Limited, ''Supplementary Submission to the Royal 
Commission on St. Lawrence: Rock-stress, Rock-bursts, Mining Methods, Newfluor 
Safety Policy and Practice, Accidents, Safety Training,"GN 6, 3, P ANL. 
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miners left St. Lawrence and went to the recently opened Gullbridge copper mine in 
northeastern Newfoundland. 98 
By 1966, rockbursting at Director had become so frequent and intense that it was 
seriously affecting operations and New:fluor decided that to meet production goals it 
would have to re-open the Tarefare shaft, which had last been worked on a small scale in 
1947.99 When it decided to re-start operations at the Tarefare site, New:fluor hired 
contractors to do much of the development work, such as sinking the shaft and driving 
raises and drifts. The union opposed this contracting-out on the grounds that the 
contractors' men were taking jobs which the union felt should go to local men, that the 
presence of contractors' men constituted non-unionized labour in the workplace, and that 
the men were paid more than those employed directly by New:fluor, which created tension 
in the workplace and the community. The union also claimed that the contracting firms 
were less concerned about industrial hazards than were regular employees. 100 One 
reported instance which illustrated that the union had grounds for this belief occurred in 
1966, when a team of contractors' men removed the vent tubing from an area ofTarefare 
mine in order to speed up their work. When the government monitor checked the radiation 
level there shortly after, it was 66 x SWL. Management's defense in this instance was that, 
98Interview with Jim Roberts. 
99Department of Mines, Agriculture and Resources, Annual Report for the Year 
Ended 31 March, 1967, 193. 
1~eo Slaney to S.T. Payne, CNTU, 31 May 1967. 
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"The Company doesn't have any control over that -- what is going on there with the 
contractor's men." Regular employees working in the same areas as contract men were, 
nonetheless, exposed to such dangers. 101 
Another ongoing source of friction during 1967 was the Union's persistent 
allegation that the company continued to find ways to avoid recording lost-time accidents 
in order to keep down its official accident rate. According to the union, this was usually 
accomplished by finding an excuse to lay off or otherwise get rid of an injured worker or 
by simply paying an injured worker for time on the job without having him actually do any 
work. 102 If it was the company's intention to reduce the reported lost-time accident rate in 
this way, it worked: in 1967, Newfluor recorded Newfoundland and Labrador's lowest 
official accident rate and was therefore the province's top contender for the John T. Ryan 
Safety Trophy, awarded annually to the safest mine in Quebec and Atlantic Canada. 103 
While these ongoing grievances would have been sufficient to create a tense 
environment during the months leading up to the first public session of the Royal 
Commission (scheduled for November 1967 in St. Lawrence), the situation was made 
more tense by a major accident that occurred on 15 September 1967. Three miners, John 
Slaney, 35, and Robert Edwards, 36, of St. Lawrence, and Noel Warren, just 24, ofBurin, 
101Report of the Royal Commission on St. Lawrence, 79. 
102Leo Slaney to S.T. Payne, CNTU, 31 May 1967. 
103Department ofMines, Agriculture and Resources, Annual Report for the Year 
Ended 31 March, 1968,220. 
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were killed when a rockburst at Director mine caused a major fall of rock. The men were 
buried under several tons of ore on the 550-foot level of Director mine and it took rescue 
crews several days to recover their bodies. 104 
This incident provoked outrage from the unio~ community residents, and the 
press. Under a headline describing Director as the "Killer Mine," the Evening Telegram 
quoted the union president stating that the men had known for some time that someone 
would be killed in that area as there had been many rockbursts and narrow escapes in the 
past. Activist Rennie Slaney remarked that ''three more" had been added to the death toll, 
and that 27 men who had lived within a 250-foot radius of his house had been killed by 
industrial diseases or mining accidents.105 Four St. Lawrence miners quit their jobs 
immediately following the accident, and Newfluor workers refused to report for work for 
the day following the funerals for the three men. The union president stated that many men 
went underground believing ''they are going to their doom," and one ex-miner suffering 
from lung cancer remarked that, "That death trap ought to be closed and never allowed to 
be opened again."106 Because the most recent victims had left a total of 18 dependents, 
the accident also provoked further public attention to the plight of the widows and 
104Department of Mines, Agriculture and Resources, Annual Report for the Year 
Ended 31 March, 1968,222-4. 
105
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children in St. Lawrence. One miner's widow described having lived for 10 years on 
welfare in a ''two room shack," while another described the experience of watching your 
husband die of cancer ''while nine children gather at your back waiting to be fed."107 
Newfluor management attempted to respond to the most recent outpouring of 
negative publicity by correcting what it called "inaccuracies" in the media's coverage of 
the accident. in a In a Letter to the Editor, Wiseman pointed out, lest people be misled by 
figures recently circulated in the press, that seven miners had been killed by accidents over 
the entire life of the Director mine. He did not mention the number killed by industrial 
diseases. Wiseman also refuted recent claims that the company was having difficulty 
getting St. Lawrence men to work underground, quoting figures to the effect that the 
majority of underground employees were still from St. Lawrence, while most of the 
remainder were from nearby communities. 108 
Given recent events and the long history of hostility and suspicion, management's 
efforts to stem the tide of criticism likely had little effect, and the Royal Commission's first 
public session, held in St. Lawrence on 27 November 1967, opened in an understandably 
charged atmosphere. The session was taken up primarily with the presentation and 
discussion of the Newfluor submission. Union president Leo Slaney attended the session, 
but no CNTU representative was present, despite assurances given to Slaney that one 
107
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would attend. 109 Inunediately following the appointment of the Royal Commission, Slaney 
had contacted the CNTU and requested that they send a representative to St. Lawrence 
and assist in writing and presenting a brief on behalf of the Union. 110 He had repeated the 
request several times in the months leading up to the hearing, but no representative had 
arrived and no submission had been prepared. Like other audience members, Slaney was 
permitted to ask questions from the floor. 
Various representatives from the company gave verbal summaries of different parts 
of the New:fluor submission. Much of the actual written submission was devoted to 
defending Newfluor' s safety record and to arguing that the company had always 
cooperated with govenunent and medical officials in detecting and responding to health 
hazards. One example cited in this regard waS the issuing of two sets of Special Rules to 
help protect the health and safety ofNewfluor employees. The second of these, issued in 
1965, contained special instructions regarding protection from radiation and other 
industrial hazards. 111 The submission also expressed the company' s hope that the Royal 
109Slaney stated that he had been told the previous week that a CNTU 
representative would be at the session, and that he had heard nothing about that or about 
the submission since. Transcript of a public hearing held at St. Lawrence, 27 November 
1967, 215. Commission Chairman Aylward had also contacted the CNTU, informing 
them of the Commission's schedule and inviting them to make a presentation. Fintan 
Aylward, Chairman, Royal Commission on St. Lawrence, Newfoundland, to S.T. Payne, 
CNTU, 9 October 1967, SLMM; and Aylward to Payne, 26 October 1967. SLMM. 
110Leo Slaney, SLWPU, to S.T. Payne, MTF, 17 April1967, SLMM. 
111Newfoundland Fluorspar Limited, "Submission to the Royal Commission on St. 
Lawrence," 46, GN 6, 3, PANL. 
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Commission would "inspire confidence among the present Newfluor work force and all 
members of the general public in Newfoundland that working conditions in Director mine 
are not a hazard to health today and have not constituted a hazard to the health of 
fluorspar mines for the past seven years."112 According to the Newfluor submission, 
negative distortion of the St. Lawrence situation had caused, among other things, a 
shortage of skilled miners, which had led to production problems. It provided figures to 
the effect that of 70 underground miners employed by Newfluor in 1959, only 17 
remained on the payroll in 1967.113 While there was no further analysis of these figures, it 
is safe to assume that at least some of these men were either dead or too sick to work, and 
that what Newfluor called the "exodus of local experienced miners" was due in part to an 
exodus to the local hospitals and cemeteries. 
Based on its interpretation of the situation, the company submitted four 
recommendations: that a third doctor be stationed in the community; that a single 
radiologist be put in charge of analyzing chest x-rays of St. Lawrence miners; that the 
Workmen's Compensation Act be amended to remove the limit on the time a worker 
suffering from an industrial disease had from cessation of employment to the filing of a 
claim; and that a "Special Fund" be established to provide financial assistance to former 
miners incapacitated prior to 1967 or to their dependents, in cases where it could be 
11~ewfluor, "Submission to the Royal Commission on St. Lawrence," 33. 
113Newfluor, "Submission to the Royal Commission on St. Lawrence," 27. 
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shown that workers' compensation and other forms of support were not adequate. 114 
The discussion of the Newtluor submission at the November 1967 hearing 
provided further insight into the company's handling of the St. Lawrence situation. 
Wiseman revealed, for instance, that the company had conducted tests for radiation at 
Director mine as early as 1952, but had found no significant levels. Asked why the 
company had checked for radiation at Director in 1952, Wiseman responded that it was 
prompted by the discovery of valuable uranium deposits around Elliot Lake and the 
company had checked the mine out of "curiosity."115 He stated that when the 1959-60 
tests revealed high levels of radiation at Director mine and at the St. Lawrence 
Corporation mines, the company assumed that the testing instrument used in 1952 must 
have been malfunctioning. Furthermore, Alcan' s Chief Industrial Medical Officer, Dr. 
Brent, stated in his testimony that when he had come to St. Lawrence in 1957 to 
investigate the apparently high incidence of lung cancer he suggested that the company 
check for radiation, but that apparently it was not done because nothing about the geology 
of the area suggested that possibility.116 
At one point, union president Slaney interjected to ask Wiseman why U: as he had 
testified, the company had been told informally by Windish in November 1959 that there 
114Newflour, "Submission to the Royal Commission on St. Lawrence" 176-7. 
115Transcript of a public hearing held at St. Lawrence, 27 November 1967, 25-27. 
11~ranscript of a public hearing held at St. Lawrence, 27 November 1967, 73-80. 
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were dangerous levels of radiation at Director mine, had the men not been informed of this 
and been permitted to continue working there until March 1960. Slaney also challenged 
Wiseman's testimony that no work was done in the most contaminated area, 550-foot 
level, after the discovery of radiation, until the installation of additional ventilation there. 117 
Before Wiseman could respond to the challenge, the chairman advised Slaney that he and 
the union would have the opportunity to speak at the end of the session or to present a 
brie~ so that "both sides" of the story could be heard. At this point, James Cameron, 
Alcan's Managing Director, who had been brought in from Montreal for the hearing, 
objected to use of the term "both sides." "I think we are striving for the facts here," 
Cameron insisted, ''there is no such thing as 'both sides' ."118 Several times during the 
proceedings, Brent, Wiseman, and Cameron insisted that the company had taken adequate 
steps to deal with the problem based on the information available to it at the time. At one 
point, Brent declared that the company could not rightly be accused of''foot-dragging," 
and that "Everyone was most anxious to find out what was the cause of this great 
misfortune." He added, tellingly, that, "Certainly we wanted to do everything we could to 
keep the Company's skirts as clean as possible."119 
107. 
117Transcript of a public hearing held at St. Lawrence, 27 November 1967, 50-1. 
118Transcript of a public hearing held at St. Lawrence, 27 November 1967,51-2. 
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Wiseman also testified that of the three government inspectors who periodically 
visited St. Lawrence, two had never entered the underground. 120 Regarding the procedure 
for dealing with a radiation-contaminated area, whether it was sealed off from the other 
working areas in any way to limit the movement of radon gas through the mine, Wiseman 
stated that such areas were simply blocked from access by a couple ofboards.121 
Newfluor Safety Officer Gerry Drover, asked whether he had ever received any 
instructions about where to position the radiation measuring instrument when taking a 
test, replied ''No."122 Drover was also asked whether he could in any way sense when the 
radiation reading in a particular area might be high, to which he replied, "I can't, but some 
of the miners claim they can." He also stated that the miners were very interested in the 
radiation readings and asked him about it "all the time."123 At the conclusion of the 
session, the union president was asked whether he had anything to add and when the 
union's submission might be ready. He simply replied that he had been told it would be 
ready for the current session and that a CNTU representative would be present, and that 
he hoped to have the submission soon. 124 
206. 
120Transcript of a public hearing held at St. Lawrence, 27 November 1967, 122-3. 
121Transcript of a public hearing held at St. Lawrence, 27 November 1967, 47. 
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The Royal Commission's second public hearing was scheduled for May 1968 in St. 
Lawrence, and Leo Slaney was detennined to have the union's submission ready before 
then In December 1967, Slaney wrote directly to CNTU President Marcel Pepin to 
complain that work had apparently still not begun on the union's submission for the Royal 
Commission. 125 Shortly after, Commission Chairman Aylward wrote to CNTU General 
Secretary Robert Sauve reminding him of an earlier promise to get the submission in. 126 
There are several possible reasons for the CNTU's delay in getting the submission in. Ted 
Payne, who had been acting as the SL WPU's Technical Advisor on behalf of the CNTU 
since affiliation in 1963, was ill and off the job during the fall and winter of 1967-68.127 At 
the administrative level, the Mines Federation and the Metal Trades Federation were going 
through a complex process of amalgamation that was completed in 1968.128 Also, the 
Quiet Revolution and increasing political unrest in Quebec were bringing new pressures to 
bear on organizations such as the CNTU during the latter half of the 1960s. While it 
attempted to maintain its traditional stance of non-affiliation with any political party or 
movement, the CNTU could not resist being drawn, to some extent, into the political 
125Leo Slaney to Marcel Pepin, President, CNTU, 4 December 1967, SLMM. 
126Fintan Aylward, Chairman, Royal Commission on St. Lawrence, to Robert 
Sauve, General Secretary, CNTU, 19 December 1967, SL:MM. 
127Leo Slaney to Marcel Pepin, President, CNTU, 4 December 1967, SLMM. 
128Rouillard, Histoire de Ia CSN, 258-60. 
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upheaval sweeping the province.129 In short, factors within the CNTU and within Quebec 
were not conducive to the St. Lawrence union receiving prompt attention. 
Payne was back on the St. Lawrence case in January 1968, but there are 
indications that he was not very familiar with the health and safety issues being considered 
by the Royal Commission: Slaney had to explain to him in very simple terms what a 
rockburst was and what dangers it presented, as well as what the radiation hazard 
consisted of and the methods for dealing with it. 130 Payne' s lack of knowledge in these 
areas is not surprising, for despite the fact that he had been the SL WPU' s Technical 
Advisor for five years, he had had limited involvement with occupational health and safety 
issues apart from where they arose in the context of collective agreements. Also, Payne 
was from the Metal Workers' Federation, not the Miners' Federation, and this limited his 
knowledge of these areas. 
Despite the limitations, the union's submission was ready in time for the May 1968 
hearing and Payne was in attendance to help present it. The submission itself charged that 
both the historical and current conditions at the mines was evidence that the company was 
"unable or unwilling to apply control measures" and that this indicated the need for 
129See Ralph P. Gfultzel, "Rapprocher les lieux du pouvoir," Labour/Le Travail, 46 
(Fall2000), 269-96; and Jacques Rouillard, Histoire de Ia CSN, 1921-1981 (Montreal: 
Boreal Express/CSN, 1981), 369-96. 
130Leo Slaney to S.T. Payne, CNTU,18 January 1968. SLMM. 
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increased government intervention. 131 Summarizing the history of mining and industrial 
disease in St. Lawrence, the brief claimed that the bitterness and mistrust harboured by the 
people of St. Lawrence was the result, not of a lack of understanding of the facts, but of 
the people's knowledge that so many had died, and would die a horrible and unnecessary 
death for the sake of"industrial development and corporate profits. " 132 In exchange for 
this ''terrible price," the brief argued, many had been left unable care for themselves and 
their families because of illness and a lack of financial support. The submission cited the 
example of one former miner who had to take up fishing to supplement his compensation 
benefits, and was so incapacitated he had to be helped from his boat onto the wharf by a 
rope. 133 The submission contained several specific recommendations to improve 
conditions at the mines, including increased ventilation and monitoring, and it 
recommended establishment of a pro-active health and safety program to replace the ''trial 
and error" method used in the past. The submission also requested a detailed study of 
medical and work histories back to 1933, an increase in the scope of workers' 
compensation coverage, and an increase in benefits. It also demanded that the government 
"accept responsibility for inaction" and compensate all claims dating back to 1933.134 
I31St. Lawrence Workers Protective Union (CNTU), "Submission to the Royal 
Commission on St. Lawrence," 45, GN6, 3, P ANL. 
132SL WPU, ''Submission to the Royal Commission on St. Lawrence," 3 .. 
133SL WPU, "Submission to the Royal Commission on St. Lawrence,''51. 
134SLWPU, "Submission to the Royal Commission on St. Lawrence," 90-1. 
345 
The Commission's third and final public hearing was held in St. Lawrence in April 
1969. The main topic at this hearing was the submission of the St. Lawrence Town 
Council, which was presented by Mayor Fabian Aylward (the brother of the Commission 
Chairman). Though brief, the Town Council's submission was direct and highly critical, 
especially of the provincial government: 
Rigid and proper inspection in the mines would have reduced substantially 
the hazardous conditions prevailing in the stopes long before this 
[ventilation and monitoring] system was introduced .... The time has come 
when procrastination on the part of all Departments of Government must 
be frowned upon, condemned and proscribed by those responsible .... 135 
Furthermore, the Town Council submission argued, most improvements in working 
conditions at the mines over the years had been brought about, not out of concern and 
action by the government and the companies, but by ''persistent and insistent demands for 
intervention, regulation and control by Union leaders and respectable citizens."136 The 
Council submission also harshly criticized the 1965 sale and transfer of the Corporation's 
St. Lawrence holdings to Alcan. That move, the submission stated, added to the people's 
"deep seated sense of injustice" by simply handing over, without consultation, something 
which the people, because of the history of the industry, considered ''part of their natural 
135Town of St. Lawrence, "Submission of the to the Royal Commission on St. 
Lawrence," 16, GN 6, 3, P ANL. 
13~own of St. Lawrence, "Submission to the Royal Commission on St. 
Lawrence," 6. 
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inheritance."137 The Council submission also pressed the need for alternate industries, 
particularly in a context where dependence on a single industry left the people 
"particularly susceptible to the hazards associated with industrial activity."138 
In addition to the acceptance of written submissions and the holding of public 
hearings, the Royal Commission also sought to find out as much as possible about the 
work and health histories of mine employees, the impact of industrial disease on workers 
and their dependants, and their experiences with compensation claims. This was 
accomplished partly by accessing and compiling employment, medical and death records. 
In the case of the St. Lawrence Corporation, and both companies in the pre-1950 period, 
this proved difficult to accomplish in some cases, and the evidence had to be 
supplemented by the testimony of witnesses. Another major component of the Royal 
Commission's work involved interviewing miners, former miners and dependants. The 
Commission met with about 150 individuals for this purpose. In addition, there were two 
general meetings with widows already in receipt of compensation benefits. 
The evidence gathered and compiled in these case files presents a vivid picture of 
the impact of industrial disease on miners and their families over the years. In some cases, 
incapacitated miners, as well widows and children, had subsisted for years on social 
137T own of St. Lawrence, "Submission to the Royal Commission on St. 
Lawrence," 9. 
138Town of St. Lawrence, ''Submission to the Royal Commission on St. 
Lawrence," 14. 
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assistance payments because the claimant had been out of the place of employment for 
more than twelve months prior to the claim being made, because death or incapacity 
occurred before 1951, because of an inability conclusively to diagnose the ailment, or 
because of some other bureaucratic or technical reason. 
One man had worked at the Corporation for a few years beginning in 1940 before 
moving to Newfluor in 1942. He was badly hurt in a groundfall in 1944, returned to work 
in 194 7, and worked until 1961, when he was forced to quit because of "shortness of 
breath." His compensation claim had been refused because his disease was not covered by 
Act, and he and his wife and five children had been living on welfare in the meantime. 139 
Another man, who had worked underground at Newfluor from 1948 until being 
transferred to a surface job in 1960, had been told in 1963 that he had a chronic 
obstructive lung disease but had his claim repeatedly denied because he had neither cancer 
nor silicosis. He had been told to do only "light work" but, having no education, could 
find no such employment. 140 
In another case, a miner had worked with both companies for seventeen years and 
continued working until two weeks before he died of cancer in 1949, at the age of39. His 
wife died three months later. The compensation claim had been denied because the miner 
died before the Act came into effect. A son had since worked to raise his seven brothers 
139Case Files, Royal Commission on St. Lawrence, GN 6, 1, P ANL. 
14
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and sisters, with some help from the grandfather.141 
A man who bad become incapacitated in 1957 and bad his claim denied bad tried 
to return to work with contractors at the Tarefare _mine in 1967. He had worked just eight 
shifts before having to take to his bed, and was told by a doctor that he could never work 
in a mine again. The plight faced by these people is starkly illustrated by the fact that, in a 
letter to this claimant in 1960, the WCB noted its confusion that the man did not appear 
relieved that his x-ray showed no silicosis.142 For men in this situation, a compensable 
disease was their only hope for a modicum of income support. 
Many claimants had found the WCB far from helpful and in some instances 
insulting and condescending. For example, one disabled miner -- who was later 
compensated for a chronic obstructive pulmonary disease resulting from his approximately 
twenty years as a miner-- had been told by a WCB Medical Officer that,"I think the 
impression in St. Lawtence is that all ailments, infections, allergies, etc., will be covered by 
the Board."143 Claims had been rejected because the Act covered only specific illnesses, 
whereas many men were suffering or had died -- some at a very early age -- from cancer 
of the stomach, bowels, spine, or of the throat or some part of the respiratory system 
other than the lungs. There were also cases in which former miners were diagnosed as 
141Case Files, Royal Commission on St. Lawrence, GN 6, 1, P ANL. 
142Case Files, Royal Commission on St. Lawrence, GN 6, 1, P ANL. 
143Case Files, Royal Commission on St. Lawrence, GN 6, 1, P ANL. 
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partially disabled and were being compensated based on the WCB's assessment of their 
potential earning capacity, but the fact was that many of these men, incapacitated, lacking 
education and other skills and living in what was essentially a single-industry community, 
simply could not earn any money to supplement their compensation benefits. In addition, 
job opportunities for women were very limited, and it was unlikely that they could acquire 
paying work to supplement the family income. 
These are just a few of the many cases examined by the Royal Commission, 
revealing the toll that industrial disease and bureaucratic strictures had exacted from these 
people, and the inadequacy of the existing compensation regime in dealing with a problem 
of this magnitude. 
While the Royal Commission proceeded with its public hearings and investigations 
and with the compiling of its report, the union and the company were busy with other 
matters. In August 1967, the union had notified the company of its desire to re-negotiate 
the collective agreement, which expired in August. 144 The Union's chief demands were in 
the areas of wages and ''union security," including the issue of contracting out. The union 
claimed that in many cases the men employed by contractors earned up to $1.00 an hour 
more than Newfluor men doing the same work and that, to correct this "glaring injustice," 
the contractors should be made to comply with the tenns of the collective agreement. Also 
under "security," the union was once again forced to combat an attempt by Newfluor to 
144Leo Slaney to Wiseman, 15 August 1967, SLMM. 
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absolve the company of responsibility for the dues check-off. The union also demanded an 
across-the-board wage increase of 50 cents per hour as of30 September I967, and 
another 50 cents as of 30 September I968. 145 
Negotiations went slowly during the winter ofi967-68, partly because ofthe focus 
on the Royal Commission, and partly because of the same factors which delayed 
preparation of the union's submission to the Commission. The agreement which was 
finally signed in Aprili968 retained the company's obligation to perform the dues check-
off: but did not address the issue of contracting out. Also, though they were far short of 
the union's demands, the agreement did secure some wage increases: fourteen cents per 
hour as of I Aprili968, ten cents as of I Aprili969, and nine cents as of 1 April1970. 
The agreement was set to expire on 31 March 197I. 146 
Newfluor, meanwhile, continued to refine its public relations campaign. A key 
element in this was the I968 establishment of a newsletter called the Newjluor News. This 
publication was used for a variety of purposes -- it advertised local events, provided 
sports and other community news and served as a forum for local service organizations, 
such as the Lions Club (which Wtseman had helped found). Its chief aim, however, was to 
put a good face on Newfluor' s safety record and its contribution to the community. The 
145Georges Cantin, Technical Advisor, CNTU, to L.K. Lossing, Alcan, 23 January 
I968, SLMM. 
146
"Collective Labour Agreement between Newfoundland Fluorspar Limited and 
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March 1968 issue, for example, contained an article about a piece published in the 
magazine Canadian Scientist, stating that ventilation and monitoring had rendered 
Director mine free of radiation hazards, as well as an article summarizing Newfluor' s 
handling of the rockburst problem at Director. 147 The October 1968 issue had an article 
on a recent visit of the "Alcan Medical Team" to St. Lawrence, with sub-headings such as 
"Employees Express Satisfaction," and "Doctors lmpressed."148 The Alcan Medical Team 
itself: which began visiting St. Lawrence annually in early 1968 was part ofthe public 
relations campaign. According to Dr. Brent, it had been established to give St. Lawrence 
"the kind of Company health program that is available to Alcan employees in other parts 
ofCanada."149 The company also began a ritual of handing out Safety Medallions to 
employees who had gone a certain number of hours without a lost-time accident, instituted 
a "Twenty-Five Year Club" which inducted and honoured workers achieving that length 
of service, and established a "Wise Owl Club" which recognized workers who protected 
their own health and safety.150 The Newfluor News was also used as a forum for 
publishing average radiation readings, and anything else that contributed to polishing the 
147
''Newfluor Brief Submitted," Newfluor News, 2, 3 (March 1968), 1-2. 
14~'Medical Team Completes Examinations," Newjluor News, 2, II (October 
I968), 1. 
149
"Medical Team Completes Examinations," Ne-wfluor News, 2, 11 (October 
1968), 1. 
150f'or instance: "Four New 25-Year Club Members," Newfluor News, 2, 12 
(November 1968), 1. 
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company's image. 
Newfluor had also begun using community organizations as part of it public 
relations efforts. Safety Officer Gerry Drover and other staff members became involved in 
community groups such as the Lions Club, and the company became involved in 
sponsoring local sports teams and competitions. In 1968, Newfluor began sponsoring an 
annual Christmas event where children of current or former Newfluor employees received 
a gift, compliments of the company, from ''Santa Claus." Newfluor also continued its 
attempts, through more private channels, to win the support of various government 
officials. In May 1968, for instance, Ethridge sent to provincial Health Minister John C. 
Crosbie a 1967 magazine article called "Alcan Companies Play Major Role in Eradicating 
Miner's [sic] Sickness." The article stated that it was Alcan's Dr. Frank Brent who first 
suggested the St. Lawrence mines be checked for radiation, in 1957.151 The article did not 
mention that the radiation tests were not done. 
In March 1968, the company brought in additional professional help for its public 
relations campaign. It obtained the services of Eric Trist, an expert in "Organizational 
Theory" from the University of California, to conduct a field study in the community and 
provide recommendations on improving community morale and labour relations. Trist was 
in St. Lawrence during 18-23 March 1968. Trist claimed to have found that there was still 
151Harry Ethridge, Public Relations Manager, Newfluor, to John C. Crosbie, 
Minister ofHealth, Government ofNewfoundland, 10 May 1968, "Survey Lung Cancer 
St. Lawrence Miners," GN 78/1/B, 220, File 290/G/07, PANL. 
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a lot of anxiety about the radiation hazard among those not actually employed in the 
mines, such as the ''wives and mothers of those likely to be exposed" and among people 
outside the community, but that most of those actually working underground believed the 
mine to be safe. 152 The best possibility for instilling wider confidence, he suggested, would 
be a "favourable report from the [Royal] Commission."153 He commended management 
for what he considered good public relations moves, such as the recent decision to post 
daily radiation readings. He pointed out, however, that any trust which existed was 
"brittle," and cited as evidence the union's claim that if and when the government's daily 
radiation monitor left St. Lawrence, the company would not conduct the daily readings 
because it simply would not be willing to pay a man to do it. 154 According to Trist, the 
establishment of the Ne»fluor News, the formation of the Alcan Medical Team and the 
introduction of a company-sponsored weekly radio broadcast called ''St. Lawrence 
Report" had done much to "communicate a more rational understanding" of the situation 
and to project a more positive image of the company. The Newjluor News, in his 
assessment, was especially effective since, "Anything it says about radiation is the more 
readily believed because the facts it reports about community activities can be verified by 
152Eric L. Trist, "The Situation at Newfoundland Fluorspar Limited in relation to 
the St. Lawrence Community," unpublished document, CNS. 
153Trist, ''The Situation at St. Lawrence," 4. 
154Trist, "The Situation at St. Lawrence," 5. 
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the readers."155 He recommended that the company continue and increase such efforts, 
make more use of community groups such as the Lions Club, and make a sizeable 
contribution to a fund being proposed for the construction of a recreational facility. 156 
Trist also pointed out that an important factor contributing to the morale problem 
plaguing the workplace and the community was the fact that supervisory staff were almost 
invariably from mainland Canada or Europe and the lack of local men in these positions 
contributed to sociaJ differentiation and resentment. 157 According to Trist, health and 
safety problems at the mines bad also eroded the sense of self-worth among the 
underground workforce and given rise to the belief, especially among young people, that 
the mine was somewhere you might be forced to go if you did not do well in school. 158 
The Trist Report also touched upon the dilemma in which workers in such 
situations, lacking employment alternatives, often found themselves. During 1966, work 
associated with the opening of the Tarefare mine brought the Newfluor workforce up to 
250.159 The closure of sections of Director mine after the rockburst accident of September 
155Trist, "The Situation at St. Lawrence," 6-8. 
156Trist, "The Situation at St. Lawrence," 26. 
157Trist, "The Situation at St. Lawrence," 15-16. 
158Trist, "The Situation at St. Lawrence," 16-17. 
159Department of Mines, Agriculture and Resources, Annual Report for the Year 
Ended 31 March 1967, 173. 
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1967, however, had resulted in a decrease in employment, down to about 200 men 160 
Trist stated that in discussing with the union president and others the closure of sections of 
the Director mine after the 1967 accident, he found that the men were tom between their 
belief that the Director mine was dangerous and their desire to get the mine back into full 
production and get displaced miners back to work. 161 
When Newfluor staff met to discuss Trist' s report on 29 May 1968, several ofhis 
conclusions were called into question. Management pointed out, for example, that there 
was no longer any shortage oflocal men willing to apply for jobs, and that Trist's 
assessment of the different levels of anxiety among different segments of the population 
did not seem to be accurate. Management also rejected the suggestion that the company 
assume responsibility for daily radiation readings should the government withdraw that 
service, since in its view daily radiation readings were unnecessary. 162 Management 
agreed, however, with other suggestions made by Trist. It was agreed that efforts should 
be made to try to get the union president to become a paid employee of the company 
rather than of the union and to then get him involved in radiation readings and other health 
160Department of Mines, Agriculture and Resources, Annual Report for the Year 
Ended 31 March 1968, 212. 
161Trist, "The Situation at St. Lawrence," 10-13. 
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and safety measures, something which Trist claimed the union president was in favour 
o£163 This, it was believed, would have the combined effect of giving the president's 
stamp of approval in health and safety matters and familiarize him with the daily 
operations of the mine. 164 Management also agreed that the company should continue and 
increase its public relations efforts, and more specifically that it would provide further 
funding for the establishment of community organizations.165 
The opening of the new Tarefare mine in the fall of 1968 provided another 
opportunity for a public relations event. Minister of Mines W.R CaUahan detonated the 
underground blast that signaled the official opening, and both he and Newfluor officials 
pointed to the Tarefare project as an indication of Alcan's long-term commitment to the 
St. Lawrence fluorpsar industry. CaUaban also used the occasion to praise the work ofthe 
Royal Commission and Newfluor' s efforts in making the St. Lawrence mines "as safe as 
any in the world." 166 These public relations efforts continued throughout 1969, especially 
by way of the Nelif/uor News, which continued to run articles extolling the many 
economic benefits the company had brought to St. Lawrence, its professed commitment to 
continued industry expansion and its support of local community and sports organizations. 
The newsletter also continued to be a forum for attempting to improve the company' s 
163Trist, ''The Situation at St. Lawrence," 10-13. 
164
"Report on the meeting to discuss the report of Professor Eric Trist," 2. 
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image on health and safety issues, publishing articles on inductions into the "Wise Owl 
Club," visits by the Alcan Medical Team and results of radiation surveys (including 
explanations for any excessive readings). Another strategy undertaken by way of the 
Newjluor News, beginning in 1969, was an effort to put a more human face on the 
company. A two-part article published in April and May 1969 presented a personal profile 
of newly-appointed Alcan president Paul Lexnan, including a description of his family 
life.t67 
6.5 The Findings of the Royal Commission 
The Royal Commission submitted its report and recommendations to the 
government in July 1969. The report did not deal in detail with the historical aspects of 
the case, though there was a brief discussion of the circumstances surrounding the 
establishment of the mining industry and of the findings of the Trade Dispute Board in 
1942. The report noted that at that time the union had requested that x-rays be taken to 
determine whether conditions at the mines were hann:ful to the workers' health. The Royal 
Commission report remarked that, "It is indeed most unfortunate that the x-ray 
examinations of the miners as requested by the Union at that time were not taken. 
Subsequent events proved that this was indeed a most important submission and a 
167Newjluor News, 3, 4 (April1969), 1; and 3,5 (May 1969), 4. 
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reasonable request but no action was taken."168 Apart from this and a brief account of the 
1960 strike, there was little discussion of the role played by the union or others in 
demanding better working conditions and action on the industrial disease problem. 
The report was mildly critical of the St. Lawrence Corporation's handling of the 
industrial disease question, noting that even after official diagnosis of the first silicosis case 
in 1952, the Corporation manager ''refused to believe that silicosis was present."169 The 
report stated that since the confirmation of the radiation hazard in 1960, both Newfluor 
management and the government had done a good job of keeping levels down and 
controlling the hazard.170 There was very little discussion, and no criticism, of the role 
played by the Department of Mines and its inspectorate. The report did, however, criticize 
the provincial Department of Heath for being "slow in its acknowledgment of serious 
occupational health hazards in the mines at St. Lawrence."171 The report also charged that 
the federal Department of Health and Welfare had been ''unwarrantedly bureaucratic" in 
its response to the situation in the 1950s. According to the report, in 1950 the physician 
at St. Lawrence (Dr. Pepper) wrote the Department ofNational Health and Welfare 
asking for help in starting a health survey among St. Lawrence miners, and was told that 
the federal department would act on such a request only if put to them by the provincial 
168Report of the Royal Commission on St. Lawrence, 24. 
169Report of the Royal Commission on St. Lawrence, 164. 
170 Report of the Royal Commission on St. Lawrence, 62. 
171Report of the Royal Commission on St. Lawrence, 42. 
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Department of Health. Six years later, according to the Commission's report, the same 
request was made by the provincial Department of Mines, and the same answer received, 
so the provincial Department of Mines asked the provincial Department of Health to 
request the survey, and the federal Department then complied.172 
The technical portion of the report included scientific discussion of the nature of 
radiation and radon gases, and the pathologies of cancer and respiratory diseases. The 
report also discussed mortality rates, workers' compensation claims, and the plight of 
disabled miners and dependants. As of 1967, 240 deaths were known to have occurred 
among those who had worked for either company since 1933. Ofthese, 25 were said to 
have been caused by silicosis and tuberculosis, 9 by other diseases of the respiratory 
system, 53 from cancer of the trachea and lungs, 21 from cancer of the stomach and 
digestive system, 10 by other cancers, and 61 from diseases of the heart and 
cardiovascular system. Of the 53 deaths from cancer ofthe trachea and lungs, 24 had 
occurred in the period 1963-67 alone, 35 of the victims had been under 55 years old, and 
all but 2 had worked mostly underground as opposed to on the surface. 173 
In addition to the incidence of cancer of the trachea and lungs, the other striking 
figure, in the Commission's view, was the incidence of cancer of the digestive system, 
which accounted for two-thirds of all other cancer deaths. While the rate of death from 
172Report of the Royal Commission on St. Lawrence, 34. 
173 Report of the Royal Commission on St. Lawrence, 178-9. 
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cancer of the stomach and digestive system was roughly the same among surface and 
underground employees, there was a striking difference in the average age of deaths in this 
category; for surface employees with this type of cancer, the average age at death was 
71.2 years, while for underground employees it was just 52.6 years. In the words of the 
report, this ''may be suggestive of an as yet unrecognized aspect of occupational 
exposure." The Commission suggested that this phenomenon might have been related to 
the ingestion of local water from both the mines' and the community's public water 
supply. These supplies had been tested and were known to contain much higher than 
normal levels of radon-222.174 The Commission noted that while the incidence of death 
from stomach cancer among the general population in St. Lawrence did not appear higher 
than the average for the Burin Peninsula, ''the age at death definitely showed a shift to the 
younger age group," but that the evidence on whether this was caused by an 
environmental factor was thus far inconclusive. 175 It is worth noting that many miners had 
been drinking radon-contaminated water for years, sometimes directly off the rock face, 
and had been claiming since the 1930s that the water was not fit to drink, and demanding 
proper drinking and sanitary facilities. 
Examining the level of compensation benefits being received by widows and 
disabled miners, the Commission found them inadequate to meet even basic needs. In 
174Report of the Royal Commission on St. Lawrence, 136-7. 
175Report of the Royal Commission on St. Lawrence, 134. 
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1969, the widow of a deceased miner received, upon her husband's death, a $300.00 lump 
sum payment plus $300.00 for burial expenses and, after that, $100.00 per month for 
herself and $35.00 per month for each dependent child. In the event that she remarried, 
her benefits and her children's benefits were terminated and she received a lump sum 
payment of $1,200, or twelve times her monthly payment, whichever was the greater 
amount. In cases of disabled workers with a permanent partial disability, compensation 
was based upon the WCB's assessment of the percentage of earning power lost because of 
the disability. In cases of permanent total disability, the benefit was calculated as 75 per 
cent of the average weekly earnings in the twelve months prior to the disability. The 
maximum amount of compensation payable per month, in cases of both disability and 
death, and regardless of the number of dependents, was $312.50. 176 
In 1969, there were 4 3 widows and their dependent children receiving 
compensation benefits arising from industrial diseases associated with the St. Lawrence 
mines, and another seven received benefits arising from fatal accidents. In addition, there 
were ten cases of men receiving compensation for silicosis. The official percentage of 
their disability ranged from 25 to 100 per cent, and their monthly payments from $46.88 to 
$250.00. Three other miners were receiving compensation for lung cancer; and their 
benefits ranged from $57.69 to $72.11 per month. One of the serious problems with the 
176Act No. 58, 1967. An Act to Amend the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1962. 
(A new consolidated Act was passed in 1962, embodying the amendments made since 
1950.) 
362 
administration of benefits arose from the way in which the principle of retroactivity was 
applied. Since the introduction of the Act in 1951, there had been periodic, moderate 
increases in benefits. The level of benefit actually paid for a compensable injury or disease, 
however, did not reflect these increases but was based on the amount in effect at the time 
of disablement or death. Thus, if a widow began receiving compensation in 1953, she did 
not receive any increase in payments as a result of amendments made thereafter. This not 
only left payments abysmally low in many cases, but also created a serious inequity in 
amounts received. The Commission found that in 1967 there were many cases where 
widows with the same number of dependents received very different amounts of 
compensation because some received, for instance, the 1962 rate and others the 1954 rate. 
This inequity was "a major complaint of the widows interviewed." So pressing was this 
problem that the Commission urged the WCB to address it immediately and an 
amendment was passed on 1 July 1967 making all widows eligible for rates then in 
effect.177 The1967 amendment did not, however, grant widows retroactive payments to 
make up for benefits they had lost over the years because they had not received the 
periodic increases. 
The Commission discovered many instances where widows had no indoor 
plumbing, could not carry out basic maintenance on their homes and were unable to 
177 Report of the Royal Commission on St. Lawrence, 233-4. 
363 
provide decent winter clothing for their children.178 Widows receiving compensation 
benefits, especially those with large families, were in many cases worse off financially than 
those on social assistance.179 Many of these women, it was pointed out, had no access to 
other means of support, and could hardly turn to their family or neighbours for help, when 
so many in the community were in the same position. The Commission concluded that it 
was "unjust, humiliating and degrading for widows of deceased workmen who died as a 
result of an occupational disease" to be left in this position. 180 
The Commission also examined compensation claims which had already been made 
and the claims which might be made based on the medical and employment information 
which had been gathered. The purpose of this was two-fold: to assess the WCB's reasons 
for rejecting past claims, and to recommend whether certain claims should be now be 
rejected or accepted. The question of acceptance or rejection depended on both the 
Commission's assessment ofthe WCB's handling of past claims and on which ofthe 
Commission's recommendations the government accepted or rejected. In other words, the 
Commission could decide that some claims should be accepted if the Commission's 
recommendations were accepted. 
178Case Files, Royal Commission on St. Lawrence. 
119Report of the Royal Commission on St. Lawrence, 232-3. 
180 Report of the Royal Commission on St. Lawrence, 260-1. 
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The Commission found that 18 claims had been rejected by the Board, some 
because they arose from deaths or disabilities which occurred before 1951, others because 
the person had died from an illness other than lung cancer. This second group included 
deaths from bowel cancer, stomach cancer and kidney cancer, as well as deaths attributed 
to tuberculosis and chronic bronchitis.181 In assessing the WCB's justification for rejecting 
these claims, the Commission, while questioning the scope of the Newfoundland 
legislation in dealing with a situation such as that which existed in St. Lawrence, 
nonetheless concluded that based on the legislation as it was constituted up to that point, 
"the Workmen's Compensation Board was reasonably efficient in handling the majority of 
the claims for compensation arising out of ... the fluorspar mines at St. Lawrence."182 The 
Commission examined 122 cases in all. Of these, 23 were already receiving compensation 
or had received it at some point. Of the others, 47 were judged to be ''Not entitled to 
compensation under our recommendations," and 52 to be "Entitled to compensation under 
our recommendations."183 Those judged to be not entitled were oftwo groups: (1) deaths 
not considered related to underground employment," including deaths from cardiovascular 
diseases, gastro-intestinal and urinary system diseases, and cancers other than that of the 
respiratory system and lungs, and (2) deaths of individuals with no record of underground 
181Report of the Royal Commission on St. Lawrence, 260-1. 
182 Report of the Royal Commission on St. Lawrence, 266. 
183 Report of the Royal Commission on St. Lawrence, 266-72. 
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employment or with a record of underground employment "incompatible with disease 
causing disability or death." The Commission was careful to note that it did not have the 
final word on any case -- the emergence of new evidence or some other development 
might affect the status of any claim.184 Furthermore, those determined to be entitled 
would not necessarily be compensated and nor would those determined to be not entitled 
necessarily be rejected. In either case, that judgement would depend on whether or not the 
relevant recommendations were ultimately accepted and made into law. The final Report 
of the Royal Commissio~ submitted in July 1969, contained 69 "Conclusions and 
Recommendations." The fate of widows, disabled miners, and workers now hinged on the 
government's response to those recommendations-- which ones it would institute and 
which it would reject. 
6.6 Conclusion 
Shipments and employment levels remained high through the 1960s, and Newfluor 
re-opened the Tarefare mine to meet sustained demand for fluorspar. In their new status as 
an affiliate of the CNTU, the union was able to win some key concessions in several 
collective agreements, in the areas of wages and occupational health and safety. Union-
management relations continued to be strained, however, especially over workplace health 
issues such as radiation and rockbursts. The government attempted to allay the 
184 Report of the Royal Commission on St. Lawrence, 272. 
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workforce's fears and suspicions by introducing new legislative measures and by issuing 
assurances, sometimes at the request of the company, that the mines were safe. Radiation 
readings in excess of safe working levels continued to be common, however, and workers 
were not reassured by the pronouncements of the government and the company. Another 
factor contributing to the hostility that marked this period was the inadequacy of financial 
support paid to widows and disabled miners and the legislative restrictions that cut many 
off from any kind of compensation benefits. Based upon a brief submitted by St. 
Lawrence resident Rennie Slaney, the Workmen's Compensation Review Committee 
appointed in 1965 urged the provincial government to recognize the extent of the St. 
Lawrence tragedy and to take action to address it. The result was the appointment of a 
Royal Commission in 1967, which revealed some of the history of neglect which had 
contributed to the tragedy as well as the toll it had exacted in physical, financial, 
psychological, and social terms. The company's response to increased public attention to 
the St. Lawrence situation was to embark on a well-planned public relations campaign to 
counteract negative publicity and to polish its corporate image. The Royal Commission 
itself was perceived by the company and the government as an important part of that 
campaign. That workers were not placated by the efforts of the company and the 
government indicates the depth of the animosity and suspicion which had become 
ingrained over the years. Furthermore, while the findings of the Royal Commission were 
generally favourable to the demands of compensation claimants, it was still up to the 
government to accept or reject those recommendations. The government's response to the 
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Royal Commission and subsequent events during the 1970s forms the subject of the next 
chapter. 
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Chapter 7: Labour Unrest, Public Protest, and Industry Closure, 1970-78 
Introduction 
The company and the government had clearly hoped that the Royal Commission 
would help bring a measure of peace and stability to the St. Lawrence situation, just as 
widows, disabled miners, and the union had hoped that the commission would address 
their concerns over health and safety and workers' compensation. The 1970s turned out, 
however, to be a time of unprecedented labour unrest and public protest. During the 
1970s, the unrest and hostility which had marked the labour relations climate for years 
spilled into the community itself in a more open way than it ever had before, as the wives 
of miners staged protests and blockades to support their husbands and to demand action 
on occupational health and safety and workers' compensation issues. While the company 
proceeded with development and expansion plans as well as possible within this climate, in 
1977 it announced its decision to shut down the St. Lawrence mines. This chapter 
explores labour and public unrest, the legislative and corporate response to it, and the 
complex array of factors and forces which shaped this tumultuous period in the history of 
the St. Lawrence mines, culminating in complete industry closure in 1978, after nearly five 
decades of mining. 
7.1 The Response to the Royal Commission 
Initially, the 1970s promised to be good years for the St. Lawrence mines. Both 
the Director and Tarefare mines were in production, milling and loading facilities were 
being upgraded and expanded, two new staff residences had been constructed at a 
combined cost of over $50,000 and Newfluor employed 335 workers at the end of1969. 
In 1970, the company shipped a new record 158,000 tons of fluorspar, an increase of 
about 40 per cent over 1969. Plans were also underway to open a third mine at the old 
Blue Beach site which Alcan had purchased from the St. Lawrence Corporation in 1965.1 
After submission of the Royal Commission's report, Newfluor continued its efforts to 
polish its corporate image, sponsoring events such as the annual Santa Claus visit and 
various sporting events, and supporting organizations such as the Boy Scouts, Girl Guides 
and Lion's Club. The company also continued to publicize radiation readings and to claim 
that problem areas were immediately addressed, and to draw attention to its other health 
and safety initiatives, such as the "WISe Owl Club." The company also repeatedly 
congratulated its workers for achieving record production levels while paying close 
attention to health and safety considerations. 2 
Alongside the expansion ofthe mining industry and the image of harmony 
portrayed by the public relations material, however, hostilities and grievances still 
simmered. These were sometimes manifested in such things as increased vandalism and 
theft of company property, to the point where Newfluor was compelled in 1969 to hire 
1Canada, Department of Mines and Technical Surveys, Canadian Mineral 
Industry, (Ottawa, 1970), 227-8. 
2These subjects were regular features of the Ne'Kj/uor News throughout 1969 and 
1970. 
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professional security officers. 3 A major source of grievance during late 1969 and early 
1970 was the perceived lack of action on the part of the government in response to the 
Royal Commission. From the time the report was submitted to the government in July 
1969, various parties, including the union and the Town Council, pressed the government 
to make public its position on the report's recommendations.4 The government' s response 
to the recommendations, which it finally released in May 1970, neither addressed the 
grievances nor alleviated tensions in the workplace and the community. In fact, the 
government's response further eroded standards in some areas and increased hostility in 
the workplace and the community. 
Many of the Royal Commission's "Conclusions and Recommendations" were 
routine and non-controversial reiterations of what had already been established by 
previous studies. Others, however, became far more contentious, especially those dealing 
with radiation monitoring and with compensation coverage. The Commission had 
recommended that a second radiation monitor be employed at St. Lawrence. The 
government proposed that in the future radiation monitoring would be the responsibility of 
the company, which would bear the costs of as many monitors it chose to employ. 5 This 
3
"Security Police for Newfluor," Newjluor News, 3, 6 (June 1969), 3. 
4SLWPU to Smallwood, 24 November 1969, and Joint Councils ofthe Burin 
Peninsula to Smallwood, 2 February 1970, Coli 075, File 3.27.037, CNSA. 
5
"Decisions of the Government Made in Respect of the Conclusions and 
Recommendations Set Forth in the Report of the Royal Commission Respecting 
Radiation, Compensation and Safety at the St. Lawrence Fluorspar Mines," 2-3, 
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reply grew out of a suggestion made several months earlier by Mines Minister W.R. 
Callahan, who hoped that Newfluor would employ the government monitor then in St. 
Lawrence and thus free up resources to allow the Mines Inspection Division to hire a 
clerk.6 In concurring with this suggestion, the government was in effect absolving itself of 
responsibility for monitoring and leaving workers with no independent monitor. 
The government's initial response to the recommendations also signaled little 
improvement in the area of workers' compensation and widows' benefits. The 
Commission had recommended that anyone still employed at a St. Lawrence mine in 1970 
who had worked in a St. Lawrence mine before 1960 be given regular medical 
examinations and then given the option to either continue or discontinue working 
underground based on the results of those examinations. It had recommended that, should 
they choose to discontinue, they be compensated accordingly. The problem with this 
recommendation, from the government's point of view, was that it included anyone 
working in a St. Lawrence mine "before 1960," for the government still sought to limit 
retroactivity of claims to when the Act came into force in 1951. The government's 
response, therefore, was to agree on the issues of examination and of compensation where 
appropriate, but to limit the potential qualifying group to those who "did not terminate 
unpublished document, CNS. 
6W.R. Callahan, Minister ofMines, Agriculture and Resources, to Smallwood, 19 
February 1970, Coli 075, File 3.27.037, CNSA Callahan had recently replaced Keough, 
who became Minister of Labour. 
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their employment prior to 1951. "7 
This limit on retroactivity set the standard for the government's response to many 
of the other reconunendations dealing with compensation. Recommendation 28 had noted 
that since the medical evidence on the complex interaction of the causes of reduced 
puhnonary function (bronchitis, silicosis, tuberculosis, twnors, etc.) was in some cases 
indeterminate, "the symptom ofloss of pulmonary function" should be taken into account 
when considering compensation to those employed in the mines before 1960. To this, the 
government replied that any decision to award compensation in such cases would be 
subject to a limit on retroactivity to 1951.8 Similarly, to a a recommendation that ''the 
dependents of every miner who died or may die as a result oflung cancer or silicosis 
regardless of the date of death should receive compensation," the government agreed, 
with the qualification that this apply to those who died or may die "as a result oflung 
cancer or silicosis contracted while working in a mine since 1951." Other 
recommendations called for compensation for anyone disabled by lung cancer or silicosis 
who had worked in a St. Lawrence mine "at any time." Here the government explicitly 
rejected the phrase "at any time," and stated that it should be replaced with "since 1951" 
anywhere it was used in the recommendations.9 The only consideration given to claims 
7
"Decisions of the Government on the Report of the Royal Commission," 4. 
&'Decisions of the Government on the Report of the Royal Commission," 6-7. 
9
"Decisions of the Government on the Report of the Royal Commission," 14-16. 
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arising in cases where the worker had terminated employment prior to 1951 was under the 
"Special Fund" which had been suggested by the company in its submission and been 
incorporated as a recommendation. The government stated that in cases where a disabled 
or deceased worker had ceased employment in the mines prior to 1951, consideration 
would be given to including such cases under this Special Fund, and that it would pursue 
the possibility ofhaving such a fund established with the assistance of the other relevant 
parties.10 
In addition to extending retroactivity, the Commission had also recommended 
extending compensation coverage to cases of tuberculosis, any chronic obstructive 
pulmonary disease and cancers other than lung cancers, such as those affecting the nose 
and throat. The government responded that these diseases would not be added to the 
Schedule oflndustrial Diseases and therefore would not be compensable. The government 
did agree, however, to include silico-tuberculosis as a compensable disease. 11 The 
Commission had also recommended raising the compensation rates paid to widows, and 
the government agreed to remove the monthly limit of $375.00 (which had been in effect 
as of 1 July 1969) and to pay $100.00 per month to widows and $35.00 for each 
dependent child regardless of the number of children. 12 
10. 
10
"Decisions of the Government on the Report ofthe Royal Commission," 4. 
11
"Decisions ofthe Government on the Report ofthe Royal Commission," 14-16, 
12
"Decisions of the Government on the Report of the Royal Commission," 16. 
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By retaining the 1951 limit on potential compensation claims, apart from possible 
consideration under the yet to be established Special Fund, the government's response did 
nothing to address those cases where workers had terminated employment -- in many 
cases because of an industrial disease -- before 1951. Apart from a relatively small 
number of cases where workers had developed silico-tuberculosis and had terminated their 
employment after 1951, its response also did nothing to address those many documented 
cases of workers whose death or disability arose from other diseases developed while 
working in the mines before and after 1951. The removal of the $375.00 monthly limit on 
widows' benefits would also benefit only a few cases. The ceiling of$375.00 per month 
was based on $100.00 per month for a widow and $35.00 for each dependent child up to a 
maximum of eight children, so the removal of the limit would result in an increase only for 
those widows with more than eight dependent children. 
Not surprisingly, the government's response to the recommendations drew sharp 
criticism from some quarters. The union charged that the government's position on the 
compensation issues demonstrated its complete lack of regard for the "misery and 
suffering that have faced the widows and dependents of deceased and disabled miners." 
The union also argued that the decision to make the radiation monitor an employee of the 
company had reversed what little progress had been made in that area in recent years and 
had revealed that the government's real intent in appointing a monitor at the union's 
insistence in 1967 was "to bury a very controversial issue that was a source of 
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embarrassment to the Government. " 13 Burin MHA Alex Hickman (one of several 
politicians who had recently crossed from the Liberal to the Progressive Conservative side 
of the House) charged that by handing responsibility for radiation monitoring over to the 
company, the government was "abdicating" its duty to protect the health of St. Lawrence 
miners.14 In the House of Assembly, Mines Minister Callahan was repeatedly called on to 
defend the government's decision in this regard, but did little other than repeat the claim 
that it was the "legal responsibility" and the ''moral responsibility'' of the company to 
protect the health of its employees. Hickman reminded Callahan that the union president 
had stated that this decision would cause increased suspicion of the company and labour 
unrest at St. Lawrence. Callahan replied that the government would conduct its own 
inspections to ensure that the company was fulfilling its duties, and repeated that the law 
required operators to ensure that their mines were safe. 15 
The government also came under sharp criticism for its handling of the issue of 
widows' benefits. In March 1970, just before release of the government's response to the 
Royal Commssion, the Department of Public Welfare reported on an investigation into the 
circumstances of about 20 widows in St. Lawrence, which it had carried out at the request 
13Leo Slaney, SL WPU, to W.J. Keough, Minister of Labour, 28 May 1970, 
SLMM. 
14
"Government Response to St. Lawrence Study Draws Fire," Evening Telegram, 
3 June 1970. 
15Journal of the House of Assembly of Newfoundland, 4 June 1970, Vol. 96,6137-
45. 
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of the union. The department conceded that in many cases compensation benefits were 
inadequate and families were living in sub-standard housing, but stated that little that 
could be done except to advise these women of their right to apply for welfare to 
supplement their compensation benefits. The department also suggested that these women 
try to supplement their incomes through such activities as "small scale gardening, berry 
picking, mending and sewing. " 16 
After the release of the government's response to the Royal Commission, Hickman 
pointed out that widows in St. Lawrence were still no better off and that in many cases 
widows receiving compensation were still financially worse off than others receiving 
welfare. While conceding that some of these women might receive welfare benefits to 
supplement their incomes if they chose to apply, Hickman pointed out that they were not 
entitled to other welfare benefits, such as those covering housing and school supplies. In 
addition, he pointed out, many widows refused to apply for welfare on the grounds that 
they believed there was a fundamental difference between welfare and compensation and 
saw no justification for having to go on welfare when they should be entitled to a 
sufficient income from the compensation for which their husbands had worked. To this, 
the Minister ofPublic Health and Welfare simply replied that these women had been 
16StephenA Neary, Minister ofPublic Welfare, to Leo Slaney, SLWPU, 31 March 
1970, SLMM. 
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informed of their rights under the legislation.17 
Criticism ofthe government's response to the Commission's recommendations 
continued through 1970. In November, Commission Chairman Fintan Aylward wrote to 
the Premier charging that the government had essentially ignored the Commission's 
recommendations regarding compensation and stating that he had been contacted by many 
widows and disabled miners who were frustrated by the government's response to their 
plight. 18 One source of confusion was the fact that the Commission's report had listed 51 
names of men who were "Entitled to compensation under our recommendations" and 
many people apparently interpreted this as meaning they were automatically entitled. Many 
of the recommendations, however, had not been accepted and consequently only 7 of 
these 51 claims had actually been accepted.19 
7.2 Public Protest and Labour Unrest. 1971 
It was within this highly charged atmosphere that the union notified the company, 
in February 1971, of its desire to re-negotiate the collective agreement.20 The union's 
main demand was for an across-the-board wage increase of$1 .25 per hour, which would 
17Journal of the House of Assembly of Newfoundland, 8 June1970, Vol. 100, 
6431-3. 
18Fintan Aylward to Smallwood, 30 November 1970, Coli 075, File 3.27.037, 
CNSA. 
1~eough to Smallwood, 17 November 1970, Coli 075, File 3.27.037, CNSA. 
20SLWPU, Press Release, 5 February 1971, SLMM. 
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give St. Lawrence workers wage parity with workers at Alcan's Arvida smelter. In making 
this demand, the union predicted "hard bargaining ahead," a prediction which turned out 
to be accurate. 21 A government conciliator appointed in March was unable to facilitate an 
agreement and on 27 March talks broke down. On 1 April, the union requested 
appointment of a conciliation board. Under the Labour Relations Act, the Minister of 
Labour had fourteen days after the request to appoint a board and, if no appointment was 
made in that time, the union was then in a legal position to strike. 22 
On 5 April, however, before expiration of the 14-day waiting period, matters took 
an unusual turn when about 30 women from St. Lawrence and Lawn began picketing the 
loading dock to prevent an ore carrier from loading a shipment of ore for Arvida. They 
spent that night at the dock, under observation by several RCMP officers, and were joined 
the following day by about ten other women. The union was reportedly "not backing this 
picketing"; workers stayed on the job, but made no effort to cross the women's protest 
line and load the vessel.23 The women were still on the dock two days later, with many 
carrying placards reading "We Support Our Husbands." A spokeswoman for the group 
stated that they believed that allowing the ore to be loaded would undercut the union's 
bargaining position. About a dozen RCMP officers from detachments around the Burin 
21SLWPU, Press Release, 5 February 1971, SLMM. 
22Evening Telegram, 7 April1971 , 3. Steve Neary was Acting Minister or Labour 
at this time, as W.J. Keough had recently died. 
23Evening Telegram, 6 April1971, 3. 
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Peninsula continued to patrol the scene. 24 The protest ended on 8 Ap~ when the ore 
carrier sailed without having loaded the ore. 25 
While brief: the women's protest was significant in a number of respects. Though 
women had long suffered the adverse effects of industrial disease -- caring for dying 
husbands, raising children with little financial support, living with the constant fear that · 
their husband or son might be next -- and though they had tried through various channels 
to draw attention to their plight, the 1971 protest was the first concerted, public action 
they had taken. Given the hardships and frustration that women of the community had 
endured for so many years, it is not surprising that labour relations hostilities spilled into 
the general community in the tense atmosphere of the early 1970s. 
The company and the union continued to meet during early Ap~ but could not 
reach a deal on wages. The company replied to the union's demand of a $1.25 per hour 
increase with an offer of a $1.00 per hour increase for the highest paid workers and 
considerably less than that for most. On 15 Ap~ union members rejected that offer 299 
to 6, and on 18 April the workers went on strike. 26 While the official and specific 
justification for the 1971 strike was the demand for a wage increase, the strike must be 
viewed as part of the complex web of grievances and forces which were at work. The 
24Evening Telegram, 7 April1971, 3. 
25Evening Telegram, 8 Apri11971 , 3. 
26
"St. Lawrence Workers Vote to Strike," Evening Telegram, 16 Aprill971, 3, 
and 18 April1971. 
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Special Fund, which the government had promised to establish more than a year earlier 
with contnbutions from company and government sources, had still not been established 
by April1971, and the government was drawing criticism for inaction on this proposal.27 
It had also been revealed that Alcan had entered into an agreement in 1970 to purchase 
fluorspar from a Mexican supplier and that shipments of that ore were reportedly 
scheduled to commence in April 1971.28 The knowledge that Alcan was turning to 
Mexican suppliers did little to reduce hostilities at St. Lawrence, especially given the 
demise of the Corporation's St. Lawrence mines while that company had been importing 
Mexican ore for Canadian consumers. 
At the more general level, labour unrest increased dramatically across the entire 
province in 1971. In 1970, there was a total of just 8 strikes involving less than 1,000 
workers in the province; in 1971, there were 29 strikes involving nearly 6,000 workers.29 
About a week before St. Lawrence miners took to the picket line, members of the United 
Steelworkers of America Local6960 at the British Newfoundland Exploration copper 
mine in Springdale on the northeast coast began a month-long strike to demand increased 
wages and improved benefits. 30 On 3 April, the Newfoundland Fishermen, Food and 
27
"Long Time Before Benefits Come, says St. Lawrence Union President," 
Evening Telegram, 2 April1971. 
28
"St. Lawrence Strike," Evening Telegram, 10 April 1970. 
29Kealey, "History and Structure," 112. 
30
"Strikes Continue, Over 500 Workers Out," Evening Telegram, 12 April 1971. 
Springdale miners returned to work on 6 May, settling for a 24 cents per hour increase 
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Allied Workers' Union (NFFA WU) began what would become a long series of strikes and 
protests around the island. When the St. Lawrence strike began on 18 April, it brought to 
over 1,000 the number of workers from various sectors on strike around the province.31 
In addition to this growing labour unrest, the political scene was also in turmoil. 
The Smallwood government was coming to the end of its term in office and appeared to 
be losing the grip it had held on Newfoundland politics since 1949. The govenunent was 
under intense pressure to call an election and was being vigorously challenged by a group 
of highly vocal Progressive Conservative politicians, including Alex Hickman, the .MHA 
for Burin, who missed no opportunity to raise the St. Lawrence issue in the media and in 
the House of Assembly. 32 This political situation would play a key role in events in St. 
Lawrence during 1971 and in the media's depiction of the situation there. 
Representatives from both Alcan and the CNTU, brought in from Montreal, along 
with local union and company representatives, began to meet again on 4 May to try to 
settle the dispute, but talks broke down again just two days later. From the union's 
perspective, its wage demand was intended not only to help keep pace with the rising cost 
of living, but also to help compensate for the special dangers encountered by St. Lawrence 
miners. When company representatives compared its wage offer to the one accepted by 
over two years; they had sought 20 cents over one year: "Month-old Strike Ends at 
Springdale," Evening Telegram, 6 May 1971. 
31
"1,000 Workers Now Off Jobs," Evening Telegram, 19 Aprill97l. 
32See Gillespie, A Class Act, 130-2. 
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Springdale miners on 5 May (24 cents over 2 years), the SL WPU president responded 
that, "There is no comparison. They don't have the problems in Springdale that we have 
here. "33 CNTU representative Peter Curtis, who was participating in the ta1ks, reiterated 
this position and suggested that in this strike the company was dealing with a different 
situation than it had grown used to in St. Lawrence. To the company's suggestion that its 
offer of a $1.01 per hour increase was very generous, Curtis replied that there was more at 
stake than wages and that Alcan was dealing with a ''new breed of worker" in St. 
Lawrence, ''men who had watched their fathers and relations snuffed out in the prime of 
life by lung cancer or mine accidents. Men who have seen these same fathers and relations 
taken advantage of in other wage settlements." Curtis suggested that any wage offer 
made to St. Lawrence miners had to be considered in light of the special dangers that 
existed there. He charged that the company was being infleXIble at the bargaining table and 
promised CNTU support for as long as the strike lasted. As an indication of the 
underlying issues at stake and the solidarity they had generated, on 7 May women in the 
community took over the picket lines while the striking miners marched through the town 
to the cemetery carrying a coffin and a cancer symbol.34 
33
"Breakdown Negotiations, St. Lawrence Strike Still On," Evening Telegram, 7 
May 1971. 
34
"St. Lawrence Strike Could be a Long One," Evening Telegram, 10 May 1971, 
3. 
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As the strike continued through May, June and July, the issues of health and safety, 
workers' compensation and the Special Fund continued to be sources of controversy. 
After drawing strong criticism, especially from Hickman and the union, for its response to 
the recommendation regarding radiation monitoring, in May 1971 the government 
changed its position and proposed that the government monitor in St. Lawrence, David 
Rex, be posted there permanently at government expense. The government and the union 
had also reportedly agreed to a program for establishing qualifications for radiation 
monitors, and to a study to determine how many monitors were needed and the best 
method of testing and reporting. Mines Minister Callahan stated that a method of 
personal monitoring being considered by the Inspections Division was one whereby miners 
leaving the mine at the end of a shift would use an electric razor to shave a few hairs from 
their arms, which would then be tested for radiation exposure. In response to this 
suggestion Hickman charged that the government was not taking the matter seriously, but 
once again trying to "bury the issue and forget it. "35 
In June 1971, the government introduced changes to the Workmen's 
Compensation Act designed to embody some of its decisions on the recommendations of 
the Royal Commission. In amendments scheduled to take effect on 1 July 1971, the 
monthly payment for widows was increased from $100 to $120, and the monthly payment 
to dependent children from $35 to $40. The $375 monthly ceiling on widows' benefits 
35
"New Safety Measures Planned for St. Lawrence Mines," Evening Telegram, 14 
May 1971, 11. 
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was eliminated. The 1971 amendments also embodied another recommendation of the 
Royal Commission and gave claimants the right to select, from a prepared list, one 
member of the three-member medical committee appointed to consider compensation 
laims 36 c . 
Negotiations over the establishment of the Special Fund, meanwhile, were still 
ongoing. In May 1971, the St. Lawrence Town Council wrote to the government on 
behalf of potential claimants requesting that the fund be established. The government 
replied that Alcan and the provincial government had agreed to contribute, but that the 
federal government had not yet responded and no progress had been made in locating or 
receiving any reply from anyone associated with the St. Lawrence Corporation. 37 By the 
end of July 1971, the provincial government and Alcan had apparently given up hope that 
the federal government or the St. Lawrence Corporation would be contnbuting to the 
fund and decided to proceed on a fifty-fifty basis. Alcan urged the provincial government 
to make an announcement to that effect "as quickly as possible" -- a request no doubt 
made in light of the strike situation at St. Lawrence. 38 
36Workmen's Compensation (Amendment) Act, 1971 . 
37St. Lawrence Town Council to Smallwood, 26 May 1971, and Smallwood to St. 
Lawrence Town Council, 1 June 1971, Coli 075, File 3.27.037, CNSA. 
38J.W. Cameron, Aluminum Company of Canada, to Smallwood, 28 July 1971, 
Coli 075, File 3.27.037, CNSA. 
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As the St. Lawrence strike dragged on, other issues began to come into play and 
to complicate matters for the company and the government. There was the general 
problem of continuing widespread labour unrest. On 21 June, over 500 miners and 
electricians at ASARCO's Bucl1ans mine went on strike for improved wages and benefits, 
joining 800 others from various sectors on strike around the province. 39 At the local level, 
perceived social problems in the community of St. Lawrence also began to attract media 
attention. The press reported in June that many young people in St. Lawrence had 
become involved in drug use. The parish priest, RCMP and town residents attnouted the 
apparently higher than usual incidence of drug abuse in the community to a number of 
factors. It was suggested that, because of its status as an industrial community, St. 
Lawrence was not like other, more traditional Newfoundland communities and that people 
there were more apt to "try new things," including drugs. Others pointed out that there 
were no recreational facilities in the community, though a facility had been promised for 
years. The most common reason offered for increasing drug use in the town, however, 
was the number ofhouseholds without fathers and the belief that the high death rate in the 
community had instilled in young people the attitude that they should "eat, drink, and be 
merry for tomorrow we may die. '"*0 Many Newfoundland communities had no youth 
recreational facilities and many communities, such as the pulp and paper towns and other 
3. 
39
"Buchans Strike Could be a Long One," Evening Telegram, 23 June 1971, 3. 
40
"Drug Problem Developing in St. Lawrence," Evening Telegram, 30 June 1971, 
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mining communities, did not qualify as ''traditional" Newfoundland communities. If drug 
use by young people in St. Lawrence was higher than in other Newfoundland 
communities, it was likely related to the high incidence of death among the adult male 
population. It was not demonstrated, however, that drug use was any higher there than 
elsewhere in Newfoundland, and only further research could determine whether this was 
so and why. 
In addition to these social problems, the plight of St. Lawrence widows and 
disabled miners also continued to garner public attention over the course of the strike. A 
newspaper report in early July depicted the dire circumstances under which many people 
continued to struggle. One woman, whose husband was classed as 80 per cent disabled 
but was unable to earn any other income, descnbed trying to raise six children on $158 a 
month. Widows talked of raising two children on their own with less than $200 monthly 
income. Many widows' houses were in disrepair and many talked of having no social life 
because they could not afford even the small amount of money it would take to attend 
events such as card games or bingo. One widow described how frustrated she and others 
had become with seeing government reports and studies over the years amount to nothing 
in the way of real help and of getting only government procrastination and sympathy in 
response to their efforts. Others suggested that, contrary to the version of events often 
depicted by Alcan and the provincial government, it was the union and the women of the 
community who were responsible for any real action taken on issues ofhealth and safety 
and compensation. The union, it was noted, had included in its original proposal to 
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renegotiate the collective agreement in February 1971 a clause stipulating that 40 cents 
per ton of ore shipped be channeled into the Special Fund, a suggestion which the 
company refused even to consider.41 
The negative publicity continued throughout the summer. A dying miner 
interviewed in the St. Lawrence hospital talked of regretting "every day I worked in the 
mine," and of his grueling and frustrating attempts to get financial support for his family.42 
Given the circumstances and the publicity surrounding them, it is not surprising that some 
took a cynical view of a July announcement that government representatives, including 
Smallwood, would go to St. Lawrence soon to announce the establishment of the Special 
Fund. Satirist Ray Guy noted that after years of neglect and procrastination, with an 
election two months away, the "Smallwood flying circus" was off to St. Lawrence to 
"wring from the sorrow and torment of widows and orphans a few more filthy votes. •>43 
Though the picket lines themselves remained peaceful as the strike dragged on 
through summer, there were many underlying points of tension and conflict within the 
community. Striking workers were becoming deeply resentful of the non-unionized staff 
members who were carrying out basic duties such as keeping the mine pumps running, and 
they resented the company's treatment of these workers and their families. The union 
41
"The Widows Of St. Lawrence: Won't Somebody Out There Help Us," Evening 
Telegram, 6 July 1971, 8, 12. 
42
"A Miner' s Fate," Evening Telegram, 8 July 1971, 18. 
43Evening Telegram, 6 July 1971, 6. 
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charged, for example, that the company was provoking workers by delivering hampers of 
food and bottles of wine to these staff members' households and by continuing to host 
parties at the Staff House every Friday night. There was also growing conflict over the 
media coverage of the strike and of other issues over the years. Both the union president 
and the town's long-time resident physician, Dr. Brian Hollywood, charged that the 
company constantly manipulated the media's coverage of the St. Lawrence situation and 
used such channels as the Newjluor News to present a distorted version of events. The 
union president claimed that many things he had reported or submitted to the Newjluor 
News had been altered without his knowledge or consent before publication. The 
company denied all such allegations. 44 
On 2 August, Premier Smallwood made his promised trip to St. Lawrence and 
announced the establishment of the Special Fund to be jointly financed by Alcan and the 
provincial government. The details were yet to be worked out, but it was believed that 
about 100 families then receiving compensation benefits would qualify for the fund 
initially. Royal Commission chairman Fintan Aylward remarked that while the 
establishment of the Special Fund would undoubtedly benefit some families, more effort 
should have been made to locate parties associated with the former St. Lawrence 
44 Alcan Strike Enters 13th Week, Miners Not Feeling the Pinch ... Yet," Evening 
Telegram, 9 July 1971, 7. 
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Corporation and to force them to contribute to the fund. 45 One commentator noted that 
while any financial help was welcome, it was too bad that people had to wait until the 
Smallwood government needed to improve the electoral chances of its Liberal candidate in 
the district to get that help.46 
In setting up the Special Fund, the provincial government and Alcan originally 
contnbuted $500,000 each, for a total of$1,000,000, to be paid out at a rate of$100,000 
per year. A local committee was established with representatives from the union, the 
company, the government and widows in the community. Payments would be based on 
family size. Initially, 51 applicants whose claims had already been approved by the 
Workmen's Compensation Board were approved, and these would begin receiving Special 
Fund payments immediately. It was anticipated that at least 30 others would eventually 
qualify for compensation and thus the Special Fund, and approximately 70 other cases 
were under medical review. The funds for these as yet unsettled cases would be held in 
reserve. Based on the amount of money in the fund and the number of qualifYing and 
potentially qualifying recipients, the monthly payments from the fund would be $30.86 a 
month for a "head of a family unit" (disabled miner or widow), $15.43 a month for the 
wife of a disabled miner, and $7.72 per month for dependent children. Unlike workers' 
compensation benefits, the Special Fund was paid for children until they reached eighteen 
45
"Special Fund Set Up in St. Lawrence for Widows and Orphans of Miners," 
Evening Telegram, 2 August 1971,3. 
46<'At Last, Some Help," Evening Telegram, 2 August 1971, 6. 
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years of age or while they were attending school or a post-secondary institute. The highest 
amount paid out in the initial qualifying group was $100.34, to a family consisting of two 
parents with seven dependent children. 47 
Talks aimed at settling the strike, meanwhile, resumed on 25 August and by 10 
September an agreement had been reached. Under the terms of the agreement, workers 
would receive an immediate raise of 40 cents per hour and another raise of 19 cents after 
one year. There were also increases in the overtime rate, and in the rate for night shifts. 
The contract was set to expire on 31 March 1973.48 The union president noted that while 
the wage increase was considerably less than that initially sought, the union had made key 
gains in other areas, including seniority, sick benefits and annual vacations, and that the 
agreement represented the largest wage increase in the history of the operation. It was 
also pointed out that the strike had been instrumental in getting the company and the 
government to establish the Special Fund for disabled miners and dependents. It was clear, 
however, that the deal did not have solid support among the membership; only 60 per cent 
voted in favour of it. 49 Shortly after settlement of the 1971 strike, union president Leo 
47
''St. Lawrence Special Fund," (memo for the information of the Premier), Coli 
075, File 3.21.048, CNSA. 
48
"Collective Labour Agreement between Aluminum Company of Canada, Ltd., St. 
Lawrence, and St. Lawrence Workers' Protective Union, AA. 
49
''23-week old strike ends at St. Lawrence," Evening Telegram, 11 September 
1971, 3. 
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Slaney resigned and took a non-union position with the company, whereupon vice-
president George Doyle became Acting President of the union. 50 
In the aftermath of the strike, the company focused on its detrimental effects on 
the local economy. It was noted that not only were operations suspended and wages lost, 
but community projects such as the recreation centre were put on hold and the town's 
retail sector was adversely affected. 51 The company was also eager to point out that the 
Special Fund had been originally proposed by Newfluor in its brief to the Royal 
Commission and that Alcan had shown not only a willingness to contribute to the fund but 
"an anxiety to see it established."52 Alcan's willingness is understandable considering what 
the fund meant in terms of financial liability. Just as the company had been protected from 
financial liability when cancer claims were made a charge on the WCB's Disaster Fund 
about a decade earlier, under the Special Fund the company was getting the government 
and thus the taxpayers of the province to contnbute directly one half of the money 
required to compensate victims of industrial disease. Thus, the company, by proposing 
and then contnbuting to the fund, could polish its image as a good corporate citizen and 
responsible employer while at the same time avoiding much of the actual financial 
responsibility for the disease and death associated with its mines dating back to the 1940s. 
so.'St. Lawrence Union Head Quits," Evening Telegram, 30 September 1971, 1. 
51Strike ends, economy hurt," Newfluor News, 5, 4 (September 1971), 1. 
52
"Special Fund Established," Nelflluor News, 5, 4 (September 1971), 1. 
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The St. Lawrence Corporation, meanwhile, paid nothing into the Special Fund and had 
shouldered no financial liability for its negligence. 
7.3 Labour, Politics and Health and Safety, 1972-74 
Following settlement ofthe 1971 strike, relative calm returned to the labour 
relations front. There was one brief work stoppage in 1972, a wildcat strike that started on 
25 July over the firing of an employee whom the workers wanted rehired. All 325 
employees walked offthejob but returned to work the following day, though the worker 
was not rehired. 53 In January 1972, the Newfluor manager informed the Department of 
Mines that, while he believed the move was of little practical benefit because the 
company's radiation reduction program was sufficient, continuing pressure from the 
union and other ''political and social implications" had prompted the company to hire a 
second radiation monitor. The system, as he described it, would now involve weekly 
testing of areas which regularly gave no cause for concern, twice-weekly testing of areas 
which gave readings ofbetween 0 and 0.10 x SWL, and daily testing of areas with 
readings in excess ofO.IO x SWL. The company suggested that these tests be cross-
checked, as often as deemed appropriate, by the government monitor. The company 
concurred with the union in its desire to have the government monitor stay on in St. 
Lawrence because, as the manager put it, ' 'the miners trust Mr. Rex' s results more then 
53
"Wildcat Strike at St. Lawrence," Evening Telegram, 25 July 1972, 3, and 
"Wildcat Strikes are Ended," Evening Telegram, 26 July 1972, 3. 
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they do our monitors, even though the actual data collected are similar."54 
This correspondence is significant in a couple of respects. First, the remarks 
regarding the retention of the government monitor are indicative of a persistent mistrust 
on the part of the union of the company's monitoring program and of the suspicion which 
still marked the labour relations climate in general. Also, the fact that the company was · 
establishing target levels and testing frequencies indicates the extent to which it continued 
to set the agenda with respect to radiation monitoring. While this attempt at a pro-active 
approach may have been partly a public relations move, its also suggests that the 
government was willing to let the company continue to set standards for conditions in its 
own workplace. Furthermore, despite the company' s continuing claims that it had the 
radiation problem well under control, levels in excess of the SWL continued to be 
discovered. There were at least fourteen such readings obtained by the company monitor 
from March to September 1972. In September, the government monitor reported a 
reading of28.5 x SWL at Director mine. 55 
While the labour relations scene was relatively quiet in St. Lawrence in the 
aftermath of the 1971 strike, major changes were taking place in the wider political and 
labour relations arenas. On the provincial political scene, Smallwood was finally forced, 
54M.E. Gooding, Manager, Newfluor Works, to Fred Gover, Deputy Minster of 
Mines, 14 January 1972, SLMM. 
55Reports of Radiation Readings, 1972; and David Rex to Chief Inspector of Mines 
(cc: Newfluor Works and SLWPU), 28 September 1972, SLMM. 
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after a year of public relations maneuvering in which St. Lawrence figured prominently, to 
call a provincial election in September 1971. The election was held on 28 October and the 
initial results were 20 seats for Smallwood and the Liberals, 21 for Frank Moores and the 
Progressive Conservatives, and 1 for the newly-formed New Labrador Party. After a 
series of resignations (including Smallwood's) and defections during the winter of 1971-
72, it became obvious that the government as it stood was unworkable, and Moores called 
another election for 24 March 1972. The results of that election were more far more 
decisive- 33 seats for the Conservatives and just 9 for the Liberals. Hickman, the 
Conservative MHA for Burin District, held his seat in both the 1971 and 1972 elections 
and was made Minister of Justice under the new administration of Premier Frank 
Moores. 56 
Meanwhile, major upheavals were also taking place within the SL WPU's parent 
organization, the CNTU, some of which had direct implications for the St. Lawrence 
union. While the CNTU had provided public support, negotiating assistance, and financial 
aid to the SL WPU over the course of the 1971 strike, the parent body was increasingly 
preoccupied with events in Quebec. As with many parts of Canada, Quebec in the early 
1970s was subject to high inflation and unemployment, prompting a wave of labour and 
public unrest. In Quebec, there was a growing tendency to relate these economic factors 
56For an analysis of the 1971-72 elections, see Peter Neary, "Changing 
Government: The 1971-72 Newfoundland Example," in Hiller and Neary, Twentieth-
Century Newfoundland, 297-320. 
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to the political situation, giving rise to a marriage of the labour movement and the growing 
sovereignty movement. Within this context, the CNTU deepened its commitment to 
Quebec independence and to political radicalism. In September and October 1971, the 
CNTU issued its first public attacks on the capitalist system itself: identifYing it with what 
it perceived to be the imperialist domination of Quebec by Anglo-Canadian and American 
capital and concluding that the Quebec labour movement should devote itself to 
"Quebecois socialism. "57 
Not everyone, however, agreed with the CNTU's move in a more radical 
direction, and divisions within the executive and the member unions became apparent at 
the convention in May 1972, which coincided with widespread labour unrest throughout 
the province. 58 The split ultimately resulted in the loss of about 70,000 members, about 
one-third of the CNTU' s membership, over the course of 1972. About half of these joined 
a newly-formed breakaway organization known as the Confederation des Syndicats 
570n the developments of late 1971 and the immediate background to them, see 
CNTU, History of the Labour Movement in Quebec, 248-9, Black Rose Books Collective, 
Quebec Labour, 13-14; and Richard Desrosiers et Denis Heroux, Le travaillieur 
quebecois et le syndicalisme (Montreal: Les Presses de l'Universite du Quebec, 
1973),155-6. The October, 1971 manifesto is reproduced in Quebec Labour, 137-248. 
For a summary of the relationship between the Quebec labour movement and Quebec 
politics, including the role of the CNTU, in this period, see Ralph P. Giintzel, "Rapprocher 
les lieux du pouvoir": The Quebec Labour Movement and Quebec Sovereigntism, 1960-
2000," Labour, Le Travail 46 (Fall2000), 369-95. 
58 A formative event in the Quebec labour movement's shift to an increasingly 
militant position during this period was the formation of the "Common Front" in early 
1972, which refers to the unity of over 200,000 public sector workers, including 10,000 
from CNTU unions, against the Quebec government. 
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Democratique (CSD).59 Among those who eventually broke with the CNTU were many 
of the unions in the Metal Trades Federation, including those in the Quebec aluminum 
sector. By the end of 1973, about 9,000 such workers, or one-third ofthe Metal Trades 
Federation membership, had left the CNTU to join the CSD or some other parent body, or 
to become independent. From 1972 to 1973, the Metal Trades Federation of the CNTU 
went from 126locals with over 30,000 members to just 98locals with about 20,000 
members. The newly formed Metal Trades, Mines, and Chemical Products Democratic 
Federation ofthe CSD, meanwhile, had 39locals with over 7,000 members by the end of 
1973.60 The Arvida union joined the independent F&lt~ration des syndicats du secteur de 
!'aluminum (FSSA). The loss of so many unions and one-third of its membership was 
obviously a major blow to the Metal Trades Federation. For the St. Lawrence union, the 
defection of the Alcan-employed Quebec aluminum workers, especially those at Arvida, 
meant the loss of a direct connection to fellow CNTU-MTF workers and of one of the 
very few natural ties between the SL WPU and its parent organization. 
At the local level, however, the SL WPU continued to be concerned with more 
immediate issues, such as increased workers' compensation coverage and the further 
implementation of the Royal Commission' s recommendations. In July 1972, the new 
59CNTU, History of the Labour Movement in Quebec 231-49, and Rouillard, 
Histoire de Ia CSN, 233-8. 
~abour Canada, Labour Organizations in Canada, 1972, 31 , and 1973, 32-3; 
and Rouillard, Histoire de la CSN, 238, 260. 
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provincial government passed yet another amendment to the Workmen's Compensation 
Act, this one directed specifically at the St. Lawrence case. It stated that, because it was 
known that prior to 1960 miners in St. Lawrence worked in an atmosphere containing 
silica dust and radioactive particles, in cases where the causal connection between working 
conditions and the development of certain pulmonary diseases, including silicosis and lung 
cancer, could not be conclusively established, ''rational observation indicates the 
probability of such a connection." The amendment therefore stated that in cases where (a) 
a worker employed underground in a St. Lawrence mine between 1 January 1951 and 31 
December 1960 was disabled by or his death was caused by a chronic obstructive 
pulmonary disease, or (b) a worker or former worker was listed in the Report of the Royal 
Commission as being entitled to compensation under the recommendations, the disease or 
disability "shall be deemed due to the nature of the employment" and the worker and/or 
his dependents compensated accordingly. In keeping with the fact that the amendment was 
intended to embody the recommendations of the Royal Commission, entitlement to 
compensation was to be effective as of 1 September 1969 or the date of disability or 
death, whichever was the later date. The compensation to be paid out in such cases would 
be drawn from the Disaster Fund, in recognition of the fact that, "the people of this 
Province recognize the disability and death of the miners of St. Lawrence as a continuing 
disaster. '><>1 
61Workmen's Compensation (Amendment) Act, No. 54, 1972. 
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The 1972 amendment was significant in a number of respects. The assumption 
that pulmonary illnesses which developed while working in the mines were caused by the 
nature of employment was in fact a tacit recognition of a principle embodied in the original 
1951 Act and common to legislation all across the country, but had seldom been applied in 
the St. Lawrence case up to this time: that in inconclusive cases the claimant should be 
given the benefit of doubt. Also, the limit on retroactivity of benefits, to 1 September 
1969 or to the date of disability or death, whichever came later, meant that no benefits 
would be paid for those years between the time of disablement and 1 September1969, 
despite the fact that the Board now recognized that their disablement or death was caused 
by working conditions prior to that time. There was still no recourse for those who had 
become disabled prior to 1951. Also, that the funds to be paid out for potential claims 
arising from the amendment would be drawn from the Disaster Fund meant that the 
company still largely avoided financial responsibility for increased claims. 
Arguing that the Act still did not cover a variety of cases, the union continued to 
press for changes. In November 1972, for instance, the union urged the government to 
expand coverage to those who had worked in such places as the mill and crushing plant 
and had developed pulmonary diseases listed in the Schedule oflndustrial Diseases but 
were not covered under the Act because they had not worked underground. Also, in the 
union's view the Act, and especially the 1972 amendment, presumed that the danger from 
radiation and dust ceased to exist after 1960 and therefore no justifiable claims could arise 
after that date. The union argued that this was not the case and pointed out that in many 
399 
instances after 1960 miners had been moved out of certain underground areas because of 
radiation exposure. What, the union asked, would happen to such workers should they 
develop an industrial disease arising from exposure after 1960? The union also continued 
to demand that compensation coverage be extended to all those who had become disabled 
prior to 1951, and pointed to the inconsistency in compensating claimants listed in the 
Royal Commission report who had not worked after 1951 and refusing to consider other 
potential claims arising before that date simply because they had escaped the notice of the 
Royal Commission. 62 
In February 1973, the union presented the government with a formal brief outlining 
these concerns and demanding appropriate amendments to the Act. The union also 
requested changes to the practice of calculating benefits based upon wages being earned at 
the time a worker became disabled. According to the union, this practice, combined with 
the rising cost of living, left benefits far short of the amount required by disabled miners 
and their families to have a decent standard of living. To stress the psychological as well as 
the financial burden thus created, the union pointed out that because death benefits were 
calculated based upon a set amount regardless of earnings, "it is a tragic fact that some 
such men live in the realization that rather than contnbute to their dependents' welfare 
62George Doyle, President, SL WPU to T. Alex Hickman, Minister of Justice, 27 
November 1972, SLMM. 
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they are an obvious burden, in that compensation payable will increase on their deaths.'.c;3 
The union's 1973 brief also called for the appointment of an additional government 
radiation monitor at St. Lawrence, which was based on the belief that the one government 
monitor at St. Lawrence was inadequate, especially given that a third mine (the Blue 
Beach) had been opened and further expansion was planned. 64 
Before the government could give a formal response to the February brief or the 
union could pursue the matter further, the collective agreement signed in 1971 came up 
for renewal at the end of March 1973, and the union notified the company of its intention 
to seek changes, including a wage increase of$1.50 per hour. On 1 April, less than 24 
hours after expiration of the agreement, the union voted 90 per cent in favour of a strike 
and set up picket lines, claiming that the company refused to make a wage offer of any 
kind.65 
As was the case with the 1971 strike, the 1973 dispute was also part of a 
continuing wave oflabour unrest across the province. When the St. Lawrence workers 
went out on 1 April, they joined about 600 others from various sectors, including 
construction, petroleum refining and fish processing already on strike. At the Buchans 
63
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Act Respectfully Submitted to Government ofNewfoundland and Labrador by the St. 
Lawrence Workers' Protective Union," 7 February 1973, 6-7, SLMM. 
M<'Briefin Support of Certain Proposed Changes in the Workmen's Compensation 
Act," 1973, 7, SLMM. 
65
"St. Lawrence Miners Strike," Evening Telegram, 2 April1973. 
401 
mine, 570 workers represented by the USWA and the International Brotherhood of 
Electrical Workers had been on strike since 15 March demanding a wage increase, and 
USWA members at the Wabush iron ore mine had staged a week-long strike over the 
dismissal of an employee in March. 66 
Positions hardened very early in the St. Lawrence strike. Only two days after the 
walkout began, CNTU representative Peter Curtis predicted a long strike and accused the 
company of refusing to bargain seriously because it would not make a wage offer.67 The 
company, meanwhile, was seeking an injunction to force workers to let management 
personnel onto company premises. The application came before the Supreme Court on 4 
April, but the hearing was postponed until 17 April. 68 Ten days into the strike, workers 
submitted to management a petition demanding that the company restart negotiations by 
making a monetary offer of some kind. 69 Two weeks after the petition was submitted, 
management stated that it was still "studying" the document, but was not yet ready to 
formulate a response. Meanwhile, the company had been successful in obtaining a court 
664
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injunction limiting the number of picketers permitted at company entrances. 70 
On 3 May, the membership voted in favour of an offer giving them increases of 
between 55 and 78 cents per hour over the life of the contract, which was due to expire at 
the end ofMarch 1975. The new contract also contained a clause requiring the transfer 
and retraining of workers who could no longer work underground for health reasons. The 
union noted that though it did not get everything it wanted, the wage increases were 
substantial, and the retraining clause as well as other concessions in areas ofholidays and 
annual vacations were important victories. 71 
A couple of factors may have prompted the union to settle for this package at this 
point. The union president had noted several days before the settlement that workers 
were under some financial strain because they had as yet received no strike pay from the 
CNTU, though it had been due to arrive in mid-April 72 Also, on 1 May, two days before 
settlement of the strike, the government had passed further amendments to the Workmen's 
Compensation Act. 73 The 1973 amendments increased the monthly payment to widows 
from $120 to $150 and the monthly benefit to dependent children from $40 to $50. In 
7o.'St. Lawrence Union Seeks Meet with Government," Evening Telegram, 24 
April1973, 2; and "Miners Want Inquiry," Evening Telegram, 25 April1973, 2. 
71
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72
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73lt is worth noting that the changes were made public the day before the strike 
was settled: "Workmen's Compensation Payments Increased," Evening Telegram, 2 May 
1973, 2. 
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addition, a clause directed specifically at the St. Lawrence case repealed the limit which 
allowed for silicosis and cancer claims arising only from underground employment 
between 1951 and 1960, and provided for claims for workers "employed at any time, 
whether before or after the first day of January 1951." It also allowed clallns arising from 
work in "fluorspar extraction or handling, or both, at St. Lawrence," thus covering 
workers who had not been employed underground at the time of their disability. 74 This 
clause was a direct response to the union's brief presented several months earlier, and 
represented an important victory for the union and others who had been lobbying to have 
pre-1951 claims and claims for non-underground work recognized. The changes were to 
be effective as of 1 July 1973. 
The 1973 amendment resulted in an increase in claims and a reversal of decisions 
in some cases. Clallns continued to be denied, however, for various reasons, primarily 
because of a lack of evidence that a medical condition or cause of death was attnoutable 
to working conditions. 75 The union continued to lobby for settlement of such cases and 
urged the WCB to "stop fooling around with the lives of those sick men. .. and their 
families ... so that our sick Brother Members may live in a peaceful mind, knowing that at 
least their children will be taken care of because of their last efforts."76 Furthermore, even 
7~e Workmen's Compensation (Amendment) Act, No. 115, 1973. 
75There is various correspondence to this effect in the union documents for 1973. 
76George Doyle, SL WPU to Allison Bugden, Chairman, Workmen' s 
Compensation Board, 15 May 1973, SLMM. 
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with recent increases, benefits remained very low. To take a typical case: one claimant 
assessed as 30 per cent disabled had his claim approved in July 1973, and began receiving 
a weekly benefit of$17.31. This amount was based on his earnings at the time ofhis 
disability, which was prior to 1 April1961. This case also qualified for the Special Fund, 
which was awarded in September 1973, in the amount of$115.78 per month. Based on 
the formula for the Special Fund, this means that there were two adults and nine 
dependent children in this household, living on a monthly income of$185.02.77 It must 
also be noted that in cases such as this the claimant received no retroactive benefits to the 
time of the disablement- only to the time at which the Act or amendment under which his 
claim was accepted carne into force. Also, no consideration was given to the fact that 
wages and the cost of living had increased dramatically since the time of the disablement. 
Rather, benefits were calculated based on the worker's wages at that time, which in this 
case was at least thirteen years before approval of the claim. 
Following settlement of the 1973 strike, 1974 was a relatively quiet year on the 
labour relations front in St. Lawrence. On the industry front, 1974 was another year of 
increased production and expansion. Alcan established of a second mine shaft at the 
Tarefare site, known as "Tarefare 2," and by April most of the surface work had been 
completed by a Nova Scotia construction firm. The shaft-sinking, which was to be carried 
out by another firm which Newfluor had been contracting for such work since the 1960s, 
77Various letters to and from the claimant and the Workmen's Compensation 
Board, July, August, and September, 1973, SLMM. 
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was set to begin in June, and the mine was scheduled to go into production in 1976.78 
Fluorspar shipments for 197 4 set a new record. 79 
The company also continued to use such channels as the Nrnfluor News to 
generate publicity regarding its safety efforts and community involvement. During 1974, 
however, the Newjluor News ceased publishing information on radiation readings, though 
it clearly continued to be a problem and the union continued to be concerned about it. 
The union submitted to the company in May 1974, for instance, that ventilation was 
inadequate in several areas of the Tarefare mine and that levels in excess of the SWL 
continued to be to be detected by both company and government monitors at Blue Beach, 
Tarefare, and Director. 80 
Some of the company's public relations efforts bordered on the ridiculous. The 
December 1974, issue, for example, carried an advertisement for a book on making crafts 
and decorations using aluminum foil, available to Alcan employees at St. Lawrence for the 
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special reduced price of$3.00.81 Others showed the extent to which the company had 
succeeded in infiltrating and using local organizations to its own public relations ends. One 
article, for instance, quoted at length Mayor Jules Mirauh's praise for the company' s 
community improvement efforts in such initiatives as construction of a new soccer pitch; 
the mayor happened to be the man hired by the company in 1972 as a radiation 
technician. 82 
While 1974 was for the most part a relatively quiet year on the labour relations 
front, developments towards the end of the year signaled more unrest brewing, especially 
with the collective agreement coming up for renewal again in March 1975. Events as they 
subsequently unfolded in St. Lawrence must be seen in the context of the CNTU's 
continuing radicalism and how that intersected with the labour relations situation within 
Quebec and within Alcan' s other Canadian operations. Following the shift to a more 
radical program during 1971-72, the CNTU and many other Quebec-based labour 
organizations continued to engage in militant job actions. Striking members of a Quebec 
Federation of Labour (QFL) union held out for nine months during 1973-74 at the 
American-owned Firestone tire plant in Joliette, and walked out again in a wildcat strike in 
the summer of 1974. The Joliette strike was important not only because it became a 
:flashpoint for the anti-American views of many Quebec nationalists, but also because it 
81
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prompted the formation of some inter-union solidarity during a very discordant period in 
the Quebec labour movement. CNTU-affiliated workers employed by Canadian Gypsum 
walked off the job in May 1973 and won their demands after twenty months of struggle. 
In August 1973, 400 workers from 20 companies occupied the offices of the Quebec 
Department of Labour to demand anti-scab legislation. A formative event in the escalating 
labour militancy in the province was the strike by 2,000 members of the United 
Aeronautics Workers (of the QFL) at the Longueuil aircraft plant, which began in January 
1974 and became one of the longest and most bitterly fought strikes in Canadian history, 
lasting until the summer of 1975. Bitter labour battles, as well as intense inter-union 
rivalry, also gripped the Quebec construction industry in this period. In April1974, QFL 
union leaders allegedly instigated violence at the James Bay hydro-electric power project 
site in an attempt to monopolize the unions there at the expense of the CNTU. Following 
an inquiry, the Robert Bourassa government introduced legislation designed to deal with 
such actions. At the same time, workers in the construction industry also displayed 
solidarity on certain issues, especially that of wage increases to keep pace with the rising 
cost of living. Forty thousand construction workers staged a demonstration in Montreal in 
October 197 4 over the issue of wage indexation. 83 
83For a summary of major developments in the Quebec labour movement in this 
period, see CNTU, The History of the Labour Movement in Quebec, 241-6; Rouillard, 
Histoire de Ia CSN, 246-70; and CSN/CEQ, Histoire du mouvement au Quebec, 177-210. 
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The question of wage indexation was central to the Quebec labour movement, as it 
was to all Canadian unions, in this period, as in nearly every sector in every region of the 
country, inflation continued to outpace wage increases. In March 1974, for instance, 
several major organizations, including the CNTU, agreed to engage in a concerted 
campaign to demand indexation of wages to keep pace with inflation. Throughout 1974, 
several Quebec unions staged strikes and protests to demand cost-of-living increases, 
including workers at the Montreal Transit Commission, who staged a victorious 44-day 
strike over the issue in the summer of 1974.84 
Given this general background, it is not surprising that in the fall of 1974, with the 
existing collective agreement set to expire in six months, the CNTU began urging the 
SL WPU to join with it in taking a hard stand on the issue of indexation. The CNTU also 
outlined the inequity in wage scales among Alcan employees across the country as further 
justification for demanding a substantial raise. It pointed out that under a recent 
settlement workers at Alcan's aluminum smelter in Kitimat (members of the Canadian 
Association of Smelter and Allied Workers and affiliated with the Congress of Canadian 
Unions), were earning on average $2.30 more an hour than Alcan employees in St. 
Lawrence, despite the fact that the cost of living was higher in Newfoundland than in 
British Columbia. Furthermore, it was argued, inflation during the period 1972 to 1975 
meant that Newfoundland and Quebec workers had actually received no increase in real 
84CNTU, The History of the Labour Movement in Quebec, 239-40. 
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wages, while Kitirnat workers had received about an 8 per cent increase. For the CNTU, 
this was about more than wages: it was also an indication that Alcan had "divided its 
employees in Canada in three classes. A top-rated class of workers out west, a second 
class in Quebec, and a third class in Newfoundland."85 In other words, the St. Lawrence 
wage question had become, for the CNTU, an instance of regional disparity and 
oppression within Canada. 
To correct the inequality in wages and to make up for the wage attrition by 
inflation, the CNTU demanded that Alcan grant St. Lawrence workers an immediate wage 
increase of73 cents - 43 cents to compensate for inflation during 1974 and 30 cents to 
close the gap between workers in St. Lawrence and those in Kitirnat. This was more, it 
was pointed out, than the 63-cent increase offered as cost-of-living adjustment to Quebec 
workers until the end oftheir contract in 1976, and more than the 58 cents agreed to for 
the next nine months in K.itimat, but no more than the St. Lawrence workers deserved. 86 
The battle lines for renegotiation of the contract in 1975 were being established 
early and firmly, and the St. Lawrence union was being drawn into the arena of wider 
battles being fought in Quebec and across Canada. The CNTU' s position on wage 
disparities and its demand for such increases for St. Lawrence workers is also significant in 
85
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that it is one of the few times, outside the context of formal negotiations or a strike, that 
the St. Lawrence union was signaled out for such special attention by the parent body, 
even to the point of demanding bigger increases for St. Lawrence workers than for 
Quebec workers. Perhaps the departure of so many members during 1972-73 had been a 
good thing for the St. Lawrence union: with fewer locals and members to deal with, 
perhaps the CNTU was able to devote increased attention to unions which had historically 
been more peripheral to the organization. 
7.4 The Dispute of1975-76 
Apparently anticipating substantial monetary demands in the next round of 
negotiations, Alcan began early in 1975 to portray itself as going through a difficult time 
and, by implication, unable to grant expected wage demands. The February 1975 issue of 
the Newfluor News, for instance, carried an extensive article on the impact of a 
recessionary downturn on Alcan and predictions for a ''tough year ahead." Alcan 
President Paul H. Leman was quoted as saying that he had never seen "as sudden and 
violent a downturn as we are in right now."87 The demand for fluorspar was beginning to 
level off after several years of rapid growth. 88 Aluminum ingot production declined by 
about 15 per cent from 1974 to 1975, and Alcan's Quebec smelters were operating at 
87
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slightly reduced capacity. 89 In addition, technological changes in the smelting process had 
reduced the amount of fluorspar required per ton of raw aluminum.90 The company 
nonetheless continued to show substantial profits, $169 million (US) in 1974 and $35 
million (US) in 1975.91 The company attributed the decrease in profits to rising production 
costs, including increased wages. 92 
The union, apparently unconcerned about Alcan's alleged economic difficulties, 
pressed ahead with its demands for a substantial wage increase and other changes to the 
collective agreement.93 The non-monetary demands included changes in the seniority 
system, increased sick pay, more frequent radiation monitoring and increased union 
representation on the Safety Committee. The union also demanded an across-the-board 
increase of$2.50 as of 1 April1975, plus the establishment of a cost-of-living allowance 
(COLA) system under which wages would increase by 1 cent per hour for every .3 per 
cent rise in the Consumer Price Index (CPI). The agreement on basic wages was to be in 
8~itvak and Moule, A/can Aluminum Limited, 91, 150. 
90Canadian Mineral Industry, 1974, 193. 
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effect for one year, while the COLA was to be in effect for two years.94 
The company initially refused to discuss wages until the non-monetary issues had 
been settled and workers stayed on the job through April and May, two months past 
expiration of the contract. On 18 May, the company presented a counter-offer on wages 
which would see an increase of $1.23 per hour over 2 years and a COLA in year two 
only. The company claimed this was its final offer on wages.95 About a week after that 
counter-offer, a group of about 200 women staged a much larger version ofthe 1971 
protest and blocked the ore carrier Hamil doc from taking on a load of fluorspar. The 
women kept up the blockade for twelve days. The company tried to get an injunction to 
clear the women from the loading dock, but it was turned down. Based on what it called 
the "illegal" occupation of its premises and the CNTU representative's claim that $2.50 
per hour was the union's firm demand, on 8 June the company suspended all St. Lawrence 
mining operations. 96 The workers were locked out, though the company insisted that it 
was technically a layoff caused by the women preventing the loading of the ore. A 
company spokesman descnood this as an unfortunate but unavoidable development 
brought about by what he described as the unreasonable and unauthorized actions of the 
94<'1975 Proposals between SL WPU and Aluminum Company of Canada"; and 
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women. A spokeswoman for the group, on the other hand, claimed that their actions had 
simply delayed the lockout and given the men some paid work they would not have 
otherwise had. Furthermore, she added, the union would not have allowed the boat to 
sail anyway and the women had prevented them from resorting to strike action, which the 
union wanted to avoid ifpossible.97 
The day after the company shut down the mines, about 50 workers, in a move 
reportedly not sanctioned by the union, occupied the pay office and demanded the 
company issue lay-off slips so that they could apply for Unemployment Insurance (UI) 
benefits. Otherwise, the men would receive only strike pay of$30.00 per week for single 
men and $50.00 per week for married men. Six of the men were arrested and charged 
with "intimidating by violence" and participating in an ''unlawful assembly." They 
appeared in court on 12 June and had their case postponed unti127 June. The miners used 
the 12 June court appearance as an opportunity to display their solidarity; a large group of 
miners accompanied by CNTU representative Peter Curtis made the 30-mile trip to 
Marystown to attend the session. Curtis insisted that the man had had no intention of 
engaging in violence, and that the evidence of real violence was in the St. Lawrence 
cemetery, where there was "a whole graveyard ofblood and violence." Curtis also 
pointed out that the labour dispute was about more than wages: it was also about the 
history of death and disease in St. Lawrence and the inadequacy of financial support for 
97
"Female Picketers Jubilant,"Evening Telegram, 11 June 1975. 
414 
widows and disabled miners.98 
Meanwhile, on 12 May, the same day as the initial court appearance, over 100 
miners went to the payroll office to get their layoff slips, where they were met by five 
RCMP officers outside the building. The men were agitated and threatened that if their 
layoff slips stated "labour dispute" there would be trouble, as they would then have 
difficulty qu.alifYing for UI. The men were told they would be permitted into the office one 
at a time, and at that point they began pushing up against the door and hurling insults at 
the police. When the first worker emerged from the building and informed the others that 
the slips said "labour dispute," the men were enraged and vowed not to let company staff 
who were tending the mine pumps enter the mine at the four o 'clock shift change, or let 
personnel leave the pay office at five o 'clock. The atmosphere was tense, with workers 
threatening several times to go on a rampage and three RCMP cars from around the 
peninsula, with fourteen officers equipped for riot control, standing by in the community. 
A confrontation was averted when the union executive informed the men that negotiations 
had resumed and called them to a meeting at the union hall, where they were ordered not 
to return to the pay office that night.99 
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Negotiations resumed on 14 June in St. John's, with a tense atmosphere still 
pervasive in St. Lawrence. Esther Spracklin, the spokeswoman for the group which had 
staged the protest in May, stated that they were awaiting the outcome of talks but were 
prepared for further action if necessary. "They [Alcan] are afraid of us," another woman 
added, " and that's the way we like to see them." Curtis reiterated that while wages were 
the most prominent issue at stake in the ta1ks, the union was also concerned about health 
and safety, compensation and the company's recent '1>rovocative" actions. 100 
The union's continuing agitation for further improvements to workers' 
compensation coverage paid off yet again in June 1975, with the passage of another 
amendment to the Act. The amendments of 1972 and 1973 had been based on the 
assumption that there was no risk of those diseases among workers who began work after 
1960, an assumption the union had vigorously and steadily opposed. The 1975 amendment 
extended coverage to silicosis and cancer contracted after 1960.101 
The resumption of negotiations did not produce a settlement, but the union agreed 
with a government mediator' s request to have the dispute put to a conciliation board.102 
The company, however, stated that it stood by its previous offer and saw nothing to be 
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gained from agreeing to the appointment of a board. The Department of Manpower and 
Industrial Relations now also seemed to be losing patience with the company. The 
Minister, Ed Maynard, challenged the company's claim that since the parties had already 
failed to reach agreement with the assistance of a conciliation officer the appointment of a 
board would be redundant. As the Minister pointed out, a board was not the same as an 
officer; it was the next step available under the Labour Relations Act once an officer had 
failed to facilitate an agreement. 103 
As the strike dragged on through the summer of 1975, it became a flashpoint for 
many long-festering grievances. The Newfluor manager himself noted that, "There's an 
emotional feeling of bitterness against Alcan which exists all the time below the surface. A 
lot of it is ancient history, dating back to pre-Alcan years, but this feeling comes up every 
time we come to negotiations." The company's public relations manager suggested that 
the bitterness which marked the labour relations situation resulted in part from an 
increasing polarization between employees and management personnel. New:fluor 
employee Ben Edwards echoed this belief when he pointed out that Alcan could expect 
little respect from its employees and others in the community when it showed none in 
return. He recalled an incident which occurred during the women's most recent 
occupation of the loading dock, when the company reportedly told the men to "go out and 
get that mess cleaned up." "Can you imagine that," he asked, "calling the women 'that 
103
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mess' ?'' Another employee, Terry Slaney, using the language employed by the CNTU, 
claimed that the St. Lawrence workers were Alcan's ''third-class citizens" within its 
hierarchy of Canadian workers. He claimed that Alcan management was so mean-spirited 
that they would rather bury scrap lumber than give it to an employee like him to repair his 
house. He related an incident in which the company had distributed turkeys at Christmas in 
1974 with tags that, rather than wishing workers Merry Christmas, congratulated them on 
a good health and safety record. According to Terry Slaney, when he questioned 
management about this, he was told that if the turkeys had been given as Christmas 
presents, workers would expect them every year. He also claimed that management did 
not associate with workers in the community because they feh they were ''too good for the 
likes of us." As an example, he pointed out that Alcan had built a curling rink at the Staff 
Club, "on the hill" near management homes, but neither he nor his fellow workers ''would 
think of going up there. " 104 Significantly, this man was one of a large group of workers 
who were part of the new generation of St. Lawrence miners whose fathers and uncles had 
been miners in the 1930s, 40s and 50s. 105 His observations were indicative of the new 
attitude that a CNTU representative had witnessed emerging in the late 1960s and early 
1970s among a group of younger men who felt they no longer had to put up with what 
their fathers did. They were also illustrative of the social divisions that had emerged within 
104
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the community, between rank and file workers and management personnel, and of how 
those divisions had been sharpened by the labour unrest of the 1970s. 
The company, meanwhile, charged that many of the immediate labour problems in 
St. Lawrence could be attributed to the fact that the local union was being led astray by an 
"outside union" whose demands might ultimately lead to the withdrawal of the company 
from St. Lawrence. 106 
Other factors which were part of the complex background against which the 1975 
dispute was played out were the ongoing deaths among the mining population and 
increasing public attention to the history of disease and death in the community. Five 
miners, all under 50 years old, died during late 1974 and early 1975.107 In May 1975, at a 
crucial time in the escalating conflict, Memorial University Anthropology professor Elliot 
Leyton published Dying Hard: The Ravages of Industrial Carnage.108 Based on a series 
of interviews with widows and sick miners, the book detailed the physical, emotional and 
psychological pain inflicted by disease and death associated with the mines, as well as the 
frustrating and often humiliating ordeal of seeking workers' compensation benefits. 
Several men spoke of their regret that they had not stayed fishing and kept out of the 
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Evening Telegram, 21 June 1975. 
107
''New Contract Won't Settle Real Issues," Evening Telegram, 21 June 1975. 
108Elliot Leyton, Dying Hard: The Ravages of Industrial Carnage (Toronto; 
McClelland and Stewart, 1975). 
419 
mine. Others expressed a deep suspicion of the company, the government and the medical 
profession. The two women interviewed spoke of the social alienation, the financial 
hardship and the emotional trauma of trying to raise a family under their circumstances. 
All those interviewed put a human face on the toll exacted by the St. Lawrence mines over 
the years, and the book drew unprecedented public attention to the plight of people in St. 
Lawrence and others affected by the tragedy. 
That history was also evident in the words and actions of the women who 
continued publically to support the miners during the 1975 dispute. As Spracklin, their 
spokeswoman, pointed out, she and many of these women not only had husbands working 
in the mines; many of them had watched their fathers and other relatives die and were 
determined not to repeat that history. Also, Spracklin stated, the women were directly 
affected by what happened to their husbands in terms ofboth wages and working 
conditions. "What happens to the men," she stated, "affects all of us. Any one of us could 
join the nearly 200 widows in the community, and I say we're involved!"109 
In July, the government appointed an Industrial Inquiry Commissioner to 
investigate the St. Lawrence dispute and recommend an appropriate settlement. The man 
appointed was Howard Dyer, who had headed up a similar inquiry into a protracted and 
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bitter dispute at the Bucbans mines from March to October 1973.110 Dyer concluded that, 
based on recent and projected inflation rates, an appropriate wage settlement would be 
$1.00 per hour in the first year and 40 cents in the second year, with a COLA to take 
effect in the second year. The CNTU's Economic Research Department submitted to Dyer 
a detailed account of wage increases and cost of living increases in recent years which 
showed that any increases granted since 1971 had been wiped out by inflation, that real 
wages had actually dropped, and that the company's current offer of 83 cents in the first 
year and 40 in the second would not even cover projected cost-of-living increases, not to 
mention compensating for the decrease in real wages in the past few years. The union 
submission also argued that just bringing St. Lawrence workers' wages near par with 
those of Alcan workers elsewhere in Canada did not take into account the special hazards 
encountered by St. Lawrence miners. The union argued that just to keep pace with 
inflation, the workers would need $1.25 in the first year and 50 cents in the second, 
retroactive to 1 April1975, plus a COLA for the two-year life of the contract. 111 The 
union was willing to settle for that package. 
110See, Howard Dyer, "Report Number One of the Industrial Inquiry Commission 
into the Dispute between the United Steelworkers of America, Local Union 5457 and the 
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The company, however, refused to budge, and in mid-September issued an 
ultimatum to the workers informing them that the company had already purchased half its 
winter supply of fluorspar from Mexico and was prepared to purchase the remainder there 
if need be. If that purchase went ahead, management stated, no ore would be shipped from 
St. Lawrence until at least the following year. In other words, the workers were being 
forced to choose between returning to work under the company's conditions or losing 
their jobs to foreign suppliers. The union pointed out, however, that a board of referees at 
the Unemployment Insurance Commission (UIC) had recently ruled that the men had been 
laid off after the company shut down operations because of the actions of the women 
protesters, not the actions of the union, and therefore the men were not out of work 
because of a labour dispute. Given this, the union expressed confusion at the company's 
position and its ultimatum, charging that the company was insisting on treating the matter 
as a labour dispute when in fact it was a layoff. On 19 September, however, the company 
followed through on the ultimatum and shut down the mines. 112 
The miners were hopeful of obtaining UI benefits after the ruling by the UIC board 
of referees, but the commission challenged the ruling and by the end of September the men 
still had not been told if they qualified. According to the union president, however, morale 
among the men was still high and they were determined not to return to work under the 
company's conditions, though many were facing a tough winter if they had to live on 
112
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strike pay. 113 While miners awaited the ruling on their UIC eligibility, the union continued 
to exert pressure on the company to bargain. At an information session held in St. John' s 
in late October -- to which company officials were invited but did not attend -- a CNTU 
spokesman called the company's approach to the St. Lawrence situation "savage" and 
"uncivilized," unlike anything he had witnessed in Quebec. The union continued to point 
out that it was willing to negotiate and that it had retreated considerably from its original 
position on wages. The union also continued to insist that the dispute was not a lockout 
but a layoff: a decision taken by the company because at that time it could get cheaper 
fluorspar in Mexico and falsely justified on the grounds that the women had blocked the 
ore boat from loading. 114 
The question of whether the work stoppage was a labour dispute or a layoff had 
important financial implications for the CNTU as well as for the St. Lawrence workers. 
During 1975, the CNTU had lost another 20,000 members, partly as a protest against a 
request for increased union dues in the context of an unprecedented number of strikes. 115 
Clearly, the CNTU would have preferred to have the workers on UI rather than strike pay. 
On 10 November, however, word came that the Supreme Court judge who had 
adjudicated the UIC's appeal had overturned the board of referees' decision and the St. 
113
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Lawrence miners would not qualify for UI. 116 
The union used the 197 5 dispute to focus attention on health and safety issues at 
the St. Lawrence mines. On 13 November, SL WPU and CNTU representatives met with 
government officials to recommend specific changes to the Mine Safety Regulations, 
including frequent tests of pulmonary function in miners and the wearing of monitoring 
devices to assess individual radiation exposure. The miners were assured that new safety 
regulations would be on the books very soon, perhaps by February 1976.117 At the same 
meeting, the union also presented a brief prepared by the Centre for Community Initiatives 
at Memorial University which drew upon the work Leyton had done for Dying Hard and 
called for improved financial and social support for widows and children of dead miners 
and for improved access to workers' compensation for widows and disabled miners. 118 
Also in November, the CNTU submitted a brief to a cabinet committee appointed to look 
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into health and safety regulations in the province. The brief recommended legislation 
requiring the appointment of a health and safety committee at each mine in the province, 
as well as the drafting of an official "Workers' Bill of Health Rights" to enshrine such 
rights as that to refuse unsafe work and to be informed of any potential health risks in a 
workplace. 119 
The CNTU's increased attention to the issue of health and safety in the St. 
Lawrence mines at this time was also part of its increasing activity in that area among its 
Quebec unions. In 1975, for example, 3,000 CNTU and QFL-affiliated asbestos workers 
at Thetford staged a seven-month strike and eventually forced the Quebec government to 
pass more stringent dust control regulations and to compensate victims of asbestosis and 
silicosis.120 The Thetford strike and the resulting legislation was part of a nation-wide 
growth of interest in occupational health and safety during the 1970s. In Ontario, a 
scenario very similar to that which had unfolded in St. Lawrence was being investigated 
and exposed by the Royal Commission on the Health and Safety of Workers in Mines. 
The Ontario commission documented, among other things, how years of neglect, 
jurisdictional confusion and bureaucratic wrangling had led to an extremely high rate of 
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death from cancer and silicosis in the Elliot Lake uranium mines. 121 As with the St. 
Lawrence case, the Elliot lake case was characterized by years of denial and public 
relations posturing, and only received attention and action because of the efforts of several 
key individuals and the union, and because of media exposure. 122 Increased attention to 
occupational health and safety in mines also began to take hold in Newfoundland mines 
other than St. Lawrence at this time, including the iron ore mines of Labrador West and 
the asbestos mine and mill at Baie V erte. 123 
Meanwhile, the government was also being urged to intervene and help settle the 
St. Lawrence dispute. NFFA WU locals on the Burin Peninsula urged Premier Moores to 
intervene personally to force Alcan to "sit down and bargain in good faith." There was 
121The Report of the Royal Commission on the Health and Safety of Workers in 
Mines, 79-80, stated that the mining population at Elliot Lake from 1955 to 1974 was 
twice as likely as the general male population to die from lung cancer. See also D. Hewitt, 
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even some discussion among NFF A WU of a general strike on the Burin Peninsula to help 
force a settlement to the St. Lawrence dispute. As a NFF A WU spokesman put it, ''the 
militancy is here to do it. The people would shut her down from Goobies [on the northern 
part of the peninsula] south."124 
At the end ofNovember, the government appointed a lawyer to mediate in the 
dispute, something the union had requested a couple ofweeks earlier. 125 While the 
mediator and the two sides resumed bargaining, the union continued to draw public and 
:financial support from various sources. On 11 December, actors and musicians staged a 
benefit concert in St. John's to raise money for the union. The concert, sponsored by the 
New Democratic Party ofNewfoundland, the Inter-Church Committee for World 
Development and Education and Oxfam raised over $6,000 for the St. Lawrence union. 
CNTU representative Michel Chartrand addressed the crowd and, apart from a vow that 
he and other CNTU reps were prepared to go to prison along with the St. Lawrence 
miners if necessary, focused on issues more general than the St. Lawrence dispute itself. 
He denounced the capitalist system and called capitalists "sophisticated legal crooks."126 
124
"Govemment Asked to Intervene in St. Lawrence Dispute," Evening Telegram, 
19 November 1975. 
125
"Mediator Appointed in 5-month Dispute," Evening Telegram, 30 November 
1975. 
12~he breakdown on proceeds from the benefit concert is in a SLMM document 
sent by the sponsors to the SLWPU. A description of the concert, and excerpts from 
Chartrand's speech, are in "Miners in St. Lawrence Prepared to go to Prison," Evening 
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The main target of Chartrand's address, however, was the wage and price controls 
which the federal government ofPierre Trudeau had introduced on 14 October 1975 (after 
vigorously opposing the suggestion in the election campaign of 1974). Chartrand, like 
many other Canadian labour leaders, denounced the wage controls, which required 
submission of wage increases to the Anti-Inflation Board for approval, as an attack on 
workers' rights and on the collective bargaining system itself.127 Bill C-73 affected 
workers in nearly every industry sector in Canada, including Quebec, where the provincial 
government of Robert Bourassa adopted Bill C-73 as the model for a provincial wage 
control law, Bill C-64, introduced in November 1975, and aimed specifically at workers in 
the public sector and construction industry -- those sectors where workers had made 
substantial gains and displayed much solidarity and militancy in recent years. Quebec 
unions, like those elsewhere in Canada, were outraged at the wage control laws. On 26 
November 1975, more than 40,000 workers participated in a demonstration against wage 
controls at a rally in Montreal. Despite attempts by the Quebec government to quash 
unrest through the passage of more restrictive legislation (such as Bill253 introduced 
against striking hospital workers in December) labour unrest and protest against wage and 
price controls continued. At its December 1975 convention, the CNTU adopted the 
1270n the controls and labour' s response to them, see David Wilton, An Evaluation 
of Wage and Price Controls in Canada (Waterloo Economic Series, No. 130, 1975); Leo 
Panitch, Workers, Wages, and Controls (Toronto: New Hogtown Press, 1976); and Allan 
M. Maslove and Gene Swimmer, Wage Controls in Canada: A Study of Public Decision 
Making (Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1980). 
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principle of a general strike to combat the wage control laws. 128 When Chartrand spoke 
out against wage controls to the St. John's crowd in December 1975, therefore, he was 
speaking against the backdrop of ongoing battles within Quebec and across the country. 
On 18 December, the SL WPU held a general meeting to discuss events up that 
point and the company's most recent offer. Since the latest round of negotiations, the 
company had offered the membership a lump sum of$500 each, but also wanted the start-
date of the new contract changed from I April to 15 December, which would mean no 
retroactive increases. The membership voted 129 to 44 against the company's offer.129 
The following day, the company sent a conciliatory letter to all union members, 
which it claimed was in the spirit of making a "special effort" achieve to a settlement in the 
"pre-Christmas season." The letter reminded workers that under the company's most 
recent offer, each man would get a $500 lump sum upon settlement. Coming a week 
before Christmas, the offer of a $500 signing bonus was obviously timed to take full 
advantage of the desperation of people who had been raising families on 30 to 50 dollars a 
week for six months. The letter also explained that any substantial increase the company 
could grant might be rolled back by the AlB anyway, as had recently happened with a 
settlement at a K.C. Irving plant in New Brunswick. The letter concluded with a veiled 
threat, reminding workers that while Alcan could obtain fluorspar cheaper in Mexico, it 
128CNTU, The history of the labour movement in Quebec, 222-41; Rouillard, 
Histoire de la CSN, 216-20; and CSN/CEQ, Histoire du mouvement au Quebec, 195-6. 
129Minutes of General Membership Meeting, 18 December 1975, SLMM. 
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would prefer to keep its St. Lawrence mines open, but only as long as it could be assured 
an ''uninterrupted supply," which it had not had thus far in the 1970s.130 The mayor, who 
was also a member ofNewfluor staff: expressed dismay and concern that the union had 
rejected the most recent offer and suggested that the men would have accepted the offer 
had they not been under the sway of Curtis and the CNTU. He concurred with the 
company (also his employer) that the actions of the union were threatening the future of 
the St. Lawrence mines. 131 
The New Year came and went with no settlement in sight. On 5 January, the 
membership voted 130-33 in favour of presenting a demand package that included the 
$500 lump sum, an 83-cent raise as of signing, another 40 cents on 1 April1975, and a 
COLA over the life of the contract. The union also wanted charges dropped against the six 
men who had been charged in the incident ofMay 1975. The union's wage demand was 
considerably less than the $1.25 and 75 cents it had demanded in August 1975, but the 
company rejected the demands and countered with a proposal for a 2-year contract as of 
the signing date, with the 40-cent raise to come into effect a year from signing as opposed 
to on 1 April1976. 132 
13~etter from J.N. Gillis, Newfluor Manager, to members of the SLWPU, 19 
December 1975, SLMM. 
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Two weeks after rejecting the most recent proposal, the company stated that the 
monetary demands were in themselves acceptable, but that from its perspective the 
outstanding issues now were the duration of the contract and the timing of the 40-cent 
raise. The company still wanted a contract for two years from the date of signing 
(whereas the union's proposal as it stood was effectively for a fifteen-month contract) and 
the 40-cent increase to become effective in a year from signing. 133 While it was depicted 
by the company as a non-monetary issue, the timing of the raises was an important 
financial consideration for the workers. If the second raise became effective a year from 
signing the proposed contract, in January 1977, instead of April1976, the escalating cost-
of-living would have by then eradicated any real gains; the union's proposal was premised 
on the timing of the raises in conjunction with inflation. In making known its position on 
the ''non-monetary" issues, the company also took the opportunity to make another veiled 
threat, pointing out that the future of the St. Lawrence mines depended on "labor 
peace." 134 
Despite the company's repeated claims that it wanted a settlement to the strike, it 
continued to offer little in the way of compromise. At the end of January 1976, the union 
rejected a wage offer which was essentially the same as the one the company had made at 
the outset of the dispute, except that it would not be retroactive to Apri11975. 
133
"Two Issues Stalling Settlement ofStrike," Evening Telegram, 22 January 1976. 
134
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Management was also growing more direct with its threats to shut down the mines for an 
extended period, claiming that it had "made our offer and it's been rejected." The union 
countered that the company had not been making offers so much as issuing "ultimatums" 
and demanding that the workers now settle for less than they had been offered at the start 
of the dispute. 135 On 28 January, Alcan increased the pressure again by announcing that it 
would shut down the St. Lawrence mines for an "indefinite period." The company claimed 
it was disappointed that this action had to be taken, but that it had done all it could and the 
union had refused its best offer even though it was aware that the company could buy 
fluorspar cheaper on the open market than it could produce it in St. Lawrence. 136 
In the wake of this announcement, the government came under increased pressure 
to help settle the dispute, and it soon announced that it was preparing back-to-work 
legislation to force the miners back. In the context of this threat, the union and the 
company met several times and by 5 February had reached a tentative agreement. It 
included a lump sum payment of$550 in lieu of a retroactive increase to April1975, a 
wage increase of90 cents per hour effective 1 February 1976, an increase of 45 cents 
effective 1 October 1976 and a COLA of 1 cent per hour for every 0.5 increase in the 
Consumer Price Index (CPI). The agreement was to take effect from I February 1976 and 
expire 15 December I 977. The proposed agreement also called for the training of a 
135
"Alcan Reaches 'End of the Line'," Evening Telegram, 30 January I 976. 
136
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radiation monitor from within the union membership. 137 The agreement was approved by 
75 per cent of the 170 union members who voted on it. 138 
The union ended up settling for far less than its original demand of$2.50 over two 
years and for just marginally more than the company's original offer. The COLA ofl cent 
for each 0.5 increase in the CPI was also less than the 1 cent for each 0.3 increase initially 
demanded. Perhaps more detrimental, in monetary terms, was the absence of retroactivity; 
the $550 lump sum did little to compensate for the loss of nine month's wages. Union 
president Michael Slaney conceded that the union was ultimately forced to choose "the 
lesser of two evils ... to stay off the job and have legislation forced upon us [or] to accept 
this contract proposal." He also pointed to the constant threat ofhaving the mines closed 
permanently, a risk the union just "couldn't afford" to take. On the positive side, he 
noted, the union had made the company move slightly on the wage issue and the strike had 
been about more than wages, it had also been about "integrity and principle." Asked 
whether he thought the strike had damaged relations between the company and the union, 
Slaney said no, as ''we've never had a normal relationship with them anyway."139 
137T.A. Blanchard, Deputy Minister ofManpower and Industrial Relations, to 
Michael Slaney, President, SL WPU (CNTU), 5 February 1976, SLMM. 
138
"Alcan Miners Going Back to Work," Evening Telegram, 7 February 1976. 
139
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7.5 Industry Decline and Closure, 1976-78 
The wage package agreed to under the February,1976 agreement still required the 
approval of the AlB, but in the meantime the company resumed operations and began re-
hiring workers. By March, 72 unionized men were back on the job and by May about 90 
workers had been rehired. 140 In April, the CNTU had submitted a brief to the AlB in 
support of the new wage increases, tracing the history of wage negotiations and the 
deterioration of real wages during the 1970s, and showing the historical lack of parity 
between wages at St. Lawrence and those at other Alcan operations in the country, such 
as Arvida and Kitimat. 141 On 3 June, the AlB confirmed that it had approved the wage 
increases.142 
Just as the industry was beginning to get back on track in St. Lawrence, however, 
the workers were informed that labour disputes at Alcan's aluminum smelting operations 
elsewhere in Canada might have serious consequences for the St. Lawrence fluorspar 
mines. Kitimat smelter workers, who had had their wage increase scaled back by the AlB 
when they negotiated their contract in January 1976 demanded the contract be reopened 
when pulpworkers in Kitimat subsequently got a higher settlement. When Kitimat 
workers walked off the job on 2 June to back up this demand, Alcan transferred some 
1
-rounion Lists, March and May 1972, SLMM. 
141CNTU Briefto Anti-Inflation Board, Ottawa, 27 April1976, SLMM. 
142G. Weir, Compensation Branch, Anti-Inflation Board, Ottawa, to D. Mitchell, 
Alcan, and M. Slaney, SL WPU (CNTU), St. Lawrence, 3 April 1976, SLMM. 
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supervisory staff from Quebec to Kitimat to keep the Kitimat smelter running. At the 
same time, the approximately 8,000 FSSA members at three of Alcan's Quebec plants, 
including Arvida, who had been without a contract since 1 May, also walked out to 
demand increases in excess of the AlB guidelines. 143 Kitimat workers returned to the 
work on 12 June, but the Quebec workers were out until15 November. 144 
By mid-July, when talks with the Quebec workers had still not produced a 
settlement, Newfluor served layoff notices to about 90 of the 250 men it had re-hired to 
that point in St. Lawrence.145 The people of the community were apparently very 
discouraged by this development. The union president claimed to see no secure future in 
the St. Lawrence mining industry and urged the government to help come up with ideas 
for an alternative industry. 146 
Even when the Arvida strike ended in November, reactivation of the plant took 
considerable time because the plant had not been shut down properly and therefore a lot of 
damage had been done to the equipment (for example, molten metal was left to set in 
smelting pots). The combination of the St. Lawrence and Quebec labour disputes, plus 
the amount of ore already stockpiled at the beginning of the year, meant that total 
1976. 
143D.J. Mitchell, "Update on Alcan Smelters,"4 June 1976. SLMM. 
144Labour Canada, Strikes and Lockouts in Canada (1976) 46. 
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shipments for 1976 were about half the normal amount and at the end of that year there 
were just over 100 workers on the job. 147 
In February 1977, the company informed the union that while it planned to 
increase production in May or June of that year and to put the mines in two shifts for the 
first time since early 1975, it had some concerns for the long-term future of its St. 
Lawrence operations. The company claimed to be considering organizational changes at 
the staff level or technological changes to help make the St. Lawrence mines more viable 
given the fact that fluorspar could be purchased more cheaply on the open market. 148 A 
report on the future viability of the St. Lawrence operations prepared by Newfluor during 
the spring of 1977 reportedly concluded that the mines could be kept open if the company 
built a more advanced crushing and flotation mill, which would cost from three to five 
million dollars and might require "some measure of involvement" from the federal and 
provincial governments."149 Mines and Energy Minister Brian Peckford (who soon went 
on to become provincial Premier) stated in early May that the provincial government 
might be willing to provide financial assistance to keep the mines open if necessary, but 
had not yet been approached about the possibility.150 
147Canada, Department ofMines and Technical Surveys, Canadian Mineral 
Industry, 1976, 211; and Union List, December 1976, SLMM. 
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Meanwhile, workers and others in St. Lawrence were not optimistic. The union 
president pointed to several signs of what he believed was an impending closure, including 
the cancellation of a three-week scheduled holiday shutdown in May and the retraction of 
a number of job postings in June. He believed that the decision to shut down the mines 
had already been made and that the company and the government was simply "prolonging 
the agony under the guise of more studies." Many others in the community also believed 
that bad news was imminent. 151 The union was unable, however, to get any firm 
information from either the company or the government and there was uncertainty about 
whether the company was serious about shutting down or was trying to run some kind of 
"bluff' in light of recent labour troubles. As the union president put it, with the bargaining 
unit down to just 130 men and coming off a nine-month labour dispute, ''we can't afford a 
counter-bluff."152 
It was not a bluff, however, and on 22 July 1977 the company officially announced 
that it was closing the St. Lawrence mines effective 1 February 1978. The company 
expressed its "deep regret" at having to take this decision and pledged assistance in 
helping the government find alternative sources of employment and in helping its 
1977. 
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employees cope with the situation. 153 
When Newfluor manager D.J. Mitchell was asked in 1977 whether recent labour 
troubles had factored in the decision to close the mines, he replied that only in the sense 
that publicity surrounding the unrest had brought suppliers "knocking at our doors saying 
look what we can offer."154 To understand what Mitchell meant by that remark and the 
motivations for closing the St. Lawrence mines at this time, it is necessary to look at the 
industry and the labour relations context over the decade or so prior to the decision. 
In one sense, the decision to shut down the St. Lawrence mines was surprising, 
given the company's recent activities in St. Lawrence. In 1974, the company had decided 
to carry out a major extension of the Tarefare mine, including sinking the new shaft, 
Tarefare 2.155 Work on that shaft and the associated surface facilities was well underway in 
197 6 and the mine was expected to go into production in 1977.156 The new concrete-lined 
shaft nearly 1,000 feet deep was completed by 1977, but no ore was ever hoisted from 
there. Newfluor had not exhausted its ore reserves: in 1966 it had proven reserves of2.5 
million tons of usable ore and another 1.5 million tons were believed to exist at Director, 
153Press Release: "Alcan to Close Fluorspar Mines in Newfoundland," 22 July 
1977, SLMM. 
154
"Alcan Will Close Down Mine at St. Lawrence," Evening Telegram, 25 July 
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156Alcan, "BriefMining History of Alcan Newfluor Works, St. Lawrence, 
Newfoundland," 1976, AA. 
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Tarefare, Blue Beach and at other sites, some of which the company had purchased from 
the St. Lawrence Corporation in 1965. These included the Blue Beach vein, which 
Newfluor had begun mining in the early 1970s, and the "Grassy Gulch" vein, which was 
the site of the Tarefare 2 shaft. By 1976, the company had shipped 1.4 million of the total 
2.5 million tons known to exist in 1966 and still had probable reserves of another 1.5 
million. 157 This, combined with the decision to sink a new shaft, demonstrates that it was 
not exhaustion of ore which led to the closure. 
In 1966, Newfluor had projected that, based on extraction of the proven reserves 
only, and at a projected average output of 130,000 tons per year, the life of its St. 
Lawrence mines would be 15 to 20 years. The company noted in 1966, however, that the 
projected output of 130,000 per year from St. Lawrence would not meet its fluorspar 
requirements and that Alcan would have to rely on other sources to make up the 
shortfall. 158 Two years after that prediction, in 1968, it was reported that Alcan had begun 
acquiring fluorspar from Mexico.159 Significantly, shipments of fluorspar into Canada 
from Mexican suppliers had increased substantially during the 1960s, more than doubling 
in the period from 1963 to 1970.160 During the St. Lawrence strike of1971, Newfluor 
157Newfluor, "Submission to the Royal Commission on St. Lawrence,"169-74. 
15~ewfluor, "Submission to the Royal Commission on St. Lawrence," GN6, Box 
2, PANL, 169-74. 
159United States, Minerals Yearbook, 1968, 218. 
16
°Canada, Department of Mines and Technical Surveys, Canadian Mineral 
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439 
had used the Mexico supply as a bargaining weapon, shutting down operations 
temporarily and informing the union that it could do so pennanently and purchase cheaper 
fluorspar from Mexico if the union continued to press its demands. This threat became a 
regular feature of collective bargaining process throughout the 1970s. 
In assessing the St. Lawrence mines' ability to supply Alcan's fluorspar needs, it is 
important to look not only at total supply but at the consistency of the supply. While 
Newtluor's shipments of fluorspar from St. Lawrence for the period 1967 to 1977 were 
slightly less than the 130,000 tons per year it had been projected for this period in 1966, 
the supply was far from consistent. In periods of prolonged labour unrest, such as during 
1971 and 197 5-7 6, shipments were well below normal. Shipments in 1971, for instance, 
were just half what they were in the 1970 and 1972, while in 197 5 no ore was shipped. 
During times of marked decrease in St. Lawrence shipments, imports of fluorspar from 
Mexico increased sharply.161 In abandoning its St. Lawrence mines in 1977, therefore, 
Alcan was simply making more permanent a practice which had emerged during the 
decade previous, when St. Lawrence production was curtailed by labour unrest. The 
company was at the same time following through on a threat it had been making for 
several years, by abandoning St. Lawrence for a cheaper, steadier supply of fluorspar from 
an area where it would have fewer problems with workers demanding decent wages and 
working conditions. 
161See Appendix I. 
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In the wake of the announcement of the decision to close the mines, Alcan and the 
federal and provincial governments came under attack from several quarters. Burin-
Placentia MHA Patrick Caruring criticized the company for abandoning its St. Lawrence 
workers in order to "exploit the slave labour of Mexico" and called upon the federal 
government to implement a tariff on fluorspar imported into Canada. 162 Justice Minister 
Alex Hickman demanded that Alcan make public the findings of its recent feasibility study, 
which he suggested would reveal that St. Lawrence was still a viable operation. He also 
criticized the federal government for ignoring the plight of the people of St. Lawrence and 
for not introducing protective tariffs. 163 Others criticized the provincial government for 
not having done more to prevent the closure or at the very least to keep people informed. 
One St. Lawrence woman claimed that the provincial government should have ''fired 
broadsides into the conglomerate" and "shamed the company into reconsideration of its 
cruel intention." She also attacked the CNTU for being "strangely silent during the past 
few months,"a charge that seems to have some merit: the CNTU apparently had very little 
to say about the shutdown and seems to have withdrawn from involvement once the 
162
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announcement was made. The depth of this woman's bitterness is indicated by her claim 
that, 
... the sight of a roll of Alcan foil on the shelf of the supermarket sickens 
me. The commercial on the screen of the television set, urging me to buy 
Alcan siding, nauseates me.... Equally nauseating are the noises being 
made at the government level concerning the reduction of the economic 
impact on this tiny Newfoundland community.164 
The reaction among many women in the town was a mixture of resentment and relief. It 
was reported that, "A lot oflocal residents, especially the women, greeted the news with 
joy, but were sad to think it hadn't happened before a lot of their husbands died from 
radiation. " 165 Another woman was quoted as saying that, "too bad they didn't leave 20 
years ago."166 
In August, the company gave formal notice to the union of its intention to begin 
layoffs on 1 November, at which time the complete phase-out of operations would begin. 
The company stated that until that time operations would continue as usual and, perhaps 
anticipating resistance, advised that an "orderly wind-down" would be in everyone' s best 
interests. 167 While there is no evidence of outright resistance on the part of workers, 
criticism and bitterness over the impending closure lingered through the fall of 1977. A 
164Colwnn in The Southern Post, 28 July 1977. 
165
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miner approached by a journalist in a local bar in September 1977 said, .. Why the hell 
should I talk to the media? When did you ever care that we existed? Soon no-one need 
care because we won't exist. Our mine will be gone and all we'll have as monument is our 
cemetery."168 The govenunent, meanwhile, continued to issue vague assurances that it 
was doing all in its power to address the situation, including pressuring the federal 
government on the tariff issue, and to meet with Alcan officials, but nothing concrete grew 
out of these efforts. 169 By January 1978, the unionized workforce was down to just fifteen 
men, and on 1 February, the company officially locked the gates for the last time and the 
last of the ten hourly employees were laid off. 170 
7.6 Conclusion 
The closure of the Newfluor mines in February 1978 was the conclusion ofthe 
most militant and confrontational period in the history of labour relations in St. Lawrence. 
168
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Criticism of the government's reaction to the Royal Commission, continuing hostility over 
health and safety and workers' compensation, the company's uncompromising and 
sometimes provocative approach to labour relations, and the St. Lawrence union's 
affiliation with its increasingly radical and militant parent body all converged to make this 
period one which was marked by frequent and open conflict. In addition, in this period the 
conflict which had long marked labour relations spilled into the wider community in an 
open manner as women united in public displays of solidarity with their husbands. The 
actions of these women, as well as the demands of the union, demonstrated that while 
wages may have been the explicit issue in the labour disputes which erupted during the 
1970s, these disputes took place against the background of the long history of disease and 
death associated with the St. Lawrence mines, a history which shaped the attitudes of 
many young workers and made them determined not to succumb to the fate of the older 
generation of miners. The union and others who engaged in these struggles won some 
valuable victories, especially in the area of workers' compensation benefits. The lockout of 
197 5-7 6 and industry closure in 1978 also revealed, however, the vulnerability of a people 
so dependent upon a single employer. That some, especially women, in the community 
looked upon Alcan's departure with a mixture of resentment and relief was an indication 
of the fact that some people had come to believe, given the knowledge of the toll which 
the .industry had taken since the 1930s, that the price paid for jobs in St. Lawrence had 
simply grown too high. 
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Conclusion and Epilogue 
When Walter Seibert arrived in St. Lawrence in 1933 with a boatload of 
dilapidated mining equipment and a promise of paying jobs, he found a people willing to 
undergo ahnost any sacrifice to escape poverty and unemployment. The St. Lawrence 
Corporation took full advantage of the relationship of dependency subsequently created, 
subjecting workers to abnormally low wages and horrendous working conditions. Fixated 
on reducing public relief expenditures and other costs, the government did little to 
alleviate the workers' plight. It refused to update obsolete and useless mining regulations 
or introduce a badly-needed system for regular mines inspections, and gave priority to 
protecting the industry and the operators over all other considerations. The industrial 
relations regime that emerged in this environment was based primarily on paternalism and 
fear. By the end of the 1930s, the health impacts of corporate exploitation and government 
neglect had begun to become apparent. 
The outbreak of the Second World War and the establishment of a second mining 
company, New:fluor, a subsidiary of Alcan, ushered in a period of rapid change in the 
economic and labour relations climate in St. Lawrence. Just as workers in other parts of 
Newfoundland took advantage of a rejuvenated economy and expanding employment 
options to reject the harsh conditions which marked the Depression years, workers in St. 
Lawrence unionized in an attempt to bring attention to their plight and improvements to 
their circumstances. Formative events in this process were the labour disputes of 1941 
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and the intervention of the Trade Dispute Board in January 1942. The union had been 
demanding government intervention throughout the labour disputes of 1941, with 
occupational health and safety as one of their key concerns. By the time the Board was 
established, however, the health and safety issue had been pushed to the margins of the 
agenda by the government and the Corporation. Thus while the Board was beneficial in 
helping break down the isolation and paternalism which marked the labour relations 
climate, and in improving wage rates, it ignored the union's explicit demand for chest x-
rays which might have confirmed workers' fears about the health impacts of the mines. 
The lack of adequate medical facilities and the continuing neglect of the mine safety by 
both the government and the employers left the workforce still vulnerable to the health 
impacts of their working environment. The government continued periodically to bring in 
inspectors from Canada, but ignored their calls for an updated Act and for the 
establishment of a Newfoundland inspectorate, choosing to defer these issues and allowing 
the mining companies to set the agenda and to police themselves. 
A precipitous decline in the mining industry and in employment beginning in 1944, 
after a few years of rapid expansion, accentuated the community's growing reliance upon 
a single industry whose fate was determined by distant corporate forces. Within this 
environment of shrinking employment prospects, the union could do little but try to hold 
onto the few advances it had made. The late 1940s and the early 1950s, however, brought 
a revival in the St. Lawrence mining industry and by early 1950s both companies had 
undertaken expansion of their operations and shipments were at an all-time high. Under 
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newly-elected president James Cusick, the St. Lawrence union joined an island-wide trend 
and affiliated with the NFL-AFLffLC in 1949. Affiliation brought certain benefits to the 
union, including research and other support services. During the early 1950s, the union 
was able to take advantage of this and of industry expansion to win some key demands in 
such areas as wage rates. After Cusick left the presidency in 1954, however, Aloysius 
Turpin regained the presidency and the union soon reverted to independent status once 
again. 
In the early 1950s, the health impacts of working in the St. Lawrence mines were 
becoming increasingly apparent. Many miners had died from lung ailments and many 
others were showing signs of illness. In a covert autopsy performed in 1952, a St. 
Lawrence physician confirmed the first clear case of silicosis in a St. Lawrence miner. 
This sparked several years of controversy and bureaucratic procrastination. Officials of 
the provincial Department of Mines, the Department of Health and Welfare, and the 
WCB held a series of meetings, but did little other than agree that something should be 
done. Company officials did little to address the health and safety problem and in fact on 
occasion denied that one even existed. Poynter of the Corporation, for instance, 
continued to insist after the 1952 autopsy that tuberculosis was to blame for the high 
incidence of disease and death. As part of a broad range oflegislative changes that 
accompanied confederation with Canada in 1949, the Newfoundland government had an 
updated Mines Act and an inspectorate in place by 1953. One of the most striking aspects 
of the regulatory regime throughout the 1950s, however, was the discrepancy between the 
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official Department of Mines' description of working conditions in St. Lawrence and the 
circumstances which actually existed there, as described by the miners themselves. The 
evidence from the 1950s indicates that the Department's first priority was protection of 
the industry itself, while the inspectorate functioned primarily as a public relations organ 
for the government, glossing over rather than investigating occupational hazards. 
Employers continued to enjoy free rein to police their own workplaces and from the 
evidence presented here, it is obvious that the health and safety of workers was well down 
on their list of priorities. 
In 1957, again after years oflobbying on the part of the union, federal government 
investigators confirmed the presence of dangerous levels of dust in the Newfluor mine and 
mill. The Corporation, in what had become a familiar pattern over the years, once again 
escaped the scrutiny of investigators as its operations had been shut down early in 1957 
due to a lack of a market for its fluorspar. The fact that the Corporation was forced to 
shut down its mines, putting hundreds of men out of work, because it had lost its 
American market was yet another stark reminder of the pitfalls of over-reliance on a single 
industry whose fortunes depended on international market forces. Adding to the 
bitterness and resentment created by the shutdown was the fact that the Corporation had 
for several years been negotiating with Canadian consumers to supply them with fluorspar 
produced in Mexico, while its St. Lawrence miners were succumbing in alarming numbers 
to the health impacts of their working conditions. 
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The 1958 report on dust conditions at Newfluor confirmed what the union had 
been claiming for years -- that working conditions were the major contributor to 
respiratory illnesses among the workforce. Excessive dust levels did not, however, 
explain the apparently high rate of cancer -- especially lung cancer -- among the mining 
population. Tests conducted in 1959 and 1960 revealed lethal levels of radon gas in the 
mines of both Newfluor and the Corporation. As was revealed by both the dust and the 
radiation studies, the health problems associated with these conditions, which had been 
destroying the health and claiming the lives of workers for years, could have been avoided 
with the installation of a ventilation system. Ventilation was a standard feature of 
underground mines the world over and a requirement even of the pre-confederation 
Mines Act, but had been ignored by the St. Lawrence mining companies and the 
government despite union demands dating back to 1939. The frustration and suspicion 
which had been created by years of neglect on the part of employers and the government is 
demonstrated by the fact that workers walked off the job after revelations about radiation 
levels in 1960 and refused to return until adequate ventilation had been installed, despite 
the assurances of management and the government that the danger no longer existed. 
The confirmation of the existence of radiation in the Newfluor and the Corporation 
mines, combined with mounting evidence of illness and death among the workforce, 
prompted changes in workers' compensation and mine safety regulations. Lung cancer 
was made a compensable illness, but funds for covering such cases were drawn from the 
WCB's Disaster Reserve Fund rather than the regular compensation fund. This decision 
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protected Newfluor from :financial liability for its negligence since it meant no increase in it 
compensation premiums as a result of cancer claims. The decision also ran counter to one 
of the underlying principles of the workers' compensation system: that employers would 
have an incentive to make workplaces safe since premiums were based on claim rates. 
The Corporation, meanwhile, escaped all :financial liability for cancer claims associated 
with its mines, since it shut down the last of its St. Lawrence mines in 1961 and sold its St. 
Lawrence holdings to Alcan in 1964. 
The government also passed amendments to the mine safety regulations to address 
the radiation problem in St. Lawrence and appointed a monitor to help regulate radiation 
levels. Such measures did little, however, to quell suspicion and unrest in the workplace 
and the community. Workers continued to be distrustful of both government and 
company claims about such industrial hazards as radiation and of the inspection system 
itself Both the oral and the archival evidence shows that their suspicions were well-
founded. Workers continued to be exposed to dangerously high levels of radiation, and the 
union continued to lobby the government for more stringent safeguards against radiation 
and other hazards, and for more direct participation in the monitoring process. Following 
its affiliation with the CNTU in 1963, the union won the right to have such participation 
embodied in its collective agreements. 
Another ongoing source of controversy and unrest throughout the 1960s was the 
limitations on compensation coverage. Because the WCB refused to accept claims dating 
back to before the establishment of the first provincial legislation in 1951, or claims for 
450 
illnesses other than lung cancer and silicosis, many potential claimants were denied 
compensation benefits. This left many disabled miners and the widows of deceased miners 
in dire financial circumstances. Many were forced to turn to social assistance or whatever 
other meagre resources they could find to support themselves and their families. In 1966, 
the government was finally forced to take some action on this issue when its own 
Workmen's Compensation Review Committee urged it to do so. This was in response to 
a submission from St. Lawrence resident Rennie Slaney documenting the toll that 
industrial disease and the lack of compensation coverage had taken in the community. In 
response to the Committee's recommendations, the government appointed a Royal 
Commission to investigate working conditions and workers' compensation in St. 
Lawrence. 
The appointment of the Royal Commission drew unprecedented public attention to 
the St. Lawrence case and prompted a public relations battle. The company attempted to 
use the Royal Commission as a way of dispelling mistrust and unrest, and undertook a 
professional, concerted campaign to depict itself as a good corporate citizen, deeply 
concerned about the welfare of its workers and their families. Far from easing tensions 
and reducing hostility, however, the government' s response to the Royal Commission's 
recommendations actually intensified them. Through its response to the 
recommendations, the government attempted, among other things, to erode standards in 
the area of radiation monitoring. It also once again refused to extend compensation 
coverage to the pre-1951 period or to many illnesses affecting St. Lawrence miners but 
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not covered m1der the Act. 
By the early 1970s, ongoing grievances over working conditions, compensation 
and wages, combined with the CNTU' s increasingly radical political and labour relations 
program, had created a high degree oftension in the workplace and the commWlity, which 
often erupted into open confrontation. The union and miners' wives became increasingly 
militant in their demands and the I 970s was marked by almost incessant labour Wlrest and 
public protest. The company's usual response was to refuse to even negotiate with the 
Wlion and to threaten to shut down the mines and obtain fluorspar from a cheaper, more 
reliable foreign supplier. The labour Wlrest and public protest did result, however, in some 
important victories in the areas ofhealth and safety, wages and workers' compensation. 
The government was forced to retain its radiation monitor at St. Lawrence. The Wlion 
won several wage increases which, while they did not keep pace with high inflation, helped 
alleviate some of its effects. Compensation coverage was extended to some pre- I 951 
claims and to diseases other than lWlg cancer and silicosis. The efforts of the Wlion and its 
supporters also led to the institution of the St. Lawrence Special FWld for the 
compensation of victims of industrial disease and their families. The FWld was little more 
than a public relations stunt on the part of Alcan and the government, however, and 
provided meagre financial support. It was also another instance in which Alcan all but 
escaped the financial liability of its negligence and the Corporation once completely 
evaded any liability. 
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A remarkable aspect of the labour unrest that erupted repeatedly during the 1970s 
was the way in which the specific, explicit issues at stake -- such as wages - were simply 
the trigger for the playing out of long-standing grievances built up over decades of neglect 
and hostility. This was abundantly clear in the language used by the women to describe 
their motivations in coming out to publically support the men in 1971 and again in 1975. 
The participation of the women also illustrates the way in which the issues of industrial 
disease and workers' compensation had expanded the labour relations environment 
beyond the workplace and the union hall, and highlights direct and indirect links between 
the workplace, the community, and the home. By the 1970s, St. Lawrence had become a 
community wracked by bitterness and frustration, populated largely by widows and 
fatherless children, Alcan's 1977 decision to shut down its St. Lawrence mines was yet 
another reminder of the perils of single-industry dependence and of the power of capital to 
exploit and then abandon marginalized regions and people at its convenience. This power 
had been used repeatedly by both companies over the years, both to suppress labour 
unrest and to win the favour of the government. The fact that St. Lawrence workers and 
their supporters were willing to engage in sustained and adamant protest under this threat 
during the 1970s and on several occasions previous is indicative of their determination to 
risk their livelihoods if necessary to preserve their dignity. 
Given the evidence presented in this thesis, it must be concluded that the legacy of 
illness and death associated with the St. Lawrence mines resulted primarily from 
exploitation and neglect on the part of employers and the government, who consistently 
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shirked their moral and legal responsibility to protect the health and safety of St. Lawrence 
workers. Government repeatedly turned a blind eye to known health hazards, while 
operators took advantage of the government's abdication of its responsibility. One of the 
most striking aspects of the St. Lawrence case is the fact that nearly every reform that was 
instituted over the years in the areas of health and safety or workers' compensation came 
about as a result of struggle on the part of workers and others in the community. From 
the confirmation of silicosis among the workforce in the early 1950s, to the installation of 
ventilation systems in 1960, to improvements in compensation coverage in the 1970s, to 
name but a few instances, reform consistently came about against the objections and 
efforts of company and government forces. When reform did come, it was usually in the 
form of damage control rather than prevention. The recognition of dust-related diseases 
in the 1950s came more than a decade after workers had explicitly pointed out the danger 
resulting from dry-drilling in the 1930s and 1940s. The installation of ventilation systems 
in the 1960s came after decades oflobbying and complaints from the union about 
inadequate ventilation. Compensation reform in the 1970s came about when the 
government and the company wanted to polish their public image, for their own ends, and 
after workers and widows in the community had suffered decades of economic 
deprivation. In the end, workers, their families, and future generations were left to bear 
the physical, psychological, and financial scars of decades of abuse and negligence, while 
those who profited from this abominable legacy walked away unscathed. 
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Epilogue 
By the time Alcan left ~t. Lawrence in 1978, 78 miners had died from lung cancer 
alone, in addition to those who had died from other cancers, from silicosis and other 
pulmonary diseases, and from workplace accidents. Moreover, this figure represented 
only 36 per cent of the total group at risk-- a further 120 from the pre-1960 period alone 
were still at risk . 1 By 1988, the official number of lung cancer deaths among St. 
Lawrence miners had increased to 116, and 72 others had died from other types of cancer 
(including 22 from stomach cancer). The incidence of nearly every type of cancer was 
higher among St. Lawrence miners than among the general population ofNewfoundland. 
In addition, 28 miners had died from silicosis, pneumoconiosis and other obstructive lung 
diseases.2 
In response to years of repeated complaints and submissions, in 1991 the 
provincial government conducted a study of workers' compensation issues in St. 
Lawrence. At that time, there were 200 claimants in various categories in the community. 
The study found that many recipients, especially widows, were still living in substandard 
housing and on inadequate incomes. Benefits paid out under the Special Fund had not 
1Earle S. Wright and Cecil M. Couves, "Radiation Induced Lung Carcinoma of the 
Lung - the St. Lawrence Tragedy," Journal of Thoracic and Cardiovascular Surgery, 74, 
4 (October 1977), 495-8. 
2H. Morrison, "The Mortality Experience of a Group ofNewfoundland Fluorspar 
Miners Exposed to the Rn Progeny," Research report prepared for the Atomic Energy 
Control Board of Canada (1988), 45, 52. No systematic mortality studies have been 
carried out since then. 
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increased since its introduction in 1971. Many others, including widows and disabled 
miners, continued to be frustrated by an overly-bureaucratic and sometimes arbitrary 
compensation system. There were many cases, for example, where women had their 
compensation benefits terminated upon their hilsband's death for various technical 
reasons.3 
Following closure of the Newfluor mines, many people left St. Lawrence to seek 
employment elsewhere. After reaching 2,258 in 1976, by 1981 the population had 
decreased to 2,012, making St. Lawrence the only community on the Burin Peninsula and 
one of the very few in the province to experience a population decline in this period. 4 
A fish processing plant was established with the assistance of the provincial 
government in 1979. In 1982, however, the plant, which had employed between ISO and 
200 people, was shut down.5 In 1983, a British-based company known as Minworth, 
taking advantage of generous provincial government tax breaks and other concessions, 
established a subsidiary called St. Lawrence Fluorspar Inc. and began to reactivate the 
Blue Beach mine. Minworth went into St. Lawrence under a number of conditions 
3The Report is contained in "Brief by the St. Lawrence Town Council to the Statutory 
Review Committee of Workers' Compensation," 1996, unpublished document in 
possession of the author. 
4Statistics Canada, Selected Population, Dwelling, Household and Census Family 
Characteristics, 1981. 
5Federal Government Action Last Hope for St. Lawrence, " Evening Telegram, 28 
February 1983. 
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including no strikes, wages ranging from $9.00 to $10.00 an hour and only a local, 
tmaffiliated union. Four hundred men signed up for the 100 jobs available under these 
conditions. Depicting in stark terms the dilemma in which many found themselves, one of 
the applicants remarked that, "It's just as well to die with money as live without".6 This 
remark encapsulates the desperation of people who feel their lives are defined primarily by 
a choice between two evils, or for whom "choice" simply does not exist. It also illustrates 
how little had changed, in fundamental terms, in the decades since the 1930s, when the 
people of the community faced the same dilemma. The first shipment of fluorspar in ten 
years left St. Lawrence in 1987, but in 1991 Minworth declared bankruptcy and left town. 
Many of the approximately 1,500 people living in St. Lawrence in 2001 rely on 
seasonal employment at the fish plant, which processes mainly crab. The official 
unemployment rate in the community is around 25 per cent, and the annual household 
income is just over half the national average. 7 Recently, a local company, Burin Minerals 
Limited, has been doing exploratory work with an eye to reopening the fluorspar mines. 
Some people in St. Lawrence are dreaming of a return to the boom times; others are 
dreading a repeat of the nightmare. 
6Alan Story, "Old Wounds: Reopening the Mines ofSt. Lawrence," in People, 
Resources, and Power: Critical Perspectives on Underdevelopment and Primary 
Industries in Atlantic Canada (Fredericton: Acadiensis Press, 1987), 186. 
7Based on 1996 figures in Statistics Canada, Selected Population, Dwelling, 
Household and Census Family Characteristics, 1996. 
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Appendix A: Map of Newfoundland Showing St. Lawrence 
and Other Mining Sites · 
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Appendix B: Population of St. Lawrence, 1921-1986 
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Labrador. Volume III, July 1986. 
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Appendix C: Map Showing Location of St. Lawre.c:e Mines and Town 
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Appendix D: Average Hourly Wage for Corporation Employees, 1933-1961. 
Time Period Average Wage (per hour) 
1933-34 0.15 
1934-39 0.18 
1939-40 0.23 
1940-41 0.26 
1941-42 0.31* 
1942-44 0.46 
1944-46 0.67 
1946-51 0.60 
1951-53 0.72 
1953-55 1.22 
1955-61 1.26 
*Average of three different average wages paid that year. 
Source: GN 38, PANL (Files of the Commission of Government), various; Report of the 
St. Lawrence Trade Dispute Board, 1942, 30-7; Collective Agreements, SLMM. (All 
figures rounded to nearest cent.) 
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Appendix E: Annual Fluorspar Shipments by St. Lawrence Corporation, 
1933-1961 
Year Tons 
1933 2,128 
1934 2,352 
1935 4,480 
1936 11,675 
1937 12,575 
1938 13,163 
1939 14,576 
1940 14,000 
1941 unknown 
1942 17,676 
1943 23,084 
1944 18,984 
1945 22,873 
1946 20,272 
1947 17,315 
1948 23,356 
1949 37,317 
1950 15,306 
1951 43,363 
1952 47,966 
1953 49,147 
1954 74,815 
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Year Tons 
1955 100,424 
1956 111,062 
1957 45,000 
1958 3,000 
1959 4,500 
1960 7,500 
1961 4,500 
Source: G.F. Carr, The Industrial Minerals of Newfoundland, 52; and Report of the Royal 
Commission on St. Lawrence, 25. 
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Appendix F: Cross-Sectional View of Typical Underground St. Lawrence Mine 
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Appendix G: Average Hourly Wage for Newfluor Employees, 1941-1978 
Time Period Average Wage (per hour) 
1941-42 0.40 
1942-44 0.46 
1944-49 0.67 
1949-51 0.82 
1951-53 0.94 
1953-55 1.33 
1955-59 1.49 
1959-63 1.55 
1963-65 1.87 
1965-66 1.99 
1966-68 2.03 
1968-69 2.17 
1969-70 2.27 
1970-71 2.36 
1971-72 2.76 
1972-73 2.95 
1973-76 3.62 
Feb-Oct 197 6 4.52 
Oct 1976-1978 4.97 
Source: Report of the St. Lawrence Trade Dispute Board, 1942, 30-7; Collective 
Agreements, SLMM and AA. (All figures rounded to nearest cent.) 
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Appendix H: Annual Fluorspar Shipments by Newfluor, 1942-1977. 
Year Tons 
1942 17,413 
1943 57,232 
1944 33,658 
1945 22,369 
1946 --
1947 10,422 
1948 54,428 
1949 34,398 
1950 39,689 
1951 58,197 
1952 87,689 
1953 104,126 
1954 94,997 
1955 123,055 
1956 118,154 
1957 71,167 
1958 77,140 
1959 66,583 
1960 83,885 
1961 109,560 
1962 138,420 
1963 134,436 
1964 144,424 
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Year Tons 
1965 148,643 
1966 124,256 
1967 128,623 
1968 150,381 
1969 115,000 
1970 158,000 
1971 80,000 
1972 160,000 
1973 150,000 
1974 175,000 
1975 0 
1976 64,000 
1977 120,000 
Source: Figures for 1942-1968 are from Report of the Royal Commission on St. 
Lawrence, 25. Figures for 1969-76 are estimates from Canada, Department ofMines, 
Minerals Yearbook, 1969-1976. 
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Appendix 1: Shipments of Fluorspar to Canadian Consumers, 
from St. Lawrence and from Mexico, 1967-1978 
Shipments of Fluorspar to Csnadian Consumers, 1967-1978 
From St. Lawrence and From Mexico 
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' 
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1967 '68 '69 '70 '71 '72 '73 '74 '75 '76 '77 '78 
Year 
St. Lawrence --- Mexico 
Source: Canada Department of Mines and Technical Surveys, Mineral Resources 
Division, The Canadian Minerals Industry, 1967-1978. 
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